Revoking a foreign telecom’s license to operate in the United States does not physically remove its hardware from American digital infrastructure, and that gap has drawn the attention of a Republican lawmaker pushing sweeping new legislation.
Rep. Pat Harrigan (R-N.C.) has introduced the Digital Infrastructure Act of 2026, targeting what he describes as an unresolved national-security vulnerability embedded in the country’s most sensitive data centers.
The core problem, according to Harrigan, is that federal regulators stripped Chinese carriers of their operating licenses but left their physical connections inside American facilities entirely intact.
“But those companies were still able to maintain connections inside of American data centers,” Harrigan said, adding that Washington effectively “left them with a foothold in the very infrastructure that carries Americans’ information.”
His office was blunt about why existing rules fall short, noting that “a Section 214 order is a license to sell regulated telecom service, not a physical eviction order.”
The Federal Communications Commission has denied authorization to China Telecom Corporation, China Unicom Operations Limited, Pacific Networks Corp., and China Mobile USA, citing national-security and law-enforcement concerns under Section 214 of the Communications Act of 1934.
In its review of China Mobile USA, a Delaware-registered entity, the FCC concluded that the company’s ownership and control by the Chinese government would raise “substantial and serious national security and law enforcement risks.”
Yet none of those determinations compelled the companies to remove their physical presence from U.S. data center facilities, leaving the vulnerability Harrigan’s bill now seeks to address.
The proposed legislation would bar high-risk carriers from owning or operating data centers on American soil and from offering cloud services to U.S. customers, with a $1 million daily fine for any continuing violation.
Crucially, those penalties would extend beyond the Chinese entities themselves to their affiliates and to any American venture partners conducting business with them, significantly broadening the bill’s reach.
A time-limited exemption would be available for companies that receive explicit approval from U.S. communications authorities, giving regulators a mechanism to manage the transition.
Harrigan said the issue first came to his attention through direct outreach from the private sector, noting, “We talked to a lot of companies, frontier labs and data center owners, as well as operators that are concerned about this.”
The legislation arrives against a backdrop of recent disruptions to U.S. air traffic control systems, Microsoft services, and banking platforms, though Harrigan stopped short of attributing any of those incidents to Chinese actors, and no evidence of cyberattacks has emerged.
His argument is forward-looking rather than reactive: eliminating known structural weaknesses now reduces exposure before adversaries can exploit them, particularly given what is at stake.
“What we’re talking about is the infrastructure that supports our banks, our hospitals, our businesses and our communication systems,” Harrigan said.
Passage before the close of the 119th Congress appears unlikely, with Harrigan acknowledging the matter will probably carry over to the next session beginning in January.
He expressed confidence, however, that incoming Democratic majorities in both chambers would engage seriously with the bill, framing cybersecurity and artificial intelligence infrastructure as ground where both parties can find common cause.
“This is a bipartisan problem,” Harrigan said, adding that Democratic colleagues “are very willing to lend a hand because they know it’s a structural problem for our country.”