Jalaluddin Haqqani’s son, Sarajuddin, was born to Haqqani’s Arab wife, which strengthened his ties with Riyadh and insured a legitimacy among his future descendents.  Despite his sacred blood, as a boy Sarajuddin reportedly cared more about his appearance than his father’s work.  An ISI officer and friend of the family claims, “He didn’t take to war,” and he often referred to the Taliban as “heavy-handed” and “dogmatic.”[18] However, shortly after his father was insulted, Sarajuddin experienced a religious awakening and grasped the reigns of the Haqqani Network as they began to slacken in Jalaluddin’s aging grip.  From 2002 to 2006, Sarajuddin reconstituted the network and rekindled the Taliban’s might through arduous fundraising and solicitation of foreign manpower. Though the network enjoys some autonomy, they repeatedly swear allegiance to Mullah Omar and his dream of an Islamic Emirate.  Even as recently as October 2011, Sarajuddin said this to BBC regarding his relationship with the Taliban:

Ameerul Momeenin [Leader of the Faithful] Mullah Omar is our leader and we follow him, we have responsibility for certain areas within the Islamic Emirate’s administration and accordingly follow instructions. In every military operation, the Emirate gives us a plan, guide and financial support. We conduct it thoroughly. There is no question of a separate party or group.[19]

Responsible for everything from the bombing of India’s embassy in Kabul, to shooting down an American helicopter carrying Navy SEALs, to allegedly assassinating Burhanuddin Rabanni of the High Peace Council, Sarajuddin has shifted the nature of jihad in Afghanistan and the jihadists that have waged the struggle since the Haqqani Network came fully online in 2008.  Perhaps one of the most evident cases occurred in late August of 2010 when Forward Operating Base Salerno received mortar rounds and recoilless rifle fire as machine guns opened up on one the largest outposts in Khost.  Thirteen Haqqani fighters wearing suicide vests and night vision goggles maneuvered to the perimeter fence in the pre-dawn hours and breached near the airfield.  Two years later, in June of 2012, a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device pulled near the perimeter wall and detonated, leveling a good portion of Salerno’s defenses as fourteen Haqqani operatives armed with machine guns, rocket propelled grenades, and suicide vests poured in through the breach.[20]  Sarajuddin brought strategic focus to once tactical level ingenuity creating spectacular attacks that often garner international attention.  The dynamic effectiveness of the Haqqani Network has since forced American policy beyond the placement of his group on the United Nations’ international terrorist blacklist, but redefining what victory in Afghanistan entails.[21]  Perhaps the most telling reason why can be glimpsed in Sarajuddin’s warning to Pakistan:

Our advice for the people and government of Pakistan is that they should carefully note the American double standard and irreconcilable policy. They should give precedence to their national and Islamic interests. They should take [it as a given] that the Americans will never be satisfied until they loot them completely.[22]

Sarajuddin’s observation of irreconcilable policy and vampiric drain until there is nothing left is reminiscent of the manner in which his father was used by the American government, and echoes of the severance package offered in the aftermath of the assault on the Lion’s Den.

Though casualties rise, the war winds down over a decade since the first bomb fell.  The border remains porous, and the Pakistani government has never given an honest attempt at making a single arrest in northern Waziristan Province, the current stronghold and location of Haqqania, or stabilizing its border with Afghanistan.  It has been over a decade since America expressed disinterest in a continued relationship with Jalaluddin Haqqani, though he persists in reminding them what they originally saw in him, what they created of him, and the day they turned their back on him.  These stark reminders should serve as a cautionary for caustic policy making based upon bravado and anger exacerbated by cultural ignorance and diplomatic irreverence.  Haqqani is a reminder of the humanity that must exist in human intelligence.  And as strategic locations explode and erupt in the constant din of machine gun fire with a seemingly endless stream of martyrs, Jalaluddin Haqqani brazenly stands as a reminder that defiance has cold, dark eyes and wears a long, black beard.

References

[1] David B. Edwards, Before Taliban: Geneologies of an Afghan Jihad (Los Angeles: University of California Press,2002), Kindle edition, chap 7.

[2] Ibid,

[3] Jeffery A. Dressler, “Haqqani Network: From Afghanistan to Pakistan,” Afghanistan Report 6 (2010): 8.

[4] Peter Tomsen, Return of the Taliban Interview, Frontline, PBS, July 20, 2006.

[5] Ibid

[6] Robert D. Kaplan, Soldiers of God: With Islamic Warriors in Afghanistan and Pakistan (New York: Random House, 2001), Kindle edition, Introduction.

[7] Dressler, 8.

[8] Ibid, 9.

[9] Robert Baer, See No Evil: The True Story of a CIA Ground Soldier in the War on Terrorism (New York: Crown, 2002), Kindle edition, chap. 6.

[10] Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York: Penguin Books, 2005), Kindle edition, chap 16.

[11] Dressler, 9.

[12] Peter Tomsen, Return of the Taliban Interview.

[13] Dressler, 9.

[14] Guy Walter, “How the World’s Most Wanted Man Made Fools of the Elite Troops Who’d Trapped Him in His Mountain Lair,” The Mail Online, April 30, 2011,  www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1382011/.

[15] Joby Warrick, Triple Agent: The Al Qaeda Mole Who Infiltrated the CIA (New York: Random House, 2011). Kindle edition, chap. 9.

[16] Ibid, chap. 9

[17] Ibid, chap 9

[18] Dressler, 9.

[19] Sarajuddin Haqqani, Interview by BBC, News South Asia, BBC, October 3, 2011.

[20] Bill Roggio, “US Troops Repel Suicide Assault on Base in Eastern Afghanistan,” The Long Wars Journal. June 1, 2012, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/06/us_troops_repel_suic.php

[21] Al Jazeera, “UN Adds Haqqani Network to Terrorist Blacklist,” Al Jazeera. November 6, 2012, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia/2012/11/20121166251166331.html

[22] Haqqani, Interview by BBC.