The regional context, too, is a key accelerant, particularly today as the perception of ISAF-NATO as a transient regional actor pushes regional actors to establish positions on the post-American Afghan chessboard. On one side is a loose alliance between India and Iran, and on the other Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, which admittedly is a vast oversimplification ignoring diverging ambitions and tactics for each of these stakeholders. While the Saudis and Iranians are battling for regional leadership, the Indians and Pakistanis are battling largely to contain each other and to control access to Central Asian energy corridors. For the Saudi-Pakistani alliance, Sunni Taliban primacy offers the best means to achieve their interests, while the Indians and Iranians prefer an anti-Taliban bloc drawn from former Northern Alliance non-Pashtun groups. Peripheral actors such as China and Russia also share concerns on a spillover of radicalization, but neither are likely to directly participate.  Instead, China is likely to depend on Pakistani preeminence in mitigating its security worries and delivering access to economic resources.

Most worrying is the Pakistani strategic calculus that foresees a precipitous Western withdrawal and thus remains interested in Taliban primacy as the most potent means to ward off fears of Indian encirclement. Covert support continues to be extensive with a recent report suggesting that retired ISI ‘contractors’ are represented on the Quetta Shura, the Taliban’s highest leadership body. The ISI allegedly also remains actively involved at the operational level with extensive support in financing, munitions and training provision as well as assistance with cross-border movement and the provision of external sanctuary.[56] Fears of rising Indian influence as the largest regional donor to the Afghan nation-building project[57] have ignited proxy war with various attacks on Indian interests including dual attacks on its embassy in Kabul. Many observers, including the CIA, have alleged that these attacks are traceable back to the ISI and conducted on their behalf by local militant proxies, most often the Haqqanis and the Lashkar-e-Taiba.[58]

Meanwhile Iranian influence has largely centered on eastern provinces such as Herat where it shares ethnic kinship. It has committed development aid and collaborated with Indian development projects[59] and anti-drugs efforts.[60] Iran paradoxically may be facing difficulties in reconciling its dislike of the U.S. with that of the Sunni Taliban. It has established an anti-Taliban beachhead in eastern Afghanistan by arming and supporting local warlords, employing sizeable economic and cultural outreach programs[61] to advance its soft power influence and making cash payments to curry favor amongst the highest echelons of Afghan governance.[62] Iran has also been accused by coalition officials of indirectly supporting the Taliban, including allegedly training Taliban fighters in the use of anti-aircraft missiles[63] and offering Iraqi-style EFPs to insurgents.[64] Therefore, unlike India, Iranian ambitions might be best served by an American withdrawal, removing both a threat to itself and what it considers a key source of inspiration for Taliban militants. The Saudis are primarily interested in rolling back Iranian gains and ensuring Sunni primacy with themselves as facilitators and “unifiers.”[65] As one of only three governments that recognized the Taliban government, and sharing some element of religious solidarity with the Taliban, the Saudis are also sympathetic to reconciliation measures that include the Taliban, being they believe they can ‘peel off’ the hardcore global jihadists such as al-Qaeda from the broader Taliban movement.[66]


[1] Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse and Hugh Miall, “Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts,” (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009), pg. 25

[2] Andrew Mack, “Global Political Violence: Explaining the Post-Cold War Era,” International Peace Academy, March 14, 2007, pg. 2

[3] Russell Hampsey and Sean P. McKenna, “Afghanistan’s Unique Surge,” Armed Forces Journal, June 2010, Available at http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2010/06/4646076/

[4] “Operation Enduring Freedom,” iCasualties.org, August 1, 2010. Available at http://www.icasualties.org/oef/

[5] Jon Boone, “Afghanistan civilian deaths up 31% this year,” The Guardian, August 10, 2010. Available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/aug/10/afghanistan-civilian-deaths-up-un

[6] “Human Development Report 2009: Afghanistan,” United Nations Development Programme, Available at http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/country_fact_sheets/cty_fs_AFG.html

[7] “US: Taliban has grown fourfold,” Al Jazeera, October 9, 2009. Available at http://english.aljazeera.net/news/americas/2009/10/20091091814483962.html

[8] Kenneth Katzman, “Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security and U.S. Policy,” Congressional Research Service, June 7, 2010.

[9] Antonio Giustozzi, “Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop,” (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), pg. 12

[10] Isak Svensson, “Rebellion, Religion and Resolution: Exploring the Religious Dimensions of Peace Agreements,” Uppsala University, March 25, 2005. Available at http://www.religionandconflict.net/RebRelRes.pdf

[11] Antonio Giustozzi, “Negotiating with the Taliban: Issues and Prospects,” Century Foundation, June 21, 2010.

[12] Graeme Smith, “What Kandahar’s Taliban Say,” in Decoding the New Taliban: Insights from the Afghan Field, Antonio Giustozzi, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), pg. 204

[13] Sami Yousafzai and Ron Moreau. “The Mullah Omar Show,” Newsweek, August 16, 2010. Available at http://www.newsweek.com/2010/08/08/this-mullah-omar-show.html

[14] Varun Vira, “Taliban 2.0: Dissension and Regeneration,” Foreign Policy Journal, June 1, 2010. Available at http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2010/06/01/taliban-2-0-dissension-and-regeneration/all/1

[15] Sami Yousafzai and Ron Moreau, “Not Your Father’s Taliban” Newsweek, May 7, 2010. Available at http://www.newsweek.com/2010/05/07/not-your-father-s-taliban.html

[16] David Rohde, “Terrorists without borders” The New Republic, February 23, 2010. Available at http://tinyurl.com/2ccovg7

[17] Sami Yousafzai and Ron Moreau, “Not Your Father’s Taliban” Newsweek, May 7, 2010. Available at http://www.newsweek.com/2010/05/07/not-your-father-s-taliban.html

[18] “Key quotes from new Taliban book,” Al Jazeera, July 27, 2009. Available at http://english.aljazeera.net/news/asia/2009/07/200972775236982270.html

[19] Seth Jones, “In the Graveyard of Empires,” (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2010), pg. 224

[20] Anand Gopal, Mansur Khan Mahsud and Brian Fishman, “The Battle for Pakistan: Militancy and Conflict in North Waziristan,” New America Foundation, April 2010, pgs 7-8.

[21] Antonio Giustozzi, “Negotiating with the Taliban: Issues and Prospects,” Century Foundation, June 21, 2010.

[22] Tom Coughland, “The Taliban in Helmand: An Oral History,” in Antonio Giustozzi, “Decoding the New Taliban: Insights from the Afghan Field,” (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), pg. 127

[23] Graeme Smith, “What Kandahar’s Taliban Say,” in Decoding the New Taliban: Insights from the Afghan Field, Antonio Giustozzi, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), pg. 205

[24] Ibid, pg. 201

[25] “International Security Assistance Force (Key Facts and Figures),” International Security Assistance Force Afghanistan, Available at http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/Placemats/100804%20Placemat.pdf

[26] David Miliband, “The danger is being outgoverned, rather than outgunned,” The New Statesman, Vol. 139, Issue 4985, January 25, 2010, p25-34

[27] Peter Bergen, “Keeping Promises,” The New Republic, July 28, 2010. Available at  http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/magazine/76422/afghanistan-war-peter-bergen

[28] Stephen Biddle, “Defining Success in Afghanistan,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 89, Issue 4, July/August 2010, pg. 48-60.

[29] David Kilcullen, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Roundtable on Afghanistan, February 5, 2009. Available at http://www.cnas.org/node/693

[30] Stephen Biddle, “Defining Success in Afghanistan,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 89, Issue 4, July/August 2010, pg. 48-60.

[31] Carl Fosberg, “Politics and Power in Kandahar,” Institute for the Study of War, April 2010.

[32] Marina Ottaway, “Combating Conflict Enterpreneurs,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, February 7, 2002. Available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/events/index.cfm?fa=eventDetail&id=453&

[33] Jonathan S Landay, “Warlords and killers seek re-election to Afghan parliament,” McClatchy, September 14, 2010. Available at http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/09/14/100574/warlords-alleged-killers-seek.html

[34] Fabrizio Foschini, “(Campaign Trail 6/1) Loya Paktia, elections without campaign and (many) voters,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, August 28, 2010. Available at http://aan-afghanistan.com/index.asp?id=998

[35] Fabrizio Foschini, “(Campaign Trail 6/2) Loya Paktia, elections without campaign and (many) voters,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, August 28, 2010. Available at http://aan-afghanistan.com/index.asp?id=1001

[36] Fabrizio Foschini, “Campaign Trail 2010 (1) Badakhshan – drugs, border crossing and parliamentary seats,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, June 19, 2010. Available at http://aan-afghanistan.com/index.asp?id=833

[37] Katrina Rohl, “Greed or Grievance: Why does the FARC keep fighting?” Peace and Conflict Monitor, Available at http://www.monitor.upeace.org/Colombia.pdf

[38] “Afghan perceptions and experiences of corruption: A National Survey 2010,” Integrity Watch Afghanistan, July 2010.

[39] Matthew Rosenberg, “Corruption suspected in airlift of billions in cash from Kabul,” Wall Street Journal, June 25, 2010. Available at http://tiny.cc/5dupn

[40] David S. Cloud, “US, Afghan forces launch assault in southern Afghanistan,” Los Angeles Times, September 15, 2010. Available at http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-afghanistan-20100915,0,3382816,print.story

[41] Kimberly Dozier, “Analysis: Special Ops on show to woo war skeptics,” Associated Press, September 3, 2010. Available at http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5ghAznHVc0Af8OIJ_PJe97T57SOVAD9I0JEB80

[42] Rachel Martin, “Northwest Pakistan sees surge of drone strikes,” Center for a New American Security, September 20, 2010. Available at http://www.cnas.org/node/5001

[43] Gareth Porter, “Doubling of SOF Night Raids backfired in Kandahar,” Inter Press Service, September 15, 2010. Available at http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=52842

[44] “Afghan commander says kidnapped two French nationals,” Reuters, July 22, 2008. Available at http://www.e-ariana.com/ariana/eariana.nsf/allDocs/AFDC4EE5B79AF7AD8725748E003820BC?OpenDocument

[45] Antonio Giustozzi, “The Taliban Beyond the Pashtuns,” Afghanistan Papers, Vol. 5, No. 1, July 2010.

[46] “Afghanistan: Elections and the Crisis of Governance,” International Crisis Group, Asia Briefing No. 96, November 25, 2009.

[47] http://articles.sfgate.com/2002-02-15/news/17529736_1_raped-soldiers-tajik

[48] Carl Fosberg, “Politics and Power in Kandahar,” Institute for the Study of War, April 2010.

[49] Gareth Porter, “Tajik grip on Afghan Army signals strife,” Asia Times, December 1, 2009. Available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/KL01Df02.html

[50] Antonio Giustozzi, “The Afghan National Army: Unwarranted Hope,” RUSI Journal, Vol. 154, No. 6, (December 2009), pp. 36-42.

[51] Thomas Ruttig, “How Tribal are the Taliban? Afghanistan’s largest insurgent movement between its tribal roots and Islamist ideology” Afghan Analysts Network, June 29, 2010.

[52] Fabrizio Foschini, “The Kuchi-Hazara Conflict, Again,” Afghan Analysts Network, May 27, 2005. Available at http://aan-afghanistan.com/index.asp?id=5

[53] William Dalrymple, “There is no NATO game but Pakistan’s proxy war with its brother in the South,” The Guardian, July 1, 2010. Available at http://tiny.cc/zcph1

[54] Thomas Ruttig, “How Tribal are the Taliban? Afghanistan’s largest insurgent movement between its tribal roots and Islamist ideology” Afghan Analysts Network, June 29, 2010, pg. 24

[55] Gilles Dorronsoro, “Afghanistan: Searching for Political Agreement,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 14, 2010, pg. 7

[56] Matt Waldman, “The Sun in the Sky: The Relationship between Pakistan’s ISI and Afghan Insurgents,” LSE Crisis States Research Center, Discussion Paper No. 18, Series 2, June 2010.

[57] http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125061548456340511.html

[58] Mark Mazzetti and Eric Schmitt, “CIA outlines Pakistan link with militants,” New York Times, July 30, 2008. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/30/world/asia/30pstan.html

[59] Karim Sajadpour, “Iran,” in Ashley Tellis and Aroop Mukherjee, “Is a Regional Strategy Viable in Afghanistan,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 2010.

[60] Christopher M. Blanchard, “Afghanistan: Narcotics and US Policy,” Congressional Research Service, December 7, 2004.

[61] Maseh Zarif and Ahmad Majidyar, “Iranian influence in Afghanistan: Recent Developments,” American Enterprise Institute Iran Tracker, August 21, 2009. Available at http://www.irantracker.org/analysis/iranian-influence-afghanistan-recent-developments

[62] Robert Tait, “Afghan money bags point to wider Iranian outreach strategy towards neighbors,” Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, October 26, 2010. Available at http://www.rferl.org/content/Afghan_Money_Bags_Point_To_Wider_Iranian_Out_Reach_Strategy_Toward_Neighbors/2201978.html?page=1&x=1#relatedInfoContainer

[63] Sara Carter, “Iran training Taliban fighters to use surface-to-air missiles,” San Francisco Examiner, October 25, 2010. Available at http://www.sfexaminer.com/world/Iran-training-Taliban-fighters-how-to-use-surface-to-air-missiles-1328182-105728878.html

[64] Mark Townsend, “Special Forces find proof of Iran supplying Taliban with equipment to fight British,” The Guardian, June 22, 2008. Available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2008/jun/22/military.afghanistan

[65] Steven Biddle and Daniel Markey, “Afghanistan: The View from the Battleground,” Council on Foreign Relations, November 24, 2008. Available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/17850/afghanistana_view_from_the_battleground.html

[66] Christopher Boucek, “Saudi Arabia,” in Ashley Tellis and Aroop Mukherjee, “Is a Regional Strategy Viable in Afghanistan,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 2010.