A Need for Cohesive Counter-Narcotics Policy
The opium itself is a commodity that has the ability to produce another commodity: morphine. Morphine is an addictive substance that can be abused, but its purpose in the heroin market is not for personal use[17]. By acetylating morphine with precursor chemicals like acetic anhydride, the semisynthetic product known as heroin[18], a crude preparation of diamorphine, is obtained.[19] Heroin far surpasses opium and morphine in addictiveness, and in risk of use.[20] The predominant consumption of heroin is through injection, allowing for the possible spread of disease due to contaminated needles.[21] The strength of heroin makes its use more likely to result in death as compared to other illicit opiates.[22] It is the addictiveness, use of needles, and strength that make heroin the most dangerous. Yet, none of these risks are able to reduce heroin’s clientele. Its addictiveness keeps the clientele much more loyal than opium and morphine are able to, establishing a consistent demand.
While the cultivation of illicit poppy can lead to the production of opium and morphine, the combination of morphine and precursor chemicals, like acetic anhydride, can lead to the production of heroin, creating a market with at least four commodities: opium; morphine; acetic anhydride/other precursor chemicals; and heroin. Heroin, however, is the most profitable commodity within the illicit opiate market. The refining of opium into heroin can increase your profitability by 100 times, and, since carrying 100 kilograms of heroin is easier than carrying 1000 kilograms of opium, heroin is much more efficient and cost effective to traffic.[23] This also makes counternarcotic policies focused on supply reduction ineffective because the trade of other commodities involved can still occur.
All of the above makes the illicit cultivation of poppy, and illicit production of opiates, less of a risk, and more financially safe, than any licit crop in Afghanistan, as well as other similar participating regions. The heroin market’s numerous commodities allows for more players to be involved than the traditional Chinese-British Indian opium trade that occurred over a century ago.[24] This makes the heroin market much more of a tangled web than what was experienced with the opium market. And because of this, the illicit opiate market has a plethora of choices for replacing players unable to satisfy their roles within the market.
Furthermore, it is the intertwining of these commodities that allows those who participate in the illicit opiate market to take on more than one role simultaneously. By taking on more than one role, a player’s profitability can be sustained if the counternarcotic policy is not affecting all of its roles. This is because the player will simply increase its participation of the roles not being affected by that counternarcotic policy, and reduce/cease its participation in the role(s) that are being affected by that counternarcotic policy. Because of this, the illicit opiate market is able to adapt to counternarcotic policies only focused on affecting a portion of the market. This is more apparent with the heroin market’s past production site, the Golden Triangle, and its shift to today’s production site, Afghanistan.
B. Who’s responsible for selling the illicit opiate market’s commodities?
Today’s illicit opiate market players are numerous, diverse, flexible, and well connected. These players have gained wisdom from their predecessors throughout the illicit opiate market to take on different roles simultaneously, which is the key to their flexibility. “[T]here is no strict division between regions of supply and demand. The same caution is warranted in examining ‘transit’ regions, which very often are also regions of consumption and possibly add to supply.”[25] Although the previous section of this article was written to explain the actual commodities being exchanged in the market, and how they assist the market in maintaining its flexibility, this section is written to explain who has/is exchanging those commodities, and what role(s) those players have played or play within the market that controls the exchange. This section points out the ability of everyone involved in the illicit opiate market to shift positions instantly.
History is repetitive. Therefore, its ability to predict the future is great. The market’s past players are just as important as its current players. In other words, with an understanding of the market’s past, we can understand the market’s present, and hopefully foresee the market’s future. This is necessary for any counter-narcotics policy to have a long term negative effect on the market. If a counter-narcotics policy is implemented to only effect what is relevant to today, and not what may have been relevant yesterday, or what may be relevant tomorrow, then that counter-narcotics policy will fail in having any long term negative effects on the market.
“[T]oday’s international drug control system is rooted in efforts made a century ago to address the largest substance abuse problem the world has ever faced: the Chinese opium epidemic.”[26] While China was producing much of its opium, more than half of its production took place slightly to the north of Southeast Asia.[27] When China had successfully reduced production and consumption of opiates specifically within its territory, Turkey prohibited the planting, cultivation, and production of opium poppy.[28] Unfortunately, the counternarcotic policies implemented to eliminate the production sites of China and Turkey would not have long term effects on the market itself. Instead, the result would be a shift within the market to a new production site, the Golden Triangle. The result would also be an unaccounted for problem: heroin. The Golden Triangle would become the main producer of illicit opiates for two decades after that shift, maintaining the market’s profitability, and expanding the market’s production line.[29]
During the stronghold of the Golden Triangle, Pakistan and Afghanistan, also known as the Golden Crescent, would begin cultivating illicit opiates as well.[30] Although the Chinese and Turkish market had collapsed giving rise to the Southeast Asian market, the Southeast Asian market had begun collapsing as well.[31] The counter-narcotics policies being implemented at the time would not be implemented by all affected regions in a cohesive manner.[32] With few exceptions,[33] the counter-narcotics policies would be focused on reducing the supply, not the trafficking and/or demand, resulting in the shift of production sites only, and the expansion of demand sites, neither reducing the effect of, nor eliminating, the illicit opiate market.
The illicit opiate market would adapt to the loss of supply in Southeast Asia by shifting its production site to Southwest Asia, where the Golden Crescent[34] was located. As a result, Afghanistan would become the global producer of illicit opiates:
Success in controlling the supply of illicit opium in China in the middle of the 20th century, for example, displaced the problem to the Golden Triangle. Later successes in Thailand displaced the problem to Myanmar. A similar process unfolded in South West Asia from the 1970s onward.[35]
And, as had happened before with China, Turkey, and now the Golden Triangle, the market would adapt to the lack of supply in one area, by exploiting another area, Afghanistan.[36]
Today, with the loss of suppliers in the Golden Triangle,[37] and the flexibility of the illicit opiate market to change its major players, Afghanistan has transcended from poppy cultivator to the number one poppy cultivator, producer/supplier of opium, importer of precursor chemicals, manufacturer of morphine and heroin, and exporter of all of the above.[38] Globally, poppy cultivation has increased 22%, while total opium production has increased by 78%.[39] At the point of extending the member state’s deadline to reduce global supply and demand ,[40] Afghanistan had produced an astonishing 150% more opium in 2009 than it did in 1998.[41] Furthermore, neighboring countries of Afghanistan began to see an increase in participation with the illicit opiate market, and an increase in opiate use, thereby expanding the global demand from 1998 to 2007.[42]
As a result of the illicit opiate market’s shift between suppliers, Afghanistan has taken the lead in production of illicit opiates. And because counternarcotic policies have been focused on reducing the Afghan opiate supply through eradication,[43] Afghans have shifted their cultivation sites to southern regions less regulated by governmental control.[44] The ineffectiveness of supply driven policies is obvious considering the fact that Afghanistan has cultivated at least 104,000 ha a year since 2004 with such policies.[45] Afghanistan has also been at least 70% responsible for the global illicit opium production each year since 2002.[46]
Although Afghanistan experienced some environmental hardships in 2010, it was still able to cultivate an astonishing 123,000ha.[47] One of those hardships was a disease that spread throughout the poppy fields in the major growing areas after flowering in the spring, which maintained the cultivation levels, but lowered the production of opium by 48% because it was too late to plant another crop in the diseased one’s place.[48] However, because the demand would not be affected by this disease, the market was able to adapt to the loss of supply and maintain profitability by increasing the farm-gate price 164%.[49]
This increase in price was the market’s response to the drastic reduction of opium production due to environmental challenges and not counternarcotic policies.[50] Because the demand for illicit opiates was stable, but production in Afghanistan had dropped significantly, and no other region was able to take Afghanistan’s place in supplying that demand, the Afghan market sustained its profitability by adjusting the price of this limited supply. This increase in farm-gate price also occurred when the Taliban prohibited the cultivation of poppy, but not the export of its opium, because again, the supply was limited but not the demand.[51]
Alternatively, you could take secret drugs lords like the CIA out of the picture by legalising and regulating the drugs trade. But why go for simple, logical solutions when you can undermine the world though an interconnected network of drugs, oil and weapons trade?
Not that simple. To license Afghanistan for the licit manufacture of opiate pharmaceuticals, or at least the licit cultivation of poppy for other countries to manufacture those pharmaceuticals, two things would need to be done. As of now the cultivation, manufacture, export, and import of licit opiates is regulated by the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB). Afghanistan would first have to show that there is a demand for licit opiates, and second, that it could supply that demand without creating an oversupply of licit opiates. The point being, the INCB wants to make sure the medical field is supplied, but does not want an oversupply to leak into the illicit field.
Today, the INCB does not find a need for licit opiates, and instead finds an oversupply of licit opiates. Furthermore, the leading importer of licit opiates, the U.S., is contractually obligated to purchase its opiates from seven specific countries. As of now, the main argument involves having Afghanistan gain entrance into that contractual agreement with the U.S., which will not happen. And the counter-argument for that, which is why it will not happen, is that Afghanistan lacks the security for such a business venture.
Although I am stating the facts for you, based on a licit business argument, my next article will focus on Afghanistan being licensed. What should be noted, which is the main point of the above article, is that even if Afghanistan were to be licensed, that temporary fix would not have any long-term negative effect on the actual heroin market as a whole.
Thank you for your comment.
Amen to that Neo.
For further clarification, the way the system works, the United Nations, under the INCB, would have to approve this business venture. Until the correct argument is made, Afghanistan will continue to provide for the illicit market, not the licit market. And, as stated above, even if Afghanistan were to provide for the licit market, do not underestimate the potential of the heroin market to adapt to such tactics. It will, and has. Its ability to maintain profitability keeps it afloat, and such a quick fix will only affect Afghanistan, not the global market as a hole.
*whole.
Seems the sure way to make opium less profitable as a commodity have an oversupply of it. I know corn is not profitable to grow without government subsidies. There would need to be aggressive media on the dangers of heroin and super easy access to treatment along with this strategy. Heroin is not going to be a mainstream drug no matter what, the stories of it’s destructiveness are pretty much out there. A bigger problem by far is prescription opiates.
Treating drug addiction as a social problem rather than a criminal one would effectively destroy the trade.
The U.S. could start by legalizing marijuana. And medicinal marijuana would be a good substitute in many/most cases for prescription opiates. And we could go from there.
Legalizing marijuana I am likely to favor however, there would be massive economic consequences. Mexico’s main oil field is slowing down and cheap corn via NAFTA put many Mexican farmer out of work. The money from pot is a significant part of the economy there. Plus all the small time traffickers and dealers would be out of luck and keep in mind these lucrative jobs keep opening up for new people as law in enforcement takes folks out of the work force.
I fear what commercialization would do to. Industries are already great at getting people to eat loads of sugar, fat and salt and drinking alcohol. Do we really want businesses to be trying to ever increase their sales of pot while denying the real and common side effects of weight gain from increased appetite and lack of motivation? Because I can see that happening.
I don’t really see any down side to legalizing marijuana. Legalizing it in Mexico, as former President Fox just suggested doing, would help eliminate a violent black market and open up legitimate jobs. Weight gain is a dietary and exercise problem, not caused by smoking pot. and I think it’s an absolute myth that smoking pot causes people to lose their motivation. A lot of lazy people smoke pot. Pot doesn’t make them that way.
Hi Liana
This is wonderfully written.
May I suggest you research the false war on drugs when it was decided
that the CIA would let this be taken over by the new agency called DEA?
Many agents were called in 24 hours to halt their operations.
Then research the so-called drug lord Khun Sa, who was the Golden Triangle
connection. Living larger than life in the Shan mountains with three goverment’s protection. Burma Thailand and USA.
When The DEA put the heat on Burma to start the eradication of the poppy.
They did so reluctantly. There was a promise of assistance, which never came
good agents being sent back to the states, and keeping the Burmese at bay
by carrot and stick threats. While most poppy was being eradicated in accord with the USA wishes, Along comes 9-11 the mother of all wishes to come true.
Now America could get the prices up to snuff and that road from the fields to the cities back to higher yield and profits. With gangsters and drug dealers
as elected officials, and the brother of Afghan president, appointed by the USA
as a bank thief, the new world order of drugs came into play.
While American men and woman died in Afghanistan protecting what?
The career of lawyers who keep the wheel greased in drug cases in courts
through out the USA, and the public companies were building more prisons
to feed small town America’s economy, from the kids dealing on the streets
of inner cities. We were told that the poor Muslim people did not know how
to farm food? Look this is the industrial jobs complex.
First profits are from sales., then there is the Rockerfeller, lead, Methadone
program for addicts, then the 25 years to life sentences for courts and prisons
and the broken families left behind. Prisons get built. farmers sell meat
guards are hired, and you keep the wheel going. Lawyers and courts
make the wheel go round too So there will never be an honest discussion
nor termination of drug in or out of America. By us being in Afghaniland
we have allowed the poppy to yields of 4000% Its a business on one side
its the defense contract, on the other its purported to be assisting in freedom
for the poor people of Afghanistan
Peter Dale Scott’s “American War Machine” is an excellent resource on these matters.
It’s difficult to exercise any control on the narcotics trade when those doing the controlling wear both the “black” and “white” hats. They’ve set this up like they’ve set up US elections: no matter which way you vote, we’ll be led to the same sorry place: the paths look different but the Destination is the same. Speaking of, someone at FPJ may want to take a gander at the Director of National Intelligence’s Destination 2025 papers. It’s the roadmap for our future: global governance.