North Korean leaders were likely disturbed by two aspects of the summit’s outcome.  First, they must have been unpleasantly surprised by Obama’s remarks at the joint press conference about how he and Hu had agreed that “further provocations” must be avoided.  This strongly suggested that Hu was endorsing the view that the Cheonan and Yeongpyeong attacks constituted North Korean “provocations.”  North Korean leaders have denied any involvement in the Cheonan attack and have claimed that the Yeongpyeong bombardment was a legitimate self-defense measure against South Korean provocations.  North Korean leaders may have interpreted the joint press conference remarks to mean that Hu intended to increase pressure upon them to proceed with inter-Korea talks.  Indeed, this may be why North Korea moved so quickly to call for military talks after the summit was over.  Also, the joint statement’s mention of enacting measures to facilitate the 6 party talks and its call for “sincere and constructive talks” between the two Koreas were clearly concessions to the South Koreans, who emphasize these issues and this particular language.  That North Korea proposed just one day after the summit to hold military level talks with South Korea and proposed five days after the summit to hold military level talks with the U.S., suggests the North’s sense of urgency in gaining some control over events after the summit.

Faced with North Korea’s persistent calls for talks as well as the explicit mention of the need for inter-Korea talks prior to the 6 party talks by the U.S.-China joint communiqué issued at the conclusion of the Obama-Hu summit meeting of January 19, 2011, the South Korean government agreed to set up military level talks.  However, the preliminary meeting held to arrange a high level military meeting broke down on February 9 after a day and a half when the North Korean delegation walked out as both sides could not agree on prioritizing agenda items.  Whereas South Korea insisted on placing the issue of apologies for the two attacks before other issues, North Korea insisted that all issues be discussed simultaneously with the emphasis placed on the issue of the reduction of military tensions.

At first glance, it seems puzzling that North Korea would walk out of the talks given its view of the inter-Korea talks as a stepping stone to direct bilateral North Korea-U.S. talks.  However, North Korean officials may have reached the conclusion during negotiations with the South that progress during the inter-Korea talks, stipulated by the U.S. as a precondition for bilateral North Korea-U.S. talks, was impossible given the South’s unwavering insistence upon calling North Korea to account for its military provocations.  Since the breakdown of the talks, South Korea has shown no sign of softening its position.  Despite its hopes for a reduction in tension with and the initiation of dialogue with North Korea, the U.S. maintains its position that the resumption of the 6 party talks as well as bilateral U.S.-North Korea talks depend upon progress in the inter-Korea talks.

In late April of 2011, former U.S. president Jimmy Carter traveled to Pyongyang with other members of the Elder Group in an attempt to play a mediating role on the denuclearization and humanitarian aid issues.  Although his requests for a meeting with Chairman Kim Jong Il and Kim Jong Un were rebuffed, Carter somewhat controversially carried a message from Kim Jong Il to the South Korean government stating that Kim stood ready to meet anywhere with any of the parties to the 6 party talks without preconditions, and specifically with South Korea on any level and about any subjects.   The South Korean government dismissed the message as an insincere and empty gesture.  Even before President Carter arrived in Seoul, the South Korean Foreign Minister Kim wondered aloud why North Korea was sending a message through a private third party when so many official channels of communication existed, and also stated that he didn’t expect much to come of Carter’s visit as a private citizen to Pyongyang.  At a press conference in Seoul, President Carter was asked whether he had raised the issue of human rights during his visit to Pyongyang.  He responded that outsiders cannot force change in internal matters relating to human rights and added that the most important human rights issue in North Korea was the provision of adequate food to its people.  He then declared that the U.S. and South Korea “deliberately withhold food aid to the North Korean people because of political and military issues” and that this constituted a human rights violation.  Carter also conveyed that the North Korean military expressed deep regrets for the loss of life connected to the Yeongpyeongdo incident, although they stopped short of an apology.  News commentators in South Korea and the U.S. characterized Carter’s personal diplomacy as biased and naïve.  It was telling that President Lee did not grant Carter’s request for a meeting. Carter’s visit has had little impact on the prospects for inter-Korea talks.  Despite the message entrusted to Carter by the North Korean leader, at the time of this writing, North Korea has not made a formal proposal directly to South Korea regarding inter-Korea talks.

What are the prospects for the resumption of inter-Korea talks?  There is a strong sense among South Korean officials that North Korea must not be allowed to commit military attacks with impunity.  While South Korean officials think that it is unlikely that North Korea will meet South Korea’s preconditions fully, they will not move ahead without this because they are unwilling to face the disapproval that the South Korean public would almost certainly express.  The possibility that North Korea may face political instability and regime collapse in the near future, resulting in a united Korea on South Korean terms, also discourages South Korean officials from pursuing a policy of reconciliation and accommodation at the present time. However, depending upon a possible policy shift by the U.S. toward a flexible stance, which seems to be happening, the Lee Myung Bak government might nevertheless be open to pursuing a policy of reconciliation with the North, especially if a compromise solution could be found which allowed South Korea to claim that its preconditions had been met.

While the Obama administration would like to see progress in inter-Korea talks so that it can move into a dialogue phase with North Korea, manage relations with that nation at a tolerable risk level, and forestall the enhancement of its nuclear and missile capabilities, it is unwilling to put any public pressure on President Lee because it might cause President Lee domestic difficulty and antagonize South Korean public opinion.  Indeed, a senior State Department official said at a press conference following Carter’s visit to Pyongyang that he rejected Carter’s characterization of the food aid issue as a human rights issue, and that the U.S. and South Korea are unified in their stance on inter-Korea and U.S.-North Korea talks. While the U.S. maintains its public support for South Korea’s stance, Secretary of State Clinton and other senior officials are reported to have tried in vain to persuade President Lee to show greater flexibility.  It should also be noted that the U.S. has lately been moving toward the provision of food aid to North Korea despite continued misgivings on the part of the South Korean government. After consulting with South Korea, the U.S. dispatched  in late May a mission led by Ambassador Robert King, US special envoy on North Korean human rights, to Pyongyang to discuss food aid and other humanitarian issues. The official US denial notwithstanding, such a move by the U.S. is viewed by the officials of South Korea, Japan, and North Korea as the beginning of the US- North Korea political dialogue.

On his visit to Seoul in late April of 2011, Special Representative Wu Dawei expressed China’s support for the 3-stage formula, wherein inter-Korea talks are followed by bilateral U.S.-North Korea talks, which are followed by renewed 6 party talks.   At this moment, however, the prospects for inter-Korea talks are dim.  Neither Korea has shown an inclination to be flexible on the issue of apologies. Also, while North Korea appears willing to recommit to denuclearization in principle, it is not clear what kinds of concrete actions it is prepared to take to demonstrate its sincerity on this issue.  Then, on June 1, 2011, North Korea claimed that at a secret meeting held with South Korea on May 9, the latter had pleaded for a series of summit meetings with the North and that despite this, North Korean would no longer deal with South Korea and threatened to launch an all-out military retaliation for South Korea’s use of the portraits of Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il and Kim Jong Un as targets for shooting practice at a few South Korean army reservist training camps. The statement, issued in the name of the National Defense Commission, condemned the South Korean action as constituting the disparagement of the “supreme dignity” of their nation, i.e., its top leadership, and vowed to retaliate for the “heinous crime.”  North Korea is demanding South Korea’s apologies and punishment of South Korean officials responsible for these actions.  While North Korea’s outpouring of outrages may reflect genuine sentiments by the North Korean leaders and would impede the reconciliation with the South, South Korean analysts are suggesting that such manifestation of outrages may also be a function of competitive demonstration of the loyalty to the top leader on the part of the North Korean officials.

Still, there are formidable obstacles that must be overcome at every one of the three stages of the 3-stage formula.  Ultimately, North Korea’s core demand that the U.S. cease its policy of hostility includes the demand for a virtual abrogation of the U.S.-South Korea relationship, a demand no U.S. administration will seriously entertain.  Then there is the issue of whether and when the 6 party talks will resume.  Since the presidential statement of the UN Security Council was issued on July 9, 2010 concerning the Cheonan incident, the Chinese government has exerted persistent diplomatic efforts to get the U.S., South Korea and North Korea to agree to resume the 6 party talks.  Its objectives are to reassert its dominant role in Korean affairs, prevent the collapse of the North Korean regime, and forestall any U.S., South Korean and Japanese countermeasures against North Korea which might heighten tensions in the region, thereby adversely affecting China’s economic and developmental goals and strengthening U.S. military and political influence in the Asia Pacific region to the detriment of Chinese interests.

One intriguing question is whether North Korean officials really want to return to the 6 party talks.  Until December 2010, North Korea consistently stated that it would not return to the 6 party talks unless its preconditions were met.  These preconditions include assurances from the U.S.—concretized through bilateral U.S.-North Korea talks—about the removal of sanctions and the achievement of a peace agreement.  These are precisely the conditions which Kim Jong Il stipulated in his meeting with Chinese premier Wen Jiabao in October 2009.   It is significant that even in the most recent official statement issued by the North Korean government on May 26, 2011 following the summit between Chairman Kim and President Hu in Beijing on May 25, 2011, there is a conspicuous absence of any mention of North Korea’s willingness to return to the 6 party talks.  According to the statement, Chairman Kim shares a view with Hu that North Korea’s adherence to the objective of denuclearization of Korea—of all of the Korean peninsula, not just North Korea—and the pursuit of the peaceful resolution of issues through dialogue such as the 6 party talks are consistent with the overall interests of the Northeast Asia region.  This reflects no change from North Korea’s prior position on the subject of 6 party talks and contrasts sharply with the China News Agency report that Chairman Kim had argued for an early resumption of the 6 party talks at the summit meeting.

Some academic and media commentators in the West assume that North Korea is genuinely interested in resuming the 6 party talks, and there is some basis for this interpretation.  First, North Korean officials are aware that the U.S., and especially China, favor the resumption of talks, so they want to at least project the image that they are ready to comply and work toward denuclearization.  Second, resumption of the 6 party talks would reduce the degree of North Korea’s international isolation, potentially leading to the reduction of sanctions currently in force and enhancing North Korea’s international trade and economic relations.  It might also assist in getting South Korea to modify its hard line position of denying economic aid to North Korea. All of this would presumably facilitate North Korea’s declared objective of becoming a “powerful and prosperous” nation by 2012.