What Alam writes here is largely true, with one small caveat, which is necessary to point out in order to counter possible distortions by critics.   Members of the Israel lobby are not simply agents of the Israeli government who mechanically follow orders, analogous to American Soviet agents of the 1930s and 1940s.  In contrast to the robotic agents of Stalinist Russia, American Jews freely promote policies that they believe will serve the needs of the Jewish state, which may not always be in harmony with actual Israeli government policy.  For example, the neoconservative-developed “Clean Break” agenda of 1996, which called for Israel to pursue an offensive war policy, was critical of the policies of the Labor governments and was not implemented by the incoming Netanyahu-led  Likud government. Similarly, the neoconservatives encouraged Israel to widen its 2006 invasion of Lebanon to bring Syria and Iran into the conflict, which the Olmert government refrained from doing.  Finally, the neoconservatives developed the idea of U.S.-directed regime change in Iraq by military means,  and the Sharon government came to support it. (It is true that somewhat similar strategies to weaken Israel’s enemies–though with Israel taking the military action–had been broached in the past by Israeli strategic thinkers, as I discuss in my book, “The Transparent Cabal: The Neoconservative Agenda, War in the Middle East, and the National Interest of Israel.”)

Returning to the overall impact on the United States, Alam emphasizes that in backing Israel, the United States has acted contrary to its own national interests, as the American foreign policy elite had realized at the time of Israel’s creation in the years immediately following the end of World War II.  Over the years, America’s support for Israel has alienated the Arab people, brought about the rise of anti-American Islamic radicalism, led to unnecessary wars, and involved massive economic costs.  And the dire problems caused by this policy are far from over. “The costs that the United States—and the rest of the Western world—might incur in the future are likely to be much greater.” (p. 219)

The costs for the United States are especially immense, in Alam’s view, because no peace settlement with Israel is possible since the issue transcends the grievances of the Palestinians. He writes that “If the Zionists could somehow displace the Palestinians without directly impacting their neighbors—say, by transporting all the Palestinians to Argentina—the Islamicate would still resist this intrusion.” (p. 192)

Alam is quite different from many other critics of Israel who believe that if Israel would pursue a more moderate, conciliatory policy toward its Arab neighbors, peace would prevail. Rather, Alam seems to be saying that the creation of a Jewish state on what had been Islamic territory is simply unacceptable to the neighboring Muslims. “When these settlers create their own exclusionary state,” he contends, “they declare war not only against the people they displace. They declare a more general war, entailing violence against the demography, cartography, geopolitics, and the historical memory of the region on which they impose themselves.” (p. 192)

So as not to be misinterpreted, it should be noted that Alam strictly states that the Middle East Muslims will not accept the existence of a Jewish “exclusionary state”; he does not write that the Muslims hold  that Jewish people should now be removed from the area.  Thus, only an intentional misreading of what he writes could give fodder to the Zionist propaganda that Israel’s Islamic enemies intend to bring about the genocide of Jews.  What Alam seems to be indicating is that the position of Middle East Muslims toward Israel is comparable to the position taken by Black Africans towards the former white-ruled South Africa.  Black Africans opposed a white exclusionary state, but Black voting, which meant Black majority rule, did not mean the forcible removal of white people.  But undoubtedly many Jews live in Israel only because it is a Jewish “exclusionary state” and would leave if it were not, just as many white South Africans have emigrated from South Africa since the onset of Black rule.

At the same time, it must be acknowledged that his view is close to being the mirror image of that of the Israeli Right, which also believes that Israel’s neighbors will never voluntarily accept peace with the Jewish state.  For the government of Israel and the Israel lobby are concerned about the acceptance of the current Jewish state, not simply the acceptance of the Jewish people per se.   Thus, Jabotinsky, the godfather of the Israeli right, called for the creation of an “iron wall” to protect the Jewish state—that the Jewish state’s  Arab neighbors had to be beaten into submission and thus forced to accept its existence. With this mindset, the neoconservatives believe that the Middle East must be reconfigured to allow for Israel’s security. As I point out in “The Transparent Cabal,” this view implies the weakening and fragmentation of Israel’s enemies, as brought out by Likud thinker Oded Yinon.   Of course, if the United States were to pursue this Israelocentric policy, it would entail never-ending warfare.

Alam, although regarding Israeli policy as having been very successful so far, does not assume an ultimate victory for Israel, which is not unreasonable given the demographics of the region. At the close of the book, Alam makes some allusions to the future, in which he is understandably somewhat vague, since this was not the focus of his book and like all mortals he cannot foretell the future. He refers to the possibility that Israel might “wither away”—due to demographics, a lack of will, and other factors—which, because of its close connection to the United States, could cause the latter country to “begin to wobble.” (p. 219)  Envisioned is a future in which the  United States would  lose its hegemony over Gulf oil, and the region would  be dominated not by another foreign power such as China or Russia, but by the native Islamicate. Since oil is a fungible commodity and is the Gulf region’s fundamental export, it would not seem to me that such a situation would cause any appreciable rise in cost for American consumers, since the price of oil for Americans is currently the same as for everyone else in the world.  To Americans other than ardent Zionists, war profiteers, and perhaps some non-competitive oil and oil infrastructure companies, such a future outlined by Alam, where the United States would not be involved in continual counterproductive warfare in the Middle East, should hardly seem dystopian.

All in all, it is difficult to disagree with the overall thrust of Alam’s analysis.  Everything fits together in a very logical fashion and would seem to be the most reasonable interpretation of the historical evidence, as pessimistic as it might appear to those who Pollyannishly believe that Israel and its neighbors could coexist in peaceful harmony. Obviously, the book’s themes will not make it popular in the mainstream, so it is unlikely to get the media attention it deserves. On the issue of Israel, it is difficult, if not impossible, to obtain any measure of popularity in the United States while expressing the unadulterated truth. But anyone interested in the latter would be advised to consult this book.