[10] The Kremlin was well aware that Solidarity knew about the plans to impose martial law: “But even if the government does intend to impose martial law, Solidarity knows this very well and, for its part, has been preparing all necessary measures to cope with that.” See Session of the CPSU CC Politburo, December 10, 1981. In: Kramer, Mark (ed.) (April 1999) 162. In late 1980 the Kremlin started to suspect that a high-ranking Polish official was leaking military information to the West, and in spring of 1981 Solidarity began to reveal details about martial law to the public. See “Translator’s Note to Session of the CPSU CC Politburo, October 31, 1980.” In: Kramer, Mark (ed.) (April 1999) 56-57.
[11] The first known list of persons to be interned as part of the case “W” („state of war”) dates back to October 28, 1980. The documentation preparing for case “W” was issued by the Ministry of the Interior and the General Staff of the Polish Army in October of the same year. See: Kopka, Boguslaw and Grzegorz Majchrzak (eds.). (2001) 13.
[12] For examples of “war game” exercises, see inter alia “Inter-ministerial decision games” that took place on February 16, 1981 under the leadership of the secretary of KOK, general Tuczapski. See Paczkowski, Andrzej. Droga do “mniejszego zla”: Strategia i taktyka obozu wladzy, lipiec 1980-styczen 1982. Krakow: Wydawnictwo Literackie (2002) 137.
[13] See for example “CPSU CC Politburo Report on Topics for Discussion with the Polish Leadership, September 3, 1980.” In: Paczkowski, Andrzej and Malcolm Byrne (eds.). (2007) 83-86.
[14] For more details, see Dudek, Antoni and Krzysztof Madej (eds.) O stanie wojennym w Sejmowej Komisjii Odpowiedzialnosci Konstytucyjnej. Sprawozdanie komisji i wniosek mniejszosci wraz z ekspertami i opiniami historykow. Warsaw: Instytut Pamieci Narodowej, Komisja Scigania Zbrodni Przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu (1997).
[15] “Meeting of CK PUWP Politburo on August 29, 1980.” In: Kropka, Boguslaw and Grzegorz Majchrzak (eds.). (2001) 13.
[16] Ibid.
[17] See “Decree on the Martial Law from 12 December 1981.” In: Walichnowski, Tadeusz (ed.). Stan wojenny w Polsce: Dokumenty i materialy archiwalne, 1981-1983. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Comandor (2001) 24.
[18] According to a poll conducted by the Polish Center for the Study of Public Opinion (TNS OBOP) on December 13, 2006, a majority of Poles deemed the imposition of the martial law justified, with 60% believing that it had prevented a Soviet military intervention, and 50% believing that it had prevented a civil war. “TNS OBOP: Stan wojenny dzieli Polaków. ” In: Gazeta Wyborcza, December 13, 2006. http://wyborcza.pl/1,77062,3788063.html. Accessed July 26, 2012. These poll results did not change significantly during subsequent years, including 2011.
[19] On December 16, 1980, police supported by the army opened fire on striking workers in the Wujek mine, killing 7 and wounding 300. See Paczkowski, Andrzej. Droga do “mniejszego zla”: Strategia i taktyka obozu wladzy, lipiec 1980-styczen 1982. Krakow: Wydawnictwo Literackie (2002) 282.
[20] Kuklinski’s sentence was commuted subsequently to 25 years imprisonment, and later reversed, although he was not exonerated till 1996; according to a Polish ex-prime minister, Adam Michnik, this rehabilitation was one of the unofficial conditions set by the Clinton administration for its agreement not to oppose Poland’s accession to NATO (see Adam Michnik’s blog and his article in Transitions, dated September 15, 1998, retrieved from http://www.foia.cia.gov/MartialLawKuklinski/1998-09-05a.pdf). Accessed July 26, 2012.
[21] See “Message from Ryszard Kuklinski on Impending Warsaw Pact Invasion, December 4, 1980.” In: Paczkowski, Andrzej and Malcolm Byrne (eds.) (2007) 139-140.
[22] “CIA Alert Memorandum, “Poland”, December 3, 1980.” Ibid., 138.
[23] See “Report of the Czechoslovak Army Chief of Staff to the Minister of National Defense, December 3, 1980.” Ibid., 136-137.
[24] See “Minutes of the U.S. Special Coordination Committee Meeting, December 7, 1980.” Ibid., 162-164. In fact, Jimmy Carter issued such warnings already earlier, for example in September of 1980: See “President Carter’s Letter to the Allies on Poland, September 1, 1980.” Ibid., 81-82.
[25] See “CIA Situation Report, “Poland”, December 8, 1980.” Ibid., 165-166.
[26] Understandably, in December of 1980 NATO was drawing up contingency plans for a potential Soviet military intervention, but it stressed that there were no indications that the Soviet Union was actually preparing one. Movements of Soviet troops that were placed on alert were largely interpreted as a pressure tactic aimed at Jaruzelski. http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_archives/20111130_19801201_3530.12.02-SHINBM-S-267-80_1_DEC_80.pdf Accessed July 26, 2012. On December 13 and 14, 1981, NATO Situation Center assessments do not corroborate a threat of Soviet invasion or movements of Soviet troops, but predict that Jaruzelski might use this argument to justify the imposition of martial law. See http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_archives/20111130_19811214_AS_81_96.pdf and http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_archives/20111130_19811213_AS_81_95.pdf
[27] See especially Mastny, Vojtech. The Soviet non-Invasion of Poland in 1980/81 and the End of the Cold War. Working Paper No. 23. Cold War International History Project, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, (September 1998).
[28] German Democratic Republic in 1953, Czechoslovakia in 1968.
[29] Polish troops directly intervened in Czechoslovakia, but not in the German Democratic Republic.
[30] The sources pointed to by Mastny include the minutes of CPSU Politburo sessions of October 29 and 31, 1980 (in his Working Paper No. 23, “The Soviet non-Invasion of Poland in 1980/81 and the End of the Cold War”, 10), and an “emergency meeting of party secretaries in Moscow on December 4-5, 1980” (in his chapter “The Warsaw Pact as History.” In: Mastny, Vojtech and Malcolm Byrne (eds.) (2005) 51). For a comparison see “Minutes of the Warsaw Pact Leadership Meeting in Moscow, December 5, 1980.” In: Paczkowski, Andrzej and Malcolm Byrne (eds.) (2007) 141-161, as well as the pertinent sessions of the Soviet Politburo in Kramer, Mark (ed.). (1999) 44-59.
[31] “Minutes of the Warsaw Pact Leadership Meeting in Moscow, December 5, 1980.” In: Paczkowski, Andrzej and Malcolm Byrne (eds.) (2007) 141-161.
[32] The Suslov Commission was established on August 25, 1980 by the CC CPSU as a special commission on the Polish crisis. Mikhail Suslov, a Politburo veteran and an ideological hardliner, was appointed its head. The Suslov File was donated to the Polish government on the occasion of the state visit of President Boris Yeltsin in August 1993. See Krawczyk, Andrzej (ed.) (1993).
[33] Although Brezhnev suggested in October of 1980: “Perhaps it will indeed be necessary to impose martial law,” Ustinov put the matter quite bluntly: “If they don’t impose martial law, the matter will be very complicated and will become still more serious. In the army there is a good deal of vacillation. But we’ve prepared the Northern Group of Forces, which is in full combat readiness.” Yet the topic of a military intervention was not taken up by the rest of the Politburo at all. In fact, shortly thereafter Gromyko stated, “As concerns the imposition of a state of emergency in Poland, this must be kept in reserve as a measure to protect socialist gains.” Yet despite the fact that, at that time, Gromyko’s view was that “We simply cannot lose Poland,” Brezhnev, supported by Andropov, Suslov, and Ustinov stressed the importance of creating Polish “self-defense detachments.” Suslov also complained about Gomulka’s disregard of Soviet advice against using firearms against the workers (in December of 1970). See “Minutes of the Session of the CPSU CC Politburo, 29 October 1980.” In: Kramer, Mark (ed.) (April 1999) 46-49. Preparing troops for an event of emergency was proper military procedure, but neither at that time nor thereafter was military intervention seriously considered. Even a Polish domestic crackdown was not a desirable solution in the eyes of the great majority of the Politburo.
[34] As of December 13, 1981, 88 military officers were among the highest ranks of the Polish government, including 11 ministers or vice-ministers. The military also dominated the party leadership, and after December 13, 7400 military officers were appointed to mid-level administrative and industrial managerial positions. See Paczkowski, Andrzej (2006) 125-127.
[35] See for example the conversation between Jaruzelski’s aide, General Florian Siwicki, and the Supreme Commander of the Warsaw Pact, Soviet Marshal Victor Kulikov, on December 11, 1981, as recorded by Kulikov’s personal adjutant, Lieutenant-General Victor Ivanovich Anoshkin. On that occasion, Jaruzelski’s message seems to threaten Polish secession from the Warsaw Pact if Soviet political, economic, and military support was not forthcoming. “Document 17.9: Jaruzelski and Martial Law in Poland, 1981.” In: Hanhimaki, Jussi and Odd Arne Westad (eds.). The Cold War: A History in Documents and Eyewitness Accounts. New York: Oxford University Press (2004) 571-573. Also, “Andropov: The Polish leaders talk about military aid from the fraternal countries. However, we must firmly stick to your [Brezhnev] line – not to insert our troops into Poland. Ustinov: In general, one must say it is impossible to insert our troops into Poland. They, the Poles, are not ready to receive our troops. […]”. “Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Meeting on Rusakov’s Trip to Eastern Europe, October 29, 1981.” In: Paczkowski, Andrzej and Malcolm Byrne (eds.) (2007) 397.
