What triggers former foes to become friends and then listen to each other on their mutual interests is one puzzle political scientists tend to ask themselves. This is what we see in the bilateral relations of the United States and Myanmar.
Until a year ago, Myanmar faced sanctions and its former military generals were denied visas to the United States. The dual-track policy of the Obama administration, which began in 2009, has gradually mended the once strained relations.
President Thein Sein’s visit to the White House on May 20 was a testament to improved relations. It was the first head of state visit to Washington in 47 years. The former military ruler General Ne Win last visited Washington in 1966.
Thein Sein’s visit comes less than a year from President Obama’s visit to Myanmar last November, the first sitting US President to have visited the country. The primary reason behind the White House’s invitation to the Myanmar president was to show its support for the ongoing democratic reforms and to discuss possible ways how Washington can help.
What have changed the bilateral relations? There are a number of factors, but the most crucial ones are the release of political prisoners including Aung San Suu Kyi, the accommodation of National League for Democracy and its elected representatives in the parliament, and cessation of violence with most of the ethnic armed groups.
US-Myanmar relations in the past few years have been largely based on a quid pro quo or tit for tat strategy. Some analysts also call it action for action or give and take strategy. The Myanmar government has meticulously responded to the US demands for rapprochement. One best example is on the issue of political prisoners.
In October 11, 2011, the Myanmar government released 220 political prisoners. In response, then Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton made a three-day visit to Myanmar, which was the first US Secretary of State’s visit since John Foster Dulles in 1955.
In January and February 2012, on the anniversary of the country’s Independence Day and Union Day, the Myanmar government released more than 600 political prisoners, including prominent student leaders of the 1988 democracy uprising and ethnic minority leaders.
In response, the US government decided to resume diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level. The US-Myanmar diplomatic representation was downgraded to Chargé d’affaires in the aftermath of the 1988 democracy uprising and the subsequent nullification of the 1990 general election results.
Another significant US response was the suspension of investment sanctions on July 11 and import bans on September 26, 2012. Those initiatives allowed international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to reestablish its links with Myanmar.
Just ahead of President Thein Sein’s visit to Washington, the Myanmar government released at least 20 political prisoners on May 17. This is one reason why rights activists and democracy campaigners have criticized the Thein Sein government of using prisoners as a pawn and for public relations purposes.
There are mutual benefits in any bilateral relations. No country would establish diplomatic relations with other nations unless it has some kind of interest, either implicitly or explicitly. Such interest could range from economy to politics or pertaining to global strategic calculation.
What are the US interests on Myanmar and vice-versa? The US interests can be summed up as economic, political, and strategic. The permanent lifting of sanctions enables the US companies to invest in Myanmar, which in turn benefit both countries economically.
Politically, the US wants to maintain its global leadership status as a champion of democracy and human rights. By inviting Thein Sein to the White House, the Obama administration shows its support for the reform initiatives of Myanmar government and a commitment to help.
Strategically, Washington wants to reassert its presence in the region as it intends to build closer ties with the Southeast Asian nations. By strengthening ties with Myanmar, Washington also attempts to compete and contain the rising China, which is Myanmar’s biggest investor.
Myanmar interests on the United States can be broadly discussed under economy and politics. Normalizing relations with the US will not only attract investment companies, but it will also boost bilateral trades, both in terms of imports and exports. It will also help Myanmar secure loans and other financial assistance from international institutions associated with the United States.
Politically, the Myanmar government, still dominated by former military generals, wants the support and recognition of the United States, especially on the eve of assuming the chairmanship of the Association of Southeast Asia Nations in 2014. Moreover, President Thein Sein wants to prove to the military hardliners in Myanmar, who are skeptical of the reforms, that he has the support of the international community.
The Myanmar government will gradually seek the support of US government in developing its security infrastructure, rule of law, education, health, and poverty reduction. Another important agenda of the Thein Sein trip was to convince the US government to lift the remaining sanctions, targeted at individuals and companies.
Thein Sein’s trip to Washington is a triumph of quip pro quo diplomacy pursued by both nations. Though uncertainties still remain in Myanmar, head of state’s visit in 47 years shows Washington’s approval of the ongoing reform process.
If softliners and hardliners within the Myanmar military see confidence in its democracy roadmap, provided that there is continued support from the international community, Thein Sein’s visit to Washington can possibly pave the way for amending the 2008 constitution.
Amending or rewriting the exiting constitution is not only important but it is a necessity for a true democracy to develop. Whether the Thein Sein government can convince Washington to officially call the country name ‘Myanmar’ rather than ‘Burma’ is another issue to address.
This writer spent more than 24 years in the region
although there are points to be admired, I would like to take these on not for confrontation. But to allow
the perspective I had seen from both sides.
FIRST:
What are the US interests on Myanmar and vice-versa? The US interests can be summed up as economic, political, and strategic. The permanent lifting of sanctions enables the US companies to invest in Myanmar, which in turn benefit both countries economically.
( If this was true it would have been done long ago. The Clinton Administration was approached
various times with Madeline Albright. the answer was Suu Kyi or nothing at all) The reins of Suu Kyi and her NLD was manipulated by Soros and the Open Institute money. as well as the think Tanks in Washington D.C. The Institute for Asian Democracy et al; America was better off inside before China
had what they have now)
Second:
Politically, the US wants to maintain its global leadership status as a champion of democracy and human rights. By inviting Thein Sein to the White House, the Obama administration shows its support for the reform initiatives of Myanmar government and a commitment to help.
Strategically, Washington wants to reassert its presence in the region as it intends to build closer ties with the Southeast Asian nations. By strengthening ties with Myanmar, Washington also attempts to compete and contain the rising China, which is Myanmar’s biggest investor.
SECOND:
(If this was so, they would have moved sooner. The Young Turks who sent more than smoke signals to
The USA under Clinton and Bush fell on deaf ears.
The time was then. The reason now is many, But this is also not the realist answer. Suu Kyi preferred Martyrdom. After all being jailed in a 10MUSD compound is not the usual house arrest.
Even while there was no diplomatic relations
The US embassy, a small version of the Taj Mahal
ran business as usual; The US DEA was allowed open
access to the drug growing areas with the Junta
SPD assistance, All the while in the US Press and media the Burmese were condemned. The US made sre that the poppy cultivation was a a bare minimum.
In so mush so that their ally Afghanistan could crank up the world production to keep the Afghans
filthy rich if drug profits. The Thais made hundreds of millions in black trade with Made in Thai labels and pillaging the teakwood forests
THIRD:
Myanmar interests on the United States can be broadly discussed under economy and politics. Normalizing relations with the US will not only attract investment companies, but it will also boost bilateral trades, both in terms of imports and exports. It will also help Myanmar secure loans and other financial assistance from international institutions associated with the United States.
(This is a fallacious statement. The US is picking up the crumbs left on the table. The US
turned a blind eye when their allies S. Korea,
Thailand, Japan, the French , Brits et al; ran their open businesses. It was the Burmese who
made the many attempts because of sick paranoid
old men who walked backwards, on moon-lite nights,
reading astrology and palm readers. It also
had a lot to do with Saddham Hussein being over thrown. this is the reason Nappadaw was built
to take them away from Rangoon)
Not one word about Khun Sa? The Shan drug lord?
The US had a price on his head for 20+ years.
Yet while the US DEA lived and slept in Thailand
and Burma. There was not one time they moved to capture him. Khun Sa went in and out of Thailand
like a prince.. The Drug War had to continue at all costs to keep the jobs of the drug war, Agent, Lawyers, jail’s etc.
THE THAI ELITE
Government corruption is not just a problem in Thailand, it is a way of life. Like every bureaucracy, the Thai government has elaborate organizational charts marking out neatly delineated areas of authority. To the uninformed observer it seems to function much like any other meritocracy, with university graduates occupying government posts, careers advancing step by step, and proposals moving up and down the hierarchy in a more or less orderly fashion. But all of these these charts and procedures were (and are) a facade, behind which operate powerful military cliques whose driving ambition is to expropriate enough money, power, and patronage to become a government within the government. These cliques are not ideological factions, coteries of plotters united by greed and ambition.
A clique usually has its beginning in some branch of the military service, where a hardcore of friends and relatives begin to recruit supporters from the ranks of their brother officers. Since official salaries have always been notoriously inadequate for the basic needs—not to mention the dreams—of many officers, each rising faction must find itself a source of supplementary income. While graft within the military itself provides a certain amount of money, all cliques are eventually forced to extend their tentacles into the civilian sector. A clique usually concentrates on taking over a single government ministry or monopolizing a certain realm of business, such as the rice trade or the lumber industry. By the time a clique matures it has a highly disciplined pyramid of corruption. At the bottom, minor functionaries engage in extortion or graft, passing the money up the ladder, where leaders skim off vast sums for themselves divide the remainder among their loyal followers. Clique members may steal from the official government, but they usually do not dare steal from the clique itself; and the amount of money they receive from the clique is rigidly controlled.
When such a clique grows strong enough to make a bid for national power, it is inevitably forced to confront another in military faction. Such confrontations account for nearly all the coups and counter-coups that have determined the course of Thai politics ever since senior civil servants and army officers ended the absolute monarchy in 1932.
From 1947 to 1957, Thai politics was dominated by an intense rivalry between two powerful cliques: one led by General Phao Sriyanonda and the other by Marshal Sarit Thanarat. Both men were catapulted upward by the November 1947 coup which restored to power Thailand’s wartime leader, Marshal Phibun Songkhram. Too weak to execute the coup himself, Marshal Phibun had recruited these two powerful army cliques. The clique led by Sarit was composed mainly of ambitious young army officers; the other was led by the commander in chief of the army, General Phin, and sparked by his aggressive son-in-law, Colonel Phao Sriyanonda.