It appears that Kashmir is the present battleground for these ideologies. With the retention of this predominantly Muslim region, India can further prove to the democratic world that it is a truly secular state, protective and inclusive of its Muslim minorities. (In fact, Hyderabad is another majority-Muslim region in southern India and it co-exists relatively peacefully within the Indian republic.) With dominance in Kashmir, Pakistan can prove to the Islamic states of the Middle East and Bangladesh that religion has always been and always will be the foremost issue in determining alliances.

What are the stakes? It has been stipulated that Pakistan and Bangladesh had only Islam in common,[19] but Bangladesh seceded from Pakistan. As this relationship with Bangladesh refutes Pakistan’s own rationale for existence as a haven for all South Asian Muslims, Pakistan has little to lose ideologically. India, however, has everything to gain as it has an opportunity to replace its post-Independence image as a stubborn power[20]—a necessity of her non-alignment and of the Cold War’s extension to the Subcontinent—with one of a self-sufficient success story. By regaining control of Kashmir, India can prove that it has continued to shrug off foreign dependencies and has mastered a world of challenges alone. Moreover, India’s weapons testing and its rejection of a nuclear test-ban treaty – under the rationale that not only Western nations should be allowed to perform such tests – reinforce this revised image.

C. Ideologies in Theory

Traditional theories can be drawn upon to bring light to the conflict of ideologies involved in the decision to extend American military aid to Pakistan in 1954. As influential American statesmen were suspicious that India had the potential to officially accept Communism, theories that justify and refute this impression will be useful. Also, because India and Pakistan have each accepted or rejected Realism or Liberalism to some degree, the theoretical underpinnings of these decisions are telling.

Perhaps due to its experience with other Third World nations that struggled with Communism, America was wary of the extent to which India was influenced by Marxist ideology. In early 1951, governmental repression prevented Indian Communists from becoming powerful enough to be a serious threat to India’s political stability.[21] It was understood then, however, that if the Communists “concentrate on exploiting the unrest and discontent caused by India’s unsettled economic and political conditions, they might rapidly acquire new support.… It seems possible that the militant phase could be revived and guerrilla activity be extended. Then, perhaps with external aid, Communism would offer a renewed threat to India.”[22]

In reviewing American containment of Communism, John Lewis Gaddis details the spread of the Cold War to “a competition for influence in the so-called Third, or Nonaligned, World.”[23] This view is telling in that it illustrates a focused attempt to expand spheres of influence as part of the larger scheme of containing Communism, rather than an attempt to understand the particular brands of Communism in different countries and crafting individualized approaches.

Hans Morgenthau, on the other hand, argues that America should avoid viewing the Third World as nonaligned—synonymous with stubborn, difficult, and intransigent (as Communist governments have been labeled)—and instead calls for a “differentiated approach to communism” that considers individual Communist governments in light of their particular interests.[24] The advantage is that it prevents America from immediately allying itself with governments that are anti-Communist and also from needlessly alienating nations that are not readily hostile to its own interests. In furtherance of this approach, Morgenthau identifies two flaws in American outright opposition to Third World Communism: first, it assumes a Communist monolith united in its opposition to American interests; and, second, it assumes a uniform reception in the Third World to “aggressive anti-American communism.”[25]

Morgenthau also provides the Realist description of international politics in the Cold War that is often considered to be the most influential:[26] “All history shows that nations active in international politics are continuously preparing for, actively involved in, or recovering from organized violence in the form of war.”[27]

In their model of complex interdependence, Keohane and Nye offer an explanation of international politics alternative to the Realist models commonly accepted by capitalist and Communist societies. They imply that a government that does not accept a Realist interpretation is not necessarily intransigent; it might simply recognize that factors other than an international struggle for a balance of power are most relevant in formulating policy. First, they set out to downplay the central role of the Realist explanation by describing their model of complex interdependence (which is often referred to as a Liberal model): there are multiple channels which connect societies, there is no hierarchy among issues because military security is not a dominant theme, and “military force is not used by governments toward other governments within the region, or on the issues.”[28]

They also recognize that their model is an ideal one as is the Realist explanation. At times, the Realist model is useful in explaining international politics, but where it is limited this alternative explanation allows for a deeper understanding of international relations. The significance of Keohane’s and Nye’s model is that it opens our eyes to the ensuing possibilities of cooperation. We can deduce that if a government does not accept the capitalist and Communist struggle for a balance of power, it can nevertheless be a significant political body and should not simply be shrugged off as a nuisance.

But why should America allow India—a government that refuses to cooperate with it by remaining non-aligned—a voice in determining world affairs? According to Kenneth Waltz, it is natural for one state to arm itself against others. “Because some states may at any time use force, all states must be prepared to do so – or live at the mercy of their militarily more vigorous neighbor.”[29] Thus, alliance members naturally expect one another to provide access to their geographically-strategic positions; similarly, the United States would expect such behavior if it were to ally with India. Luckily for India, there are other members of the non-aligned movement.

D. The Indian Ideological Twist

India has had a history of not associating with Western capitalist thinking. It has, nevertheless, also attempted to distance itself from the ideals of the Russian Revolution. It is the uniqueness of Indian ideology that has necessitated a policy of non-alignment.

Before Indian Independence, Western imperialism was viewed as irksome. The perceived opposite—socialism—was thus instinctively accepted. Over time, though, the ideals of the Indian national movement were understood as autonomous of the political thinking of both capitalism and Communism. As exploitation by the West was despised, so was Communism’s use of violence. Especially opposed to this was Mahatma Gandhi, whose faith in non-violence made the Indian nationalist movement “confident of building a new set of political and economic institutions [that] would steer clear of the evils of both the systems and break new ideological ground for the future course of human progress.”[30] Of course, these institutions would supposedly fare best in a society that is domestically secular (so that it fosters the interplay of ideas), while steering clear of external pressures to join the capitalist or Communist camp in tilting the scales of power struggles.

We see in Harbans Mukhia’s Marx on Pre-Colonial India an assessment of India’s preparedness for socialism. While accepting that Karl Marx prematurely accepted the idea of “the unchanging East,”[31] Mukhia also notes Marx’s determination that Indian land is used for a variety of reasons. At times, it is used for communal cultivation but usually each person owns and tills his own land.[32] This would imply an agrarian India society ready for both some form of socialism as well as capitalism. Mukhia draws specific reference to Marx’s take on Indian use of land:

Those small and extremely ancient Indian communities … are based on possession in common of the land…. The constitution of these communities varies in different parts of India. In those of the simplest form, the land is tilled in common, and the produce divided among the members.[33]

The Soviet revised understanding of the Indian position is instructive in that the Soviets realized their own faulty perception of India’s ideological position. With the Soviets’ worsening of ties with China and Pakistan, Moscow initially understood the Indian position as not unlike its own. Nevertheless, Soviet leaders were not blind to reality. After having intervened in the 1966 Tashkent Conference, their influence in South Asia had steadily grown, but “by the 1970s, no country in the region was any closer to making that transition to socialism.”[34] Perhaps part of the reason for this was India’s non-alignment policy and Pakistan’s increasing closeness to China, which opposed the Soviets.

Indeed, while India rejected Communism as a phenomenon of the Soviet and Chinese regimes, it did not reject socialism. Nehru admitted this acceptance in Indian society. In speaking against a rigid, constrained definition of socialism, he

look[ed] upon it as a growing, dynamic conception, as something which must fit in with the changing conditions of human life and activity in every country. I believe that socialism can be of many varieties…. What I want is that all individuals in India should have equal opportunities of growth, from birth upwards, and equal opportunities for work according to their capacity.[35]

The important point is to distinguish between Communism and socialism, the former being a working-class revolt against capitalism but the latter representing a self-sufficient utopia. The United States Government also noted India’s distance from Soviet Communism: suggestions that the Indian Communists received guidance from Moscow Communists had been hinted, but “[t]here is … little evidence that this is the case.”[36] Nevertheless, it often based its South Asian policy on the belief that India was ripe for Communism. (This will be more evident in the discussion on the influence of personalities, below.) While India rejected Communism, its own peculiar traditions fostered a unique combination of capitalism and socialism.

In order to preserve such a unique way of life, alliances with nations that valued different ideologies were frowned upon because they were not in the Indian interest. When the United States gave up its close relations with India on the basis of common democratic values alone, India had a further incentive to revert to its policy of nonalignment. Ideological differences with both capitalist and Communist nations necessitated a foreign policy objective of coexistence without alliances. Interestingly, this was the stance recommended by President George Washington as well in his Farewell Address:

[A] passionate attachment of one nation to another, produces a variety of evils. Sympathy for the favorite nation, facilitating the illusion of an imaginary common interest, in cases where no real common interest exists, and infusing into one the enmities of the other, betrays the former into a participation in the quarrels and wars of the latter, without adequate inducement or justification…. Such an attachment of a small or weak, towards a great and powerful nation, dooms the former to be the satellite of the latter.[37]

E. Pakistani Realism

Pakistani ideology regarding regional and foreign policy stemmed from historic insecurity in a region used by invaders to enter the Subcontinent, from its suspicions of India’s territorial intentions, from its founding ideology of Islam, and from India’s claims to secularism and nonalignment.

Due to its strategic geographic location and continued reminders of this by India, Pakistan was suspicious of India’s intentions. With the Middle East, the Soviet Union, India, and China on its borders, Pakistan stands at the mountain passes through which invaders have almost always entered the Subcontinent.[38] As Roderick Peattie illustrates, such a geographic position is inherently unsafe: “It is axiomatic that if several governments exist in one topographic basin or province, one government will absorb the other and the larger government will tend to grow until some barrier or definitive earth feature is reached.”[39]

Further, Pakistan has been reminded of the threat to its own territorial integrity by threatening words in India: “Geography and the mountain and the seas fashioned India as she is … Economic circumstances and the insistent demands of international affairs make the unity of India still more necessary. The picture of India we have learnt to relish will remain in our minds and our hearts.”[40]

As Pakistani President Mohammad Ayub Khan pointed out, Pakistan’s geographic position at that entrance to the Subcontinent which is usually opted for by invaders ought to make India favor a fortified Pakistan that checks invasions before they draw close to India. However, as Pakistan signed the Agreement of Cooperation with the United States in 1959 (guaranteeing US assistance in case of aggression to Pakistan), India demanded that such assistance “could not be used against India.”[41] As such, according to Khan, Pakistan would be deprived of help in case India attacks it. “There could not be a more illuminating commentary on India’s historic attitude toward Pakistan.”[42]

Also, some Pakistani leaders paralleled Islamic ideals to American ideals of democracy.[43] President Mohammad Ayub Khan indicated his belief “that Allah, in His infinite mercy, created Pakistan to give the Muslims of these regions a homeland in which to mould (sic) their lives in accordance with the fundamental principles and the spirit of Islam.”[44] However, Safdar Mahmood wrote that it is generally accepted “that democracy has failed in Pakistan” allegedly because “Islam which is the sheet anchor of this country does not encourage democratic values.”[45] Further, he quotes Keith Callard writing in Pakistan, A Political Study: “Islam has not encouraged systematic opposition. The vision of good government possessed by many Muslims is that of a people united under a strong leader and confident in the possession of certain truth.”[46]

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