But it is simply inconceivable that mainstream sources like the Times would actually find “fit to print” such elementary alternatives.
Without reading further, the conclusion Kuperman would like his readers to draw (and here the headline, “There’s Only One Way to Stop Iran”, is relevant) is clear: obviously, we cannot acquiesce to Iran acquiring nuclear weapons; therefore the only logical choice is to bomb Iran.
To underscore the unacceptability of Iran obtaining the bomb, Kuperman employs a theme that should not be unfamiliar to Americans: “If Iran acquired a nuclear arsenal,” he writes, “the risks would simply be too great that it could become a neighborhood bully or provide terrorists with the ultimate weapon”.
He draws just short of saying that if we don’t bomb Iran, the consequences could come “in the form of a mushroom cloud”, the familiar official refrain prior to the invasion of Iraq – which had no nuclear program at all, much less a weaponized one (Kuperman states further in the article that this fact “eluded American intelligence until after the 2003 invasion”. U.S. intelligence analysts, we are apparently supposed to believe, never bothered themselves to read IAEA reports noting that the agency had completely dismantled Iraq’s nuclear program by the mid-90s).
And so we must bomb Iran. Now, “admittedly, aerial bombing might not work.” It could “backfire” by “undermining Iran’s political opposition, accelerating the bomb program or provoking retaliation against American forces and allies in the region.”
All three are credible consequences widely predicted among analysts. Iran may not have a nuclear weapons program now, but if it is bombed, the likelihood that it would withdraw from the NPT, move its nuclear weapons program underground, and begin work towards obtaining a nuclear deterrent to further such attacks would be increased in no inconsiderable measure.
Again, Iraq provides a useful lesson. It was a direct consequence of Israel’s bombing of Iraq’s Osirak reactor in 1981, according to the U.S.’s own intelligence assessments, that prompted Saddam Hussein to begin pursuing his nuclear program clandestinely and also to begin his pursuit to obtain nuclear weapons.
Kuperman actually mentions the Israeli attack on Iraq’s Osirak reactor to support his assertion that bombing Iran – the very thing he advocates – might actually result in Iran “accelerating” efforts to acquire a nuclear weapon, but he obscures the obvious lesson to be had from it by suggesting an opposite and much more dubious conclusion: that the bombing slowed down, rather than accelerated, Saddam’s efforts to obtain the bomb.
In other words, bombing Iran might predictably and admittedly result in the very thing the bombing would ostensibly be aimed at preventing. The obvious corollary is that the bombing would not really be carried out in order to prevent that end.
Again, further lessons from Iraq are instructive. Consider that the war ostensibly fought to make the world safer from WMD and to fight terrorism resulted in the single most probable situation, had Iraq actually had WMD, under which Saddam Hussein would have provided them to terrorists. Again, that was the assessment of the U.S. intelligence community prior to the invasion.
Fortunately, Iraq didn’t have WMD and so this never occurred. But among the direct consequences of the war that did occur was a considerable increase in the threat of terrorism, again according to the U.S.’s own intelligence assessments. Whereas prior to the invasion, terrorist attacks within Iraq were virtually unknown, since the war began, the Iraq people continue to be plagued by terrorism as a direct consequence of the war.
The war, analysts have observed, served as a virtual billboard for terrorist organizations to recruit individuals willing to commit acts of violence in response to U.S. foreign policy – just as U.S. support for Israeli crimes against the Palestinians was a principle causal factor for the 9/11 attacks, if we are to believe the stated grievances of the originally accused mastermind of those attacks himself.
Again, the corollary is obvious: the official reasons for committing such acts of aggression against foreign nations, if we presume leading policymakers are sane and rational, cannot possibly be the actual rationale for them. That is perfectly elementary, albeit a virtual heresy to actually point out in respectable circles.
The war against Iraq had nothing to do with WMD or terrorism. Equally elementary is the observation that U.S. policy towards Iran has nothing to do with preventing it from obtaining nuclear weapons.
A further example is NATO’s bombing campaign in 1999 against Yugoslavia, which was ostensibly carried out to end atrocities on the ground, but which instead resulted in a sharp escalation of the violence – a consequence of the bombing predicted by the NATO leadership.
Kuperman also happens to mention that campaign, but, again, as with his mention of Osirak, arrives at other conclusions. Here, ignoring perhaps the most obvious lessons from his own argument and examples, his conclusion is that “Iran’s atomic sites might need to be bombed more than once to persuade Tehran to abandon its pursuit of nuclear weapons.”
Bombing once won’t work, so Iran must be bombed repeatedly. This logic is akin to arguing that since poking a snake with a stick once might cause it to strike, it must be poked continually in order to prevent it from being able to do so.
Similarly, Kuperman draws other lessons from Iraq. “If nothing else,” he writes, “the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown that the United States military can oust regimes in weeks if it wants to.”
Indeed. But if we set aside intentional ignorance, other relevant lessons just might perhaps be drawn. Kuperman, rather like the Wizard of Oz telling Dorothy and friends to pay no attention to the man behind the curtain, goes to extraordinary efforts to deflect attention away from these, though.
Casting aside some of the most obvious lessons from Iraq, Kuperman, having acknowledged the, shall we say, “drawbacks” of his proposed solution, concludes simply that air strikes “are worth a try.”
One might note the rather cavalier attitude towards the use of violence against civilian targets for political ends (the very definition of “terrorism”), an incitement to violence that might raise questions about the nature of American intellectual culture, and the moral values (or lack thereof) of the intelligentsia, if we bother to ponder on the subject.
Kuperman, needless to say, doesn’t. Instead, he has just one “final question”: “who should launch the air strikes?”
The obvious answer is Israel, which “has shown an eagerness” to bomb Iran, the option “some hawks in Washington favor” in order “to avoid fueling anti-Americanism in the Islamic world” – a rationale of astounding ignorance; the Islamic world surely would recognize that were Israel to bomb Iran, it would be with a “green light” from Washington, a wink and a nod. But never mind that.
Kuperman continues, however, with “three compelling reasons that the United States itself should carry out the bombings”, the obvious fueling of anti-Americanism and other predicted and potentially disastrous consequences aside. The U.S. has better equipment to do the job, could more credibly threaten “to expand the bombing campaign” (that is, to repeatedly bomb the country), and it would be an opportunity to send “a strong warning” to other countries.
This latter rationale for the U.S. bombing of Iran provides a more credible explanation for what the actual purpose of such a bombing would be.
Kuperman, in line with the official rationale for keeping the military “option” “on the table” – an explicit rejection of principle that force should be used only as a last resort, as well as a direct violation of international law – suggests the “strong warning” would be for “other would-be proliferators”.
Proliferation being obviously of little to no consideration to U.S. policymakers – an elementary observation drawn even from the arguments provided here – “proliferators” clearly isn’t the right word here. “Nations seeking to act independently from and in opposition to Washington” might be more accurate.
“The sooner the United States takes action” – that is, the sooner it bombs Iran – “the better”, concludes Kuperman.
At stake is U.S. “credibility”, in the Mafioso sense of the word. Washington simply can’t have a country defying its orders. That’s the bottom line. That’s the underlying foundation of the policy of the Obama administration, carried over from the policy of his predecessor.
But, of course, just as the war in Iraq couldn’t be sold to the American public on the basis of its actual rationale, expanding U.S. global hegemony, neither can the true reasons for Washington’s policies towards Iran be mentioned. It just wouldn’t do.
Better, as with Iraq, to construct nonsensical arguments dependent upon an extraordinary level of intentional ignorance and consisting at the most fundamental level of claims for which there is little, if any, evidence to support.
Whether the American public has learned the more obvious and crucial lessons from Iraq and has the moral integrity to act on them remains to be seen. But what is for certain is that without massive public pressure on Washington to alter its Iran policy, the U.S. will maintain a course the consequences of which might very well prove, as with Iraq, to be disastrous.
the problem is that situation of iraq that days and situation in iran are very different. russia did not delivery enriched uranium to iraq and usa had its interest there. but as for now there is no chance that usa will fight with iran-i think they wait for israel to start war that has to be very difficult and bloody for the latter.
Her is an additional perspective which was missed in this article:
From the very begining the aggression against Iran was pharsed in a cryptic and misleading way as ‘surgical strike’ The idea is of course that Iran is extremely helpless, supine, and passive and will remain so when such ‘surgical strike’ is attempted. This is for the internal consumption, implying the US will not invade but simply bomb Iran selectively. In, short this aggression will be limited with no consequences as was the case with the bombing of Iraq’s nuclear installations. The US public, pathetically mired in ignorance, is thus swayed to look favorably on such an act aggression. The Iran leadership, however, has made it clear again and again, and one must wisely take their statements seriously, that they will wage an all out war on the US and its allies in the ME, if such ‘surgical strike; is made. In short, Iran for all practical purposes,- and this point is completely and idiotically lost on the US corporated media, will be the triggerwire for the thrid world war and its Armegeddon. Such ‘surgical strike’ would be a de facto Jihad for 1.5 billion moslems.
But how else a fascist America will be brought to its knee and doomed if not by a ruinous world war? I personally wish to see the downfall of the United States of America in my life time. How about you?
And of course not to forget Kuperman himself: is he not smack in the middle of the most redneck US state from which that village idiot, George Bush. hails? A redneck paper would publish his garbage happily, but why NYTIMES, unless of course we realize the latter has more jews than the state of Israel. Must keep the circulation up and up.
Well written and very knowledgeable critique on the essay by Kuperman which is based on a widely held unfounded speculation fueled by fear that Iran will produce nuclear weapons even though it has the right to produce nuclear power for its domestic energy needs. The paranoid Israeli government are obviously fully supportive of the determination of the U.S. desire to further its grip on the Middle East and which would if necessary attack Iran which it recognises as a threat to its goals in that area were it not for the fact that it can not afford to get involved in another costly war that would be very damaging to its own interests and may well be a catastrophic event for the U.S. when one considers the probable reactions of other international interested parties.
The real clock that is ticking is not based on Israel’s patience or Obama’s standing with the hawks, it’s Iran’s admission to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. It has already applied for full membership.
Once China enters the field — and it will sooner than later — the entire current dialog goes out the window. That will happen when China and Russia consume more crude oil from the Middle East and supply more gasoline than the US.
If the US had a single brain among the entire government, it would give Iran a guarantee of protection against an attack from Israel in exchange for concessions on nuke inspections. As a part of this initiative it should begin to put pressure on Israel to give up its nukes and open its doors to inspection. Israel is where the real problem is, has always been, and will always be until neutralized. But China will likely have to do the neutralization.
However, Jeremy, I find you arguments, while not terribly creative or outside the box, at least well put and thought-provoking, although you come across as being on the Ayatollah’s payroll. And the following 110-word non-sentence sentence copied from above is abysmal:
In other words, while Israel regularly threatens that it won’t wait much longer for the U.S. to come to some agreement with Iran before it launches an attack against Iran’s nuclear sites that Iran’s possession of the bomb would surely deter, Iran is willing pass up an offer that would constitute “a headlong sprint” towards such a deterrent because doing so could actually jeopardize the possibility of it obtaining the bomb, since if Iran accepted the deal ostensibly designed to prevent it from being able to enrich uranium to weapons-grade, Israel would be even more likely to bomb their nuclear sites even sooner than if it Iran just rejects the proposal.
Would you care to explain that remark?
I believe “convoluted” is a better adjective. Which was the point.
Thank you for your excellent summary of all of the flaws in thinking about the Iranian nuclear program that have pervaded U.S. foreign policy, made manifest in Alan J. Kuperman’s scurrilous op-ed. Kuperman does not have the expertise that would have qualified him to write this article. The mystery is why the NY Times published a piece roughly twice as long as any they normally print with flawed reasoning by a writer with no credentials to be writing it. This is a blot on the NY Times. Iran experts have condemned Kuperman’s article universally. The fact that such flawed thinking persists in our major publications is a blot on the American consciousness.