Interview with Andreas Umland at Oxford

O.T.: But why would the EU be interested in providing such assistance with regard to Ukraine? What do the West and East-Central European countries gain from engaging more actively with Ukraine?

A.U.: Apart from anchoring Ukraine internationally, and providing guidance for internal reform, a third dimension of further EU-Ukraine rapprochement has indeed to do not only with the interests of Ukraine but also with some larger aims of the EU. A successful Ukrainian democratization could have repercussions in the former Soviet empire, as a whole. A sustainable Europeanization of Ukraine would, probably, impress the elites and populations of other post-Soviet countries. It could, for instance, in Russia and Belarus induce a rethinking of the political paths that these countries have taken after the break-up of the Soviet Union. The Belarusians and Russians are culturally close to the Ukrainians. They would therefore take seriously a functioning law-based democracy in Ukraine. The EU’s support of Ukrainian democracy, civil society and rule of law has thus a geopolitical dimension. To use a somewhat provocative metaphor, Ukraine could become the EU’s Trojan Horse with regard Russia. Western advice concerning the necessity of a democratization is often seen, by Russians, as being irrelevant to their country, if not subversive, in its intention. An EU-promoted re-democratization of Ukraine, in contrast, would be an argument more difficult to reject, by isolationist Russians. If Ukraine demonstrates that an Orthodox Eastern Slavic nation is able to create and sustain a democratic political system, this could trigger a new Russian democratization too. Ukraine could be the EU’s instrument to bring Russia back into the European family.

O.T.: You mentioned at the beginning four dimensions of the rapprochement between Ukraine and the EU.

A.U.: Indeed, there is yet another, fourth aspect that makes the rapprochement between Ukraine and the EU important. During the last year, the relevance of the European idea for the Ukrainian state has further risen in connection with worrying domestic developments. Since the election of Viktor Yanukovych as President, the already high social and cultural polarization of the country has increased further. A vivid expression of the growing fragmentation of the Ukrainian national community has been, for instance, the rise of Oleh Tiahnybok’s nationalist, so-called Freedom party.

O.T.: In his speeches though, Tiahnybok is promising to unite the nation…

A.U.: Indeed, Tiahnybok’s party calls itself an “All-Ukrainian Association” and continuously proclaims its allegiance to Great Ukraine (Velyka Ukraina). However, “Svoboda” is de facto a regional and, because of its idiosyncratic historical discourse, implicitly even a separatist party. It has a strong base in the three Galician regions of L’viv, Ivano-Frankivsk and Ternopil, but far less support elsewhere. “Svoboda” promotes a kind of nationalism that is disliked in much of the rest of Ukraine. Instead of contributing to the formation of a modern Ukrainian political nation, “Svoboda” alienates rather than attracts many Ukrainians. Moreover, “Svoboda’s” membership in the pan-European, extremely right-wing Alliance of European Nationalist Movements illustrates yet another problem. Tiahnybok’s party represents a form of nationalism that, while not being marginal in all European countries, is highly stigmatized, in the European political mainstream, as an anachronistic and anti-democratic ideology. The elimination or, at least, containment of exactly this sort of nationalism has been one of the impulses for starting the post-war European integration process.

O.T.: But “Svoboda” has so far remained a minor actor in all-Ukrainian politics, and only become an important player in Western Ukraine.

A.U.: That is certainly true and speaks for the maturity of the Ukrainian electorate. However, in the case of an escalation of political conflicts in Ukraine, “Svoboda” could still become a source of instability of the Ukrainian state. Should there be, for instance, a new Ukrainian insurrection resembling the Orange Revolution of 2004, “Svoboda” might be able to organizationally capture and ideologically impregnate the Galician part of the protest movement. In view of the unacceptability of “Svoboda” outside Galicia, this could disconnect Galician civil society from that of the rest of Ukraine. Such a division could transform a new Ukrainian mass civic movement from an anti-regime protest into an anti-state action. A regionally and ideologically fragmented anti-governmental mass action would not bode well for the integrity of the Ukrainian state. Other examples of deepening divides within the Ukrainian nation – with regard to social, cultural, religious, educational and other issues – could be mentioned.

O.T.: This is a rather grim picture.

A.U.: Against this background, the idea of European integration gains further significance. It is a factor that still unites the Ukrainian political, intellectual, economic and social elites as well as large parts of the population of Ukraine. There are, of course, also important historical events or figures, like the Holodomor or Taras Shevchenko, that unite rather than divide Ukrainians. However, concerning the present and future of Ukraine, there are not that many unifying concepts beyond some general wish for affluence, stability and security. Rejoining Europe might be the most important and least controversial concrete idea which has wide acceptance among the elites of Western, Central and Eastern Ukraine – though somewhat less so in the South. Perhaps, these four dimensions of Ukraine’s rapprochement with the EU are the most relevant: anchoring Ukraine internationally, directing Ukrainian reforms, impressing Russia with Ukraine’s Europeanization, and using the European idea to keep Ukraine united. Therefore, it seems justified to speak of a high significance of Ukraine’s further gradual integration into Europe.

O.T.: Dr. Umland, thank you for your answers!