The Impact of Chinese/Russian Detente
Moscow and Beijing been drawn more closely to each other as both powers have risen economically and politically over the past decade. Russia has increased technical and economic cooperation with China — a tactical move that can be seen as a way to indirectly impact U.S. defense capacity. The end of 2010 saw increased Sino-Russian economic cooperation and a decision to replace the U.S. dollar as the primary currency for international trade between the two states. Shortly after, China was accused by U.S. politicians of deliberately devaluing the Yuan. These two developments could be an attempt to increase pressure on the U.S. economy, with the indirect effect of decreasing defense spending.
Increase in Sino-Russian ties in the scientific and technological realm could result in the transfer of knowledge for military development. In January 2010, Russia demonstrated its Sukhoi T-50 stealth fighter jet. A year later, China carried out a test flight of its first stealth fighter jet during the visit of U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates to Beijing. The event was a manifestation of the escalating military capability of China. Furthermore, there has been speculation about China’s Dong Feng 21D (land-based anti-ship ballistic missile) achieving operational status. Such capability is a countermeasure against the United States’ naval capabilities. In the event that Russia and China continue to expand their joint military capacity, The U.S. will feel the need to continue to devote further investment in the development of more advanced weapons systems, which will cost trillions of dollars in additional defense spending in the long-term and will add further strain to the U.S. economy.
The threat of China’s accelerating ballistic missiles capability should not be assessed from an American perspective only, for it poses a potential threat to Russia’s security as well. In the course of the New START ratification process, the U.S. Senate was concerned about the tactical nuclear weapons disparity between U.S. (400 deployed and 400 in reserve) and Russia (estimated 3,800 deployed and 2,000 in reserve). Russia justifies the number of its tactical weapons as a countermeasure against NATO’s conventional weapons in Europe, yet, it is surely also a countermeasure against potential attack from China.
Conclusion
Russia suspended its participation in the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) in 2007. Its reinstatement has been one of NATO’s priorities, as it is an important instrument for sustaining the security landscape in Europe. NATO-Russia joint missile defense could offer the reassurance needed for Russia to downgrade its tactical nuclear weapons capability, since it can benefit from a missile defense shield against potential adversaries. This presents an opportunity for NATO to pressure Russia on the CFE, and more generally, on the benefits of cooperation.
Given the advancement of NATO’s missile defense capability, and Russia’s lack thereof, Moscow is highly likely to agree to more comprehensive cooperation with the Alliance in the long-term. Russia knows that it is not in a position to alter the progress of NATO’s territorial missile defense program. Thus, a joint effort under the NRC is the lesser evil.
Failure to cooperate on missile defense will have further undesirable effects for Russia. As noted by President Medvedev, it is likely to restart the arms race, as Moscow will attempt to safeguard its nuclear deterrent by redeploying offensive weapons.[11] However, replacing the aging Russian arsenal will inevitably incur an undesirably high financial burden for Moscow at a time when it must devote substantial financial resources to economic revitalization. In the end, Russia is likely to fall into line, despite its bluster and posturing.
Notes
[1] Russian Ambassador Dmitry Rogozin , at a press conference following a recent NRC meeting (http://natomission.ru/en/society/article/society/artbews/92/).
[2] NATO-Russia Council Joint Statement, November 20, 2010. (NATO website: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/
news_68871.htm?selectedLocale=en).
[3] http://andersfogh.info/2011/01/19/missile-defence-two-independent-systems.
[4] http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49635.htm.
[5] http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_70114.htm?selectedLocale=en.
[6] http://en.rian.ru/russia/20110112/162107128.html.
[7] Also see: http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20110106_1455.php .
[9] http://rt.com/politics/russia-warheads-missiles-designer/.
[10] http://www.cfr.org/terrorism/after-new-start-old-tensions/p23897.
[11] http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5ipn0YAy0hwWHPP_AiH306XKwuToQ?docId=CNG.85bc84cf65dec965e2307bfe85784c7f.7b1.
