The Kurdish Issue

The Impact on the Politics of Iraq and Turkey and Their Bilateral Relations Regarding Kurds Post-Saddam Hussein Regime

by Sonia Roy

April 22, 2011

Turkey

The Kurds live across all of Turkey but the majority live to the east and southeast of the country. The republic of Turkey’s treatment of its citizens of Kurdish ethnicity has been a frequent subject of international criticism. It is generally believed that Kemal Attatuk was the main discriminator of these Kurds, known as ‘Mountain Turks’ here (a deprivation of their religious, ethinic, notional as well as their linguistic identities). The Sevres Treaty of 1920 partitioned Turkey, reducing it to one-third of the Empire’s size, and promised the Kurds a country of their own. Ataturk rejected Sevres and rallied Turks in a “war of liberation.” Victorious, he succeeded in scuttling Sevres and replacing it with the Lausanne Treaty of 1923. In 1925, Kurds launched an insurgency to restore the autonomy that existed under Ottoman rule, but the rebellion was brutally put down and its ringleaders hanged in the central square of Diyarbakir. In the 1930s, Turkish government policy has aimed at forcible dissimilation and Turkification policies of the local Kurds. Following the 1937 Tunceli uprising, Turkey adopted draconian measures denying the very existence of Kurds in Turkey and referring to them as “Mountain Turks.” Kurdish language, culture, and geographical place names were banned. Simmering tensions continued until Turkey’s military coup on September 12, 1980.

However, the sudden success the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Parti Karkerani Kurdistan , or PKK) had in mobilizing large number of Kurds during 1980s and 1990s in its struggle against the Turkish state showed that years of Turkish Republican rule that institutionalized and sedimented Turkey’s policy of denial of Kurdish identity, language and culture remained futile. Furthermore, the establishment of the Turkish Workers Party (TIP) in 1961 and its broad agenda offered an election platform where Kurdish demands and national rights could be discussed. The ‘sociopolitical pluralism’ that Turkey experienced during the 1960s weakened the state’s ability to hegemonize the social identity of its citizens resulting in the emergence of a number of alternative discourses challenging the dominant Kemalist identity, the Kurdish nationalist movement among them.

In the present context, Turkey’s chances of entering the EU will significantly increase if it can achieve a long-term resolution of its Kurdish issue by continuing and implementing its legal-political reforms in order to tackle its ethnic plurality via liberal democracy and economic development. It would also significantly increase the EU’s credibility and political-economic weight as a global actor and as a social-political project, in the developing world in general and the Muslim world in particular. The more Turkey can secure its relations with its citizens of Kurdish origin through democratic and developmental means, the less it would be threatened by Kurdish nationalism in Iraq and elsewhere. With local elections looming, the AKP initiated full-time Kurdish language broadcasts on Turkish Radio and Television in 2009. Recent positive changes are gradually being witnessed like allowing Kurdish names to the children, etc., which were previously outlawed by the government authority.

Turkey and the European Union

Turkey is a state that borders Europe and Asia. It is a democratic, secular, unitaty, constitutional republic, with an ancient and historical cultural heritage. Its constitution reasserts the principle of being a secular state, making the Tukish National the supreme identity in its soil. However, Turkish as the official language and the complete disregard for the fact that Kurds have a separate identity on any terms have brought into question its secular, democratic nature. Turkey and the EU relations have evolved with lots of difficulties since Turkey’s application date for full membership on September 12, 1987. Historically, Turkey is a strategically important country for the EU. Still there are certain barriers. The minority treatment issue is one of those barriers. In fact, “respect for and protection of minorities” is one of the principles accepted in the Copenhagen Criteria which defines whether a country is eligible to join the European Union.

Turkey’s Kurdish issue, in this sense, is one of the stumbling blocks of Turkey on the road to EU accession. On October 3, 2005, when the European Union formally initiated accession negotiations with Turkey, more attention than ever was focused on the Kurdish problem of Turkey. Until recently, Turkey was even denying having a Kurdish problem to begin with, and speaking Kurdish was a crime according to the law. Therefore, it was sensation when Prime Minister of Turkey, Mr. Erdogan admitted that there is a Kurdish problem. Until then, this problem was “pronounced” as “southeastern problem” or “southeastern issue”.

Bilateral Relations Between Iraq and Turkey: The Kurd Factor

Turkey and Saddam’s regime enjoyed good trade and political relations until the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1991. Economic sanctions imposed on Iraq had an obvious detrimental impact on the economic relations between the two states. Hot air was blown between the two when Turkey allowed NATO aircraft to use its territory to impose the no-fly zone over the north of the country. However, the relations between these two states have entered a new phase since the 2003 invasion of Iraq by the US forces. Since then, the Iraqi governing authority has coordinated with Turkey over issues like border control and trade. Turkey today is one of the important gateways to Iraqi oil. However, Turkey is vehemently against Iraq’s granting of autonomy to the Kurds in the northern Iraqi provinces, as this could lead to demands of a similar nature back home, an issue the Turkish authorities have not yet come to terms with.

Iraqi Kurds, threatened with a military incursion by Turkey, find themselves in a pivotal—and ironic—position as Ankara and Washington searched for ways to end attacks by Turkish Kurdish militants holed up in semi-autonomous northern Iraq. Turkey wanted a diplomatic solution to a crisis which has seen scores of Turkish troops killed in cross-border raids by PKK forces. Ankara did not recognize the KRG and refused to meet with its representatives in any official capacity. That reflects Ankara’s fear that any international respect shown to the autonomous Iraqi Kurdish region would only embolden Turkey’s own Kurdish minority to seek similar home-rule status. As Ankara and Washington look for solutions from the Iraqi Kurdish leaders—who are among the strongest supporters of the United States in Iraq—those same leaders see the crisis as presenting them with some valuable bargaining power. One of the main arenas of concern among the recent (post Saddam) bilateral relations between the two bordering state of Iraq and Turkey is definetely the Kurds. Turkey has an abiding fear that if Kirkuk joins the KRG, it will provide the groundwork for an economically viable independent Kurdish state inspiring Turkish Kurds to seek greater autonomy. If Turkey cracked down on the rights of Kurds in Turkey or launched a major military action, either to prevent a referendum on Kirkuk’s status or to attack the PKK, Turkey’s European Union (EU) antagonists could use it as a pretext for impeding Ankara’s candidacy. Its a double jeopardy. Turkey needs a stable and strong Iraq to contain Iran. With powerful Iraqi Shi’a groups acting in ways that advance Tehran’s interests, Iraqi Kurdistan—stable, democratic, and pro-western—could become an essential buffer to sectarian violence emanating from an increasingly chaotic, politically polarized, and religiously radicalized Iraq. But at the same time, the fear remains for Turkey that autonomous Kurdistan could quite obviously entail Turkey’s own domestic Kurds to rise against the Turkish state.

Turkey initially joined the US-led campaign against Iraq under intense US pressure. Perhaps the rationale Turkey adopted was that if it couldn’t supercede the US decision to invade Iraq, at least it would have some impact on post war reconstruction if it remained a US ally. The newly elected government of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) gave in to US pressure after a lengthy period of indecision, diplomatic efforts to persuade the Iraqi and US governments to seek a peaceful solution, consultations with the president and the military, and intense negotiations with the US government. However, on 1 March 2003, the Parliament declined the government’s motion to authorize the deployment This was a major blow to US-Turkish relations; Turkey had been a major and consistent strategic partner for the USA, which in turn had supported Turkey in such an important area as the EU membership demands, for one. Turkey had its fear that the PKK, which fought a separatist war against Turkey between 1984 and 1999, would find a safe haven in Kurdish-controlled northern Iraq.

The second possible consequence was Iraqi-Kurdish statehood or autonomy. The PKK had proved to be a major threat to Turkish state security. Armed clashes with it, which were believed to have cost more than 30,000 lives, mostly ended when the movement’s leader, Abdullah Ocalan, was captured with US assistance in Kenya and jailed for life in 1999. However, the PKK remained active politically and militarily in Turkey, Iraq, and other countries, including parts of Western Europe.

A substantial portion of Turkish military and political leaders long suspected the USA—and Israel—of sympathizing with Iraqi-Kurdish statehood, which would reignite Kurdish secessionism within Turkey, to its own detriment. In October 2003, the parliament authorized the deployment of Turkish troops to join the coalition forces in Iraq, in accordance with US demands. However, this prospect met with vocal Iraqi opposition, especially from Iraqi Kurds. They feared that Turkey would use its military presence against Kurdish statehood—a well justified fear at that time. Accordingly, Turkey’s primary interests lie in, first, Iraq’s economic and political stability; second, the emergence of a democratic regime in Iraq; and, third, the pursuit of friendly and cooperative relations with Turkey by the new Iraqi administration in general—and by Iraqi Kurds in particular. In fact, this outcomehould probably be the overriding strategic objective for Turkey, as well as or the USA, the EU, and Iraqi Kurds.

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13 Responses to The Kurdish Issue

Ali Mostofi

April 22, 2011 at 8:16 am

The Kurds do have a common heritage and are united with other ancient people of West Asia along the Noruz traditions. Noruz biinds us all, especially the Kurds. It seems that the author has no knowledge of the underlying foundation of the culture. Close to 200 million people acted out the Noruz ceremoney on 21 Marchon the first day of Spring. This peaceful secular force has united and kept the national identity of the people of West Asia against all foreign invasions, religions and political ideologies’ attempts to destroy them. That is why Kurdistan has remained from the moment of The Medes. Read the Zend Avesta and other ancient books and then comment on the people in the area.
lahijohny

April 22, 2011 at 8:25 am

We should have left them to be assurian slave long time ago!? cause that’s exactly whom they are to west today period.
Alan

April 22, 2011 at 9:04 am

A huge factual mistake in the first paragraph – it says 90% of Kurds live in Iraq. This is not the case. Majority of Kurds (estimated here at 30 million) live in Turkey, with estimates between 14 to 20 million. Only up to 5 million Kurds live in Iraq, although they are still the biggest Kurdish community proportionally inside the country they live, as they make around 15 to 20 per cent of Iraq.
- Sonia
  
  April 23, 2011 at 2:08 am
  
  In accordance to the CIA World Factbook, Kurds comprise 20% of the
  population in Turkey,15-20% in Iraq, perhaps 8% in Syria, 7% in Iran
  and 1.3% in Armenia. With the exception of Iran, Kurds form the second
  largest ethnic group in all the rest.
Hiwa

April 22, 2011 at 11:56 am

Thank you very much Sonia for your attention in Kurdish issues. Although I have some disagreements with you, I must confess I really enjoyed reading your informative article. My biggest disagreement with you is in that you believe/think there is no common thing that makes Kurdish people, living in different countries, united. I must tell you that the strongest reason that makes us (the Kurdish people) united is the word KURD itself. When you introduce yourself as a Kurd to another Kurd whom you have never seen before in any corner of the world, you suddenly make intimate friends (the reason for that is mainly because of our common suffering in the hands of occupiers and a Kurdish say that reads: “Kurds have no friends but the mountains”). A fact that in my opinion is the most significant measure in identifying a nation.
By the way, I think you meant ‘’ASSIMILATION’’ and not “DISSIMILATION” in the first paragraph under TURKEY’s subtitle.
Sevket Zaimoglu

April 22, 2011 at 2:06 pm

There are so many factual and spelling errors throughout the article, which make it difficult to take its main argument seriously.

- Firstly, as mentioned by another commenter, it is a gross error to state that “90% of the Kurds live in Iraq.”
- In another sentence, the author claims “Kurds are the largest ethnic group in West Asia after the Arabs.” Even if we suppose the author considered Turkey to be “in Europe”, hence did not take into account the Turks, how about the Iranians? Isn’t Iran in West Asia?
- Turkey’s application for EU membership was not on 12 September 1987, but 14 April 1987.
- The author argues Turkey’s treatment of its Kurds constitute a “barrier” towards entry to the EU because it violates the Copenhagen criteria. However, complying with the Copenhagen criteria was a preliminary condition for a country to be officially accepted as a candidate for EU membership. Turkey was given the status of EU member candidate in 2004 only after the European commission’s report found that it indeed satisfied the Copenhagen criteria.
- When describing how the “no-fly zone” north of the 36th parallel came into force, the author fails to mention that hundreds of thousands of Kurdish refugees took refuge in the Turkish-Iraqi border, and the “no-fly zone” was established after the recommendation of Turkey’s president Turgut Ozal. Turkey also allowed the “Poised Hammer” combined task force to use the Incirlik airbase in Turkey. Throughout the 1990s, there were serious concerns in Turkey that this task force was secretly aiding the PKK terrorists, yet in the face of any other alternative to protect the Iraqi Kurds from Saddam’s wrath, Turkey continued to permit the task force’s operations. Without Turkey’s support, the task force could not operate, and hence the “no-fly zone” could not be enforced. Furthermore, the “no-fly zone” was not a unilateral declaration of the US, as the author implies, but the outcome of a UN Security Council resolution.
- Azcapotzalco
  
  April 22, 2011 at 11:57 pm
  
  @ Sevket Zaimoglo:
  
  You are also making factual errors. You wrote:
  
  1) “In another sentence, the author claims “Kurds are the largest ethnic group in West Asia after the Arabs.” Even if we suppose the author considered Turkey to be “in Europe”, hence did not take into account the Turks, how about the Iranians? Isn’t Iran in West Asia?
  
  My answer: Iranians are not an ethnic entity, it’s a linguistic and nationality marker. So everybody living in Iran is by definition Iranian, as much as every swedish citizen is swedish, but that does not make a kurd with a swedish passport an ethnic swede. Apart from that Kurds constitute 10 % of the iranian population, there are several other iranian groups that also constitute a significant number of the population – i.e., Lor, Gilaki, Baluchi, etc. And none of them are persians (but they are iranians); in fact, the persians form only 30-50 % of the overall population in Iran. This support the authors claim that Kurds constitute the second largest ethnic group in west asia.
  
  2) You wrote: “When describing how the “no-fly zone” north of the 36th parallel came into force, the author fails to mention that hundreds of thousands of Kurdish refugees took refuge in the Turkish-Iraqi border”
  
  My answer: The problem is that Turkey never recognised these Kurdish refugees coming from Iraq as refugees. Because, if that would be the case, Turkey would have been forced to teach the Kurdish refugees in the camps in their mother language (because, according to an UN charter, refugees are allowed to get education in their mother language). However, if we take Turkeys stance towards the Kurds during this period, it feels that that would be impossible. Therefore, Turkey decided to not recognise them as refugees. So don’t take any credits on behalf of your country for the “well-treatment”, of Kurdish refugees.
- Jeremy R. Hammond
  
  April 23, 2011 at 1:32 am
  
  Sevket, the Iraqi no-fly zone was indeed a unilateral US action. It was not authorized by the UNSC, as you incorrectly stated.
Dipanwita

April 22, 2011 at 7:55 pm

A very informative article. I am sure there will be agreements-disagreements and more stipulated discussions about an issue as contemporary and controversial as the Kurdish Problem in Iraq and Turkey, but I would really like to thank the author for bringing our notice to a problem as massive and widespread as this. Thank you so much for your article. I have found it to be extremely educative.
Shaho

April 26, 2011 at 9:49 am

I am surprised by the many mistakes regarding the situation of Kurds in Iran. The only recognized minorities in the Iranian constitution are religious ones, i.e. Christians, Jews and Sunni Muslims. Kurds are not mentioned in any legal document and they certainly don’t have minority status. They do not have the right to learn their mother tongue in schools(public or private) as the only official language in Iran is Persian and Sunni Kurds can not even run for presidency since candidates are required to practice Twelver Shia. Over the past century, there have been large scale military conflicts between government forces and Kurds: 1880s (Sheikh Ubaydulla revolt in northwest),1920s (Simko in northwest/Urmia), 1947 (Mahabad Republic), 1978-1984(KDPI and Komala in West and northwest). In 1999, large scale demonstrations in support of Ocalan in Kurdish areas of Iran were forcefully suppressed. In 2005, after the ratification of the new Iraqi constitution many Kurds took to the streets in a dozen Kurdish cities and towns across western Iran to demand Kurdish rights similar to the ones enjoyed by Iraqi Kurds and again they were brutally suppressed. Over the last few years, tens of Kurdish activists have been executed by the Iranian authorities.
I suggest you take a close look at the HRW reports and the books published on the situation of Kurds in Iran, rather than buying into the cheap propaganda of the Iranian government and some exiled groups.
- Usul
  
  April 27, 2011 at 1:15 pm
  
  What is your point Shaho? Did you feel that some good ‘ole anti-Iran propaganda was missing in this thread? Why don’t you write a piece of your own so that we can learn from you? Or from HRW? Or the BBC? Or the CIA? Dig it?
shamal mirza

April 30, 2011 at 10:19 pm

I personally appreciate you efforts for paying attention to a sensitive subject such as the Kurdish issue. There are some quantitative as well as qualitative errors throughout the article. For example you estimated the numbers of Kurdish Population approximately to 30 Million. By bearing in mind that the you obtained this number from others without clear references the validity of the articles will be questioned and if presumably think that the you acquired this demographic statistic from CIA Fact book it could be argued that the 20% populations of 80 million people in Turkey would exceed from 20 million, and if we take 10% of Kurdish population to this number the populations of Kurd will be more than 30 million plus the 5 Million population of Kurd in IRAQ and some 4 million in Syria.
rojan

August 9, 2011 at 7:37 pm

There are some nations in iran such as persians,turks,kurds,baluch,arab,turkman,gilak and also lurs that some people consider them as kurdish nation.SO,in the middle east i dont think persian people living in iran to be second largest group of people.Well,after arabs and turks,kurds are third largest group of people living in middle east.I think(i havnt any evidence,of course)kurdish nation were now formed by composing native ancience nations of the region(i mean zagros mountains and northern mezopotamya).well, what is important is that all of them name themselves as kurd kurd kurd kurd yes KURD.kurds that know where live,a definite region KURDISTAN.