An Indian think tank reports (‘Indo-Pak Nuclear CBMs: The Road to Nowhere’) on one reason why India and Pakistan do not pursue nuclear confidence building measures (NCBMs) with any sense of purpose or a degree of urgency as being “the threat of a nuclear showdown is primarily an invention of the West, especially the US.”
Is such a belief warranted? Does precedence of the nuclear level not having figured in the Kargil War and the ‘twin peaks crisis’ episodes suggest that the two states are rational enough to keep the nuclear overhang become a sword of Damocles?
The two states are working overtime to ensure mutual deterrence. Both are at the three figure mark in warhead numbers. Indians are additionally looking for a ballistic missile shield, having successfully conducted its fourth interceptor missile test, and a nuclear submarine anchored ‘triad’. Pakistanis have reinforced their intention of going first by unveiling the Nasr, advertised as a tactical nuclear weapon. Will deterrence hold if conventional push comes to nuclear shove?
Admittedly, the two states are wisely lengthening the nuclear fuse. India’s commerce minister’s three day visit to Pakistan is set to open up mutual investment. He inspected the integrated check post completed at Wagah border along with his Pakistani counterpart. The two states are into their second round of talks, indicating that even terror incidents of the order of 26/11 can at best dent the relationship, not set it back irretrievably. They have conventional CBMs and CBMs over Kashmir in place. On the NCBMs front they have extended the life of their agreement on interaction in case of nuclear accidents by five years.
However, if all these welcome features are taken as substituting for the missing, and more consequential NCBMs, there is need for ‘selling’ the idea aggressively. Not emplacing NCBMs while the going’s good, such as now, may be regretted later.
The fact is that India, believing that Pakistan exploited the nuclearisation of May 1998 more proactively, has drawn a page from Pakistan’s book. At the conventional level, imitating Pakistan’s observation of space for conventional operations below the nuclear threshold, it has gone in for a ‘proactive’ offensive conventional doctrine. At the nuclear level, it has attempted to increase this space by assuring ‘massive’ punitive retaliation in case of Pakistani first use, even if provoked by India’s conventional pincers.
Pakistan for its part has reportedly firmed up its conventional counter, apparently termed ‘early strategic offensive’. Even though its troops are involved in counter insurgency on the western front, it intends to beat India’s integrated battle groups to the draw. Given that it is a military dominant state, it does not have democratic and bureaucratic encumbrances. It would need to use the time profitably while India debates whether and to what degree the Pakistani state is complicit and whether to go in for firepower-centric, air force led reprisals or go for Cold Start.
Secondly, even if Nasr is a deterrence-gimmick for the moment, when the balloon goes up, it would be hazardous to think, as revealed by the Indian think tank, that: “Though Pakistan threatens to use the nuclear weapons and has convinced the rest of the world that its nuclear threshold is low, there is a larger understanding between the two countries that the threat is only a posture and not an actual position.”
Given this as ‘dry tinder’ piled up high, all that is needed is the proverbial spark. This is not unlikely, given the onrush of the magic year, 2014. Imagine a situation in case of the West disengaging progressively from ‘AfPak’ in which uncertainty reigns. With both states in election mode over the interim, there would be less maneuver space for governments. It bears recall that the parliament attack and 26/11 both were in some measure a spillover of the turn of events in ‘AfPak’. Since the end game there is set to culminate in 2014, and if Leon Panetta is to be believed, may even be advanced to 2013, the ‘spark’ could well be round the corner.
The catastrophic terror threat by autonomous non-state actors in Pakistan not having receded, more needs doing to manage the fallout. Under the circumstance, getting NCBMs into place appears sensible. It is self-evidently so in India’s case since it has made arrangements over the past decade to leverage its conventional military advantage.
Superficially, this may not be in Pakistan’s interest since its nuclear deterrence is also meant to cover the conventional level. However, the Pakistan’s Establishment would not want the extremist fringe gaining space, more than a happenstance in case an India-Pak crisis turns into conflict.
In the December round of talks in Islamabad, India asked Pakistan to come clean on its nuclear doctrine. This bespeaks of maneuvering and validates the revelation in the think tank report of down grading nuclear dangers. The reason is perhaps that keeping such dangers off the radar screen enables the state to quietly work on nuclear preparedness unhindered by the self-interested scrutiny of an aroused attentive public. No wonder the mechanics of engagement are in place.
The logic from a state point of view should instead be that the more the nuclear preparations, the more the need to manage the environment. NCBMs provide the necessary cover and a back stop. What needs setting up instead is a strategic dialogue mechanism for across-the-spectrum engagement. Because it would be in continuous session, it can also serve, if needed, as an ‘NCBM plus’ or an NRRC (Nuclear Risk Reduction Center) by the backdoor.
India has recently committed to a working mechanism with China for consultation and coordination over their border issues composed of diplomatic and military officials of the two sides. This is a useful model for managing its relations with Pakistan. The timing of such an initiative from India is just right in that this would ease pressure on Pakistan and its Army, thereby making the idea easier to materialize and the state and its minder more amenable to peace overtures.
Both states have strategic dialogues with their mutual friend, the US. It makes more sense to have such a dialogue mechanism in place with the perceived adversary, i.e. with each other.
Will following work?
Pak, India agree to minimise N-accidents (The News)
ISLAMABAD: In a welcome step, India and Pakistan agreed today, to extend for another five years a bilateral agreement, which would go a long way in reducing the risk from accidents related to nuclear weapons. Earlier the Agreement entered into force on February 21 2007 for an initial period of five years.
According to the original agreement any one of the two countries may withdraw from this Agreement by giving six months’ written notice to the other indicating its intention to terminate the Agreement.
The two sides agreed to extend the validity of the ‘Agreement on Reducing the Risk from Accidents Relating to Nuclear Weapons’ for five years with effect from today in line with an understanding reached during the sixth round of bilateral expert-level talks on nuclear confidence building measures held in Islamabad on December 27, 2011.
“The agreement had entered into force on February 21, 2007 for an initial duration of five years,” said a statement from Pakistan’s Foreign Office. It was in February 2007, that India and Pakistan signed an agreement to reduce the risk from accidents arising from nuclear weapons. The proposal was initiated when former Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee visited Lahore in 1999. The agreement aimed at reassuring the international community that the two countries are responsible nuclear states and aware of the importance of nuclear restraint.
Both countries last held talks in December 2011, after a gap of two years, where both sides reviewed and exchanged proposals, to increase confidence building measures related to conventional and nuclear weapons.
According to the text of the eight point Agreement which was renewed today, both sides shall maintain and improve, as they deem necessary, existing national measures including organizational and technical arrangements, to guard against accidents related to nuclear weapons under its control.
Secondly they shall notify each other immediately in the event of any accident relating to nuclear weapons, under their respective jurisdiction or control, which could create the risk of a radioactive fallout, with adverse consequences for both sides, or create the risk of an outbreak of a nuclear war between the two countries.
In the event of such an accident the Party within whose jurisdiction or control the accident has taken place will immediately take necessary measures to minimize the radiological consequences of such an accident.
The obligation of a Party to notify shall be in respect of only such accidents which may result in an international trans-boundary release that could be of radiological safety significance or have security implication for the other Party. In the event ofoccurrence of an accident of the type referred to in Article-2 of this Agreement:
(i) Each Party shall act in such a manner as to reduce the possibilities of its actions being misinterpreted by the other Party;
(ii) In case of likely impact of the accident on the other Party, the first Party shall inform the other Party forthwith with relevant information.
Both sides shall make use of the hotline links between the two Foreign Secretaries and DGMOs or any other appropriate communication link as mutually agreed upon between their Governments for transmission of, or request for, urgent information in situations relating to the implementation of this Agreement. The Parties may also make use of any other communication channels, including diplomatic channels depending upon the urgency of the situation.
Information obtained by a Party pursuant to this Agreement shall not be disclosed to a third Party without the prior consent of the other Party except where it concerns environment, public health or safety.
This Agreement shall not affect the rights and obligations of the Parties under existing international agreements to which they are a Party. The Parties may hold consultations, as mutually agreed upon, to review the implementation of the provisions of this Agreement as well as to consider possible amendments aimed at furthering the objectives of this Agreement. Amendments shall enter into force in accordance with procedures that shall be agreed upon.
And lastly, this Agreement shall remain in force for a period of five years. Upon agreement by the Parties, the Agreement may be extended for successive periods of five years at a time. A Party may withdraw from this Agreement by giving six months written notice to the other indicating its intention to terminate the Agreement.
http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=12644&Cat=13