Israel’s attack on Egypt in June ’67 was not ‘preemptive’
by Jeremy R. Hammond
July 4, 2010
It is often claimed that Israel’s attack on Egypt that began the June 1967 “Six Day War” was a “preemptive” one. Implicit in that description is the notion that Israel was under imminent threat of an attack from Egypt. Yet this historical interpretation of the war is not sustained by the documentary record.
The President of Egypt, then known as the United Arab Republic (UAR), Gamal Abdel Nasser, later conveyed to U.S. President Lyndon Johnson that his troop buildup in the Sinai Peninsula prior to the war had been to defend against a feared Israeli attack.
Israel's June 5, 1967 surprise attack on Egypt resulted in the obliteration of Egypt's air force while most of its planes were still on the ground.
In a meeting with Nasser, Johnson’s special envoy to the UAR, Robert B. Anderson, expressed U.S. puzzlement over why he had massed troops in the Sinai, to which Nasser replied, “Whether you believe it or not, we were in fear of an attack from Israel. We had been informed that the Israelis were massing troops on the Syrian border with the idea of first attacking Syria, there they did not expect to meet great resistance, and then commence their attack on the UAR.”
Anderson then told Nasser “that it was unfortunate the UAR had believed such reports, which were simply not in accordance with the facts”, to which Nasser responded that his information had come from reliable sources (presumably referring to intelligence information passed along by the USSR).
Nasser added that “your own State Department called in my Ambassador to the U.S. in April or May and warned him that there were rumors that there might be a conflict between Israel and the UAR.”
U.S. intelligence had indeed foreseen the coming war. “The CIA was right about the timing, duration, and outcome of the war”, notes David S. Robarge in an article available on the CIA’s website.
On May 23, Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms presented Johnson with the CIA’s assessment that Israel could “defend successfully against simultaneous Arab attacks on all fronts … or hold on any three fronts while mounting successfully a major offensive on the fourth.”
In an document entitled “Military Capabilities of Israel and the Arab States”, the CIA assessed that “Israel could almost certainly attain air supremacy over the Sinai Peninsula in less than 24 hours after taking the initiative or in two or three days if the UAR struck first.”
Additionally, the CIA assessed that Nasser’s military presence in the Sinai was defensive, stating that “Armored striking forces could breach the UAR’s double defense line in the Sinai in three to four days and drive the Egyptians west of the Suez Canal in seven to nine days. Israel could contain any attacks by Syria or Jordan during this period” (emphasis added).
Although the Arabs had numerical superiority in terms of military hardware, “Nonetheless, the IDF [Israeli Defense Force] maintain qualitative superiority over the Arab armed forces in almost all aspects of combat operations.”
Johnson himself told the Israeli Foreign Minister, Abba Eban, “All of our intelligence people are unanimous that if the UAR attacks, you will whip hell out of them.”
Israel meanwhile claimed that it was “badly outgunned”, apparently presuming, Robarge writes, “that Washington accorded its analyses such special import that US leaders would listen to its judgments on Arab-Israeli issues over those of their own intelligence services.”
Yet “Helms had the Office of National Estimates (ONE) prepare an appraisal of the Mossad assessment”, which stated: “We do not believe” that the Israeli claim of being the underdog “was a serious estimate of the sort they would submit to their own high officials.”
Neither U.S. nor Israeli intelligence assessed that there was any kind of serious threat of an Egyptian attack. On the contrary, both considered the possibility that Nasser might strike first as being extremely slim.
The current Israeli Ambassador to the U.S., Michael B. Oren, acknowledged in his book “Six Days of War“, widely regarded as the definitive account of the war, that “By all reports Israel received from the Americans, and according to its own intelligence, Nasser had no interest in bloodshed”.
In the Israeli view, “Nasser would have to be deranged” to attack Israel first, and war “could only come about if Nasser felt he had complete military superiority over the IDF, if Israel were caught up in a domestic crisis, and, most crucially, was isolated internationally–a most unlikely confluence” (pp. 59-60).
Four days before Israel’s attack on Egypt, Helms met with a senior Israeli official who expressed Israel’s intent to go to war, and that the only reason it hadn’t already struck was because of efforts by the Johnson administration to restrain both sides to prevent a violent conflict.
“Helms interpreted the remarks as suggesting that Israel would attack very soon”, writes Robarge. He reported to Johnson “that Israel probably would start a war within a few days.”
“Helms was awakened at 3:00 in the morning on 5 June by a call from the CIA Operations Center”, which had received the report “that Israel had launched its attack” and that, contrary to Israel’s claims that Egypt had been the aggressor, Israel had fired first.
Yitzhak Rabin, who would later become Prime Minister, told Le Monde the year following the ’67 war, “I do not think Nasser wanted war. The two divisions he sent to the Sinai would not have been sufficient to launch an offensive war. He knew it and we knew it.”
Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin acknowledged in a speech in 1982 that its war on Egypt in 1956 was a war of “choice” and that, “In June 1967 we again had a choice. The Egyptian army concentrations in the Sinai approaches do not prove that Nasser was really about to attack us. We must be honest with ourselves. We decided to attack him.”
Despite its total lack of sustainability from the documentary record, and despite such admissions from top Israeli officials, it is virtually obligatory for commentators in contemporary mainstream accounts of the ’67 war to describe Israel’s attack on Egypt as “preemptive”.
Jeremy R. Hammond is an independent political analyst whose articles have been featured in numerous print and online publications around the world. He is the founder and editor of Foreign Policy Journal (www.foreignpolicyjournal.com), an online source for news, critical analysis, and opinion commentary on U.S. foreign policy. He was a recipient of the 2010 Project Censored Awards for Outstanding Investigative Journalism. Read more articles by Jeremy R. Hammond.http://www.jeremyrhammond.com
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The first problem with your supposition is with the Egyptian closing of the straits of Tiran. That is an act of war. The second problem is the ordering out of Sinai of the U.N. troops by Egypt. If Egypt feared an attack from Israel, it would be illogical to remove the U.N. troops, especially as such an act would be seen as an additional act of belligerency both by Israel and any objective third party. Then we have the war pact with Jordan and Syria, Egypt massing troops on the border with Israel, the mass anti-Israel government organized demonstrations in Egypt accompanied by Nasser’s declarations to obliterate Israel. It is also somewhat specious to claim in hindsight that the CIA assessments indicated that Israel could defend itself. It should be remembered that Israel was a country in its virtually non defensible pre June 4 1967 borders, being faced with imminent attack on several fronts. Not only Israelis but all supporters of Israel feared that Israel was on the brink of extinction. Israel even begged King of Hussein of Jordan to cease hostilities after the war with Egypt broke out in fear of not being able to maintain a second front. The pre-emptive strike by Israel came only after weeks of acts of belligerency and acts of war by Egypt combined with public declarations by Nasser that Israel was about to destroyed.
I agree with you on all counts. This article by Jeremy Hammond is uninformed nonsense.
Kindly point out any error in fact or logic in the article. Thanks.
Bottom line: Israel knew Egypt was not going to attack and Israel fired the first shot.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Six-Day_War
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In the presence of Hitler, only an idiot would not fire “the first shot.” OK, so Nasser wasn’t Hitler – but that’s only because he had no Cyclone-B. so he was forced to announce that he would drive the Jews into the Mediterranean Sea. But with your kind of analysis, irrespective of your facts, you would say that that does not mean they would necessarily drown, right. We should have waited until the dawning began, right? Everyone knows Israel fired the first shot – it was the correct thing to do.
From the very beginning the position of the Arab and Muslim world was to maintain their Palestinian “brothers” as refugees in places like Gaza. And Gaza even didn’t belong to Egypt – it was Palestine. The policy of Egypt was to wait until it was strong enough to defeat Israel. But by your stupid rules, Israel should have waited until Egypt was strong enough to attack, right? Your disappointed that Israel didn’t loose – because it didn’t play by your rules of national, or genocidal, destruction, right?
Ludvikus, let me know when you are actually able to produce an argument to support your view.
The person firing the first shot is always the aggressor and loses the moral high ground in a war. The defender’s response is always to a provocation. No one wins a war unless you consider the loss of human life a win. Real heroes hate and despise war. Only a warmonger could love it. The only winning move in this chess game is not to play.
We should take the advice of great generals such as Washington, Butler and Eisenhower and mind our own business. General Smedley Butler, “The Fighting Quaker”, the most highly decorated U.S. Marine in history in his day was no pacifist. He adamantly opposed getting involved where we didn’t belong but if America was threatened, he was a tenacious bulldog defending his turf. That should be our policy. Not war for oil, contracts, land, power, politics, etc…
The fact that Israel was the aggressor means that all the land claimed is illegal and must be given back along with reparations and interest ASAP.
And we’re still providing every ounce of fuel, delivered to Israel’s doorstep, free of charge.
These backstabbing pricks should be cut-off at once. It can’t happen soon enough for me.
CustomersMan, that is incorrect. Whether Israel was the aggressor or not, its occupation of Palestinian land is illegal.
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A lot was going on before and during the 1967 War and we will never know what really happened and why it happened. From my reading two items come to light. The first is that the war was conducted to secure Israels nuclear weapons program and second the war could have easily ignited WWIII.
Before the war Russian Mig25s were overflying the Negev nuclear research facility.
During the war there was allegedly a Russian Echo class sub off of Israel’s coast waiting for orders to nuke Israel, the USN launched a nuclear armed strike towards Egypt that was recalled, and the Americans and Israelis together were executing something called Operation Cyanide that involved the USS Liberty.
It took close to 50 years for the CIA to admit it’s part in bringing the Shah to power. Maybe in 2017 we will find out more about what was going on then.
I highly doubt the USSR had any such thing going on.
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Jeremy, I, for one, am interested in the duplicitous role of the Johnson administration. From day one in office, Johnson did everything possible to change the direction of his predecessor and tilt American policy in a one-sided direction towards Israel. As the anti-Kennedy, he allowed (or ignored) the symbiotic relation between elements of the CIA and Mossad. He went out of his way to arm Israel to the teeth and, unlike JFK, he covertly supported Israel’s drive for nuclear weapons. Why Nasser would confide with this individual only confirms how far he was out of touch. As you have indicated the best source for proof of Israel’s premeditated expansionist policy in the Six Day War can be garnered from the hundreds of quotes from high Israeli officials who openly stated that it was a war of choice. Maybe they knew their friends in the Western press would never allow the myth to die. As the saying goes, if you tell a lie often enough, it becomes the truth.
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PS> If Operation Cyanide existed it must have been justification for the murder of 34 US Sailors and the maiming of 174 others on that fateful day on 8 June 1967 by Israeli forces who probably either needed cover for their mass execution of Egyptian prisoners of war (POWs) or their coordinated (?) attempt to blame the Egyptians for the intended sinking of the vessel. As I said, the duplicity of the Johnson administration was and is astounding.
Richard, I happen to be researching U.S. policy following the June war and up to the passage of UN resolution 242. What is clear to me is that Johnson’s decision to renew arms sales to Israel was based on the considerations that a) business as usual should continue (military-industrial complex) and b) the USSR was arming Arab states hostile to Israel. The U.S. was also arming Arab states, but refused to renew arms sales to Jordan and other states Israel also viewed as hostile. In other words, it was perceived to be in the best interests of the U.S. (as defined by policymakers) to tilt towards Israel.
I don’t know about covert support for Israel’s nuclear weapons program. Johnson’s duplicity and treachery with regard to Israel’s sinking of the USS Liberty is indeed astounding.
Jeremy, as you are aware, Israel has, over the years, worked with many sympathetic actors in numerous western governments to steal nuclear materials to support her illicit weapons program. One of the most egregious incidents occured between 1957-1965 when over two hundred pouns (kilograms?) of material was stolen from a processing facility in Apollo, Pennsylvania. The bulk of that material was taken during the first two years of the Johnson Administration, which made no attempt to prosecute those involved. The theft was supported by far to many government officials who either as part of policy or loyalty to the Jewish state sought to ensure the delivery of weapons grade material. To show how relevent this material is today, arlen spector, in his last act in office, is currently attemtping to clear the name of Mr. A Shapiro who was point on the project some 45 years ago. ( see http://www.forbes.com/feeds/businesswire/2010/07/06/businesswire142042372.html)
Jeremy, now that you bring it up, how do you see Israel’s attack on the U.S.S. Liberty fitting in with Israel’s attacks on Egypt and Syria?
Ed, I’m not sure I understand quite what you’re asking, but my response is that I think the most likely explanations for the attack are that Israel a) wanted to cover up massacres on the ground in Egypt and at the same time b) hoped the U.S. would think Egypt attacked the Liberty and come in on Israel’s side.