As for the second line of argument, it urges us to ask the question, if the West has financed and organized the recent Arab revolts in order to modernize and democratize the Middle East, why then did it not start with Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Oman; namely, with genuinely medieval and, all the more, hereditary “Oriental despotisms” that possess roughly half of the world’s discovered energy reserves? If the reason is these countries’ pledges to reform their political systems, modernize social life, and stay loyal to the West indefinitely, that is out of the realm of “Realpolitik” and thus cannot be considered a satisfactory answer. Rather, the oil monarchs made an offer the West could not refuse, specifically to reshape the entire Arab world in its image and likeness; in other words, to make it politically loyal, trouble-free in economic and financial terms, and, most importantly, religiously autonomous, especially from Iran and its bid for religious domination in the Islamic world.

The last point explains a lot in terms of the West’s readiness to accept the inevitable ascendance of orthodox Islamic movements and organizations to power in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and possibly Syria. One may assume that once the Islamists come to power in these countries, their transformation into fundamentalist regimes that stifle every sign of democracy and civil freedoms will be inevitable. However, that hardly bothers Western policymakers. What is genuinely important to the West is that the process will result in the division of the Islamic world into at least two antagonistic camps: pro-Western, led by Saudis and other regional monarchies, and anti-Western, where Iran will stand as a dominant power.

Thus, having at one extreme theocratic Iran, capable of forging a new coalition of fundamental forces and movements, and at the other Saudi Arabia, successfully preaching its own version of orthodox Islam (Wahhabism), we may soon observe a serious crisis of orthodox Islam.

In sum, the situation is exactly opposite to that suggested by proponents of “the clash of civilizations” concept. In the not-distant past, the latter were bullying the world with their premise that the West’s policy in the Middle East was aimed at consolidating the Islamic world in order to turn it into a real and dangerous opponent to “Western civilization” (in Samuel Huntington’s term). Without such confrontation, which must stimulate revision of religious tolerance, the chimera of multiculturalism, liberal migration policy, and adoption of tough mobilization models of economic and financial development, “Western civilization” will not be able to cope with increasing economic crises and moral, spiritual, and cultural degradation, and it will soon fall.[5]

However, it is worth reiterating that by coordinating and encouraging changes of secular regimes in a set of Arab countries, the West is by no means consolidating but rather splitting up the Islamic world. As for Saudi Arabia, it has assumed the role of general financier in this political-military game. Riyadh is lobbying this process in international organizations from the United Nations to the Arab League, hiring and arming opponents to the secular regimes in the Arab states, organizing and coordinating vast propaganda campaigns in the world mass media, and so forth.

Undoubtedly, Riyadh is pursuing its own agenda in this political undertaking. As we noted earlier, one of its basic purposes is to impede Iran’s bid for spiritual leadership in the Islamic world. Another not less important purpose is an aspiration to revive an all-Arabian national idea with apparently far-reaching plans of becoming the leader of the Arab world. Indeed, the weakness of the all-Arabian national idea is among the reasons of disunity in the Arab world. Instead, what today uniting roughly 400 million Arabs in more than a dozen countries between the Atlantic and Indian Oceans is the hatred of Israel.

So how long will this process continue? While the interests of the West and the Saudi monarchs coincide, and while their plans regarding Middle Eastern geopolitics are being fulfilled without contradicting one another. What is crystal clear is that in the foreseeable future, we will witness substantial changes in the geopolitical situation of the Middle East. And it is hardly plausible that these changes will be acceptable to all regional actors, including the architects of the Arab Spring. We address these issues in the second part of our “pragmatic point of view.”

PART II

The first part of our article was aimed at revealing the actual organizers and sponsors of the Arab revolutions and the goals they pursued. The analysis of the events in North Africa and the Middle East provides us enough ground to suppose that the Arab Spring was organized with direct involvement of Persian Gulf monarchies and with the approval of the Western powers. This initiative was aimed at:

  • Division of the Islamic world into at least two antagonistic camps, which would impede the formation of a somewhat anti-Western political-religious union, and
  • Revival of an all-Arabian national idea with far-reaching geopolitical goals.

In the second part of our work, we will mostly focus on the question: What consequences may the social, political, and other processes in the Arab East have in regional and perhaps global terms, and how will these consequences influence the states of the Greater Middle East and the whole “Islamic Crescent” stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to the Great Wall of China? Let us start with the most apparent developments.

Arab Countries

The countries of Libya, Yemen, Iraq, and possibly Syria will be actively splitting for the foreseeable future. The Libyan oil-rich province of Cyrenacia has already declared its autonomy from the central government and has started demarking new territorial boundaries with barbed wire.[6] A similar secessionist movement was sparked recently in the south of the country.[7] Yemen has failed to become a unified state. Its expected division into North Yemen and South Yemen currently seems unreal, and it will probably split into more than two de facto independent entities. Iraq has practically divided into three parts and maintains the status of a unitary state only in diplomatic documents. Egypt, according to many analysts, has all the preconditions for splitting into more than two separate entities.[8] The same sources suggest that the Egyptian army’s refusal to accept such a perspective was the central reason that prompted it to assume power in this country for an interim period.

However, the above-mentioned transformations do not bother the genuine initiators and financiers of these processes, which, according to widespread opinion, are Saudi Arabia and other oil-rich monarchies of the Persian Gulf.[9] Moreover, splitting the Arab states is exactly what these countries were striving to achieve because of the obvious benefits they can derive from it. The benefits are primarily political (or geopolitical) and in part economic. The disintegration of regional countries and the formation of smaller entities will make the latter much more susceptible to external political influence and therefore will ease the task of reviving the all-Arabian national idea. So too it is with oil. Influencing the oil policy of smaller and consequently weaker political entities will require lesser diplomatic and political efforts. It is also worth mentioning that the oil-rich monarchies can derive huge benefit in terms of regional domination and participation in large-scale geopolitical projects and maneuvers. We will discuss the Saudis’ and their satellites’ benefits more thoroughly throughout this work. Meanwhile, it is more important to pay attention to what may hinder the plans of those who are projecting to redraw the spheres of influence in the region and possibly the map of the Greater Middle East. The first and foremost of these is Iraq.

Iraq

As we have mentioned earlier, the division of this country into three parts is gaining momentum. As a result, the possibility of new states emerging in southern, central, and northern Iraq is becoming more and more realistic. Northern Iraq—populated predominantly by Kurds—needs to be examined in connection with the larger and multifaceted Kurdish problem. For this reason, we left this issue for the latter part of our work. Yet, it is more important currently to focus on southern Iraq. The developments around this part of the country (richer with hydrocarbons) may influence regional geopolitics greatly. Although this area is populated mainly by Arabs, they are Shiites and recognize Tehran as their spiritual (religious) center. Hence, one may infer that if a new state emerges in the south of Iraq, it will most likely be oriented toward Iran politically and thus may be influenced by Tehran significantly, or even fall under the latter’s control. It is worth reiterating that such a perspective is not unrealistic given the weakness of the Iraqi central government and above all the fact that religious identity prevails over ethnic identity in this region. Moreover, Iraqi Shiites have not forgotten the oppression and persecution they were exposed to by Sunni Arabs under Saddam’s reign.

This is a worrisome issue for the Persian Gulf monarchies. Needless to say, the emergence of an oil-rich, pro-Iranian state in the south of Iraq will significantly change the regional balance of forces in Tehran’s favor. Hence, the Gulf monarchies cannot underestimate this imminent threat when waging their regional initiatives, nor can this factor be underestimated by Iran. Tehran well understands the power of this trump card in projecting its regional policy.

Iran

Although it sounds paradoxical, Iran may find itself in a winning position as a result of the Arab Spring. First of all, one of Tehran’s regional archrivals, Egypt, was considerably weakened without much effort by Iran. Despite being a secular state, Egypt had claimed the position of spiritual leader in the Middle East and was promoting its claims by significant financial expenditures aimed at religious education in neighboring states and even in the post-Soviet space.[10] Moreover, Cairo was effectively resisting the attempts of Arab states to build up an anti-Israeli political-military coalition. Using its large and well-equipped army and strong secret service, Egypt was checking the activities of Islamic radicals and extremists, including the Saudi Wahhabites and the Iran-sponsored military-religious organizations.