A Need for Cohesive Counter-Narcotics Policy

The opium itself is a commodity that has the ability to produce another commodity: morphine.  Morphine is an addictive substance that can be abused, but its purpose in the heroin market is not for personal use[17].  By acetylating morphine with precursor chemicals like acetic anhydride, the semisynthetic product known as heroin[18], a crude preparation of diamorphine, is obtained.[19] Heroin far surpasses opium and morphine in addictiveness, and in risk of use.[20] The predominant consumption of heroin is through injection, allowing for the possible spread of disease due to contaminated needles.[21] The strength of heroin makes its use more likely to result in death as compared to other illicit opiates.[22] It is the addictiveness, use of needles, and strength that make heroin the most dangerous.  Yet, none of these risks are able to reduce heroin’s clientele.  Its addictiveness keeps the clientele much more loyal than opium and morphine are able to, establishing a consistent demand.

While the cultivation of illicit poppy can lead to the production of opium and morphine, the combination of morphine and precursor chemicals, like acetic anhydride, can lead to the production of heroin, creating a market with at least four commodities: opium; morphine; acetic anhydride/other precursor chemicals; and heroin.  Heroin, however, is the most profitable commodity within the illicit opiate market.  The refining of opium into heroin can increase your profitability by 100 times, and, since carrying 100 kilograms of heroin is easier than carrying 1000 kilograms of opium, heroin is much more efficient and cost effective to traffic.[23] This also makes counternarcotic policies focused on supply reduction ineffective because the trade of other commodities involved can still occur.

All of the above makes the illicit cultivation of poppy, and illicit production of opiates, less of a risk, and more financially safe, than any licit crop in Afghanistan, as well as other similar participating regions.  The heroin market’s numerous commodities allows for more players to be involved than the traditional Chinese-British Indian opium trade that occurred over a century ago.[24] This makes the heroin market much more of a tangled web than what was experienced with the opium market.  And because of this, the illicit opiate market has a plethora of choices for replacing players unable to satisfy their roles within the market.

Furthermore, it is the intertwining of these commodities that allows those who participate in the illicit opiate market to take on more than one role simultaneously.  By taking on more than one role, a player’s profitability can be sustained if the counternarcotic policy is not affecting all of its roles.  This is because the player will simply increase its participation of the roles not being affected by that counternarcotic policy, and reduce/cease its participation in the role(s) that are being affected by that counternarcotic policy.  Because of this, the illicit opiate market is able to adapt to counternarcotic policies only focused on affecting a portion of the market.  This is more apparent with the heroin market’s past production site, the Golden Triangle, and its shift to today’s production site, Afghanistan.

B. Who’s responsible for selling the illicit opiate market’s commodities?

Today’s illicit opiate market players are numerous, diverse, flexible, and well connected.  These players have gained wisdom from their predecessors throughout the illicit opiate market to take on different roles simultaneously, which is the key to their flexibility.  “[T]here is no strict division between regions of supply and demand.  The same caution is warranted in examining ‘transit’ regions, which very often are also regions of consumption and possibly add to supply.”[25] Although the previous section of this article was written to explain the actual commodities being exchanged in the market, and how they assist the market in maintaining its flexibility, this section is written to explain who has/is exchanging those commodities, and what role(s) those players have played or play within the market that controls the exchange.  This section points out the ability of everyone involved in the illicit opiate market to shift positions instantly.

History is repetitive.  Therefore, its ability to predict the future is great.  The market’s past players are just as important as its current players.  In other words, with an understanding of the market’s past, we can understand the market’s present, and hopefully foresee the market’s future.  This is necessary for any counter-narcotics policy to have a long term negative effect on the market.  If a counter-narcotics policy is implemented to only effect what is relevant to today, and not what may have been relevant yesterday, or what may be relevant tomorrow, then that counter-narcotics policy will fail in having any long term negative effects on the market.

“[T]oday’s international drug control system is rooted in efforts made a century ago to address the largest substance abuse problem the world has ever faced: the Chinese opium epidemic.”[26] While China was producing much of its opium, more than half of its production took place slightly to the north of Southeast Asia.[27] When China had successfully reduced production and consumption of opiates specifically within its territory, Turkey prohibited the planting, cultivation, and production of opium poppy.[28] Unfortunately, the counternarcotic policies implemented to eliminate the production sites of China and Turkey would not have long term effects on the market itself.  Instead, the result would be a shift within the market to a new production site, the Golden Triangle.  The result would also be an unaccounted for problem: heroin.  The Golden Triangle would become the main producer of illicit opiates for two decades after that shift, maintaining the market’s profitability, and expanding the market’s production line.[29]

During the stronghold of the Golden Triangle, Pakistan and Afghanistan, also known as the Golden Crescent, would begin cultivating illicit opiates as well.[30] Although the Chinese and Turkish market had collapsed giving rise to the Southeast Asian market, the Southeast Asian market had begun collapsing as well.[31] The counter-narcotics policies being implemented at the time would not be implemented by all affected regions in a cohesive manner.[32] With few exceptions,[33] the counter-narcotics policies would be focused on reducing the supply, not the trafficking and/or demand, resulting in the shift of production sites only, and the expansion of demand sites, neither reducing the effect of, nor eliminating, the illicit opiate market.

The illicit opiate market would adapt to the loss of supply in Southeast Asia by shifting its production site to Southwest Asia, where the Golden Crescent[34] was located.  As a result, Afghanistan would become the global producer of illicit opiates:

Success in controlling the supply of illicit opium in China in the middle of the 20th century, for example, displaced the problem to the Golden Triangle.  Later successes in Thailand displaced the problem to Myanmar.  A similar process unfolded in South West Asia from the 1970s onward.[35]

And, as had happened before with China, Turkey, and now the Golden Triangle, the market would adapt to the lack of supply in one area, by exploiting another area, Afghanistan.[36]

Today, with the loss of suppliers in the Golden Triangle,[37] and the flexibility of the illicit opiate market to change its major players, Afghanistan has transcended from poppy cultivator to the number one poppy cultivator, producer/supplier of opium, importer of precursor chemicals, manufacturer of morphine and heroin, and exporter of all of the above.[38] Globally, poppy cultivation has increased 22%, while total opium production has increased by 78%.[39] At the point of extending the member state’s deadline to reduce global supply and demand ,[40] Afghanistan had produced an astonishing 150% more opium in 2009 than it did in 1998.[41] Furthermore, neighboring countries of Afghanistan began to see an increase in participation with the illicit opiate market, and an increase in opiate use, thereby expanding the global demand from 1998 to 2007.[42]

As a result of the illicit opiate market’s shift between suppliers, Afghanistan has taken the lead in production of illicit opiates.  And because counternarcotic policies have been focused on reducing the Afghan opiate supply through eradication,[43] Afghans have shifted their cultivation sites to southern regions less regulated by governmental control.[44] The ineffectiveness of supply driven policies is obvious considering the fact that Afghanistan has cultivated at least 104,000 ha a year since 2004 with such policies.[45] Afghanistan has also been at least 70% responsible for the global illicit opium production each year since 2002.[46]

Although Afghanistan experienced some environmental hardships in 2010, it was still able to cultivate an astonishing 123,000ha.[47] One of those hardships was a disease that spread throughout the poppy fields in the major growing areas after flowering in the spring, which maintained the cultivation levels, but lowered the production of opium by 48% because it was too late to plant another crop in the diseased one’s place.[48] However, because the demand would not be affected by this disease, the market was able to adapt to the loss of supply and maintain profitability by increasing the farm-gate price 164%.[49]

This increase in price was the market’s response to the drastic reduction of opium production due to environmental challenges and not counternarcotic policies.[50] Because the demand for illicit opiates was stable, but production in Afghanistan had dropped significantly, and no other region was able to take Afghanistan’s place in supplying that demand, the Afghan market sustained its profitability by adjusting the price of this limited supply.  This increase in farm-gate price also occurred when the Taliban prohibited the cultivation of poppy, but not the export of its opium, because again, the supply was limited but not the demand.[51]