In effect, neither the international community nor regional states are enthusiastic about opposing the Kurds’ oppressions. Hence, it is not difficult to see that the emergence of a new and particularly unruly state is not desirable for either regional countries (which will be forced to cede part of their territories to Kurdistan) or the international community. However, such a possibility is very real. If the re-division of the Middle East gains momentum, Kurds will inevitably create autonomous areas in Syria, Iran, and Turkey (as they did in Iraq). The creation of autonomous areas leading to their unification into an independent state is just one step. Meanwhile, without any traditions of statecraft, a Kurdish state can turn into an uncontrolled and even unpredictable force in the Middle East (with a population exceeding roughly thirty million people). Given such unpromising prospects for the international community, it is hardly plausible that the latter’s support to Iraqi Kurds in the creation of autonomy had far-reaching goals of establishing a “Free Kurdistan” as some analysts suggest.[13] Any support, rather, was aimed at solving a concrete tactical issue: a complete weakening of Iraq and possibly its partition. Does this mean that the international community is not yet ready to place strategic importance on solving the Kurdish issue? It seems so.

Syria

Likewise, the international community currently is trying to solve similar tactical issues in Syria, though it hardly wants to see this country partitioned. Weakening Syria’s ruling regime, isolating it, restraining its ability for independent decision-making and therefore carrying out one’s own policy in the region—all this is quite desirable for major political actors in the Middle East and the global powers behind them. But this is all they want. Otherwise, the complete destruction of Syria and its partition would give greater leeway for Turkey’s geopolitical maneuvers, which is premature and unconstructive, as Ankara has not determined its geopolitical orientation in the Middle East. In other words, Turkey has not yet decided if it will remain the West’s strategic partner and therefore oppose Iran seriously or if, as it declares, it will carry out an independent policy aimed at regional leadership. The second option would undoubtedly put Arabs on alert, primarily those in Riyadh and Cairo. They want to weaken Syria and make it their satellite in the unfolding big regional “game,” but by no means at the expense of strengthening Turkey.

As the Syrian regime demonstrates steadiness and more importantly a resolve to struggle for the country’s unity, the material and financial support reportedly provided by Saudi Arabia to Syrian opposition will shrink. Hence, Turkey may soon be left alone in doing the “dirty work” of adding fuel to the fire of the Syrian uprising, which may pit Ankara against the rest of the Arab world.

Even the Western powers have abandoned the idea of active assistance to the Syrian revolution, let alone consideration of overthrowing Bashar al-Assad’s regime through military intervention. In effect, with Syria, the West’s protest has been confined to diplomatic démarches (recalling ambassadors from Damask). The assumption that this might be the result of Russia’s and China’s positions on Syrian issue is implausible. (Neither Moscow’s nor Beijing’s nor anyone else’s objection shook Washington’s determination to attack Iraq in March 2003.) Rather, Western policymakers well understand that further weakening Arab states will strengthen Turks and Iranians. This would not only create a growing geopolitical disparity in the Middle East that may seriously undermine the region’s fragile stability, but it could reduce the Western influence over the region significantly. It is perhaps for this reason that the West is currently trying to restore equilibrium between the major powers in the Middle East. If anything, the United States has recently resumed $1.3 billion in annual military aid to Egypt.[14]

Russia’s and China’s Positions

The final point we would like to touch on is Russia’s and in part China’s position in Middle Eastern affairs. It would be incorrect to suppose that Russia vetoed the UN Security Council resolution on Syria because Moscow wants to get its debt repaid for arms supplies. Kremlin policymakers well understand that Damascus will hardly ever pay this debt, as it has not paid Egypt, Iraq, and Libya for similar arms supplies. Russia’s position is rather demonstrative and expresses its solidarity with the Chinese. Both Moscow and Beijing are striving to demonstrate their resolve and readiness to oppose the “color” revolutions in the zones of their traditional influence, not to mention their own states. This is extremely important for China given the problems with Tibet and the provinces with Muslim populations (namely perpetual separatist tendencies in these areas). So too is the case for Russia, which—along with numerous domestic problems (including the permanently insurgent North Caucasus)—needs to prevent socio-political explosions in the whole post-Soviet space. However, the greatest source of concern for the Russians in this connection is post-Soviet Central Asia. If the Arab-Spring-style revolutions spill over to the Central Asian states, Russian ideologues and politicians argue, Russia will have a number of hostile Islamic states at its southern borders, which are practically unprotected.

However, let us return to the Middle East. It will definitely take much time, if it will ever happen, to unravel the tangle of problems there. This gives rise to perhaps the most important question of our work: are the ongoing processes in the Middle East genuinely aimed at maintaining permanent tension and stimulating insoluble problems in the region? We do not have an answer to this question yet. Perhaps we will after some time. However, history suggests that relative stability in the Middle East has been achieved solely under the rule of empires, be they Persian, Roman, Arab, Ottoman, or British.

Notes

[1] Michael L. Ross, (2001), Does Oil Hinder Democracy? World Politics, Volume 53, Issue 03, pp 325 – 361.

[2] Paula Russo, (2004) Great Arab Popular Socialist Libyan Jamahyria, Stable URL: http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/caimed/unpan019179.pdf (accessed on March 10, 2012).

[3] Peter Iskanderov (12.26.2011), Управляемый хаос (Manageable Chaos), “STOLETIE”, Stable URL: http://www.stoletie.ru/geopolitika/upravlajemyj_khaos_2011-12-26.htm (accessed on March 8, 2012).

Anup Shah, (12.06.2011), Middle East, Global Issues, Stable URL: http://www.globalissues.org/issue/103/middle-east (accessed on March 9, 2012).

Michael Chossudovski, (2011), Toward a World War III Scenario, Global Research Publishers, Montreal.

[4] Wyatt Andrews, (02.27.2012), Clinton: Arming Syrian rebels could help al Qaeda, CBS EVENING NEWS, Stable URL: http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-18563_162-57386279/clinton-arming-syrian-rebels-could-help-al-qaeda/ (accessed on March 10, 2012).

[5] Akop Nazaretian, (1994), Столкновение цивилизаций” и “Конец истории (“The Clash of Civilizations” and “The End of History”), “Obshestvennie nauki i sovremennost”, № 6. С. 140-146. Stable URL: http://ecsocman.hse.ru/data/347/412/1218/014Akop_NAZARETYaN.pdf (accessed on March 1, 2012).

Andrey Medvedev, (02.28.2012), “Евгений Примаков: США оказались в одной лодке с “Аль-Каидой (Evgeni Primakov: United States appeared in the same boat with Al-Qaeda), VESTI.RU, Stable URL: http://www.vesti.ru/videos?vid=399432&cid=9 (accessed on March 10, 2012).

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