A Need for Cohesive Counter-Narcotics Policy
[42] U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime [UNODC], 2009 World Drug Report 33 (United Nations Publications 2009) (“The highest levels of use (in terms of the proportion of the population aged 15-64 years) are
found along the main drug trafficking routes close to Afghanistan.”)
[43] See, The Senlis Council, Impact Assessment of Crop Eradication in Afghanistan and Lessons Learned from Latin America and South East Asia 9-38 (MF Publishing Ltd 2006)
[44] U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime [UNODC], All Afghan Opium Surveys (United Nations Publications)
[45] U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime [UNODC], 2010 Afghan Opium Survey, 2, Figure 1 (United Nations Publications 2010)
[46] European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, The State of the Drugs Problem in Europe Annual Report 2010 6, Figure 1 (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union 2010)
[47] U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime [UNODC], 2010 Afghan Opium Survey, 2 (United Nations Publications 2010)
[48] Id. at 2 (“Total opium production in 2010 was estimated at 3,600 metric tons (mt), a 48% decrease from 2009. The sharp decline was due to the spread of a disease that affected opium fields in the major growing provinces, particularly Hilmand and Kandahar. The disease started to appear in the fields after flowering in spring. This was too late to plant another crop, therefore the disease did not change the area under opium cultivation.” “The major effect of the disease was visible in the yield which dropped to 29.2 kg/ha, a 48% reduction from 2009.”)
[49] Id. at 22 (“In 2010, the average farm-gate price of dry opium at harvest time (weighted by production) was US$ 169/kg, a 164% increase from 2009.”)
[50] Id. at 22 (“The rapid increasing trend is a market response to the drastic reduction of the opium production which is due to the spreading of the opium disease in the major growing areas.”)
[51] David Mansfield and Adam Pain, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit [AREU], Counter-Narcotics in Afghanistan: The Failure of Success, 2 (Dec. 2008) (“The Taliban prohibition of 2001 led to an increase in the farm-gate price of opium, not only encouraging the return to cultivation the following year but also attracting new entrants.”)
[52] U.N. Int’l Narcotics Control Board [INCB], 2009 Annual Report, 30, ¶145 (United Nations Publications 2009) (“In 2008, the Government of Afghanistan informed the Board that there was no legitimate use for acetic anhydride in Afghanistan and requested all producing and trading countries not to authorize any exports of acetic anhydride to that country.”)
[53] See U.N. Int’l Narcotics Control Board [INCB], 2009 Annual Report, 30, ¶145 (United Nations Publications 2009); See Also, United Nations 1988 Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Dec. 20, 1988.
[54] See, 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs as Amended by its 1972 Protocol, Mar. 25, 1972; See Also, United Nations 1988 Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Dec. 20, 1988.
[55] U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime [UNODC], Strategic Programme Framework for Afghanistan 2006-2010, 5 (United Nations 2006)
[56] See, 21 C.F.R. Part 1312 (Also known as the 80/20 rule. Australia was not mentioned because it is not likely that Australia is diverting its precursor chemicals to Afghanistan.)
[57] U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime [UNODC], Strategic Programme Framework for Afghanistan 2006-2010, 30 (United Nations 2006)
[58] U.N. Int’l Narcotics Control Board [INCB], 2009 Annual Report, 30, ¶145 (United Nations Publications 2009)
[59] See, U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime [UNODC], 2010 Afghan Opium Survey (United Nations Publications 2010)
[60] U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime [UNODC], 2010 World Drug Report 53 (United Nations Publications 2010) (“The Balkan route to West and Central Europe runs from Afghanistan via the Islamic Republic of Iran, Turkey and south-east European countries. This route and its various branches form the artery that carries high purity Afghan heroin into every important market in Europe. UNODC estimates that 37% of all Afghan heroin or 140 mt is annually trafficked into the Islamic Republic of Iran, from Afghanistan and Pakistan, towards the European market.”)
[61] Id. at 48 (“Unlike other major routes out of Afghanistan which have existed for decades, the Northern route through Central Asia and into the Russian Federation is a relatively recent phenomenon, only taking shape in the mid-1990s.” Estimated 25% of Afghan heroin or 95 mt, is annually trafficked through the Central Asian Republics.)
[62] Id. at 56 (“Considerable quantities of heroin are trafficked to Europe by sea and air, but the Balkan route resembles the Northern route in that the bulk of the flow proceeds by land.”)
[63] U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime [UNODC], Addiction, Crime, and Insurgency: The Transnational Threat of Afghan Opium, 11 (United Nations Publications 2009)
[64] Id. at 71 (“The manufacturing of acetic anhydride was discontinued in Pakistan in 1995, but the country borders two major chemical producers, China and India. Based on seizure data, Pkaistan appears to be a major source of precursors entering Afghanistan.”)
[65] Id. at 48 (“[T]here are approximately 547,000 heroin and 145,000 opium users in Pakistan.”),
[66] Id. at 38 (The UK alone “estimate[s] that 25 pe cent of the heroin found on their market is shipped directly from Pakistan to the UK (by air or sea).”)
[67] U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime [UNODC], 2010 World Drug Report 60 (United Nations Publications 2010)
[68] Id. at 60 (“More Afghan opiates pass through Pakistan than any other country bordering Afghanistan.”)
[69] Id. at 53-54 (“UNODC estimates that 37% of all Afghan heroin or 140 mt is annually trafficked into the Islamic Republic of Iran, from Afghanistan.” “Most of the heroin, around 30% (105-110 mt) of Afghanistan’s total production, continues to move west/south-west into the Islamic Republic of Iran towards Turkey and further to Europe.”)
[70] Caucasus countries are Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan.
[71] Id. at 54 (“The so-called ‘northern Balkan route’ is a relatively recent variant on the Balkan route which transits the Caucasus rather than Turkey. Every year, approximately 9 mt of heroin are estimated to be trafficked from the Islamic Republic of Iran along this route. Joining this flow is a smaller volume of about 2 mt from Central Asia (not shown on map. In all, 11 mt of heroin are estimated to enter the Caucasus. Some 4 mt are either consumed or seized.”)
[72] Id. at 38 (“Seizure statistics indicate that the vast majority (98 per cent) of the heroin seized in Turkey comes from the Islamic Republic of Iran.”)
[73] Id. at 38 See Table 12
[74] U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime [UNODC], 2010 World Drug Report (United Nations Publications 2010)
[75] U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime [UNODC], Addiction, Crime, and Insurgency: The Transnational Threat of Afghan Opium, 38 (United Nations Publications 2009) (“According to seizure information from UNODC and WCO for the years 2000-2008, 84 per cent of the heroin seized in Europe-(85-90) tons – was shipped from South-Eastern European (Balkan) countries.”)
Alternatively, you could take secret drugs lords like the CIA out of the picture by legalising and regulating the drugs trade. But why go for simple, logical solutions when you can undermine the world though an interconnected network of drugs, oil and weapons trade?
Not that simple. To license Afghanistan for the licit manufacture of opiate pharmaceuticals, or at least the licit cultivation of poppy for other countries to manufacture those pharmaceuticals, two things would need to be done. As of now the cultivation, manufacture, export, and import of licit opiates is regulated by the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB). Afghanistan would first have to show that there is a demand for licit opiates, and second, that it could supply that demand without creating an oversupply of licit opiates. The point being, the INCB wants to make sure the medical field is supplied, but does not want an oversupply to leak into the illicit field.
Today, the INCB does not find a need for licit opiates, and instead finds an oversupply of licit opiates. Furthermore, the leading importer of licit opiates, the U.S., is contractually obligated to purchase its opiates from seven specific countries. As of now, the main argument involves having Afghanistan gain entrance into that contractual agreement with the U.S., which will not happen. And the counter-argument for that, which is why it will not happen, is that Afghanistan lacks the security for such a business venture.
Although I am stating the facts for you, based on a licit business argument, my next article will focus on Afghanistan being licensed. What should be noted, which is the main point of the above article, is that even if Afghanistan were to be licensed, that temporary fix would not have any long-term negative effect on the actual heroin market as a whole.
Thank you for your comment.
Amen to that Neo.
For further clarification, the way the system works, the United Nations, under the INCB, would have to approve this business venture. Until the correct argument is made, Afghanistan will continue to provide for the illicit market, not the licit market. And, as stated above, even if Afghanistan were to provide for the licit market, do not underestimate the potential of the heroin market to adapt to such tactics. It will, and has. Its ability to maintain profitability keeps it afloat, and such a quick fix will only affect Afghanistan, not the global market as a hole.
*whole.
Seems the sure way to make opium less profitable as a commodity have an oversupply of it. I know corn is not profitable to grow without government subsidies. There would need to be aggressive media on the dangers of heroin and super easy access to treatment along with this strategy. Heroin is not going to be a mainstream drug no matter what, the stories of it’s destructiveness are pretty much out there. A bigger problem by far is prescription opiates.
Treating drug addiction as a social problem rather than a criminal one would effectively destroy the trade.
The U.S. could start by legalizing marijuana. And medicinal marijuana would be a good substitute in many/most cases for prescription opiates. And we could go from there.
Legalizing marijuana I am likely to favor however, there would be massive economic consequences. Mexico’s main oil field is slowing down and cheap corn via NAFTA put many Mexican farmer out of work. The money from pot is a significant part of the economy there. Plus all the small time traffickers and dealers would be out of luck and keep in mind these lucrative jobs keep opening up for new people as law in enforcement takes folks out of the work force.
I fear what commercialization would do to. Industries are already great at getting people to eat loads of sugar, fat and salt and drinking alcohol. Do we really want businesses to be trying to ever increase their sales of pot while denying the real and common side effects of weight gain from increased appetite and lack of motivation? Because I can see that happening.
I don’t really see any down side to legalizing marijuana. Legalizing it in Mexico, as former President Fox just suggested doing, would help eliminate a violent black market and open up legitimate jobs. Weight gain is a dietary and exercise problem, not caused by smoking pot. and I think it’s an absolute myth that smoking pot causes people to lose their motivation. A lot of lazy people smoke pot. Pot doesn’t make them that way.
Hi Liana
This is wonderfully written.
May I suggest you research the false war on drugs when it was decided
that the CIA would let this be taken over by the new agency called DEA?
Many agents were called in 24 hours to halt their operations.
Then research the so-called drug lord Khun Sa, who was the Golden Triangle
connection. Living larger than life in the Shan mountains with three goverment’s protection. Burma Thailand and USA.
When The DEA put the heat on Burma to start the eradication of the poppy.
They did so reluctantly. There was a promise of assistance, which never came
good agents being sent back to the states, and keeping the Burmese at bay
by carrot and stick threats. While most poppy was being eradicated in accord with the USA wishes, Along comes 9-11 the mother of all wishes to come true.
Now America could get the prices up to snuff and that road from the fields to the cities back to higher yield and profits. With gangsters and drug dealers
as elected officials, and the brother of Afghan president, appointed by the USA
as a bank thief, the new world order of drugs came into play.
While American men and woman died in Afghanistan protecting what?
The career of lawyers who keep the wheel greased in drug cases in courts
through out the USA, and the public companies were building more prisons
to feed small town America’s economy, from the kids dealing on the streets
of inner cities. We were told that the poor Muslim people did not know how
to farm food? Look this is the industrial jobs complex.
First profits are from sales., then there is the Rockerfeller, lead, Methadone
program for addicts, then the 25 years to life sentences for courts and prisons
and the broken families left behind. Prisons get built. farmers sell meat
guards are hired, and you keep the wheel going. Lawyers and courts
make the wheel go round too So there will never be an honest discussion
nor termination of drug in or out of America. By us being in Afghaniland
we have allowed the poppy to yields of 4000% Its a business on one side
its the defense contract, on the other its purported to be assisting in freedom
for the poor people of Afghanistan
Peter Dale Scott’s “American War Machine” is an excellent resource on these matters.
It’s difficult to exercise any control on the narcotics trade when those doing the controlling wear both the “black” and “white” hats. They’ve set this up like they’ve set up US elections: no matter which way you vote, we’ll be led to the same sorry place: the paths look different but the Destination is the same. Speaking of, someone at FPJ may want to take a gander at the Director of National Intelligence’s Destination 2025 papers. It’s the roadmap for our future: global governance.