[1] David Rohde, “Terrorists without borders” The New Republic, February 23, 2010. Available at http://tinyurl.com/2ccovg7
[2] Steven M. Walt, “Birds of a feather: Flocking together or flying apart?” Foreign Policy, October 28, 2009. Available at http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/10/28/birds_of_a_feather_flocking_together_or_flying_apart
[3] Brian Wolfe, “The Pakistani Taliban’s Suicide Bomber Trainer: A Profile of Qari Hussain Mehsud” American Enterprise Institute, May 25, 2010. Available at http://www.criticalthreats.org/pakistan/pakistani-talibans-suicide-bomber-trainer-profile-qari-hussain-mehsud-may-25-2010
[4] Nicholas Schmidle, “In a ditch,” The New Republic, May 4, 2010. Available at http://www.tnr.com/article/world/ditch
[5] Sami Yousafzai and Ron Moreau, “Not Your Father’s Taliban” Newsweek, May 7, 2010. Available at http://www.newsweek.com/2010/05/07/not-your-father-s-taliban.html
[6] Anand Gopal, Mansur Khan Mahsud and Brian Fishman, “The Battle for Pakistan: Militancy and Conflict in North Waziristan” New America Foundation, April 2010.
[7] Mark Mazetti and Eric Shmitt, “Afghan strikes by Taliban get Pakistan help, US aides say” New York Times, March 25, 2009. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/26/world/asia/26tribal.html
[8] “Haqqani Network” Institute for the Study of War. Available at http://www.understandingwar.org/themenode/haqqani-network
[9] David Rohde, “7 Months, 10 Days in Cptivity,” New York Times, October 17, 2009. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/18/world/asia/18hostage.html?_r=1
[10] Nicholas Schmidle, “Next-Gen Taliban,” New York Times, January 6, 2008. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/06/magazine/06PAKISTAN-t.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1
[11] “Gunmen kill ‘peace broker’ in NW Pakistan,” Voice of America, May 20, 2010. Available at http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/asia/Gunmen-Kill-Influential-Peace-Broker-in-NW-Pakistan-94433779.html
[12] Bill Roggio, “Khawaja’s petition blocks extradition of Mullah Baradar, Quetta Shura leaders,” Long War Journal, February 26, 2010. Available at http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2010/02/khawajas_petition_blocks_extra_1.php
[13] B. Raman, “The mysterious case of Arif Qasmani,” Outlook India, July 4, 2009. Available at http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?214668
[14] Arif Jamal, “The Asian Tigers – the new face of the Punjabi Taliban” Jamestown Foundation, May 20, 2010. Available at http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=36398&tx_ttnews[backPid]=13&cHash=c029bd42c8
[15] Syed Saleem Shahzad, “Militants in no mood to talk” Asia Times, March 11, 2010. Available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/LE11Df01.html
[16] Bill Roggio, “Pakistani journalist aids in murder of ISI officer,” Long War Journal, May 16, 2010. Available at http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2010/05/pakistani_journalist_aids_in_m.php
[17] Kashif Abbasi, “LJ killed my father: Usama Khalid,” The Nation, May 1, 2010. Available at http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/Politics/01-May-2010/LJ-killed-my-father-Usama-Khalid
[18] “HuJI chief behind ex-ISI man’s killing,” Times of India, March 2, 2010. Available at http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/World/Pakistan/HuJI-chief-behind-ex-ISI-mans-killing/articleshow/5882004.cms
[19] Sabrina Tavernise, Carlotta Gall and Ismaili Khan, “In shift, Pakistan considers attack on militant lair,” New York Times, April 30, 2010. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/30/world/asia/30pstan.html
[20] “Adnan R. Khan, “Ex-Spy’s slaying spreads fear in Pakistan,” AOL News, May 1, 2010. Available at http://www.aolnews.com/world/article/slaying-of-ex-pakistan-spy-khalid-khawaja-spreads-fear/19461393
[21] Hassan Abbas, “Defining the Pubjabi Taliban network,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 2, Issue 4. (April 2009).
[22] Omar Waraich, “Sectarian attacks on Lahore mosques kill more than 80” Time Magazine, May 28, 2010. Available at http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1992630,00.html
[23] Amir Mir, “Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan threatens LeT founder Hafiz Mohammed Saeed,” Daily News and Analysis India, May 20, 2010. Available at http://www.dnaindia.com/world/report_tehrik-e-taliban-pakistan-threatens-let-founder-hafiz-mohammad-saeed_1385192
[24] Kamal Siddiqi and Pramit Pal Chaudhari, “Rise of Punjabi Taliban” Hindustan Times, October 25, 2009. Available at http://www.hindustantimes.com/Rise-of-Punjabi-Taliban/Article1-468938.aspx
[25] Syed Saleem Shahzad, “Confessions of a Pakistani spy,” Asia Times, April 24, 2010. Available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/LD24Df04.html
[26] Brigadier General Shaukat Qadir, “Will the new Punjabi Taliban provoke a war in North Waziristan?” The National, May 9, 2010. Available at http://www.thenational.ae/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20100510/OPINION/705099963/1080
[27] Amir Mir, “Killers of ISI official wanted custody of Afghan Taliban, not release,” The News, May 2, 2010. Available at http://www.thenews.com.pk/print1.asp?id=237109
[28] Mazhar Tufail, “Mullah Omar Orders Halt to Attacks on Pak Troops,” The News, February 24, 2009. Available through Lexis Nexis.
[29] Abdul Hameed Bakier, “Jihadis debate growing rift between al-Qaeda and the Taliban,” Jamestown Foundation, December 15, 2009. Available at http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=35831&tx_ttnews[backPid]=7&cHash=173d41ac96
[30] David S. Cloud and Julian S. Barnes, “Some US officials see a growing Taliban-Al Qaeda rift,” Los Angeles Times, May 11, 2010. Available at http://articles.latimes.com/2010/mar/11/world/la-fg-extremist-wedge12-2010mar12
[31] Vahid Brown, “The Façade of Allegiance: Bin Ladin’s dubious pledge to Mullah Omar,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 3, Issue 1, (January 2010).
[32] “William MacLean, “Bin Laden’s son: No “love” among Qaeda-Taliban,” Reuters, January 26, 2010. Available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE60P4A320100126
[33] Bruce Riedel, Edward Luce and Martin Indyk, “The Search for Al Qaeda: Its Leadership, Ideology and Future,” Brookings Institution, Washington D.C., March 9, 2010. Transcript of lecture available from http://www.brookings.edu/events/2010/0309_al_qaeda.aspx
[35] Bill Roggio, “Hakeemullah’s pullout from North Waziristan an ‘excuse’ for Pakistan not to move” Long War Journal, May 26, 2010. Available at http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/05/hakeemullahs_pullout.php
[36] Mustaq Yusufzai, “Mehsud militants agree to leave NWA” The News, May 25, 2010. Available at http://www.thenews.com.pk/print1.asp?id=241101
[37] Steve Coll, “The Paradoxes of Al Qaeda” New America Foundation, January 27, 2010. Available at http://newamerica.net/publications/resources/2010/the_paradoxes_of_al_qaeda
[38] Brian Fishman, Greg Bruno and Jayshree Bajoria, “Jihadists and Time Square” Council on Foreign Relations, May 6, 2010. Available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/22058/jihadists_and_times_square.html
[39] Kamal Siddiqi and Pramit Pal Chaudhari, “Rise of Punjabi Taliban” Hindustan Times, October 25, 2009. Available at http://www.hindustantimes.com/Rise-of-Punjabi-Taliban/Article1-468938.aspx
[40] Steven Tankel, “Terrorism out of Pakistan” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 27, 2010. Available at http://carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=40867
[41] Ryan Mauro, “Part Time Allies” Front Page Magazine, May 19, 2010. Available at http://frontpagemag.com/2010/05/19/part-time-allies/
[42] Aparna Pande, “The Fight for Pakistan” Hudson Institute, January 29, 2010. Available at http://www.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publication_details&id=6727
[43] Steven Walt, “The Safe Haven Myth” Foreign Policy, August 18, 2009. Available at http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/08/18/the_safe_haven_myth
Its interesting that Mr. Varun is speaking and writing the language of his former Imperial masters from almost a century ago and the Afghan Pashtuns still havnt been enslaved. Varun you could learn alot from the Taliban about sefl respect.
What a ridiculous comment.
Good work. The last paragraph ıs strıkıng. The potentıal of Pakıstanı groups to contınue to target Pakıstan after Amerıcan wıthdrawal from Afghanıstan.. I personally belıeve a lot of them are orchestrated by CIA or other Amerıcan establıshments though. Take Maulana Fazlullah for example. He fought Pakıstanı Army ın Swat Valley. But last week we saw hım and hıs 300 men attackıng Amerıcan bases ın Noorıstan. What changed and he turned to Afghanıstan agaın..
Great piece by Varun in which he tried to bring so many theories and facts together and educate the reader. However, there are a few things I’d like to make clear.
Unlike the world-wide impression of Taliban as an agent of the ISI or CIA, the Kandahar-based Islamic movement is purely indigenous. It came as a result of CIA and ISI miscarriages in Afghanistan. Taliban is not a product of the ISI. Back in 1994, ISI was busy aiding and arming Gulbuddin Hekmatyar of Hezb-e-Islami when Taliban captured Kandahar in a lightening raid. No one took them seriously until they captured Herat within couple of months. The ISI only aligned itself when Taliban marched towards Kabul via Khost and Ghazni.
It may be true that the ISI, like any other intelligence agency that is opportunist at heart, changed its strategy and decided to embrace Taliban while abandoning Hezb-e-Islami.
Taliban, from day 1, was only interested in restoring peace and order in Afghanistan. The desire to impose Shariah law made it unacceptable for the West as well as Iran which is an ideological adversary of the Taliban. Taliban ranks included all minority ethnic as well as sectarian groups including Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras, Baloch and Shias. It is the interference and rejection from the West and Iran that put this fragile unity at stake and isolated the reconciliatory powers among Taliban ranks.
The inclusion of Pakistani Taliban, most of them coming from Sipah-e-Sahaba, damaged Taliban’s Afghan nationalist stance and did their best to turn the Islamic movement into a hardcore Sunni militia. The core Taliban leadership was never interested in ruling anything else than Afghanistan, as suggested by the writer.
Al-Qaeda has never enjoyed complete trust of Taliban and never will due to the fact that Afghans are always wary of the foreigners. They will be hospitable but will never refuse to let go their qualms about foreigners.
U.S. never gave Taliban government the chance to comprehend the situation and analyse the role of al-Qaeda in 9/11 attacks. Mulla Umar, along with other Taliban leaders, agreed to hand over Bin Laden to a third country, a clear indication that they were suspicious about the organisation. People who know the history of Afghanistan and Taliban will tell you that Taliban extended their hospitality to elements of al-Qaeda on the condition that they remain dormant and not use Afghanistan as the base of their worldwide operations. Taliban leadership was never happy with the fact that the mastermind of USS Cole attacks was trained on Afghan soil. However, they couldn’t do a lot about it due to extreme pressure from West-backed Northern Alliance.
The West wasted a golden opportunity to contain the virus of al-Qaeda in 2001 by invading Afghanistan. Taliban, tired of 2 decades of foreign invasion and civil war, were in no mood of an aggression. However, the Afghan code of defending the homeland at all costs preceded and Taliban retreated to regroup and expel the foreign invaders.
What al-Qaeda has done so far in Afghanistan and neighbouring Pakistan has harmed the interests of Taliban who rely on the support of many Pakistanis including businessmen and civilians. If you travel across the country, you’ll find that Pakistanis still have a soft spot for the Afghan Taliban despite being hostile to al-Qaeda and their Pakistani allies viz Kashmiri mujahideen, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi or TTP.
So to sum up, I’ll say that any resolution of Afghan conflict depends on the fact that all groups need to be dealt with on case by case basis. Punishing them all with one stick is just going to make the situation extremely complicated and self-defeating.
Moign, I agree with most of this, but actually Pakistan was supporting the Taliban before their capture of Kandahar. Hekmatyar by that time was seen as a failed use of their resources. Ahmed Rashid writes, “In Islamabad no foreign diplomat or analyst doubted that they had received considerable support from Pakistan. The fall of Kandahar was celebrated by the Pakistan government…” He also writes:
“However the Taliban’s closest links were with Pakistan where many of them had grown up and studied in madrassas run by the mercurial Maulana Fazlur Rehman and his Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam (JUI), a fundamentalist party which had considerable support amongst the Pashtuns in Baluchistan and the North West Frontier Province (NWFP). More significantly Maulana Rehman was now a political ally of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and he had access to the government, the army and the ISI to whom he described this newly emerging force…. Pakistan was getting tired of backing a loser and was looking around for other potential Pashtun proxies.”
He is referring to the time before the capture of Kandahar. Coupled with the fact that Pakistan funded the madrassas from which the Taliban arose (at a time when the CIA was funneling money to the ISI to support the mujaheddin jihad against the USSR), it seems quite fair to say that the Taliban is in no small measure a creation of the ISI. And certainly, Pakistan openly supported the Taliban from Kandahar forward, so for most of its existence, it has clearly been a tool of Pakistan policy, a situation that continued into the post-9/11 period.
Jeremy, Ahmed Rashid knows a lot about the region and the history however he is not an authority. He’s one Taliban basher who has always criticised them and never gave any credit to a few things they did good for the Afghan people.
The trouble with Taliban is that they’re naive people for sure. Mulla Omar has never travelled outside Kandahar. The farthest he’s been to is Khost. He never travelled to Kabul either. The elements in Pakistan, including ISI and JUI, as you mentioned, have always taken advantage of the Taliban, not to mention the Kashmiri jihadi groups that collected money in the name of Taliban without their permission.
Another impression about the madarsas is that they’re funded by the ISI which is not true. A few top madarsas like Haqqania, run by Maulana Sami-ul-Haq, a rival of Maulana Fazlur Rahman, can be funded by ISI. However, the bulk of madarsas in far flung areas are purely run by public support. The bulk of Taliban come from such madarsas and not from the top notch ones.
Gen. Hameed Gul is also of the idea that Taliban is an indigenous movement which later got the support of ISI after establishing their credibility and control.
A stable Afghanistan is in Pakistan’s as well as the region’s supreme interest and supporting the Taliban is a no-brainer. The parasites on Taliban changed the course of the movement and transformed it into an extremist movement. Had the West accepted the regime that controlled 90% of the country and sat to negotiate with it, things would have been completely different. Bulk of the Taliban are poor peasants and students of madarsas who live in simple mud houses and have no desire to live in palaces. It is the evil elements in ISI, CIA, Kashmiri mujahideen groups, sectarian groups, al-Qaeda, US and western governments that manipulated and tarnished Taliban’s image and transformed it into a puritanical movement bent upon imposing strict form of Islam.
Moderate voices like Mulla Wakeel Ahmad Muttawakkil (former Taliban FM) and Abdus Salaam Zaeef were imprisoned and tortured by the US. These were the people who wanted to keep the foundations of a modern Afghanistan and were willing to have a meaningful dialogue with the West. Sadly, West revels in creating monsters and naming them Hezbollah, Hamas, al-Qaeda, Taliban etc.
Moign, If Rashid isn’t an authority, I don’t know who is. He is very widely considered to be a leading expert. I don’t agree with your characterization of him. He certainly criticizes them, but I don’t think unjustifiably so. And he very much gives credit to the positive developments they accomplished in Afghanistan, beginning with their rise to power being seen as liberators and establishing law and order, through to their eradication of the poppy crop, etc.
When I said madrassas were funded by the ISI, I was not speaking of the present, but of during the Soviet-Afghan war. Again, from Rashid: “Between 1982 and 1992, some 35,000 generally radical Muslims from 43 Islamic countries in the Middle East, North and East Africa, Central Asia and the Far East would enjoy their baptism under fire with the Afghan Mujaheddin. Tens of thousands more foreign Muslims came to study in the hundreds of new religious schools (“madrassas” in Arabic) that Pakistan’s military government began to fund, in Pakistan and along the Afghan border. Eventually more than 100,000 generally radical Muslims were to have direct contact with Pakistan and Afghanistan and be influenced by the holy war (jihad) against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.”
You cite Gul as a credible source on the Taliban, so I would observe that Gul told me in person that RAW and Mossad are backing the TTP, which I know you disagree with. If you believe Gul that Pakistan didn’t support Taliban prior to Kandahar, why do you disbelieve him that TTP has foreign backing?
You argue the Taliban was not supported by Pakistan, and yet at the same time say that, “A stable Afghanistan is in Pakistan’s as well as the region’s supreme interest and supporting the Taliban is a no-brainer.” If it’s a no-brainer, why should we not trust Rashid that Pakistan supported them from the beginning? It seems fairly uncontroversial to me that that was the case, for just that reason.
There also seems to be a disconnect between your saying, on one hand, that the CIA and ISI are not behind the Taliban, while also saying, on the other hand, that CIA and ISI manipulated the Taliban to turn it into an extremist movement. So I’m a bit confused there, as there seems to me to be a contradiction.
Well Jeremy, I’ll elaborate. What I’m trying to say is that Taliban’s origins are from the very people of Kandahar and it started spontaneously due to some disturbing events in southern Afghanistan viz. Chaman and Kandahar. When they captured Kandahar it seemed as if it’s another take over by a warlord in the region. However this time it changed the game forever. Taliban emerged as a serious group that wanted to change the law and order situation and impose some form of rules and regulations.
What happened later is another story. Once they emerged as a serious group with proximity to certain elements in Pakistan, ISI stepped in to tap their power. Some say they armed the Taliban while others say the Pakistani intelligence controlled them. It may or may not be true. However, Taliban emerged as the most powerful group in Afghanistan and went on to capture 90% of the country including Kabul.
On TTP, my stance is clear. They’re a product of US-Pakistan policies in North and South Waziristan and al-Qaeda’s influence in the region. People in that region have strong sentiments against the war in Afghanistan and oppose Islamabad’s cooperation with US military. TTP was formed to impose Taliban style Shariah in Waziristan and to aide their brethren in Afghanistan which the ISI and Pakistani establishment didn’t like at all. This might have given RAW and other ISI rivals the chance to cooperate with them of which I’m not so sure. The flames of discontent were there and all that needed to be done was a bit of fanning them. RAW and Mossad might have done that.
So in a nutshell, I always say that general discontent leads to the creation and establishment of a insurgent movement (Taliban, TTP, LeT, BLA etc.). It is only after that stage they start receiving support from external players (ISI, CIA, RAW, Mossad etc.). It is not easy for intelligence agencies to create a militant from scratch. However, it is very easy for them to lend support once it’s spotted and vetted.
I hope I’m more clear now. Thanks.
Thanks for the clarifications, Moign. I think we’re pretty much in agreement, given what you’ve said here, which I think is pretty much right on.
Good summary Mr Khawaja. Thanks
http://www.theunjustmedia.com/Islamic%20Perspectives/June10/Operation%20Blue%20Tulsi%20How%20India%20Approached%20Israel%20For%20Help%20Against%20Pakistan.htm Artıcle explaıns Indıan and Israelı efforts to balkanıse Pakıstan and take hold of ıts nuclear assets. It ıs quıte confusıng for non experts lıke me though. You mıght be ınterested ın that kınd of stuff. I would gladly read any clarıfıcatıon on thıs matter.
The fact that the websıte ıs the mouthpıece of Afghan Talıban makes ıt ınterestıng to read. Contrary to your claıms Mr Khawaja they say TTP ıs mujahıds only agents ınfıltrated ınto theır ranks. I have always separated TTP and Afghanıstan Talıban so far.
@LT
The sad reality is that every government or militant organisation involved in a conflict never admits its accesses, violations of human rights, war crimes and crimes against humanity. Not to mean that all parties involved in a conflict commit above mentioned crimes.
TTP, like Afghan Taliban and their allies, has committed crimes against the civilian population in the name of God and Jihad. They’ve targeted and killed innocent civilians in numerous suicide operations, road-side bombings, beheadings and massive car bombings. Not to mention the damage to civilian properties like schools and hospitals. I can discount their claim to an extent that some infiltration took place but did the culprits got caught and punished by the TTP leadership?
The claim that FPJ is the mouthpiece of Afghan Taliban is ridiculous to say the least. I’ve maintained my position that Afghan Taliban rose against the tyranny and violations of human dignity and tried to bring an end to it. Sadly, American intervention forced them to change their tactics and join the bandwagon of human rights abusers.
There are many revolutionary movements in contemporary history that took up arms with a righteous cause but brutal suppression by the governments forced them to change their course and adopt inhuman tactics which they stood against in the first place. Taliban is no exception to this tragedy.
Thanks for explanatıons. Just want to correct a mısunderstandıng. FPJ ıs of course not the mouthpıece of Afghan Taleban . I meant The Unjustmedıa websıte whose lınk I gave above.
Brutal suppressıon ıs good poınt. We saw hundreds of unlawfully kılled Taleban on the streets of Swat after army takeover. Drone attacks add ınsult to ınjury and render the Taleban desperate and angry to the same extent I suppose. At the end they are dırectly or ındırectly forced to wıeld the same methods. In Rome, do what Romans do basıcally. Thanks agaın