A Need for Cohesive Counter-Narcotics Policy

As has been shown with the Golden Triangle and Afghanistan, when the supply/demand is attacked in only one area, only affecting one portion of the market, the market will flexibly adapt to the situation and shift the supply/demand to another location.  These shifts were due to the lack of cohesion among affected states to implement a counternarcotic policy that would prevent the market from exploiting regions not affected by that counternarcotic policy, but still affected by the market.  Profitability keeps any business afloat.  Whether or not the Golden Triangle or Afghanistan, or any other country, provides the supply is irrelevant: the supply and the demand will always come from somewhere as long as the profitability of providing them is there.

With so many countries playing similar roles within the market, the market has a plethora of choices to exploit if Afghanistan begins to drop its supply of illicit opiates.  According to the 2010 World Drug Report:

Turning to the Americas, the average amount of opium estimated to be produced in Latin America and Mexico was around 130 mt per year until 2006. In 2008, a reported 120% increase in opium production in Mexico made it the third biggest opium producing country after Myanmar with 325 mt potentially produced in 2008.  Some data also suggest that limited illicit cultivation takes place in other countries, such as Egypt and India.  At the time of writing, no information was available on the quantities cultivated and produced, which, in the case of Egypt, may be negligible. Algeria reports the eradication of approximately 80,000 opium poppy plants every year, but this production appears to be limited to supplying the local market.23 Finally, there is illicit cultivation in some CIS countries. Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and the

Russian Federation for example seem to be self-supplied for their own local market of poppy straw derivative solution (Kompot).[95]

Afghanistan was once like the above stated countries, self-supplying to the local market.  Although the countries mentioned in this section are considered to be the main producing, trafficking, and consuming destinations in the Afghan heroin market, with the fall of the Golden Triangle, “Afghan heroin has started to be trafficked to all regions of the world.”[96]

Because counternarcotic policies have only recently been dealing with the demand aspect of the market, although financially speaking supply reduction is the focus of most counternarcotic policies, demand in trafficking regions has increased over the past year, establishing a new area for the demand to come from if Europe were to reduce its demand.  If counternarcotic policies are to affect today’s supply of the illicit opiate market, as stated by the World Drug report, the illicit opiate market, specifically the heroin market, is ready and able to shift production sites if Afghanistan loses its place.  The question becomes: if counter-narcotics policies successfully reduce the market for today, who will satisfy the roles necessary to maintain the market’s profitability and keep it afloat tomorrow?  Because tomorrow’s players are just as important as today’s players in maintaining the illicit opiate market’s profitability.

III. Effects of the Market

Counternarcotic policies have been attempting to reduce or eliminate the spread of opiates since 1909.[97] Although no country has experienced the addiction rate of China,[98] many countries are experiencing things that were not present during the Chinese opium epidemic: heroin and HIV. [99] Heroin is much more addictive than opium, at times injected with contaminated needles leading to the spread of HIV, and able to result in death much quicker than opium.

Although the 2008 World Drug Report claims that the International Drug Control System has improved the situation over the past hundred years,[100] the reality is that what we are comparing to a hundred years ago is not comparable.  The substances are different.  Opium use is really limited to five countries.[101] The opiate business has expanded its line of products.  And one of those products, heroin, is used in all seven continents, far surpassing the five countries that use opium.

The addictiveness of these new products has caused the demand to be a much more loyal clientele than what was experienced during the Chinese opium epidemic.  This makes it much more difficult to eliminate, or at least significantly reduce, the demand.  Iran, India, USA, and Canada, along with other countries have dramatically increased in opiate use as compared to the dramatic decrease of opiate use in all of China and Southeast Asian countries.[102] Furthermore, as discussed above, the added products to this business inevitably result in an increase of participants intertwining the involvement of more states than ever before.

The purpose of this section is to highlight the extreme severity of today’s situation by giving statistical information behind the grave consequences of not limiting the stronghold that the heroin market has on our society.  Other than profitability, the effects of this market involve the spread of addiction, disease, and death.  The most vulnerable have been the trafficking countries which have all shown increasing levels of HIV cases and deaths as a result of the Afghan heroin trade.  The World Health Organization’s 2010 Aids report specified that in Eastern Europe and Central Asia persons who inject drugs have high HIV transmission rates that have almost tripled since 2000.[103] In fact, of the 1.8 million people who inject drugs in the Russian Federation, it is estimated that more than one third of them are living with HIV.[104] The Ukraine alone has an estimated 39%-50% of its people that inject drugs living with HIV.[105] In Central Asia, “the total number of officially registered HIV cases … has increased 19-fold in the last decade: from 1,641 cases in 2000 to 30,993 cases in late 2008.”[106]

All in all, “[a]n estimated 15.9 million [11.0 million–21.2 million] people inject drugs worldwide; of these, nearly 20%, an estimated 3 million [500 000–5.5 million] are living with HIV.”[107] However, the spread of HIV is not limited to the sharing of needles: “an estimated 35% of women living with HIV probably acquired HIV through injecting drug use, while an additional 50% were probably infected by partners who inject drugs.”[108] The Executive Director of the Afghanistan Insurgency and Crime Report said it best:

Every year, more people die from Afghan opium than any other drug in the world: perhaps 100,000 globally. The number of people who die of heroin overdoses in NATO countries per year (above 10,000) is five times higher than the total number of NATO troops killed in Afghanistan in the past 8 years, namely since the beginning of military operations there in 2001. The number of addicts in the Russian Federation has multiplied by 10 during the past 10 years, and they now consume a staggering 75-80 tons/year of Afghan heroin.  More Russian people die from drugs per year (at present 30,000-40,000, according to government estimates) than the total number of Red Army soldiers killed during the Soviet invasion and the ensuing 7-year Afghan campaign.  Despite major efforts to cope with drug trafficking, the Islamic Republic of Iran is swamped by Afghan opium: with its estimated 1 million opiate users, Iran faces one of the world’s most serious opiates addiction problem.   Central Asia, once only a conduit for Afghan heroin, is now a major consumer- a habit that is resulting in an HIV epidemic caused by injecting drug use.[109]

For hundreds, if not thousands of years,[110] opiates have caused the spread of addiction, disease, and death.[111] The countries involved in today’s illicit opiate market tend to be underdeveloped, impoverished, war torn countries in need of licit substances to exploit.  The continuation of these countries’ addiction with illicit opiates will never allow for the elimination, or at least the reduction, of the illicit opiate market, thereby continuing the spread of addiction, disease, and death, and maintaining the market’s profitability, the key to the market’s success.

IV. Conclusion

In 1998 the United Nations’ member states set a goal to “eliminate or significantly reduce” global drug supply and demand over the following 10 years.[112] In 2008, at the end of those 10 years, Member States were still “gravely concerned about the growing threat posed by the world drug problem;”[113] and rightfully so.  The United Nations’ main concern, the illicit opiate market, had not been significantly reduced, let alone eliminated.[114]

Traditionally, counternarcotic policies have not been implemented by all affected states in a cohesive manner.  Because of this, the market has been able to adapt to these counternarcotic policies by shifting its production area to a region that is not being affected by those counternarcotic policies.  Therefore, the cultivation and production of opiates has consistently shifted from one producing region to another.  Furthermore, the counternarcotic policies have traditionally been focused on supply reduction only, and not on reducing the entire market as a whole.  The market’s demand, and ability to trade with that demand, has stayed consistent.  And because of this, the profitability of the market has been sustained by either an increase in price due to a loss of supply and not demand, or by shifting production areas to avoid the effect of counternarcotic policies.