Will sophisticated diplomacy and shrewd lobbying make the EU sign an Association Agreement, with Kyiv?
Kyiv’s European Misconception
Another explanation would be that, behind the increasingly contradictory stance of the Ukrainian authorities, there stand some odd post-Soviet illusions. Perhaps, some people in Kyiv hope that they can get a signature playing on differences among European politicians on the relevance of the treaty and the degree of necessity to get it signed soon. There is indeed a range of viewpoints among the 27 EU countries comprising, on the one side, some national governments emphasizing the geopolitical importance of the treaty, and, on the other, those advocating consistency in the Union’s stand. Even if Ukraine’s current leadership were to find supporters among EU politicians, the decision to sign the Association Agreement will, however, still have to be taken through consensus of all 27 member countries. Some countries – for instance, those who have a security interest in Ukraine’s affiliation to the EU – may indeed decide that a signature is imperative now, and under whatever conditions.
But others will be worried about the reputation of the EU as a community of law-based states, and the credibility of Brussels world-wide democracy promotion. For them, an EU Association Agreement with a half-autocracy that persecutes opposition leaders, uses courts to increase its power, and is engaged in a large-scale plundering of state-property would be a sell-out of core principles on which the European community was once erected. Signing the Agreement with the kind of country Ukraine is today would subvert the EU’s normative foundation as commonwealth of democratic states, and its attempts to spread post-war European values, in other parts of the world.
Against this background, Ukrainian society will have to make an extra effort not to miss this window of opportunity that will close again, in November 2013. It is unclear whether and when, after the Vilnius summit, the chance of signing this or a similar agreement will emerge again, for Ukraine.
If this is a historic moment for the Ukrainian people, they should get their current government out of its self-made bubble. The authorities should not be left to distract themselves with public relations campaigns, political technology, or diplomatic trickery. Instead, Ukraine’s civil, economic, intellectual, and political societies should make sure that concrete and substantive changes in Ukraine’s domestic politics and national legislation are implemented within the next months. Unless, the European public gets the impression that things are indeed notably changing for the better in Ukraine, the EU will not be able to sign the Agreement – even if it wanted to. The EU’s decision makers are first and foremost domestic politicians. With as bad an image as Ukraine’s political system has today, they will not be able to justify before their national publics a decision to enter a close association with Kyiv.
The Tymoshenko Factor
If the Ukrainian people’s historic chance is not to be missed, freeing Yulia Tymoshenko will have to be part of Ukraine’s image-improvement campaign. One could even argue that this should happen whether Tymoshenko is guilty or not. Raison d’être or reasons of state have been calling for her liberation, already for months on both domestic grounds, and in terms of foreign affairs. Not only is Tymoshenko’s imprisonment an internally risky endeavor and political poker game, as it further polarizes an already divided country and sets a dangerous precedent of political losers ending up in prison. Her incarceration has, for many Europeans, become the major symbol of Ukraine’s clinging to the Soviet past. To the average European, putting a country’s major opposition leader – especially a female one – behind bars is by itself an unacceptable fact. It looks even more dubious when seen in combination with various other regressions of Yanukovych and Co., like the change of constitution or formation of turn-coats coalition, both in the newly elected President’s favor, in 2010. Some Western observers, to be sure, have voiced an opinion that Tymoshenko’s behavior may not have always been impeccable. Yet even among these critics there would be hardly anybody who has doubts that Tymoshenko’s arrest, trial, and imprisonment are manifestations of Ukraine’s authoritarianism rather than rule of law.
The simultaneous imprisonment of another opposition leader, Yurii Lutsenko, Ukraine’s former Minister of Interior, has been raising even more eyebrows among Western Ukraine-watchers than the arrest of the former prime-minister. In Tymoshenko’s case, at least, the procurator’s accusations had been grave – although in court they were not dealt with, as the EU argues, in a properly law-based trial. Concerning Lutsenko, however, his sentence always appeared as grossly disproportionate to his supposed misdoings – even if they had all been true. The Ukrainian leadership has become victim to its own propaganda: It has lost proportion in its suppression of political opposition leaders, and talked itself into an alternative reality concerning EU-Ukraine relations.
While Ukraine has, with the scheduled signing of the Association Agreement in November this year, a unique chance, it is simultaneously facing enormous risks, until the next presidential elections of 2015. Whether economic growth, financial stability, interethnic relations, energy security, social cohesion or relations with Russia – the Ukrainian state and society will be confronted with daring challenges that may bring the country on the verge of collapse. For the nascent Ukrainian political nation to hold together in stormy times, a signed Association Agreement could play the role of a rallying point, glance of hope, and unifying factor. Ukraine’s European integration is, to one degree or another, supported by all major Ukrainian political forces, large parts of the population, and almost the entire intellectual elite. It would be sad, if not tragic and could, in a worst-case scenario, be catastrophic, should the Ukrainians miss this opportunity to finally determine their destiny.
An abridged version of this text appeared, under a different title, in The National Interest.
