The expert meeting of P5+1 countries and Iran was held last week in Istanbul following the agreement of their chief nuclear negotiators last month in Moscow to continue their talks at lower level until common grounds for further rounds of high-level talks are created. The expert meeting has reportedly further clarified the positions of both parties on various issues of common concern and is to be followed by the meeting of deputy chief nuclear negotiators on July 24th in the same venue. Recently, a series of official documents outlining Iran’s detailed responses, presented at Moscow talks, to the P5+ 1 proposal, tabled at Baghdad talks, have become publicly available in both some Western and Iranian media outlets which provide new insights into Iran’s thinking on various issues relating to its nuclear program.
While the full text of the P-5+1 proposal has not been released, its main elements were earlier reported to include Western demands from Iran to suspend its 20-percent uranium enrichment activities and close its Fordow uranium enrichment center in return for providing ready fuels for Tehran research reactor and lifting, seemingly temporarily, the long-held Western embargo on the sale of civilian aircraft parts to Iran. Apart from presenting Iran’s own responses to the P5+1 proposal, the released documents also divulge more details on the substance of the P5+1 proposal to Iran.
On what regards the rationale behind the Western demand for the closure of Fordow uranium enrichment center, it becomes clear from Iran’s responses to specific quotes from the P5+1 proposal that Iran’s Western interlocutors consider the operation of 20-percent enrichment activities and the fortified nature of the Fordow center as causes for concern. In other words, because the Fordow center hosts Iran’s 20-percent enrichment activities, which are considered by Western powers to be unnecessary and uneconomical in light of their readiness to supply Iran with ready fuel for Tehran research reactor and the fact that it is protected with passive defense arrangements and thus is not easily vulnerable to military attacks by Iran’s adversaries its continued operation poses concern to Western powers and hence is demanded to be closed.
Iran’s responses to the above concern make it clear that it detaches the issue of 20-percent enrichment from the operation of the Fordow center. While offering logical arguments in defense of the continuation of its 20-percent enrichment activities, Iran rejects the idea that the sole purpose of the Fordow center is enriching uranium to 20-percent level by noting that R&D and laboratory activities as well as storing Iran’s LEU stockpile are among the other purposes of the center. Iran also finds it absurd that the Western party is concerned about the protection of the Fordow center, noting that “established international mechanisms for nuclear security highlight the need for strong protection of nuclear facilities”. Iran makes it clear that any rational state would do its best to protect its nuclear facilities from military attacks and thus as a country “facing constant threats, we need a backup facility to safeguard our enrichment activities”. Iran has further questioned the rationale behind Western demands for the closure of the Fordow center arguing that this center is under the same IAEA safeguard measures as Iran’s other nuclear facilities as it is subject to round-the-clock camera surveillance and regular inspections by the IAEA.
It is also evident from Iran’s responses to the P5+1 proposal that it does not consider the offered incentives as reflecting any genuine desire by Western powers to reach a mutually-satisfactory solution to Iran’s nuclear issue. More specifically, Iran declines to treat some offered incentives as real concessions, arguing that the supply of civilian aircraft parts and medical isotopes for cancer patients deal with basic human rights and should not be politicized, thus questioning the morality and humanity of Western embargos in these fields in the first place. Iran also treats the Western party’s declared willingness to cooperate in providing ready fuels for Tehran research reactor as too little and too late, thus devoid of any practical value to it. Iran refers to its own proved capability to manufacture fuel rods and plates for its nuclear reactors as explaining its lack of interest in such offers.
All in all, Iran’s arguments against the P5+1 proposal, as elaborated by its nuclear negotiators at Moscow and more recently at the experts meeting in Istanbul, should not be treated as adamant refusal to engage on its nuclear issue and reach a compromise with the Western powers on at least some elements of its nuclear program. Rather, Iran has argued that the Western powers have not tabled any proposal of practical value and commensurate with the extent and nature of concessions that it has been demanded to make. While the Western powers have demanded that Iran make concrete and specific concessions on its nuclear issue, such as by suspending its 20-percent uranium enrichment activities and transferring its stockpile of 20-percent enriched uranium abroad, Iran believes it has been offered no meaningful reciprocal concessions framed in tangible and unambiguous terms. Iran’s foremost priority is to normalize its nuclear issue and terminate unilateral and multilateral sanctions against it and has declared its flexibility and willingness on various occasions to consider the suspension of its 20-percent uranium enrichment activities and cooperate with the IAEA in providing further transparency on its present and past nuclear activities should they materialize that goal. It is thus very unlikely that Iran would agree to any core Western demands on its nuclear issue short of genuine reciprocity meeting the substance of its declared priority.
The issue of Iranian nukes ought to be irrelevent to Americans, but because of Israel we are up to our chins in this mess. Reverse karma for 1953, no doubt.
I have been arguing for years that neither the US nor Israel is going to launch a military attack on Iran. Obama doesn’t want to do it, and the Israelis, in my opinion, are bluffing. But if Romney gets elected (which I don’t think will happen, but who knows) the neocons will be back in the saddle, and the odds of war go way, way up. The other thing that worries me is an Iranian miscalculation regarding the Straits of Hormuz. I think the Iranians are bluffing when they threaten to block the strait, but if they actually do it the US will hit them very hard (a tragedy in my view, since I see Iran — in theory, at least — as a natural ally and partner of the US). If US interets were truly being served, we would be making nice with the Iranians and breaking off relations with the Israelis. That’ll never happen, of course.
I wish one could get a better read on the thinking of the Iranian regime. So much depends on the internal politics of Iran. If they misstep in these negotiations, there will be tragedy.
The Geneva Convention forbids attacks on nuclear power stations. Iran`s Bushehr nuclear power station is close to operating at full capacity, any damage would result in a Chernobyl like release of radioactive poison. A suggestion by Israel of her intention to attack Iran`s nuclear power stations should be met with universal condemnation of Israel, from supporters and critics alike. There is no room for debate on this issue, the Geneva Convention makes the worlds decision unequivocal.
We only have one world, in it we should have one standard that is applied fairly and equally to all nations.
Israel has already attacked Iran’s nuclear facilities with STUXNET. In regards to the Geneva Convention, “Jus in bello” is the Latin term for “the law within war”. It is also commonly known as International Humanitarian Law which is what regulates or prevents attacks on civilian installations which in this case would be Iran’s nuclear facilities. This is what Article 52 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions explicitly requires. Some argue civil objects could lose their protection once they contribute in a direct and effective way to military operations in the course of a war. Obviously, an attack cannot be warranted under the current conditions. Additionally, the threshold for support of attacking nuclear facilities is much higher than other installations. It falls under Article 56 which expressly provides the following:
“Works and installations containing dangerous forces, namely dams, dykes and nuclear electrical generating stations, shall not be made the object of attack, even where these objects are military objectives, if such attack may cause the release of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian population”.
It should be noted that some countries including the United States and Israel have not ratified many of these protocols.
With regard to Israel`s Cyber attacks on Iran, I seem to recall Obama stating such attacks on the US would be regarded as an act of war! Just rhetoric? or double standards?
I also seem to recall that, during the 1973 (Yom Kippur/Ramadan)war, Israel prepared tactical nuclear weapons, it has been mooted that this was a tactic to “persuade” the US to send massive arms supplies (Interesting CIA papers on this). Whatever the motive, the reality was Israeli preparation to use nuclear weapons.
Compare this with current US/Israeli attitudes to Iran`s nuclear program!In my opinion, It would be a highly risky venture for Israel alone to attack Iran, only with US assistance would that be feasible, but at a great cost to all involved. Yet I see all the signs of the US preparing public approval of this eventuality.
It appears as if the sum of all fears will be realized soon. Not only is Washington preparing public approval but this week but it appears we are preparing militarily for such event. We announced plans to send another carrier to the Persian Gulf and are constructing missile bases in the UAE. This week we will commence large scale war games in the Gulf which were surely be seen by Iran as provocation.
I wouldnt be so sure that Israel is bluffing. We know from 1967 that Israel wont hesitate to launch a preemptive attack if they are threatened too far. Romney is not the neocon that Bush and Cheney were and day by day his chances for election are improving. I dont think we as Americans want a war with Iran but secretly I dont think we would mind if Israel started it.
Well, I’m not saying Israel will keep bluffing forever. I think they are betting that they can, in effect, blackmail the US into doing the job for them. They’ve already succeeded in getting Obama to renounce containment.
Don’t agree with you regarding Romney. He has no more foreign policy experience than Bush did, and he’s very committed to Israel — says it’ll be his first place to visit as president. He will be putty in the neocons’ hands. On a brighter note, I don’t believe that his chances of winning the election are increasing. The Republican candidate should be capable of beating Obama, given the state of the economy, but Romney is a wooden campaigner and utterly out of touch with how the vast majority of Americans live and think. A recent analysis I did gives Obama 22 states plus D.C. with 270 electoral votes. I’m expecting a replay of 2004, with the incumbent winning a narrow victory. If Obama slices and dices Romney in the debates, his margin will be bigger.
That comment assumes Obama believed in “containment” to begin with, which is untrue. There was absolute policy continuity between the Bush and Obama administration, the policy being one of rejection of Iran’s rights as recognized by the NPT.
Well, I wish I could read Barack Obama’s mind. I freely admit that I don’t know whether he favored containment before he wound up denouncing it.
One needn’t read Obama’s mind. His administration made it clear from the beginning of his term in office that it would continue thee policy towards Iran that Bush pursued before him.
I just don’t agree with that statement, Jeremy.
What do you not agree with?