In 1973, Kissinger assured Mao that the U.S. would come to China’s assistance if attacked by Russia. [26] The groundwork was also laid for the technological and industrial build up of China, and therefore the establishment of the military strength that Mao had failed to achieve via the USSR. On July 6, Kissinger told Mao’s envoy: “I have talked to the French Foreign Minister about our interest in strengthening the PRC [People’s Republic of China]. We will do what we can to encourage our allies to speed up requests they receive from you on items for Chinese defence.

In particular you have asked for some Rolls-Royce technology. Under existing regulations we have to oppose this, but we have worked out a procedure with the British where they will go ahead anyway. We will take a formal position in opposition, but only that. Don’t be confused by what we do publicly…” [Emphasis added][27]

Kissinger’s last sentence is a key to understanding world history and politics [emphasis added]: “Don’t be confused by what we do publicly.” It is the manner in which high politics works behind the scenes, and has little to do with what is given out to the news media for public consumption.[28]In 1973, David Rockefeller went to China and waxed lyrical about the Mao regime, writing: “The social experiment in China under Chairman Mao’s leadership is one of the most important and successful in human history…”[29] David Rockefeller’s Standard Oil obtained exclusive rights to China’s oil exploration; his Chase Manhattan Bank to industrial finance.

The US-China relationship developed under the auspices of Rockefeller’s Trilateralist think tankers, such as National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, who dominated the Carter regime from the president down, when in 1978 the “normalization of relations” was finalized.

When Taiwan was dumped in 1978 and diplomatic relations were formally established with the PRC, Leonard Woodcock, an early member of the Trilateral Commission, became first U.S. Ambassador to China. Apart from the Rockefeller interests, other early globalist corporations whose chief executives were Trilateralists included: Coca Cola, given the soft drink monopoly (J Paul Austin, a backer of Carter), Boeing Aircraft (T A Wilson), and Mitsui Petrochemical (Yoshizo Ikeda). Japanese Trilateralists were also heavily involved with early dealings in China. Mitsubishi, whose chairman Chujiro Funjino was chairman of the Japanese Trilateral Commission Executive Committee, got the contract to modernize the Shanghai shipyards, the largest in China. Hitachi Ltd. (president Hirokichi Yoshiyama) got a $100,000,000 contract to supply equipment for the Paoshan steelworks and to expand the Hungchi Shipyards. Nippon Steel (Yoshihiro Inayama) was involved with constructing a giant steel plant near Shanghai.[30]

U.S.-Chinese Economies Symbiotic

The most compelling reason that confrontation between the USA and China is unlikely is that the economies of the two are symbiotic, which cannot be said in regard to the relationship between China and Russia or Russia and the USA.

Dr. Niall Ferguson stated: “Since April 2002 the central banks of China and Hong Kong have bought 96 billion dollars of U.S. government securities.” This means that, “the U.S. is reliant on the central bank of the People’s Republic of China for the financing of about 4% per year of its federal borrowing.” Ferguson mentions the “growing interdependence” between the economies of the USA and China:

Far from being strategic rivals, these two empires have the air of economic partners. The only question is which of the two is the more dependent, [sic] which, to be precise, stands to lose more in the event of a crisis in their amicable relationship, now over thirty years old….[31]

Ferguson also states: “Many commentators have noted the very muted, even quiescent reaction of China to recent American interventions. Fewer have appreciated the extent to which China now helps underwrite American power.[32]

In contrast, the relations between Russia and the USA, with increasing U.S. provocations in regard to Russia’s neighbors of the former Soviet bloc, seem to have set the USA and Russia on course towards another Cold War. If that means the demise of the unipolar world system that has emerged with the demise of the USSR, better the tensions of a new Cold War than the far gloomier outlook of a USA free to continue blustering about the world stage without restraint.

[1] Andrew Osborn and Peter Foster, “USSR planned nuclear attack on china in 1969,”, 13 May 2010, <>

[2] K R Bolton, “Russia and China: an approaching conflict?,” Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies, Vol. 34, No. 2, Summer 2009, p. 158.

[3] Ibid., p. 159.

[4] J Chang and J Halliday. Mao – the Unknown Story (London: Jonathon Cape, 2005), p. 572.

[5] H R Haldeman, The Ends of Power, (New York: New York Times Books, 1978).

[6] Andrew Osborn, op.cit.

[7] K R Bolton, op.cit., p. 159.

[8] J Chang, op.cit., p. 75. Chen had been head of the Chinese Communist Party.

[9] J. Chang, op.cit., p. 216.

[10] Ibid., Ch. “Saved by Washington,” 304-311.

[11] Ibid., p. 310.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Ibid., p. 368.

[14] K R Bolton, op.cit., p. 162.

[15] David Blair, “Why the restless Chinese and warming to Russia’s frozen east,”, 16 July 2009 <>

[16] K R Bolton, op.cit., 2009. Also, Bolton, “Water Wars,” World Affairs, India, Vol. 14, no. 1, Spring 2010.

[17] David Blair, op.cit.

[18] J Chang, op.cit. , p. 601.

[19] Richard Holbrooke, Asia Society Gala 50th anniversary dinner speeches <>

[20] Peter Grosse, Continuing The Inquiry: The Council on Foreign Relations from 1921 to 1996, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2006). Chapter: “’X’ Leads the Way.” The entire book can be read online at: Council on Foreign Relations: <>

[21] Peter Grosse, op.cit.

[22] Grosse mentions in a Note that: “Accompanying Kissinger on this momentous flight was his personal aide, Winston Lord, a former Foreign Service officer. Lord, … became president of the Council on Foreign Relations in 1977…”

[23] Ibid.

[24] However, a united Vietnam within the Soviet orbit was not in China’s interests.

[25] J. Chang, op.cit., pp. 604-605.

[26] Ibid., p. 612.

[27] Ibid. p. 613.

[28] K R Bolton, 2009, op.cit., p. 187.

[29] David Rockefeller, “From a China Traveller,” NY Times, Aug. 10, 1973.

[30] Antony Sutton, Trilaterals Over Washington, (Arizona: The August Corp., 1978), Vol. II, Chapter 6.

[31] Niall Ferguson, Colossus: The Rise & Fall of the American Empire (London: Allen Lane, 2004), p. 261.

[32] Ibid., p. 262.