A Need for Cohesive Counter-Narcotics Policy

Afghanistan’s ability to manufacture heroin is what begins to intertwine Afghanistan with other states involved in the illicit trade of opiates and/or their use/consumption.  As stated above, to refine opium into heroin necessary precursor chemicals are needed.  These precursor chemicals are not licitly manufactured or used in Afghanistan.[52] But they are licitly manufactured and/or used in other countries for the manufacture of pharmaceuticals.[53] The manufacture, importation, exportation, and use of precursor chemicals are strictly controlled by the United Nations to avoid the diversion of such precursor chemicals into the illicit market.[54] However, there is obvious diversion of precursor chemicals into the illicit market.  The “UNODC estimates that 72% of the opium produced in Afghanistan [is] converted to heroin within the country, requiring 10,000 [tons] of chemicals including 1,000 [tons] of acetic anhydride.”[55]

The diversion of such chemicals into the illicit market is as essential to the sustainability of the market as the cultivation of poppy, production of opium, trafficking of commodities, and the demand, making it an essential component of any successful counternarcotic policy.  Even complete elimination of all poppy plants today would still not eliminate the reserved stocks of opium from past overproduction.  In other words, heroin would still be manufactured with the precursor chemicals and reserved opium, regardless of cultivation, maintaining the market’s profitability and buying it time to shift cultivation sites elsewhere.  Therefore, counternarcotic policies must be able to affect the market as a whole to avoid such adaptability, including the diversion of precursor chemicals.

With an understanding of who may be diverting these licit chemicals into the illicit opiate market, counternarcotic policies have the ability to be more effective in preventing such diversion.  But, who is sending Afghanistan the necessary chemicals to manufacture heroin?  Major opiate pharmaceutical manufacturing countries around Afghanistan are India, Turkey, France, and Spain.[56] Arguably, any of those countries could be providing the chemicals necessary for Afghan opium to be refined into heroin if they are experiencing diversion of their licit resources into the illicit market. The UNODC has noted, based on submitted seizure data, that “[t]he vast bulk of these precursor chemicals are imported from as far away as Western and Eastern Europe, Russia, China and the Gulf States.”[57] And, “Africa [has] emerged as a new target area for traffickers in search of acetic anhydride.”[58]

Because most of the heroin manufacturing facilities have been found in the South and Southwestern part of the country,[59] the ability for these chemicals prohibited in Afghanistan to pass its borders means that counternarcotic policies are still ineffectively focusing on a portion of the market, such as the supply of opium, instead of the entire market, such as the supply of these chemicals and the trading of such supply.  Regardless, once the heroin is manufactured, if directly done in Afghanistan, there are a few trading routes that can be used for the trafficking of Afghan heroin to consuming countries.  The two main routes have been noted as the Balkan Route[60] and the Northern Route (traditionally known as the Silk Route).[61][62]

The main countries involved in the exporting of Afghan heroin are Pakistan at 40%, the Islamic Republic of Iran at 30%, and Central Asian countries at 25%.[63] These countries are responsible for maintaining the market’s profitability by assisting Afghanistan with the manufacture, exportation, importation, and consumption of its commodities.  Because these countries have more of a partnership in the illicit opiate market due to their roles as cultivator, producer, manufacturer, importer, exporter, and consumer of opiates, any counternarcotic policy only implemented to affect Afghanistan will obviously only have an effect on Afghanistan, and not on the market as whole.

Understanding the numerous roles played by participating states today gives an understanding of the states’ capabilities for participating tomorrow, as well as the market’s capabilities for shifting roles when adjusting to any possible limitation on its profitability.  Therefore, the numerous roles played by Afghanistan’s partners today, may give hints to who will play what roles tomorrow.  These understandings are essential for any counter-narcotics policy to be effective in diminishing the entire market’s profitability over a longer period of time.

Pakistan simultaneously plays the roles of importer, exporter, manufacturer, and consumer within the illicit opiate market.  Its ability to traffic precursor chemicals from India and China to Afghanistan,[64] as well as consume Afghan opiates with an estimated demand of 547,000 heroin users, and 145,000 opium users,[65] and export the Afghan heroin to the global market,[66] makes Pakistan just as important in the illicit opiate market as Afghanistan.  With an “immediate proximity to heroin processing zones in Afghanistan, notably the adjoining provinces of Hilmand, Nimroz and Kandahar”[67] as well as its immediate proximity to the developing Northern route and the developed Balkan route, both of which traffic the processed Afghan heroin to major consuming markets in Europe, Pakistan’s success in exporting Afghan heroin can be attributed to its location.  In fact, the UNODC notes Pakistan as having more opiates trafficked through its borders from Afghanistan than any other country bordering Afghanistan.[68]

Similar to Pakistan, the Islamic Republic of Iran holds numerous roles in the illicit opiate market.  Iran, like Pakistan, is a major transit country that exports Afghan heroin along the Balkan Route by trafficking it to Turkey, the Balkan route’s “doorway” to the European Market.[69] Iran is also responsible for trafficking Afghan heroin through the Caucasus[70] rather than Turkey.  This is a relatively recent variant on the Balkan route labeled the Northern Balkan route.[71] Both the Balkan Route and the more recent Northern Balkan Route, lead to the largest consumer of Afghan heroin from Iran, the European market.

The more traditional Balkan Route technically begins with Iran and then Turkey.[72] However, some reports will note Turkey as the starting point.[73] Furthermore, as discussed above, heroin exported to Pakistan is also exported to Iran making it a starting point for the Balkan Route as well.[74] Either way, once the Afghan heroin enters Turkey from Iran, it is then trafficked to Southeast European countries.[75] The main consuming countries are “namely the United Kingdom (some 19mt), Italy (about 18 mt), France (an estimated 10 mt) and Germany (approximately 7 mt).”[76]

The other route coming from Afghanistan is the Northern Route.  This route travels from Afghanistan, through the Central Asian Republics[77] towards the Russian Federation.[78] The main Central Asian country within the Northern Route is Kazakhstan.  In fact, according to the UNODC, Kazakhstan holds the same importance with the Northern Route as Turkey holds with the Balkan route because Kazakhstan is also considered a “doorway” to a major consuming market; the Russian Federation.[79]

The Russian Federation, as most countries within the market, plays numerous roles simultaneously.[80] Originally only a transit country for Afghan opiates to Eastern Europe,[81] today the Russian Federation is a major consumer as well with an estimated 1.5-1.8 million users[82]:

Between 1998 and 1999, the number of Russian users increased 400 percent, absorbing much of the product that used to go on to other markets.  As wealth in Russia (i.e., Moscow and St. Petersburg) rose over the past decade, the Russian consumer market helped absorb even more of the product flow.[83]

Also, as noted above, the UNODC claims that precursor chemicals supplied to Afghanistan for the manufacture of heroin are originating from the Russian Federation.[84]

The Central Asian countries[85] have also followed in the footsteps of the Russian Federation, transitioning from trafficker, to trafficker, exporter of precursor chemicals, and consumer.[86] Today the Russian market is the second major consumer of Afghan heroin consuming an estimated 70 mt, while the Central Asian countries consume an estimated 11 mt.[87] Because opium (not refined into morphine or heroin) is also consumed by the Central Asian countries and the Russian Federation, it is estimated that “approximately 780-800 mt of opiates are trafficked annually along this route.”[88]

China also plays more than one role within the market.  As discussed above, China is an exporter of precursor chemicals to Afghanistan[89] and consumer of Afghan heroin.  Although China was once a consumer of opiates from the Golden Triangle, “[f]ollowing the sharp decrease [of] opium production in Myanmar, Afghan heroin started being shipped to China.”[90] Even with Myanmar’s current production of 330 mt of opium[91], the Golden Triangle’s heroin supply has not been sufficient enough to meet all of the Chinese demand[92] since after 2002.[93] Furthermore, the heroin trafficked into China that is not consumed there is sent to Australia.[94] As the Chinese demand began to look at Afghanistan’s supply after its inability to access sufficient supply from the Golden Triangle, Australia, part of the oceanic region and also traditionally a consumer of opiates from the Golden Triangle, began looking to Afghanistan as well.

The market today is diverse, multifaceted, flexible, and resilient.  Afghanistan will continue to be the major cultivator of poppy, producer of illicit opiates, importer of precursor chemicals, manufacture of heroin, and exporter of illicit opiates for the global demand spreading addiction, disease, and death thanks to its ideal location.  Pakistan and Iran will continue to be business partners in the spread of Afghan heroin.  Countries such as Turkey, and those in the Caucasus, along the Balkan route, and in Central Asia, will all continue their role as trafficker and simultaneously take on the role of consumer as well, allowing the demand of illicit opiates to increase, or at least maintain stability.