The Fallacy of the “Conveyor Belt” Theory
Internal government reports leaked to the Sunday Telegraph in 2010 concluded that they “do not believe that it is accurate to regard radicalization in this country as a linear ‘conveyor belt’ moving from grievance, through radicalization, to violence”. They went on that the “thesis seems to both misread the radicalization process and to give undue weight to ideological factors.” So according to the British government’s own officials and experts, suggesting that “Islamist extremist” aspirations (which are a part of normative Islam) are a gateway to terrorism is incorrect. Hence any subsequent claims to that effect can reasonably be construed as politically disingenuous.
While the conveyor-belt theory may offer a simplistic narrative fit for popular consumption, the issues involved in such cases seldom are.
Each case has several idiosyncratic elements involved that also need to be considered. In the specific instance of Woolwich, though many details are still yet to emerge, there are claims that one of the alleged perpetrators Michael Adebolajo was tortured in Kenya in 2010 and was subsequently approached numerous times by British intelligence, while Michael Adebowale saw a friend “literally sliced to pieces” in front of him (while being stabbed himself) in 2008. This means that the role of torture, security service harassment and other traumatic experiences along with other socio-economic factors would also have to be analyzed to understand the specific mindsets and motivations of these two men. Even then, none of this proves any causality.
There are other slightly more detailed phase models that attempt to explain and help identify radicalization currently used by western police and intelligence services, such as those developed by the NYPD and Danish Security and Intelligence Services. However, other academic research, such as a report by the Netherlands Institute of International Relations, argues that these models have major substantive shortcomings, are based upon post hoc studies and make the simple methodological error of “selection on the dependent variable”, among others, which invalidates their conclusions. As the report mentions, just as it is impossible to explain why books become bestsellers by examining only bestsellers, it is impossible to explain radicalization only by cases of radicalization.
There are obvious problems with these simplistic models, which are multiplied when considering the crude contention that “non-violent extremism” leads to “violent extremism.” Drawing conclusions based on theories that suffer from this type of selection bias is extremely risky and may inadvertently substantiate statements such as “not every Islamist extremist is a terrorist, but all Islamist extremist terrorists are Islamist extremists,” which could be considered a politically correct way of suggesting “not every Muslim is a terrorist, but all Muslim terrorists are Muslim,” particularly when it has already been shown that the identifiers of “Islamist extremism” are actually unequivocally aspects of normative Islam.
Consequences to the Blair Narrative
While both the Blair narrative and the convenient “conveyor-belt” theory may assuage the public’s need for an explanation of what lies behind such attacks—which politicians are loath to admit is linked to Western foreign policy—they only further alienate and frustrate those Muslims who have legitimate foreign policy grievances and believe in normative Islamic ideals.
Additionally, they serve to sow distrust and suspicion against Muslims among the rest of the population, exemplified by the former head of MI5 Stella Stella Rimington, who recently implied people should be spying on their neighbors in order to inform the police for any signs of “extremism.” A further example would be Cameron’s intervention in parliament on June 3, warning against extremism in mosques and Islamic seminaries (despite the fact that neither had anything to do with the Woolwich attack). The same week then witnessed more arson attacks, this time on an Islamic studies boarding school and an Islamic community center both in London—highlighting how the political discourse feeds into anti-Muslim sentiments on the ground and can lead to such results. A simple inversion of the conveyor belt theory would therefore pose many more questions of Cameron et al who hold official positions of power and influence over millions, as opposed to the accused “extremists.”
There was a reported 15-fold increase in reported attacks upon Muslims and mosques in the days after the Woolwich attack, not unsurprising given the circumstances but fed by the restatement of the same narrative—that Islam is not the “problem” but an “Islamist extremism,” which is then defined in terms of normative Islamic views and holding grievances against foreign policy. It is unlikely many people will see the proclaimed difference, and they are certainly unable to see any difference between Cameron’s “good” and “bad” Islamic seminaries and mosques.
In any case, Blair’s recent intervention indicates that he is slowly giving up the pretense that any such difference between “Islam” and “Islamism” exists stating “the world view goes deeper and wider than it is comfortable for us to admit.” By making such comments, the mask of the “Islamist extremist” narrative momentarily slipped to reveal the true meanings behind the discourse: Islam and Muslims are to blame for the blowback of a globalized war of which he was a major protagonist.
The same war without limits is today led by President Obama, who only recently was compelled to outline policy regarding drone strikes and Guantanamo bay detention center, two of the most frequently discussed grievances regarding America’s foreign policy of the moment (part of a long list including but not limited to illegal renditions, torture, indiscriminate killing and the continuing effects of the use of depleted uranium shells). Such policies are what lead commentators such as Glenn Greenwald to continuously point out that “the proximate cause of these attacks are plainly political grievances: namely, the belief that engaging in violence against aggressive western nations is the only way to deter and/or avenge western violence that kills Muslim civilians.”
As highlighted in numerous polls and obvious to any observer, grievances regarding western foreign policy in the Middle East and other Muslim countries are widespread. The recent uprisings in the region have all been against former allies in America’s “war on terror,”: Mubarak in Egypt, Ben Ali in Tunisia, Gaddafi in Libya, Saleh in Yemen and now al-Assad in Syria, all of whom were formerly collaborating with America in intelligence-sharing, renditions, and torture. Belief in an idealized global Islamic brotherhood is still cherished by Muslims despite their internal differences while aspirations for Islamic governance under Sharia law and the unification of Muslim countries are also popular and mainstream in several parts of the Muslim world.
Demonizing such grievances and aspirations may be understandable in the context of secular, liberal western democracies, especially when governments are participating as part of a seemingly never ending, expanding and self-perpetuating “war of terror.” However, such demonization is hardly conducive to community cohesion whether in a national or international context.
An alternative prudent and principled approach would be to instead start making truly concerted efforts to understand what such grievances and aspirations really mean to their advocates, rather than simply inaccurately labeling them as international security concerns while continuing to prosecute aggression seemingly without limits or oversight against others abroad in what arguably looks very much like a thinly disguised war on Islam.
