A Need for Cohesive Counter-Narcotics Policy
[108] Id. at 39
[109] [UNODC], Addiction, Crime, and Insurgency: The Transnational Threat of Afghan Opium, 1 (United Nations Publications 2009)
[110] See, U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime [UNODC], 2008 World Drug Report (United Nations Publications 2008)
[111] Other things not discussed in this paper for their sheer depth, that are of equal importance, involve the intertwining of tribal groups throughout the trafficking routes that do not lack any sense of extremism like Al-Queda cells and the diversion of pharmaceutical opiates into the illicit realm The intertwining of tribal groups along the trafficking routes makes it more difficult for persecution of such persons, and increases the probability of attaining more common consensus among the groups that do not just involve profitability, but may also involve the common thoughts and/or acts of extremism. Please see Strategic Studies Institute, John A. Glaze, Opium and Afghanistan: Reassessing U.S. Counter-narcotics Strategy (Oct. 2007); and See Also, U.N. Office of Drugs and Crime [UNODC], Afghanistan’s Drug Industry Structure, Functioning, Dynamics, and Implications for Counter-Narcotics Policy 155-213 (2006)
[112] U.N. Office of Drugs and Crime [UNODC], 2010 World Drug Report 11-12 (United Nations Publications 2010) (“In 1998, a special session of the UN General Assembly decided to work towards the “elimination or significant reduction” of illicit drug production and abuse by 2008”) (Citing: United Nations General Assembly Special Session on the World Drug Problem (UNGASS), New York, 8-10 June, 1998 (A/S-20/4, chapter V, section A))
[113] Id. (“Gathered at the end of the 10-year period, Member States were not satisfied with the results … and it was decided that the effort would continue for another decade.” ) (Citing: High-level Segment to the 2009 United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs, Political Declaration and Plan of Action on International Cooperation towards an Integrated and Balanced Strategy to Counter the World Drug Problem, March 2009 (E/2009/28 – E/ CN.7/2009/12)).
[115] U.N. Economic and Social Council, Report on the fifty-second session, E/2009/28 E/CN.7/2009/12, Mar. 14, 2008 & Mar. 11-20, 2009 Political Declaration and Plan of Action on International Cooperation towards an Integrated and Balanced Strategy to Counter the World Drug Problem (2009)
[116] Id. at 38 (“Fully aware that the world drug problem remains a common and shared responsibility that requires effective and increased international cooperation and demands an integrated, multidisciplinary, mutually reinforcing and balanced paproaced to supply and demand reduction strategies.”)
[117] SEE 2008 WDR
[118] U.N. Office of Drugs and Crime [UNODC], 2010 World Drug Report 38 (United Nations Publications 2010)
[119] See, U.N. Office of Drugs and Crime [UNODC], 2010 World Drug Report 31 (United Nations Publications 2010); See Also, U.N. Office of Drugs and Crime [UNODC], 2009 World Drug Report 10 (United Nations Publications 2009) (depicting 98-08 Afghan, Myanmar, and Laos production of opiates which were only on a light decline in ‘00’, ‘05’, and ’08’ while all other years production increased. And with the exception of 2001 Taliban prohibition on cultivation, Afghanistan increased cultivation from 98-08 with only slight declines in ‘00’, ‘05’ and ‘08’ while Myanmar and Laos were static in cultivation form 98-08 but remained close to one another in regards to hectares cultivated. )
[120] U.N. Office of Drugs and Crime [UNODC], 2010 World Drug Report 35 (United Nations Publications 2010)
[121] Id. at 37.
[122] U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime [UNODC], 2010 Afghan Opium Survey, 16 (United Nations Publications 2010) (“Stockpiles of illicit opium now probably exceed 10,000 tons – enough to satisfy two years of world (heroin) addiction, or three years of medical (morphine) prescription.”)
[123] Int’l Narcotics Control Board [INCB], 2009 Precursors and Chemicals Frequently Used in the Illicit Manufacture of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 83 (United Nations Publications 2010) (The success of the Golden Triangle may be short lived considering the fact that the area is beginning to see a rise in poppy cultivation by 3.3% as compared with 2007.); See Also, Id. at 87. (“In Myanmar … the total area under illicit opium poppy cultivation increased by 3 per cent (to 28,500 ha) in 2008. The area under illicit opium poppy cultivation in 2008 also increased to 1,600 ha in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, to 288 ha in Thailand and to 99 ha in Viet Nam.”).
[124] SENLIS Council, Global Drug Policy: Building a New Framework, XV (Lisbon International Symposium on Global Drug Policy 2003) (citing: Tony White, former Chief of Supply Reduction and Law Enforcement at the United Nations Drug Control Programme (“An ill wind?” at 40-42)
Alternatively, you could take secret drugs lords like the CIA out of the picture by legalising and regulating the drugs trade. But why go for simple, logical solutions when you can undermine the world though an interconnected network of drugs, oil and weapons trade?
Not that simple. To license Afghanistan for the licit manufacture of opiate pharmaceuticals, or at least the licit cultivation of poppy for other countries to manufacture those pharmaceuticals, two things would need to be done. As of now the cultivation, manufacture, export, and import of licit opiates is regulated by the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB). Afghanistan would first have to show that there is a demand for licit opiates, and second, that it could supply that demand without creating an oversupply of licit opiates. The point being, the INCB wants to make sure the medical field is supplied, but does not want an oversupply to leak into the illicit field.
Today, the INCB does not find a need for licit opiates, and instead finds an oversupply of licit opiates. Furthermore, the leading importer of licit opiates, the U.S., is contractually obligated to purchase its opiates from seven specific countries. As of now, the main argument involves having Afghanistan gain entrance into that contractual agreement with the U.S., which will not happen. And the counter-argument for that, which is why it will not happen, is that Afghanistan lacks the security for such a business venture.
Although I am stating the facts for you, based on a licit business argument, my next article will focus on Afghanistan being licensed. What should be noted, which is the main point of the above article, is that even if Afghanistan were to be licensed, that temporary fix would not have any long-term negative effect on the actual heroin market as a whole.
Thank you for your comment.
Amen to that Neo.
For further clarification, the way the system works, the United Nations, under the INCB, would have to approve this business venture. Until the correct argument is made, Afghanistan will continue to provide for the illicit market, not the licit market. And, as stated above, even if Afghanistan were to provide for the licit market, do not underestimate the potential of the heroin market to adapt to such tactics. It will, and has. Its ability to maintain profitability keeps it afloat, and such a quick fix will only affect Afghanistan, not the global market as a hole.
*whole.
Seems the sure way to make opium less profitable as a commodity have an oversupply of it. I know corn is not profitable to grow without government subsidies. There would need to be aggressive media on the dangers of heroin and super easy access to treatment along with this strategy. Heroin is not going to be a mainstream drug no matter what, the stories of it’s destructiveness are pretty much out there. A bigger problem by far is prescription opiates.
Treating drug addiction as a social problem rather than a criminal one would effectively destroy the trade.
The U.S. could start by legalizing marijuana. And medicinal marijuana would be a good substitute in many/most cases for prescription opiates. And we could go from there.
Legalizing marijuana I am likely to favor however, there would be massive economic consequences. Mexico’s main oil field is slowing down and cheap corn via NAFTA put many Mexican farmer out of work. The money from pot is a significant part of the economy there. Plus all the small time traffickers and dealers would be out of luck and keep in mind these lucrative jobs keep opening up for new people as law in enforcement takes folks out of the work force.
I fear what commercialization would do to. Industries are already great at getting people to eat loads of sugar, fat and salt and drinking alcohol. Do we really want businesses to be trying to ever increase their sales of pot while denying the real and common side effects of weight gain from increased appetite and lack of motivation? Because I can see that happening.
I don’t really see any down side to legalizing marijuana. Legalizing it in Mexico, as former President Fox just suggested doing, would help eliminate a violent black market and open up legitimate jobs. Weight gain is a dietary and exercise problem, not caused by smoking pot. and I think it’s an absolute myth that smoking pot causes people to lose their motivation. A lot of lazy people smoke pot. Pot doesn’t make them that way.
Hi Liana
This is wonderfully written.
May I suggest you research the false war on drugs when it was decided
that the CIA would let this be taken over by the new agency called DEA?
Many agents were called in 24 hours to halt their operations.
Then research the so-called drug lord Khun Sa, who was the Golden Triangle
connection. Living larger than life in the Shan mountains with three goverment’s protection. Burma Thailand and USA.
When The DEA put the heat on Burma to start the eradication of the poppy.
They did so reluctantly. There was a promise of assistance, which never came
good agents being sent back to the states, and keeping the Burmese at bay
by carrot and stick threats. While most poppy was being eradicated in accord with the USA wishes, Along comes 9-11 the mother of all wishes to come true.
Now America could get the prices up to snuff and that road from the fields to the cities back to higher yield and profits. With gangsters and drug dealers
as elected officials, and the brother of Afghan president, appointed by the USA
as a bank thief, the new world order of drugs came into play.
While American men and woman died in Afghanistan protecting what?
The career of lawyers who keep the wheel greased in drug cases in courts
through out the USA, and the public companies were building more prisons
to feed small town America’s economy, from the kids dealing on the streets
of inner cities. We were told that the poor Muslim people did not know how
to farm food? Look this is the industrial jobs complex.
First profits are from sales., then there is the Rockerfeller, lead, Methadone
program for addicts, then the 25 years to life sentences for courts and prisons
and the broken families left behind. Prisons get built. farmers sell meat
guards are hired, and you keep the wheel going. Lawyers and courts
make the wheel go round too So there will never be an honest discussion
nor termination of drug in or out of America. By us being in Afghaniland
we have allowed the poppy to yields of 4000% Its a business on one side
its the defense contract, on the other its purported to be assisting in freedom
for the poor people of Afghanistan
Peter Dale Scott’s “American War Machine” is an excellent resource on these matters.
It’s difficult to exercise any control on the narcotics trade when those doing the controlling wear both the “black” and “white” hats. They’ve set this up like they’ve set up US elections: no matter which way you vote, we’ll be led to the same sorry place: the paths look different but the Destination is the same. Speaking of, someone at FPJ may want to take a gander at the Director of National Intelligence’s Destination 2025 papers. It’s the roadmap for our future: global governance.