Despite the Zionist propaganda, Alam points out that individuals espousing the viewpoint of the U.S. foreign policy elite, who dominated the unelected positions in the State Department and the Defense Department, opposed the creation of Israel as contrary to American interests because it would deeply antagonize the Arab nations in the crucial Middle East, which they realized would become increasingly important as energy providers for the United States and its allies.  The elite were especially concerned that American support for Israel would radicalize the Arabs and turn them toward the Soviet Union.   Zionists, however, were able to exercise immense power in the political arena.  President Truman thus supported the creation of Israel “because the exigencies of electoral politics weighed more heavily than concerns about the long-term strategic costs of creating a Jewish state in Palestine.  Domestic politics had trumped the vital interests of the United States.” (p. 166)

None of this is to say that the Truman administration (or any other president’s administration) was willing to abandon an effort to maintain good relations with the Arabs.  In fact, Alam points out that after the 1948 elections, “Truman felt he had more latitude in resisting the domestic pressures of Zionism” (p. 166) and thus distanced the United States from Israel.

Israel realized that in order to get full United States government backing for its policies, it would need to do more than passively depend on the political support from the Zionist lobby.  Israel would have to take actions to affect the Middle East environment in such a way as to make itself appear valuable to the strategic interests of the United States.  Thus, Israel pursued the following strategy, as outlined by Alam.   Instead of making concessions to obtain peace with the Arabs, Israel strove to antagonize them.  “These provocations served a variety of Israeli objectives,” writes Alam. “They deepened Arab anger, radicalized Arab politics, and turned Arab nationalists against the United States.” (p. 174)   Particularly important were violent threats against Israel.  This heightened Arab belligerence toward Israel (induced by the latter’s provocations), however, was wholly rhetorical since the Arab states lacked the military strength to actually endanger the security of the Jewish state.

But Israel used these “hollow Arab threats to demand expanded military and economic assistance from the West.”  (p. 174) In response, the West, especially the United States, provided the requested aid. This, in turn, caused Arab hostility to the West to intensify, and, consequently, some Arab states began to seek support from the Soviet Union. Then Israel could more realistically present itself as the West’s only reliable friend in the Middle East in order to justify even greater support.  In essence, “Israel had manufactured the threats that would make it look like a strategic asset” (p. 218), writes Alam.  “Without Israel,” Alam maintains, “there was little chance that any of the Arab regimes would turn away from their dependence on the West.” (p. 171)

As the 1950s progressed, the United States would turn more toward Israel, but its support would often be covert so as not to antagonize the Arabs.  The move toward Israel was not as rapid as it might have been because President Eisenhower, having a strong base of popular support, could politically afford to buck the Israel lobby.  “The resurgence of the Israeli lobby,” Alam observes, “began during the Presidency of John Kennedy; from then onward the sky would be the limit.” (p. 177)

Israel would be able to prove its value to the United States in the Six Day War of 1967.  “It had now gained the gratitude of the Western world by greatly diminishing the Arab nationalist threat to their interests in the region,” writes Alam. (p. 181)  But, of course, any threat to Western interests had been initially caused by Israel.  Alam emphasizes that Israel’s 1967 victory did not create the special relationship between the United States and Israel but “only imparted fresh momentum to forces, ascendant since the late 1950s, that were pushing for a stronger U. S. commitment to Israel as a strategic asset.” (p. 206)  In fact, Alam views this special relationship as an inevitable result of Israel’s very creation, which  “would force the major actors to take the course that they did take over the subsequent decades.  This inexorable logic flowed from the simple brute fact that the West, led by the United States, could not abandon Israel.” (p. 206)

But the United States realized it could not maintain its strategic influence in the Middle East without a friendly relationship with the Arab world, which was being undermined by its support for Israel.  The United States thus sought to end the Arab-Israeli conflict by bringing about a comprehensive peace.

Israel’s position was quite different, however. “Should the Arab nationalist states make peace with Israel and abandon the Soviets, this would greatly diminish Israel’s value to the United States,” Alam astutely observes.  “Israel could not claim the privileges of a strategic asset if key Arab nationalist states—like Egypt and Syria—too joined the American camp.” (p. 186)

In essence, Alam’s view here is very different from that of Noam Chomsky and his epigones, who believe that Israel really is a true U.S. asset, serving to advance U.S. strategic and economic interests in the Middle East. (The strategic and economic interests, of course, are those of the U.S. ruling economic elite, not the American people as a whole.)  Alam, in contrast, claims that the U.S. relationship with Israel has not been of net benefit to the U.S.  elite.  Rather, by Israel’s taking actions that turn the rest of the Middle East against the United States—that is, harming U.S. imperial interests–the Israel lobby has been able to tout the Jewish state as America’s only reliable friend in the region.  Alam devotes a number of pages (pp. 197-205) to explicitly refuting the Chomsky thesis.

In contrast to America’s search for a compromise peace in the Middle East, “the Zionists increasingly shifted to the right in their rhetoric and their policies – and prepared for the inevitable war against the Palestinians and the neighboring Arabs.” (p. 207)

Alam maintains that this shift to a more overt militancy, however, did not represent a real change in Zionism, as liberal Zionists would like to believe, but rather a logical continuation of Zionist history.   “This shift was inevitable,” writes Alam, “as the Zionists confronted the central demand of their movement:  they could not establish a Jewish state in Palestine without the ethnic cleansing of Palestinians.” (p. 207)

This rightward shift took place both in Israel and in the leadership of Zionist groups in the United States. One leading rightist Zionist element in the United States was the neoconservatives, “a mostly Jewish elite group who sought to place American power in the service of Israel.” (p. 211)  Alam writes that “Over time, the Jewish neoconservatives cultivated close ties with right-wing Israeli politicians and ideologues; they often worked together in American and Israeli right-wing think tanks.  Together, they advocated placing the U.S. military behind Israel’s hegemonic ambitions in the Middle East.” (p. 211)  Alam briefly describes how the neocons brought about the United States invasion of  Iraq in 2003.

Alam addresses the intriguing question as to which is the leading partner, Israel or the Israel lobby in America.  Alam writes that “It would be unhistorical to see the rise of American Jewish power as a force in isolation from Israel.  The fortunes of the two have been deeply interconnected.” (p. 212)  But while the two are interconnected, Alam maintains that Israel “has directed the global Zionist enterprise.”  The American Jewish community has “shaped its institutions, values, and even alliances more and more to serve the needs of Israel.” (p. 212)