Also, the perceived threat to India seemed only worse with the fact that India and Pakistan had fought each other in the past. If there had been no armed conflicts in the past, the present military aid procurement might not be as relevant to Indian security. However, “if two countries have actually been conducting military operations against each other in the past and are in a state of truce, military aid to either of them is an act unfriendly to the other and not in keeping with neutrality.”[125] But as Pakistan claimed to need military aid, it could naturally not accept non-alignment. In this light, the aggravation of tensions in Kashmir was inevitable.

Nehru hinted that Pakistan’s Prime Minister Mohammad Ali would indeed use this aid to deal with the Kashmir problem.[126] According to Nehru, “[t]his is an indication of the way his mind works and how he thinks this military aid might be utilized (sic). Military aid is only utilized (sic) in war or in a threat of war.”[127] This statement is significant for several reasons. First, Mohammad Ali had already claimed that “the decision to obtain military aid from the United States is not aimed against any country whatsoever,”[128] although by using America’s military aid in Kashmir Pakistan would obviously be using it against India (even though some Pakistanis believed that Kashmir ought to have belonged to Pakistan to begin with). Second, with Nehru’s belief that Pakistan had no reason to be defensive, the United States’ military aid to Pakistan was ostensibly being used to prepare for a war with India over Kashmir. Third, it proved Nehru’s point (and the point of U.S. Ambassador to India, Chester Bowles) that foreign military involvement in South Asian affairs would aggravate regional tensions.

F. Nehru on Kashmir

Let us take a look at Nehru’s own interest in Kashmir. Without emphasizing this point, we should be aware that Nehru was a Kashmiri. He details his fascination with that which he believes to be traditionally Indian. In writing to Gandhi, he romanticizes India’s majestic mountains:

The sight of this outline against the sky (the Himalayas), and now their summits and sides are covered with fresh snow, have meant a great deal to me. They seem to rouse in me ancient memories of the long age when perhaps my ancestors wandered about the mountains of Kashmir and played in their snow and glaciers.[129]

In a broadcast from New Delhi on November 2, 1947, Nehru defended India’s handling of the Kashmir dispute by first narrating the dispute itself. Once again romanticizing Kashmir, he stated that the Pakistani “raiders from outside, well-armed and well-equipped … have sacked and looted the towns and villages and put many of the inhabitants to the sword. Frightfulness descended upon this lovely and peaceful country and the beautiful city of Srinagar was on the verge of destruction.”[130]

In this way, Nehru appeared to be the defender of Kashmir, at a time when Kashmir indeed needed articulate leaders. And Nehru’s defense of all Kashmiris fit well with India’s secularism. Upon realizing that communal violence in the form of raids across the Pakistan border in the province of Jammu resulted in the killing of Muslims, Nehru articulated that India has in the past “condemn[ed] evil whoever might have committed it,”[131] thus condemning in this instance the Hindus and Sikhs that might have been responsible. This attitude is a testament to Gandhi’s lasting legacy and of India’s brand of secularism – the ability to take sides on the basis of nothing except Truth, even when condemning one’s own actions.

G. The Accession of Kashmir

As raiders entered Kashmir on October 24, 1947, Kashmir State forces could not stop them and people of all religious backgrounds fled. In reaction, Kashmir requested both accession to and military help from India. According to Nehru, the request for accession came from both the Maharaja’s Government as well as from Sheikh Abdullah,[132] the popular leader of most Kashmiris. As Maharaja of Kashmir Hari Singh wrote in October 27, 1947, “[I]n the exercise of my sovereignty in and over [Jammu and Kashmir]…. I hereby declare that I accede to the Dominion of India.”[133] In requesting Lord Mountbatten’s approval of this, Hari Singh described the emergency state of affairs leading him “no option but to ask for help from the Indian Dominion” which “[n]aturally they cannot…[do] without my State acceding to the Dominion of India. I have accordingly decided to do so.”[134] Moreover, he would establish an interim government and “ask Sheikh Abdullah to carry the responsibilities in this emergency with [his] Prime Minister.” But why would Sheikh Abdullah collaborate with Hari Singh in the new government? Although Sheikh Abdullah had been sent to prison for his “Free Kashmir” activities against Hari Singh, perhaps the two were united in wanting to avoid the destruction of their shared homeland; in any case, as stated above, Hari Singh really felt he had no option.

Sheikh Abdullah, for his part, might have preferred the lesser of two evils – join India in the short-term to limit mayhem and carnage, and focus on Kashmiri independence in the long-term. He declared that he and the National Conference never believed in the two-nation theory based on religion, nor in communal hatred.[135] “We realized that Pakistan would not allow us any time, that we had either to suffer the fate of our kith and kin of Muzaffarabad, Baramula, Srinagar and other towns and villages, or to seek help from some outside authority….Under those circumstances, both the Maharaja and the people of Kashmir requested the Government of India to accept our accession.”[136] Moreover, Sheikh Abdullah did not feel that Pakistan’s subsequent insistence on a plebiscite was genuine, as it had shrugged off his Free Kashmir movement only years before. He pointed out that Pakistan had also rejected a conditional offer by the Kashmiri people to join Pakistan and then hold a plebiscite, on the basis that Pakistan felt that it could easily conquer the entire state of Jammu and Kashmir without the need to agree to this. On the contrary, Abdullah found Nehru’s conditional acceptance to be telling, as India did not need to offer Kashmir this concession in light of the latter’s exigent circumstances.[137]

Nehru’s response was typical of his Realism and idealism (accept a struggle for power regionally, but revert to secularism domestically): “We decided to accept this accession … but we made a condition that the accession would have to be considered by the people of Kashmir later when peace and order were established. We were anxious not to finalize (sic) anything in a moment of crisis and without the fullest opportunity being given to the people of Kashmir to have their say. It was for them ultimately to decide.”[138] In accepting Kashmir, he behaved in a Realist manner (allowing individual states to affect the balance of power), while in calling for a plebiscite he showed his idealist belief in the right of people to elect their own representatives. Ultimately, India never accepted a UN plebiscite because such “peace and order” was never established, i.e., the invaders never left. To wit, UN Resolution 47 recommended that in order to implement a plebiscite, Pakistan should withdraw all tribesmen and nationals and India should keep only minimal troops needed to maintain civil order.[139] However, Pakistan ignored this, continued fighting and retained control of the region it had gained. On this basis, India thereafter refused to allow the plebiscite.[140] This stance is consistent with the prevailing understanding: in accepting Hari Singh’s accession to India, Lord Mountbatten clarified that “it is my Government’s wish that, as soon as law and order have been restored in Kashmir and its soil cleared of the invader, the question of the State’s accession should be settled by a reference to the people (emphasis added).”[141]

This compromise between idealism and Realism of the Indian accession is also codified in the Indian Constitution:

Article 370(1)(b) the power of Parliament to make laws for the said State shall be limited to (i) those matters in the Union List and the Concurrent List which … are declared by the President to correspond to matters specified in the Instrument of Accession governing the matters with respect to which the Dominion Legislature may make laws for that State; and (ii) such other matters in the said List as … the President may by order specify.[142]

These clauses are interesting in that they limit the domain of the Indian central government, while nonetheless legitimizing Indian control.

What exactly did Nehru mean by a call to self-determination? Apparently, he saw a decision by the Kashmiri people as providing the official recognition required by the international community. This is perhaps the main incentive for his insistence that a referendum be held under United Nations supervision. Under UN auspices, the entire world would see that India was the accepted leader in regional affairs and Indian secularism the accepted interpretation of South Asian history.

Nehru’s unique role is understood by looking at his view on Indian interests with regard to Kashmir in the region:

We were, of course, vitally interested in the decision that the State would take. Kashmir, because of her geographical position, with her frontiers with three countries, namely, the Soviet Union, China and Afghanistan, is intimately connected with the security and international contacts of India. Economically also, Kashmir is intimately related with India. The caravan trade routes from Central Asia to India pass through Kashmir State.”[143]

However, when the Maharaja of Kashmir Hari Singh, backed by Sheikh Abdullah, actually offered Kashmir to India unconditionally, Nehru showed his commitment to a combination of idealism and Realism. He was mainly responsible for insisting that the accession of Kashmir to India would be conditional in nature; i.e., he would accept Kashmir now but would require a vote by Kashmiris on the fate of their state once law and order was restored and the invader had left. Nehru argued that the people of Kashmir should decide their own future without duress. It is this conditional character of the accession that Pakistan has always emphasized at the U.N. and which has been India’s main weakness in its claim to Kashmir.[144] However, as Bandyopahyaya writes, the Realism of Nehru’s approach is that the Kashmiris’ wishes had been already ascertained because Sheikh Abdullah, President of the Kashmir National Conference and the undisputed leader of the Kashmir Muslims, ultimately decided to accede it to India. The decision was hasty only because of the Pakistani aggression.[145] If we accept this argument, then no referendum is needed. The idealist side of Nehru’s approach can be seen in his words in the Constituent Assembly in March 1948: “Our making a reference on this issue to the Security Council of the United Nations was an act of faith, because we believe in the progressive realization of a world order and a world government.”[146] He was, however, confident that Sheikh Abdullah’s decision to accede to India indicated that the Kashmiri people had already decided in favor of a future in the Indian Union because he was the popular leader. It would seem that Nehru’s own unique role was involved in determining Kashmir’s status at the time of accession as well as since that time.

H. Further Strife in Kashmir

With no administration left in the Kashmir capital of Srinagar, Sheikh Abdullah symbolically combined ranks with Muslim, Hindu, and Sikh volunteers to maintain order against “the ruthless invader who was destroying their country and trying to compel them by terrorism to join Pakistan.”[147] Per Abdullah, “I had thought all along that the world had got rid of Hitlers and Goebbels, but, from what has happened and what is happening in my poor country, I am convinced that they have only transmigrated their souls into Pakistan…” With this background, the decision by the Maharaja of Kashmir to make Sheikh Abdullah the administration leader at this point symbolized “the struggle in Kashmir [as] a struggle of the people of Kashmir under popular leadership against the invader. Our troops are there to help in this struggle, and as soon as Kashmir is free from the invader, our troops will have no further necessity to remain there and the fate of Kashmir will be left in the hands of the people of Kashmir.”[148]

In late October 1947, people from Pakistan invaded Kashmir. As Nehru points out, it was clear at that time that this invasion was “not only encouraged and patronized but actively supported by the Pakistan Government.”[149] It was later hinted that the Pakistani Army actively participated as well. However, the Pakistani Government at first gainsaid it “aggressively, loudly, and persistently”[150] for nearly ten months. On the basis of this, the Pakistani admission to this later on indicates a record of deception. According to Nehru, all proceedings addressed to the UN Security Council regarding Kashmiri sovereignty “should be viewed from that aspect.”[151] Indeed, any discussion of a conflict in Kashmir should be based on “the fundamental factor … [of] the aggression of Pakistan on Indian Union territory; secondly, the denial of the fact of that aggression; thirdly, the present admission of that fact.”[152]

I. The Pakistani Reaction

On the other side of the ideological debate, America and Pakistan have used Realist approaches to explain shows of force through military action. As Paul Viotti summarizes in International Relations Theory, “[p]ower … is a key concept. To the Realist, military security or strategic issues are sometimes referred to as high politics, whereas economic and social issues are viewed by many of them as the more mundane, less important low politics.”[153] These definitions are important in understanding how America and Pakistan viewed India’s emphasis on secularism, an “economic and social”, as opposed to “strategic,” issue.

Understandably, Pakistan could not accept Indian secularism because its chief proponent was Mahatma Gandhi, a Hindu. The new Islamic nation tried to polarize herself from a Hindu India in order to ensure that the world saw Pakistan as a haven for Muslims from repressive Hindus. In Liaquat Ali Khan’s speech to the U.S. Senate on May 4, 1950, he stated that “Pakistan was founded by the indomitable will of a hundred million Muslims who felt that they were a nation too numerous and too distinct to be relegated forever to the unalterable position of a political minority.”[154] These Muslims were convinced that their already-poor economic position would likely worsen.[155] This is one reason that Pakistan sought alliances with the West, in defiance of Nehru’s urging of a nonaligned policy. With such backing, Pakistan could enforce its platform on the Kashmir issue, an issue that represented a boiling point for opposing beliefs.

In addition, Pakistan’s understanding of global policy was based on Realism. Nehru was a Realist regionally, but an idealist globally. Pakistan refused to accept his idealism globally, opting instead for a Realist approach. This is the source of one reason that Pakistani Prime Minister Mohammad Ali further attacked Nehru’s non-alignment model of global policy. Nehru recognized that the two superpowers’ blocs were balanced and that a weaker power that leads small nations could therefore be decisive in shifting the scales. “That is what Nehru wants. By holding the balance of power, he wants to dominate the two great power blocs.”[156] Therefore, another power that threatened India’s ability to lead smaller nations will weaken “Nehru’s bargaining position. . . . That is why he is against an agreement for military aid between America and Pakistan.”[157]

Historically, the superpowers have disliked India’s policy of nonalignment because for them it represents a “policy of standing up for the weak and the oppressed in various continents, [which is not] to the liking of the great Powers who directly or indirectly share in their exploitation.”[158] And the superpowers’ dissatisfaction with India means a window of opportunity for Pakistan.

Simply put, Nehru attempted to reunite the Subcontinent at least ideologically. By claiming nonalignment and secular policies for all of South Asia, the hope was that India and Pakistan would resolve their problems without outside interference and through an application of Nehru’s own brand of realism and idealism (as is evidenced in his handling of problems in Kashmir and Kashmir’s accession to India). Pakistan could not accept this without being wary of Indian attempts to reunite the Subcontinent territorially as well as symbolically. The constant fear of Hindu reprisals and worldwide recognition of India as the major power in the Subcontinent prevented a Pakistan intent on having its own voice in South Asian affairs from joining India. Instead, Although it was founded as a haven for South Asian Muslims, Pakistan now claims to be a secular country because that is what its Cold War democratic allies, such as the United States, have wanted to believe. Meanwhile, Pakistan’s adoption of a Realist stance in external affairs resulted from a greater sensitivity than India to its own territorial integrity, and a concomitant need for Western military aid in Kashmir. This facilitated a Pakistani move closer to a military alliance with the United States in 1954 and set the stage for Pakistan’s subsequent procurement of weapons.

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