Patterns of chaos and instability for Afghanistan have been documented over time. Scholars have written about cyclical power shifts in Afghan history and compared the most recent phenomenon to the “Charismatic Mullah Movement”; a cultural phenomenon that manifests in cyclical power shifts from Maliks and Khans to Mullahs. The British referred to these power shifts as “Mad Mullah Movements” (Tribal Analysis Center, 2008). Mullahs capitalize on the oppression that people are experiencing at the hands of the established government, take advantage of the relative ignorance and illiteracy of the villagers, and utilize their own “knowledge” of the Koran to manipulate their soon-to-be followers. They have been known to stage dramatic events that make them appear to be “special” or selected by God to lead the people; counting on oral tradition to exaggerate the story over time and distance. Mullah Omar staged one such scene in 1994 when he appeared publicly wearing a garment that supposedly belonged to the Prophet Mohammed (Peace be upon him). The public believed that the cloak was so imbued with mystical power that if Omar were not the “chosen” leader that he claimed to be, he would fall dead from wearing the garment. After having worn the cloak in public, Mullah Omar was declared “amir ul-mominim” or commander of the faithful. Mullah Omar’s Taliban were then fighting an insurgency trying to take control of the government in much the same way as other Mullahs had challenged leaders in power during previous “Mad Mullah Movements”. What differentiates the Taliban movement from those Mad Mullah Movements of the past is that the U.S. made them its Enemy, thus giving them notoriety and the appearance of legitimacy in the anti-U.S. world, and Al Qaeda backed them, providing financial support and further legitimizing them among the enemies of America. After having been forcibly removed from power, Mullah Omar’s resistance is expected along tribal lines, as he is a Hotak Ghilzai and we backed his blood enemy, a Popalzai Durani. Having enlisted the assistance of other strong-men leaders; former Mujahidin, drug lords, and war lords etc., Mullah Omar was able to temporarily bind the chaos into what appeared to be an insurgency. At some point in the last ten years, that focus was broken and the small fiefdoms began fighting with each other once again. Evidence of this is apparent. Taliban must keep strict division of ethnicities and tribes in their ranks to keep dissent and internal fighting from occurring. Taliban commanders often conduct illicit business and fight with each other for greater territory to “tax” and for greater personal gain. Within the common vernacular of the Pashtun people, the Taliban are referred to, under five separate categories, only one of which is the “Real Taliban”. Professionals in the field also refer to Taliban in two different ways: Taliban with an upper case “T” (big T Taliban), who are true believers who fight for jihad and to return Afghanistan to a state of pure Sharia; and taliban with a lower case “t” (small t taliban), which are those who just oppose the centralized government of Kabul. The true issue in Afghanistan is much more dynamic than this.
The existence of the “Chaotic Cannibalistic State” calls for a re-evaluation of our current strategy on Afghanistan and quite possible a new definition of our desired end state — the point at which the work of the international community is done, and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan is left to stand on its own two feet. Current Counterinsurgency doctrine is based on the imperative that the population, or at least a vast majority of the population, supports the central government and is desirous of actually being governed by it. This is a tall order given the fact that in the long and violent history of Afghanistan, no central government has ever effectively ruled the entire country for any significant period of time. Even the strongest and most ruthless of leaders were continuously occupied with putting down rebellions from challenging regional warlords, or sending out military “punitive expeditions” to areas where would-be challengers may be building a power base. Certainly no central government in Afghanistan’s modern era has exercised effective governance over the country as a whole. These so-called rulers have existed on a thin razor’s edge where they exerted control over their own power bases in Kabul or Kandahar for example, but ceded power to regional actors in places like Herat, Mazr-e-Sharif and the Hazarajat. These relationships existed in a constant state of tension where the slightest perception of weakness in a rival, would erupt into a violent grab for more power leaving the dead bodies of innocent Afghans in their wakes. Today’s Afghans have never in their lifetimes, known an effective central government in their country. They have not even heard stories, passed down by their ancestors, about what life was like under an effective central government. So, we are asking them to accept on faith that a strong central government is what they need and what they should actively support. We, who are considered by most Afghans as an invading army, are asking a people who have endured numerous invasions, to trust that we know what is best for them. For most Afghans, certainly those who live outside of the central districts of the major population centers, this simply does not compute. It could be argued that what these Afghans want most from their government, whether regional or national, is to be left alone. Their interactions with regional and national government “officials” have been one way: the people give, the government takes. As ISAF endeavors to convince these people of the merits of representative democracy, we will be continually hamstrung by the dysfunction and overt corruptness of the very representatives they have “democratically elected”. With international public support for continuing operations in Afghanistan waning, ISAF will be faced with some tough decisions in the very near future. We can continue with our current strategy of support for GIRoA (such that it is) and classic counterinsurgency tactics against the enemies of a stable Afghanistan, which ISAF will call the “Taliban”. This strategy may, within several years, yield a security situation sufficient for ISAF to declare victory, withdraw its forces and leave Afghanistan to its own devices. It is unlikely that American, British and other Coalition Member public opinion will survive long enough to sustain this course of action.
Recognizing that we have entered into a situation we did not fully understand and we are being bled by criminal groups that would normally be attacking each other with greater vigor in our absence;
Recognizing that we are perceived by the Afghan people as either their latest meal ticket or as invaders, not liberators;
Recognizing that we have created an unhealthy, non-sustainable dependency that allows a country which has outgrown its carrying capacity to continue down a path of population growth;
Recognizing that we have defeated the original insurgents, leaving only bands of criminals, thugs and would-be war lords;
Recognizing that our presence creates an enemy coalescence and keeps these internal groups from feeding on each other with greater voracity;
Recognizing that the narco-economy and culture of Afghanistan cannot be changed by a short-term commitment of less than three generations;
It is only reasonable for us to declare victory over what was once an Insurgency, determine that the drug-lords, small-time gangsters and official corruption are internal problems, and change our engagement strategy for operations in this country from counterinsurgency (COIN) to international law enforcement and military adviser support.
It would be unconscionable for us to simply leave the soldiers and police of this country, who volunteered at great personal risk to stand for their belief in democracy. As our troops draw down, professional consultants, political, diplomatic and law enforcement advisers must take on a greater role of capacity building than they already have. The 2011 withdrawal date set by the Obama administration is realistic; the political and military strategy would be better informed, given the discussion set forth in this document. Identifying Afghanistan for what it is, and acknowledgment of the limits of our ability to change this state is a first step. Orchestrating a means to extricate ourselves without making the situation worse is the next step. Applying a tourniquet to the flow of soldier’s lives and U.S. taxpayer dollars being spent on this country in realization that Afghan people have been fighting their own battles from time immemorial is the final step. We must acknowledge that effective COIN has been utilized to defeat the Insurgency phase of the chaotic cycle of violence in Afghanistan; that these organizations have devolved into criminal groups; and that nation-building in Afghanistan is too costly an endeavor to pursue. We must further accept that unless we are willing to commit to an occupation and education program that is multigenerational, there will be no change to the Chaotic Cannibalistic State that is Afghanistan. Understanding and declaring to the population that this is and has been the state of Afghanistan, and that we have accomplished what we set out to accomplish here is our political exit strategy. Acknowledgement of a newly articulated political state of being for Afghanistan allows us to effectively change strategies for US engagement.
Notes
[1] Field Notes, 2006-2009.
Works Cited
Hartmann, F. H. (1982). The Conservation of Enemies: A Study in Enmity. Greenwood Press.
Jones, S. G. (2010). In the Graveyard of Empires: Americas War in Afghanistan. WW Norton and Co.
Keen, S. (1991). Faces of the Enemy: Reflections of the Hostile Imagination. Harpercollins.
Meredith, K., Villarreal, S., & Wilkinson, M. (2010). Afghanistan: The De-evolution of Insurgency. Small Wars Journal , 1-23.
Tribal Analysis Center. (2008). Mad Mullahs, Opportunists, and Family Connections: The Violent Pashtun Cycle. Williamsburg: Tribal Analysis Center LTD
