President Obama’s decision to revisit George Bush’s defense architecture early on in his presidency has been influenced by a number of underlying issues. The President believed it was important to meet the evolving threat of Iran, North Korea, and other rogue states with adequate defense capabilities, but he had to take into consideration spending realities resulting from the financial crisis while seeking to preserve the international non-proliferation regime and maintain strategic stability. While wanting to emphasize the shared transatlantic security burden in Europe, President Obama also wanted to reset relations with Russia, which had cooled considerably during the Bush years.

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and U.S. President Barack Obama

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and U.S. President Barack Obama

Meaningful progress has been made over the past 18 months. With regard to present and potential outcomes of President Obama’s Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) to missile defense, there is a positive shift toward more collaborative bilateral efforts between the U.S. and Russia on missile defense, nuclear non-proliferation and strategic arms reduction. Our analysis suggests that NATO’s present search for a new strategic identity offers a possibility to make U.S. missile defense a national contribution to the Alliance’s Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD). The mid-term elections and other contentious political trends in the U.S. could hinder President Obama’s ability to pursue his missile defense, disarmament and no-proliferation agenda over the next two years.

If the Obama Administration succeeds in communicating convincingly the non-offensive motives behind the expansion of its missile defense architecture, joint efforts with Russia in missile defense, disarmament and non-proliferation could succeed. Positive milestones in U.S.-Russia cooperation on missile defense have been established since Obama took office. For instance, a couple of months prior to the announcement of the change of course from the Bush Administration, the two states agreed on a Joint Treaty Assessment effort to allow for exchange of threat perceptions and estimation of shared ballistic missile risks.[1] A U.S-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission was with an Arms Control and International Security Working Group charged with missile defense cooperation, among other issues.[2] Initiatives of this kind have served to reassure the Russians of America’s peaceful intentions behind the PAA to missile defense. Furthermore, they have established a more comprehensive format for bilateral cooperation on other matters.

President Obama’s effort to promote transparency and international cooperation on missile defense issues has the potential to result in joint U.S.-Russia research, development, testing and analysis of current and future missile defense architectures. Given that the present Administration remains open to the 2007 Russian proposal to share intelligence on Iranian flight tests retrieved by some of its early warning radars, there is a great potential for refining bilateral cooperation further.[3] A positive indication of improving cooperation was President Medvedev’s July 2010 statement expressing a desire to advance relations with the U.S. more generally in technology and innovation. As Medvedev noted, ‘cooperation cannot be limited to missile reduction’.[4]

Recent diplomatic developments vis-a-vis the Iranian nuclear weapons issue have indicated a tendency to increase Russia’s role in helping defuse Iran’s  continued enrichment of uranium. Early in 2010, the Iranian government announced its plans to develop up to 20 percent enriched uranium nuclear fuel and to expand its present program with ten additional uranium enrichment plants within the year ahead.[5] The decision followed Iran’s refusal to agree to a nuclear fuel swap which would have resulted in the exchange of Iran’s partially enriched uranium with fuel from abroad (Turkey and Brazil).[6] Tehran’s detour raised Russia’s concern over Iran’s suspected pursuit of nuclear weapons — allegations that have been further enhanced by the politicization of Iran’s verification obligations under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) guidelines. A joint letter from Moscow, Washington and Paris voiced their concern over the Islamic Republic’s plans for uranium enrichment.[7] This was an early indication of Russia’s readiness to collaborate with the U.S. in sustaining the nuclear nonproliferation regime, resulting in UN Security Council Resolution 1929 (2010), as agreed by all the permanent members of the Council. The positive vote on the Resolution was in part a manifestation of Russia’s agreement with the U.S. conclusion regarding the presence of a potential ballistic missile threat from Iran. It also indicated the potential for more proactive engagement from Russia in joint missile defense efforts.

The ratification of the 2010 Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Arms (the New START) and possible endorsement of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) will be decisive factors to this end. Regardless of the initial cynicism expressed by the Kremlin vis-à-vis the expansion of U.S. missile defense assets, the ratification process of the New START has been initiated by the legislatures of both Russia and the U.S. Cold War negativism still exists amongst both Russia’s Duma and the U.S. Senate with regard to the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons. However, there is some expert consensus in both states that the gradual reduction of such weapons is  a long-term objective from a cost reduction perspective, necessary in order to be compliant with treaty obligations, and essential for sustaining security and cooperation.[8] As President Medvedev put it, Russia is committed to “‘simultaneous ratification, neither earlier, nor later” than the American side.[9] Discussions in the Russian legislature would be carried out in parallel with hearings in the U.S. Congress, in accordance with an agreement between the two parties on simultaneous ratification of the New START.

Eventual ratification of the Treaty would not only lead to reductions in the nuclear stockpiles of the two signatory states, but will also be a positive step forward and a source of pressure for greater international nuclear disarmament. Given that the U.S. has embraced missile defense as a driving element of its nuclear disarmament objectives, endorsement of the New START will facilitate the process of limiting offensive capabilities and enhancing the role of non-nuclear defense systems. It will also allow for further development and deployment of missile defense elements. Following the recent U.S. decision to reveal the number of its nuclear warheads, Russia has indicated the potential for a reciprocal disclosure of information upon entry into force of the New START.[10] This would significantly enhance transparency and cooperation between the two states, which would benefit collaboration on missile defense. Eventual ratification of the Treaty would also pave the way for more comprehensive discussions on the CTBT.

Regardless of the progress the Obama Administration has made in resetting relations with Russia, a number of negative developments could impede some of the objectives behind the new missile defense posture. As the democrats lack the sixty seats necessary in the Senate to approve the Treaty outright, President Obama might find it difficult to fulfill some of the obligations and promises made to America’s foreign allies and partners. The mid-term elections, the mood of American voters, and the growing polarization of lawmakers in Washington will continue to impact the legislative process. The revised missile defense policy might, therefore, fail to live up to its potential of facilitating Obama’s new transparent and particularly multilateral foreign policy objectives.

If the Congress fails once again to endorse the CTBT, relations between Russia and the U.S. will experience a new setback that will likely prolong Russia’s suspension under the CFE and allow for further belligerence in Georgia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The signing of a modified missile defense agreement between the U.S. and Poland in July 2010 was not welcome by the Russian leadership and may ultimately negatively affect CFE developments and the endorsement of the New START. Pursuant to the revised accord, Poland agreed to host U.S. land-based missile defense interceptors as part of the PAA developments scheduled for 2018.[11] In conjunction with a recent deployment of PATRIOT interceptor batteries in Poland, such developments have questioned U.S. intent and can prove damaging for the New START ratification process.

With regard to redressing the U.S. defense architecture under the auspices of NATO, some experts have argued that, given the technical and security difficulties, cooperation between the Alliance and Russia on missile defense would take time and be limited to the exchange of early warning information.[12] It is important to note that Russia’s new Military Doctrine — approved in February 2010 — identifies NATO as one of the main external threats to the Federation.[13] In particular, the Alliance’s enlargement in proximity to Russia’s borders and its Article 5 collective defense mechanisms are seen as undermining Russia’s strategic stability.[14] With regard to missile defense, the initiation of President Bush’s plans were seen by Moscow as putting the joint NATO-Russia effort towards missile defense for deployed forces on hold.[15] Russia’s willingness to restart this cooperation will thus depend on Obama’s continual consultations and reassurances vis-à-vis Moscow. Given the recent efforts of the present Administration to expand the European missile defense pillar towards Bulgaria and Romania, relations between U.S and Russia could experience a downturn, inevitability affecting the NATO-Russia Council. The latter is particularly vulnerable now that President Medvedev has proposed an alternative European security treaty and architecture.

The present financial instability experienced by a number of European allies might also prove an obstacle to U.S. PAA to missile defense in the region. While President Obama has expressed willingness to share the burden of missile defense with allied states, the abrupt decline in national defense budgets would make it hard for some European states to share the high cost of the project. For instance, within the auspices of NATO, twenty out of its twenty-six members have been struggling to fulfill their two percent of GDP defense spending target.[16] Among the six states with high contributions, Greece experienced a major debt crisis and the U.K.’s new coalition government is faced with enormous budget deficit.[17] At present, Germany is contemplating cutting more than €9.3 billion from its defense budget and Britain  has just slashed 8% from its £36.9-billion defense bill. The progress of the PAA to missile defense may therefore depend on U.S. willingness to incur the bulk of the cost for the project. Sparing allies the financial burden of contributing in a meaningful way to regional defense could increase skepticism within the U.S. Congress, resulting in further constraints on the President’s ability to act.

Finally, Iran’s decision not to ‘withdraw even one inch from its stance’[18] — regardless of the international pressure — has helped rationalize Obama’s missile defense agenda, based on the perceived ongoing threat from Iran. In the long run, the perceived Iranian threat can become an overwhelming challenge to the PAA, making it extremely difficult to prove its effectiveness. The first test mimicking a strike from Iran was carried out in February 2010 and experienced malfunction in the Sea-Based X-band (SBX) radar, which failed to intercept its target,[19] even though the head of the MDA anticipated landmark results from the $150 million simulation.[20] Given the significance of the SBX radar in the GMD system, which is meant to defend the U.S. from long-range missiles, future failures of test exercises would raise further question about the reliability of Obama’s PAA to missile defense.

Conclusion

Progress has been made in demonstrating America’s non-aggressive intentions toward Russia, reassuring allies and securing ratification of the New START and a possible endorsement of the CTBT. At the same time, persisting technical limitations and political realities in the U.S. have introduced more variables to the future progress of President Obama’s PAA to missile defense. President Obama’s ability to maneuver through the political landmines that await his next two years in office will ultimately determine whether his PAA to missile defense becomes a reality.

For President Obama, the primary objective of maintaining the security status quo requires nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament , coupled with a desire to maintain strategic stability and cooperation. Ballistic missile defense has become essential to the achievement of both. The PAA has offered a less aggressive and more transparent variation of the former missile defense approach through gradual development and deployment of proven, flexible and movable capabilities, complemented by regular consultations with the parties concerned.

The ‘less offensive’ missile defense manifesto of the present Administration will allow for further joint ventures with Russia in missile defense, disarmament and non-proliferation. NATO’s present search for a new strategic concept — and the subsequent advancement of the Alliance’s missile defense effort — has presented an opportunity to share the burden of European missile defense with regional allies. The inclusion of the new PAA to missile defense within the Group of Expert’s 2010 report on NATO’s new security strategy suggests that President Obama’s ambition to make U.S. missile defense a national contribution to the Alliance’s Active Layered Theatre capability is likely to be accepted.


[1] Rose, Frank A. (2010), ‘Prospects for U.S.-Russia Missile Defense Cooperation’, Remarks at the 11th Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI) Missile Defence Conference, London, United Kingdom 27 May  2010, U.S. Department of State, http://www.state.gov/t/vci/rls/142329.htm, 18 June 2010.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Dyomkin, Denis (2010), ‘Russia’s Medvedev calls for alliances with U.S., EU’, Reuters, 12 July 2010, http://in.reuters.com/article/idINIndia-50061520100712, 12 July 2010.

[5] Jaseb, Hossein and Fredrik Dahl (2010), ‘Iran Plans Major Nuclear Expansion Over Next Year’ Reuters, 8 February 2010, http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USLDE61705120100208, 8 February 2010.

[6] Mostafavi, Ramin (2010), ‘Iran “Could Cancel Uranium Deal over Sanctions”’, Reuters, 20 May 2010, http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USTRE64J3K520100520, 20 May 2010 (2010).

[7] Hafezi Parisa and Reza Derakshi (2010), ‘Iran Says Will Respond to Any Sanctions’, Reuters, 16 February 2010, http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USTRE61F2Z920100216, 16 February 2010.

[8] ‘Medvedev Promotes Ratification of “New START”, NTIGlobal Security Newswire, 25 June 2010, http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20100625_6180.php, 8 July 2010.

[9] ‘Medvedev Submits New START for Ratification’, Voice of Russia, 28 May 2010, http://english.ruvr.ru/rtvideo/2010/05/28/video_8669968.html, 8 July 2010.

[10] Faulconbridge, Guy (2010), ‘Russia Says May Lift Veil on Nuclear Arsenal’, Reuters, 12 May 2010, http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USTRE64B2U920100512, 18 May 2010.

[11] ‘U.S.-Polish Missile Shield Collaboration Moves Ahead’, NTI-Global Security Newswire, 6 July 2010, http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20100706_2466.php, 8 July 2010.

[12] Brunnstrom, David (2010), ‘NATO Urges Missile Defense Pact, Cites Iran Threat’, Reuters, 26 March 2010, http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USTRE62P1U520100326, 29 March 2010.

[13] Russian Military Doctrine (2010), Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/2010russia_military_doctrine.pdf, 31 March 2010.

[14] ‘Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on Relations with Nato, the EU and the WTO’, The Telegraph, 22 June 2010, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sponsored/russianow/politics/7847648/Russias-foreign-minister-Sergei-Lavrov-on-relations-with-Nato-the-EU-and-the-WTO.html, 25 June 2010.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Brunnstrom, David (2010), ‘NATO Emphasizes Defense Spending Despite Crisis’, Reuters, 17 May 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE64G48920100517, 6 July 2010.

[17] ‘Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on Relations with Nato, the EU and the WT’ (2010).

[18] Mostafavi, Ramin and David Alexander (2010), ‘U.N. Resolution vs Iran “Not Worth Penny”’: Ahmadinejad’, Reuters, 12 May 2010, http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USTRE64B2RN20100512, 18 May 2010.

[19] Wolf, Jim (2010), ‘U.S. Missile Test Mimicking Iran Strike Fails’, Reuters, 1 February 2010, http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USTRE6104F420100201, 2 February 2010.

[20] Ibid.