The Gaza Ceasefire, unlike a similar ceasefire achieved after Operation Cast Lead four years ago, is an event that has a likely significance far beyond ending the violence after eight days of murderous attacks. It is just possible that it will be looked back upon as a turning point in the long struggle between Israel and Palestine. Many have talked about ‘the fog of war,’ but it pales beside the ‘the fog of truce making,’ and in our media-infected air, the outcomes along with conjectures about the future are already being spun in all possible directions. Supporters of every position give their own spin, and then proclaim ‘victory.’ But as with the violent phases of the conflict, it is clarifying to distinguish the more persuasive contentions and interpretations from those that are less persuasive. What follows is one such attempt at such clarification.
It remains too soon to tell whether the ceasefire will hold for very long, and if it does, whether its central provisions will be implemented in good faith. At this early moment, the prospects are not promising. Israel has already used excessive violence to disperse Palestinian civilians who gathered on the Gaza side of the border, with a few straying across into Israel, to celebrate what they thought was their new freedom now to venture close to the border. This so-called ‘no-go-area’ was decreed by Israel after its 2005 ‘disengagement’ has been a killing field where 213, including 17 children and 154 uninvolved, had lost their lives, according to Israeli human rights organizations. Israeli security forces, after firing warning shots, killed one Palestinian civilian and wounded 20 others with live ammunition. The Israeli explanation was that it had given warnings, and since there had been no agreement on new ground rules implementing the ceasefire, the old regime of control was still in place. It is notable that Hamas protested, but at this point has made no moves to cancel the ceasefire or to retaliate violently, but the situation remains tense, fragile, and subject to change.
Putting aside the precariousness of the current situation and the accompanying uncertainties, it remains useful to look at the process by which the ceasefire was brought about, how this sheds light on the changing dynamics of the conflict itself, as well as discloses some underlying shifts in the regional and global balances of forces.
First of all, the role and outlook of the Arab governments was far more pro-active than in past interludes of intensified Israel/Palestine violence. During attacks several leading foreign ministers from the region visited Gaza and were received by the Hamas governing authorities, thus undermining the Israeli policy of isolating Hamas and excluding it from participation in diplomacy affecting the Palestinian people. Egypt played the critical role in brokering the agreement, despite the Muslim Brotherhood affiliation of its leaders. Mohammed Morsi, the Egyptian President, emerged as the key diplomatic figure in the process and widely praised by the West for his ‘pragmatism.’ This can be understood as recognition of Morsi’s capability as a statesman to address the concerns of both sides without intruding his own pro-Palestinian outlook. Indeed, the auspices of this brokered agreement inverted what Americans have brought to the table in past negotiations, a pretension of balance, a reality of partisanship.
Secondly, the text of the agreement implicitly acknowledged Hamas as the governing authority of Gaza, and thereby gives it, at least temporarily, a greatly enhanced status among Palestinians, regionally, and internationally. Its claim to be a (not the) legitimate representative of the Palestinian people has now become plausible, making Hamas a political actor that has for the moment been brought in from the terrorist cold. While Hamas is almost certain to remain formally ‘a terrorist organization’ in the eyes of Israel, the United States, and Europe, throughout this just concluded feverish effort to establish a ceasefire, Hamas was treated as if ‘a political actor’ with sovereign authority to speak on behalf of the people living in Gaza. Such a move represents a potential sea change, depending on whether there is an effort to build on the momentum achieved or a return to the futile and embittering Israeli/U.S. policy of excluding Hamas from diplomatic channels by insisting that no contact with a terrorist organization is permissible or politically acceptable. Correspondingly, the Palestinian Authority, and its leader, Mahmoud Abbas, have been for the moment awkwardly sidelined, overshadowed, and made to appear irrelevant in the midst of this latest terrible ordeal affecting the Palestinian people. It is puzzling why such an impression was fostered by the approach taken by all the diplomatic players.
Thirdly, Israel accepted as integral conditions of the ceasefire two sets of obligations toward the people of Gaza that it would never have agreed to before it launched its Pillar of Defense Operation: (1) agreeing not to engage in “incursions and targeting of individuals” and (2) agreeing to meet so as to arrange for the “opening the crossings and facilitating the movements of people and the transfer of goods, and refraining from restricting residents free movement, and targeting residents in border areas.” If implemented in good faith by Israel, this means the end of targeted assassinations and it requires the lifting of the blockade that has tormented Gaza for more than five years. These are major setbacks for the Israeli policy, although Hamas is obligated to stop sending rockets from its territory. The political acceptance by Tel Aviv of a prohibition on targeted assassinations, if respected, renounces a favorite tactic of Israeli governments for many years, which although generally regarded as illegal was still frequently relied upon by Israel with impunity. Indeed, the most dramatic precipitating event in the recent controversial unfolding crisis timeline was the killing of Ahmed al-Jabari on 14 November, a military/political leader of Hamas, who at the very time was negotiating a truce relating to cross-border violence. Unraveling the competing claims of acting defensively should at least acknowledge this complexity that makes polemical the contention that only one side is responsible. The Obama administration, with its usual deference to Tel Aviv, misleadingly told the story of the sustained violence as if only Israel was entitled to claim a defensive prerogative.
Fourthly, the role of the United States, while still significant, was considerably downsized by these other factors, especially by the need to allow Egypt to play the main role as arbiter. Such a need was partly, no doubt, a consequence of Washington’s dysfunctional insistence of continuing to avoid any direct contact with Hamas officials. This Egyptian prominence suggests a trend toward the regionalization of Middle East diplomacy that diminishes the importance and seriously erodes the legitimacy of extra-regional interference. This is bad news for the Israelis and for the United States. Turkey, a state with bad relations with Israel, also played a significant role in defusing the escalating crisis.
There exists a revealing gap between the U.S. insistence all along that Israel’s use of force was fully justified because every country has the right to defend itself and the ceasefire text that placed restrictions on future violence as being applicable to both sides. After the ceasefire, the United States needs to make a defining choice: either continue its role as Israel’s unconditional enabler or itself adopt a more ‘pragmatic’ approach to the conflict in the manner of Morsi. If the United States remains primarily an enabler, its diplomatic role is likely to diminish rapidly, but if it decides to adopt a balanced approach, even if quietly, it might still be able to take the lead in establishing a real peace process that is sensitive to the rights of both sides under international law. To make such a shift credible, President Obama would have to make a major speech to the American people at some point explaining why it is necessary to choose between partisanship and diplomacy in reshaping its future relationship to the conflict. However sensible such a shift would be both for American foreign policy and the stability of the Middle East, it is highly unlikely to happen. There is nothing in Obama’s resume that suggests a willingness to go to the people to circumvent the dysfunctional outlook of special interest groups that have dominated the way the U.S. Congress and the media present the conflict.
Fifthly, the United Nations was made to appear almost irrelevant, despite the presence of the Secretary General in the region during the diplomatic endgame. Ban Ki Moon did not help matters by seeming to echo the sentiments coming from Washington, calling attention almost exclusively to Israeli defensive rights. The UN could provide more neutral auspices for future negotiations if it were to disentangle itself from Western geopolitics. To do this would probably require withdrawing from participation in the Quartet, and pledging a commitment to a sustaining and just peace for both peoples. As with United States, it is highly unlikely that the UN will make such a move, at least not without prior authorization from Washington. As with Obama, there is nothing in the performance to date of Ban Ki Moon as Secretary General that suggests either the willingness or the capacity to act independently when the geopolitical stakes are high.
Sixthly, the immediate aftermath of the ceasefire was a call from the Gaza streets for Palestinian unity, symbolized by the presence of Palestinian Authority, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine flags all flying in harmonious co-existence. As the New York Times commented, “a rainbow not visible here in years.” If Palestinian unity holds, and becomes a practical reality by being implemented at governmental levels, it could alter the political landscape in a fundamental manner. To take hold it would require open and free elections throughout Occupied Palestine. If this narrative were to unfold, it might make the ceasefire to be perceived as much more than a temporary tense truce, but as a new beginning in the long march toward Palestinian justice.
All in all, the outcome of Operation Pillar of Defense was a resounding defeat for Israel in at least three respects: despite the incessant pounding of Gaza for eight days and the threat of a ground invasion, Hamas did not give in to Israeli demands for a unilateral ceasefire; the military capabilities of Gaza rockets exhibited a far greater capacity than in the past to inflict damage throughout the whole of Israel including Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, which suggests that in any future recurrence of major violence the military capabilities at the disposal of Gaza will become even greater; and the Israeli politics of promoting the Palestinian Authority as the only legitimate representative of the Palestinian people while refusing to deal with Hamas was dealt a heavy, possibly fatal, blow.
There is one chilling slant being given by Israeli officials to this attack on Gaza. It is brazenly being described as ‘a war game’ designed to rehearse for an impending attack on Iran. In the words of Israel’s ambassador to the United States, Michael Oren, “Israel was not confronting Gaza, but Iran.” Considering that at least 160 Gazans were killed, 1,000 wounded, and many more traumatized, this is, or should be, a shocking admission of a declared intent to commit crimes against humanity. It should at least prompt the UN Human Rights Council to appoint a fact-finding mission to assess the allegations of criminal conduct during the military attack. In effect, the situation demands a Goldstone 2 report, but this time with the political will to follow through, assuming that incriminating findings are reported. If the HRC does not initiate such a process, as seems a near certainty at this point, the responsibility and the opportunity is a challenge to civil society organizations committed to peace and justice. Given the tactics and disproportionate levels of violence, it would be a fresh abuse of those who died and were injured, to fail to assess this behavior from the perspective of international criminal law.
Mr. Falk is swimming and failing to see the new reality for Gaza. The issue between Israel and her neighbors is how to administer the Arab populations in the Jewish homeland, now comprising territories including the area of the state recognized as Israel by both Jordan and Egypt, so as to keep the nature of Israel Jewish. Will the large part of the non-Jewish population be absorbed by the Jewish population, or will the non-Jewish population remain separate. This is the real question, and has been since the modern resettlement of the Jewish homeland.
First, one has to realize that the Jewish population continues to grow in all areas of the Jewish homeland, except one – that is Gaza. In 1880, there were roughly only 20000 Jews between the Mediterranean and the Jordan, while there were at least 250000 Arabs. Now there are over 6 million Jews and 3 million Arabs. This is a phenominal explosion of the Jewish population by any measure.
Second, all Arab countries and most Arabs in the Jewish homeland realize that the Jews are in place to stay. Jewish immigration to Israel continues, with well educated and affluent groups coming more and more from the U.S. and Europe.
Third, the economy of Israel is stable and the standard of living and wealth creation pace continues substantially farther ahead than that of neighboring Arab countries and continues to accelerate. I have noted in these pages that Hizbullah is said to have won the war against Israel in 2006, much as Herr Falk urges in his most recent epistle to which I respond. Well, if one compares the economy of Israel to Lebanon today, the apparent victor of the 2006b conflict appears to be Israel, while Lebanon, in fits and starts, attempts to rebuild a shattered economy and polity.
Finally, by any measure, the politics in the Jewish homeland, whether in Israel or the Arab districts, seems much more stable and manageable than in neighboring Arab countries. The standard of living of all of those living in the Jewish homeland, be it in Israel proper or the administered territories is way ahead of that in neighboring Arab states. Egypt cannot feed itself. There is no need here to comment on how delightful life is in Syria or Lebanon. Jordan is on the brink of an Islamist putsch. And Israel is preparing for ……. free and fair elections! Falk and his ilk can talk to themselves all they want – that Gaza beat Israel. Only a fool who doesn’t know how to measure economic reality and political stability would believe him.
But Gaza is emerging in a sense, as a bordered Arab region inside the Jewish homeland, and these are seeds of an autonomy. The recent end of conflict agreement recognizews this border, inside of which a true autonomous zone may be able to emerge. In this sense, the Gazans will be able to build on their ‘success’ provided conditions to grow economically can be promoted. Here it is to be noted that weapon importation will probably continue to be used for the so-called resistance, and bombing and rocketing of Israeli civilians will trigger an actual invasion of Gaza.
Don’t expect the Israeli government to not pounce on this opportunity, for an invasion and to change the political reality inside the Jewish homeland. The parallel situation between India and East Pakistan comes to mind. After years of provocation, the Indian army invaded East Pakistan and crushed the government, set up a puppet government and established a peaceful border. The same is in store for Gaza. Gaza will become the administrative center of autonomy for the Arabs in the Jewish homeland between the Mediterranean and the Jordan after an Israeli invasion that will crush Hamas and set up a sympathetic puppet regime there. Gazans will sue for peace to establish healthy economic conditions and end the confrontation with Israelis. All Arabs in the Jewish homeland will get their passports there and vote for a legislature to be located in Gaza. There are certainly candidates in the Arab community who will collaborate with Israel to do this, and Israel will protect and support them. Jews will resettle in Gaza. India-East Pakistan – Bangladesh is a precedent for this. The recent negotiations, brokered by Morsi of Egypt, have gone a long way to turn Gaza into an autonomous zone for the Arabs living in the Jewish homeland. This is what Falk is talking about, but just doesn’t see.
I notice you make no comment on my revelation that the Hebrews were Arabs, and religion is not limited by race.
My attitude to Israel is based only on the actions of Israelis, were they Druids I would feel the same.
Jews! Arabs! What an absurd misconception!
To be Jewish is to accept the Hebrew faith, and the Hebrew tribe were Arabs (Iraqi Arabs to be specific). Abraham, Moses, King David, Solomon were all Arabs, Jesus of Nazareth was a Palestinian Arab with Jewish beliefs (No one knows when Hebrew became Jewish).
There are 30,000 Iranians who still practice their Jewish Beliefs (With guaranteed seats in the Iranian Parliament, same for Christians)There are Chinese Jews, Russian Jews, African Jews, American Jews who`s forefathers had no genetic links to Palestine, they just liked the Jewish faith and stuck with it.
Nothing wrong with that, what is wrong is all these differing nationalities are given the right by Israel to live on land stolen from the real descendents of the Kingdom of Israel, The Palestinians who are filled with Semite DNA.
Are you proposing a DNA test for citizenship? Pretty RACIST if you ask me.
More misconceptions from M H Rubin, and another absurd assumption and accusation. A religious justification for evicting Palestinians from their historical land does not exist, That would also apply if Israelis were Druids.
It takes rather a twit to claim that the land is historically “Palestinian” without also saying that the land is historically Israel.
No one doubts the Kingdom of Israel Existed, David and Solomon ruled there for 74 or 79 years (take your historical pick), Rehoboam presided over it`s disintegration, a historical fact, as is the fact that they were all monotheist Arabs.
No one knows what percentage of those Arabs who lived in the Kingdom of Israel were pagan, but there were many who followed the Hebrew faith still around when a Palestinian Arab known as Jesus of Nazareth was crucified.
No one knows how many converted from Judaism to Christianity or how long it took, but a census taken by the Ottormans in the 1850`s showed 80% of Palestinian Arabs were Moslem, 15% were Christian and 5% were Jewish. The overwhelming bulk of those people could trace their ancestry back to the time of David and Solomon.
Race does not define religious beliefs and religious beliefs do not define race, hence my objection to M H Rubin`s use of the divisive expression “Jews and Arabs”.