Citing himself in 1993 Tomsen says, the U.S. “needs to proceed in a pragmatic, hard headed manner. We should begin by establishing a policy overlay for the region integrated with our broader policy in the Eurasian region.”
Okay here it is, the broad U.S. strategic policy for the region:
First, we support Israel as an outpost to protect our desire for the regions natural resources. Secondly, we will do what is necessary to protect our access to cheap energy and other resources in the region. Finally, we are going to build a circle of bases around Russia and China to prevent their influence in the region and their access to the same resources.
That should be obvious to any political observer of U.S. interests who can see the full global picture. Tomsen is either naïve to think otherwise, or is so imbued with U.S. rhetoric and hubris that he simply cannot see those aspects of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. It is not about democracy, it is not about freedom, it is not about free enterprise: it is about Israel, oil, resources, and containment.
Creating the Enemy
A good empire needs an enemy. When the Soviet Union died, and the world did not roll over into the U.S. empire, another enemy needed to be found. This other enemy turned out to be the Islamic world, with 9/11 being the critical point for implementing the path of destruction that would salve Israel’s security needs, allowing the U.S. to implement its military empire in the Middle East and South Asia, and create the necessary fear factor to keep the people at home directing their negative thoughts at some ‘other’ whom they disliked because they were different but mostly simply evil by nature.
Tomsen sees the terror wars as a long term fight. His final comments in his concluding chapter, The Way Ahead are disconcerting in consideration of the imperial nature of the project that he does not seem to acknowledge. He seems some positives (one being the drone attacks, another being the “spectacular success’ of the capture of bin Laden) and some negatives. The biggest of the latter he posits as being the “flawed strategic approach to the region,” that there is “No long term, comprehensive, geostrategic policy” for achieving U.S. goals.
While Tomsen does lay out some sensible concrete actions that can be taken in order to quell terrorism, his latter and second to last statement of the book requires more consideration. He continues the fear factor noting “The multidecade struggle against the scourge of Islamic terrorism will, most of all, be a battle for Muslim minds. The outcome will be decided by many millions of Muslims in their own countries guided by their own history, culture and aspirations.”
The latter suggestion also requires the U.S. to acknowledge its own duplicity in creating the terror, through its own direct military actions, through its covert actions, through its support of dictators and monarchies of the region, through its own desires for hegemonic control. It then needs to have a scientific-criminal investigation for the events of 9/11. Finally, it needs to simply get out of the region and allow the people to proceed as Tomsen says, to be guided by their own history, culture and aspirations—a history, culture, and aspirations that for all too long have been subject to western empires, in spite of grand sounding rhetoric, desiring to control the people and resources of the region.
In spite of all this criticism, The Wars of Afghanistan is a strong historical base for understanding what is happening in the region. It is long (811 pages including notes), comprehensive, and well detailed and may require having some preliminary referencing in one’s reading repertoire. A good atlas and access to a broader shorter history of the region would be good supplements.
