[36] Even on December 10, 1981, Andropov insisted ”If Cde. Kulikov actually spoke about the insertion of troops then I consider that he did so incorrectly. We cannot risk that. We do not intend to insert troops to Poland. That is the correct position, and we must observe it to the end.” “Transcript of the Soviet Politburo Meeting on the Crisis in Poland, December 10, 1981.” In: Mastny, Vojtech and Malcolm Byrne (eds.). A Cardboard Castle? An Inside History of the Warsaw Pact, 1955-1991. Budapest, New York: Central European University Press (2005) 459. Andropov was immediately corrected by Ustinov that Kulikov had not, in fact, said such a thing. In reality, Kulikov did discuss the crossing of Warsaw Pact troops onto Polish territory as late as in June 1981 – but it was strictly in the context of the Warsaw Pact’s long-planned Shield-81 joint exercises. See “Report on Conversation between Marshal Kulikov and Senior East German Military Officials, June 13, 1981.” Ibid., 446.

[37] For example, on two occasions (April 9 and 13, 1981) the Soviet leadership presented Jaruzelski and Kania with undated documents declaring martial law for their signature, which both declined to render. See “Session of the CPSU CC Politburo, April 9, 1981.” In: Kramer, Mark (ed.) (April 1999) 106.

[38] See in particular the records of the congratulatory telephone call of Brezhnev to Jaruzelski upon the election of the latter as the General Secretary of CK PUWP on October 19, 1981. In: Krawczyk, Andrzej (ed.) (1993) 53-59.

[39] “Andropov: […] Now I would like to note that Jaruzelski is rather persistently placing economic demands before us and conditioning the implementation of Operation “X” on our economic aid; and I would even say more than that, he is raising the question, albeit indirectly, of military assistance.” “Transcript of the Soviet Politburo Meeting on the Crisis in Poland, December 10, 1981.” In: Mastny, Vojtech and Malcolm Byrne (eds.) (2005) 459.

[40] Such price increases were not unusual in that period: for example, on February 1, 1982 the announced price increase for food was 241%. See: Walichnowski, Tadeusz (ed.) (2001) 471.

[41] See “Session of the CPSU CC Politburo, December 10, 1981.” In: Kramer, Mark (ed.) (April 1999) 161. See also fn 7 above.

[42] See Judt, Tony. Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945. New York: The Penguin Press (2005) 592.

[43] See “Transcript of the Soviet Politburo Meeting on the Crisis in Poland, December 10, 1981.” In: Krawczyk, Andrzej (ed.) (1993) 87.

The Soviet Union did, in fact, issue a call for economic aid to Sofia, Budapest, Berlin, Ulan Bator, Prague, Havana, Hanoi, and Vientiane on December 14, 1981. See “Minutes of the Meeting of CK CPSU, December 13, 1981.” Ibid., 95.

[44] “Andropov: […] But if the capitalist countries fall upon the Soviet Union, and they already have a suitable agreement, with various kinds of economic and political sanctions, then that will be very difficult for us. We must show concern for our country, for the strengthening of the Soviet Union. That is our main line.” “Transcript of the Soviet Politburo Meeting on the Crisis in Poland, December 10, 1981.” In: Mastny, Vojtech and Malcolm Byrne (eds.) (2005) 459.

[45] See U.S. involvement in El Salvador and Nicaragua.

[46] Rather than proving to be the anticipated quick and cheap intervention, the war lasted for over 9 years, 1979-1989, and ended in Soviet withdrawal in disgrace under Gorbachev, after which the communist government in Kabul survived for all of 3 more years.

[47]Concerns over access to the world’s oil reserves in the Middle East were a recurring theme of Carter and Reagan administrations’ public announcements. See for example a response to the imposition of martial law in Poland published in the New York Times by Admiral Stanfield Turner, USN, formerly Director of Central Intelligence: Turner, Stansfield. “A New Strategy for NATO,” The New York Times, December 13, 1981.

[48] Unable to reach consensus about adjourning the meeting (while the Eastern European delegations pressured for following the agenda), the delegations spent a “night of long silences” before a “coffee break” was announced that lasted 54.5 hours before the representatives could agree on adjourning the meeting until November 1982. See Vojtech and Malcolm Byrne (eds.) (2005) 337.

[49]See Wyatt-Walter, Holly. The European Community and the Security Dilemma 1979-1992. London: St Anthony’s College, Oxford (1997) 78. Also Young, John W. “Western Europe and the end of the Cold War, 1979-1989.” In: Leffler, Melvyn P. and Odd Arne Westad (eds ). The Cambridge History of the Cold War. Vol. III: Endings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2010) 294.

[50] Villaume, Poul and Odd Arne Westad (eds.). Perforating the Iron Curtain: European Detente, Transatlantic Relations, and the Cold War, 1965-1985. Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press (2010) 200.

[51] This was understood by NATO early on. See NATO Working Paper The Scope of NATO Action in the Event of Soviet or WP Military Intervention in Poland. Bruxelles: North Atlantic Treaty Organization (October 27, 1980). http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_archives/20111130_19801027_3050-SHPPOP-S45-80_-_27_OCT_60.pdf  Accessed July 26, 2012.

[52] See “Session of the CPSU CC Politburo, April 9, 1981.”  In: Kramer, Mark (ed.) (April 1999) 107.

[53]See “Extract from Protocol No 213 of the Session of the CPSU CC Politburo on 3 September 1980: On Theses for the Discussion with Representatives of the Polish Leadership.” In: Kramer, Mark (ed.) (April 1999) 39.

[54]“Andropov: […] I do not know how matters will develop in Poland, but even if Poland comes under the authority of Solidarity that will be one thing. But if the capitalist countries fall upon the Soviet Union, and they already have a suitable agreement, with various kinds of economic and political sanctions, then that will be very difficult for us. We must show concern for our country, for the strengthening of the Soviet Union. That is our main line.” “Transcript of the Soviet Politburo Meeting on the Crisis in Poland, December 10, 1981.” In: Mastny, Vojtech and Malcolm Byrne (eds.) (2005) 459.

[55] Erich Honecker, Gustav Husak and Todor Zhivkov repeatedly warned Brezhnev about the danger of spilling Polish unrest and ideas to their countries. See Kramer, Mark (ed.) (April 1999) 25.

[56] “Andropov: In addition, I want to say that the Polish events are influencing the situation in the western provinces of our country, particularly in Belorussia. Many villages there are listening in to Polish-language radio and television. I might add that in certain other regions, especially in Georgia, we have had wild demonstrations. And in Tbilisi […],” etc. See “Session of the CPSU CC Politburo, April 2, 1980.” In: Kramer, Mark (ed.) (April 1999) 100.

[57] Hungarian Revolution.

[58] Prague Spring.

[59] See fn 52 above.

[60] See “CPSU CC Instruction to the Soviet Ambassador Concerning Lech Walesa Visit to Italy, January 14, 1981.” In: Paczkowski, Andrzej and Malcolm Byrne (eds.) (2007) 177-179.

[61] They complained of cramped small rooms, very bad sanitary conditions, difficulties with receiving letters and visits from their families, and insufficient medical care, which was especially an issue with Edward Gierek who purportedly suffered from tuberculosis.  See “Note from January 27, 1982, from the meeting of the leadership of CK PUWP with Edward Gierek and Piotr Jaroszewicz.” In: Walichnowski, Tadeusz (ed.) (2001) 216-223.

[62] The entertainment at Walesa’s disposal included outdoor sports, pool, ping pong, walks, and out-of- town fishing trips. During the first seven months of detention he received 58 visits, mostly from clergy. After several long-term visits from his family (transportation was provided at no charge by the Ministry of Interior), his wife moved with five children into his place of detention. The family’s choice is not very surprising considering the fact that at that time of notorious food shortages Walesa had access to unlimited food supplies from special government sources. For example, within seven months, Walesa and his guests consumed 114 bottles of hard liquor, 77 bottles of wine and champagne, 512 bottles of beer, and 628 packets of cigarettes. See “Note of the Office of Government Security and the Investigative Office of the Ministry of Interior regarding the letter of the Bishop of Gdansk Lech Kaczmarek (of July 9, 1982) to the president of the Military Council of National Salvation gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski, regarding the release of Lech Walesa from internment.” In: Kropka, Boguslaw and Grzegorz Majchrzak (eds.) (2001) 277-280.