…The quest for raw materials is the central goal of the country’s foreign policy. And virtually every natural resource imaginable is found just over the border. Here, beneath steppe and tundra, are large reserves of natural gas, oil, diamonds and gold, while millions of square miles of birch and pine provide immense supplies of timber. All this amounts to an astonishing combination: a densely packed country trying to keep its economy roaring ahead by laying its hands on natural resources, living alongside a largely empty region with huge mineral wealth and fewer inhabitants year on year. Russia and China might operate a tactical alliance, but there is already tension between them over the Far East. Moscow is wary of large numbers of Chinese settlers moving into this region, bringing timber and mining companies in their wake.
Blair’s contention that the present “accord” between Russia and China is a fragile marriage of convenience vis-à-vis the USA is in agreement with my contention that there could well be conflict between them – my scenario being based largely upon conflict over water resources in a region replete with water problems from South East Asia, to Tibet to Russia.
Blair’s view is that, “If Russia begins losing control over the Far East to a resurgent China, the Kremlin will have to seek America’s help. While Mr. Putin’s driving purpose is to show that Russia has the strength to stand alone, in the end America may be an indispensable ally to contain a rising China. Those steadily emptying forests in the Far East explain why.”
Pro-China Bias of U.S. Establishment
My view is quite the opposite, however, in regard to Blair’s belief that Russia could try and turn to China. Again, based on historical precedent spanning centuries, the USA will no more align itself with Russia against China than under the Nixon-Kissinger, or Carter-Trilateral regimes. Powerful interests in the USA have a long-term vested interest in China, and an almost innate distrust of Russia, whose relationship has not been cordial since the days of Abraham Lincoln, and the brief interregna under Trotsky-Lenin and the inherently doomed War World II alliance with Stalin against the Axis.
Like the Bolshevik Revolution during Wilson’s time, the US “foreign policy establishment’ was by no means hostile to a communist takeover of China. Despite Mao’s forlorn hope of Stalin’s comradely patronage, the “foreign policy establishment” and big business interests centred on the Rockefeller axis never gave up on China. While Gen. MacArthur was sacked in 1951 for wanting to act against China’s intervention in the Korean War, in 1953, the year of Stalin’s death, Mao sought an alliance with the USA. However the war made such an alliance impossible to sell to the American people.
It was 1970 when the long-awaited rapport with China could be broached publicly; the year following Nixon’s threat to retaliate should the USSR try and take out China’s nuclear programme. As is well remembered, the omnipresent Henry Kissinger, a lifelong protégé of the Rockefeller dynasty, paved the way. That dynasty had been eyeing China since the 1920s. In 1956, John D. Rockefeller founded the Asia Society to promote business relations with Asia. In paying tribute to Kissinger at the 50th anniversary banquet of the Asia Society, Richard Holbrooke stated:
To discuss the Rockefeller Legacy, not just John D. Rockefeller III, but the whole family, there really was only one person who could do it, and that was Henry Kissinger. Henry has been a friend of the Rockefeller family as you all know, Vice President Nelson Rockefeller, David Rockefeller, and the rest of the family, so many of whom are here tonight, for fifty years. He also has a very strong and deep connection to Asia. We all know that he was the main architect of the historic opening to China, which has resulted in so many positive achievements, and remains one of the most complicated, if not the most complicated, bilateral relationship we have in the world.
The formalities of this rapport had been worked on by the self-described “foreign policy establishment” of the Council on Foreign Relations since the early 1960s. Peter Grosse writes in the CFR sanctioned history of that institution:
The Council turned in earnest to the problem of communist China early in the 1960s. Various Council publications had started developing the idea of a ‘two-China’ policy—recognition of both the Nationalist government of Taiwan and the communist government on the mainland. This, Council authors suggested, might be the least bad policy direction. Professor A. Doak Barnett published a trail-blazing book for the Council in 1960, Communist China and Asia. A major Council study of relations between the United States and China commenced in 1964, the year China exploded its first nuclear bomb; the group met systematically for the next four years. ‘Contentment with the present stalemate in relations with the Chinese is not statesmanship,’ declared Robert Blum of the Asia Society, the first director of the project. ‘American impatience and the strong currents of political emotion often make it impossible to plan ahead to manage our policy in a persevering but flexible way.'”
Hence, the CFR was formulating a policy for the dumping of Taiwan and the recognition of Mao’s China in a typically Machiavellian manner. Grosse continues:
In 1969 the Council summed up the project under the title, The United States and China in World Affairs, [sic] publication came just as Richard Nixon, a longtime and outspoken foe of Chinese communism, became president of the United States. (Some months earlier, Nixon himself had chosen Foreign Affairs as his forum for exploring a fresh look at Asia in general, and China in particular.) Tilting at the long-prevailing freeze, the Council’s project defined a two-China policy with careful analysis. It advocated acquiescence in mainland Chinese membership in the United Nations, and argued that America must “abandon its effort to maintain the fiction that the Nationalist regime is the government of China.
Grosse concludes by proudly citing Kissinger and Cyrus Vance in their pivotal roles of opening up Red China, inaugurating a process that has made China a world power:
Kissinger, acting as Nixon’s national security adviser, embarked on a secret mission to Beijing in 1971, to make official, exploratory contact with the communist regime. Nixon himself followed in 1972. The delicate process of normalizing diplomatic relations between the United States and China was completed in 1978 by Kissinger’s successor as secretary of state, Cyrus R. Vance, a leading Council officer before and after his government service.”
The year that the USSR had approached the USA with this proposal for a final solution to the China problem was therefore the very year that the “foreign policy establishment” was busy preparing the way for a Sino-US accord. Given that this process was investigated on a formal basis from 1964, the year that Liu claims the USA had approached the USSR about dealing with China’s embryonic nuclear programme and had been rebuffed, if such an approach from the U.S. did occur, it hardly seams likely that it would have been sincere, and other motives must be considered.
Kissinger made his first trip to China in 1972 to plan a visit from Nixon. The Americans offered as a preliminary goodwill gesture the abandonment of Taiwan and official recognition of Red China, and offered to get China into the UN, as per the CFR blueprint. Additionally, the US would provide China with information on all its dealings with Russia. Kissinger also told the Chinese that the US would be withdrawing from South Vietnam, and that American troops would soon be pulled out of South Korea. China was not asked for any concessions.