Despite early assurances by Egypt’s new President Mohammed Morsi regarding his “commitment to international treaties and agreements,” one can already foretell a likely confrontation between Egypt and Israel.
A chaotic transition notwithstanding, a new, post-revolution Egypt is emerging. It is more self-assertive, emphasizing issues of national dignity and respect. In fact, the world ‘Karama’—dignity in Arabic—is now paramount in the budding discourse.
The key to understanding post-January 2011 Egypt is to appreciate the inferred but real transformation of the collective psyche or Egyptian society, one that is unequivocally challenging the denigrating stereotype of Egyptians as docile and submissive.
This would mean that neither President Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood, the Salafis, the liberals nor even the generals of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) could steer Egypt in the sole direction of their own interests. Thus Morsi’s words in Tahrir Square on June 29 were by no means detached from a parallel reality of heightened expectations. In fact, no matter how fervent and ardently clear in his rhetoric, Morsi could barely keep up with what the chanting millions expected of him. He said, “I will endeavor to regain Egypt’s free will in its foreign relations. I will abolish all meanings of subordination to any power whatsoever. Egypt is free in all its actions and discourses.”
True, Morsi did state that Egypt would honor its international commitments, as it most likely will, and insinuated that Camp David is one of these. But the peace treaty with Israel is no ordinary ‘commitment’. It is an exceptional contract signed under immense pressures and sustained through constant bribes that were never ratified by a democratically-elected parliament. It was problematic from the start. The treaty alienated Egypt from its Arab surroundings and denied the country its historical role as a regional leader.
The whole endeavor was draped in secrecy and lack of clarity. For over 30 years, it defined an anomalous relationship between the US and Israel on one hand, and Egypt’s military and political elites on the other. The Egyptian people were never a relevant component in the treaty, as is still the case. Those who challenged then President Anwar Sadat’s normalization with Israel were severely punished. Still, throughout the years, large segments of Egyptian society challenged Camp David. They were not challenging peace per se, but rather the undemocratic nature and humiliating conditions of the accords.
Sadat then claimed to represent the ‘Egyptian people.’ Of course he didn’t, but the US and Israel have historically perceived Arab nations through individual leaders. The rest simply existed but never mattered. Western countries quickly clamored to capitalize on the opportunity of ousting Egypt from the fight against Israel, generously endowing Sadat with perks, honors, and funds. He was handed the Nobel Peace Prize in 1978, even before the treaty was officially signed in Washington. Sadat then saw himself as representing not only all Egyptians, but also the “great majority of the Arab people,’ claiming that he had responded to the “the hopes of mankind.” From a pro-Israeli Western viewpoint, he was not simply a ‘peacemaker,’ but, in the words of US evangelical preacher Pat Robertson, a ‘prince of peace’.
The mood in Israel was simply that of giddy anticipation. In 1978, Israel invaded parts of Lebanon, and shortly after peace was officiated with Egypt, it invaded the rest of the country, killing and wounding thousands of civilians. The war in Lebanon and the continued subjugation of occupied Palestinians were orchestrated by Likud leader Menachem Begin, previously the wanted head of the Irgun terror gang. But Begin was now a friend, a fellow-recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize, and a gracious host, who spoke profoundly of peace and friendship.
Camp David was never a peace treaty between two nations, but rather a political oddity sustained by billions of US taxpayers’ dollars. For decades, the question of Camp David was never truly settled. Israel accurately understood that to maintain the treaty, Egyptians would have to be forced into submission by a strong ruler, and the US understood that the ruler had to be fed with cash and other perks to remain content. Based on this understanding, Israel remained Mubarak’s most faithful ally until the very end. Just days before Morsi was sworn to power, the Jerusalem Post expressed this sentiment in its editorial: “With the junta maintaining a strong grip on power…relations between Egypt and Israel are more likely to remain stable than in a scenario where both the parliament and the presidential seat are controlled by Islamists.”
Israel is interested in maintaining the status quo with Egypt, which would help it to carry on with its colonial military schemes in Palestine and its aggressive policies in Lebanon and throughout the region. Egypt is unlikely to allow that reality to continue for much longer, particularly once the power struggle within Egypt is settled and a new political discourse is fully articulated.
Unable to truly appreciate the changing face of Egypt, US mainstream media is busying itself with neo-Orientalist discourses pertaining to secularists vs. Islamists and other wholesale generalizations. Such convenient dogmas completely ignore the fact that Egypt’s relationship to the Camp David treaty—and with Israel in general—will not be determined by a false dichotomy setting up bearded religious men against clean-shaven liberals, but by a new revolutionary mood that will continue to grip the country for years.
In Tahrir Square Morsi had proclaimed: “I emphasize the concept of national security in perspectives pertaining to the depths of Africa, the Arab World, the Muslim World and the rest of the world. Will not relinquish our rights; we will not relinquish the right of any Egyptian abroad. Our regime will drive our discourses in our foreign relations.” Egyptians would accept no less anyway, and Morsi’s promises are precisely what Mubarak withheld all these years. Per this roadmap, it is becoming clear that the new Egypt is potentially dangerous. That danger hardly stems from the religious leaning of the president or his political party, but from the very idea that Egypt’s national dignity—Karama—is compelling the country into a change of course in foreign policy.
If Israel doesn’t change its own course to accommodate this new reality, a confrontation will become more inevitable than likely.
I agree completely, and I published in the same vein as early as Feb. 2011. However, we must remember that Egypt is poor and relatively weak. It cannot stand up if it stands alone. Demographics is the Achilles’ heel of Zionism; in 50 years or less Israel will be in the same position White South Africa found itself in 25 years ago. If Egypt wants to force the pace, it can only do so as a leader of a united Muslim front. That means Sunni-Shia reconciliation: an Egyptian-Iranian alliance that is smiled upon by Turkey. Such a combination would lead, eventually, to the end of Zionism in Palestine — even if America decided to intervene on the Israeli side. But is such a combination likely? No. If Egypt goes it alone, it will be crushed — economically and if necessary militarily — by the US and Israel. Better to wait and let time do for the Palestinians what Egypt alone cannot do.
Egypt should remember that Israel gave up the Sinai for the peace treaty. If they wish to tear it up Israel would be within its rights to collect a refund and recapture the Sinai.
If Egypt denounced Camp David and Israel responded by reconquering the Sinai, how do you think world opinion would react? Egypt would have to attack Israel or be caught red-handed shipping arms to Hamas before Israel would strike. Israel has almost no friends left as it is. An Israeli invasion in response to simply tearing up the treaty would only worsen Israel’s bad standing in world opinion.
World opinion!!! Jews were slaughtered by the millions in the 1940’s because world opinion held that there was no reason to intervene or even admit Jews to their nations. After that, do you really believe that Israel cares about world opinion? Israel is alone and will always be alone. It does not rely on friends, since any that it acquires will eventually be bought off by its rich enemies (see Europe and Arab markets).
As for the Sinai, of course Egypt, after rejecting the treaty, will engage in a hostile act warranting retaliation. It is the nature of Arab nations to have bloody borders. If Egypt wants to keep the Sinai, it should be advised to keep the treaty.
Paul, you provide a bit of a one sided opinion, which is fair enough, but Jon Harrison takes a more considered view, and he includes two significant words that encapsulates the problem facing Israel, they are, Time and Public Opinion. A waive of public opinion, in the West, supported the creation of the State of Israel in 1948, few in the West seriously questioned the appropriating of Arab land to be given to Europeans who were victims of criminal acts by Europeans.
The opinions of the intrinsic population of the Levant and surrounding Arab and North African countries apposed this sequestration, it has not abated and is now demonstrated with public anti-Israeli demonstrations in Egypt and other “Arab Spring” countries. The opinions of the Arab peoples have for years been suppressed by their leaders who personally profited when accepting US “persuasion”. What will replace these ousted leaders remains to be seen, time will tell, but time has also altered the US situation.
Sixty years ago the US created 50% of the worlds wealth, that figure has now declined to 25%, still a huge total, but, with the emergence of China (to name but one) the US percentage of world wealth is forecast to continue to decline. The US donates the equivalent of some $40,000 annually to every Israeli citizen, if/when US taxpayers become aware of this, how long will public opinion continue to accept such largess?
In 1973, Egypt and Syria put Israel on the verge of defeat, only massive US military supplies saved the day (CIA and Israeli documents confirm that situation), For how long will US public opinion support such actions?
American financial and military support, and disunited (to say the least) Arab countries, has created an environment for Israel since it`s founding, time will undoubtedly alter that. The Crusaders were in a similar situation, militarily dominant and regularly reinforced from Europe, the Crusaders held sway. Until that is Saladdin, and later Baybars, both unified Arab resistance and with declining European support, after nearly 200 years the Crusader kingdom ended in bloodshed.
It`s in the hands of Israel to make her existence more acceptable to (At least) Palestinians, they could start by providing a more equitable supply of water, and at the same price Israeli`s pay. Stopping the discharge of raw settlement sewage onto Palestinian land would be another, improve the living conditions of Palestinians and their opinion of Israel will improve, it`s not rocket science and time is simply not on Israel`s side.
In a sense you’re right — Israel doesn’t care all that much about world opinion generally. But it does care about US opinion, and to a lesser extent European, Russian, Chinese, Australian and Canadian opinion. It certainly doesn’t want to offend American opinion to an extent that would affect our moral and financial support for its military and imperial goals. It has to worry about whether drawing the US into a war with Iran will lead to a change in US opinion toward Israel.
If Israel truly believes it is them of Iran, they will have to take their chances with public opinion. You can’t worry about what people think if the alternative is death.