Despite the focus of the mass media on (mostly theoretical) rivalry between the USA and China, and the rapport in recent years between China and Russia through a Central Asian axis, neither of these apparent geopolitical alignments are historically or organically based. They are superficial and in particular obscure the behind-the-scenes diplomacy that takes place above and beyond the public view. I have contended since the 1980s that there will be conflict between Russia and China, and that the USA will eventually adopt a de jure pro-China position, which has continued de facto despite the occasional posturing on the world stage.
Although there has been an ongoing relationship between Israel and China and between China and the USA, Russia, on the other hand, has been regarded as highly dubious by the USA, China, and Israel, regardless of what appears from public rostrums and treaties.
• The US foreign policy and international banking establishments together with the Zionists have been nervous about Russia for over a Century. They have regarded Russians as barbaric pogromists; Russia, the land of the Black Hundreds which has only relented during the brief interregnums of (a) The Bolsheviks up to the rise of Stalin; (b) the regimes of Gorbachev and Yeltsin. The conspicuous presence of Jews among the “oligarchs” targeted by Putin for corruption has served to multiply this nervousness towards Russia.
• If there was ever going to be an historically and organically based alliance between China and Russia, one would expect this to have been forged on the basis of “fraternal relations” when Russia was nominally “Communist.” Such was far from the case however. The foundation of Sino-Soviet relations was the cynically named 1950 “Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance,” which reduced China to a vassal state, and was ended by China in 1979 with the invasion of Vietnam as a symbolic gesture of the two-fingered kind.
Causes of Future Conflict
In regard to the relationship that will emerge between Russia and China, it is a matter of “blood is thicker than water,” and for Russians the Chinese are racial enemies. However, in this instance, it is water that is likely to be the factor that will reinforce the bonds and the antagonisms of “blood.”
China’s domination of Tibet provides the probable key to future widespread conflict throughout South and Southeast Asia and extending to Russia. The control of the Himalayan headwaters that feed most of India and Southeast Asia means that China has the potential lever over life and death for tens of millions. Water resources, flooding, pollution, and drought are major, albeit rarely publicized, problems throughout Asia. China has plans that will enable it to turn off the water taps for Asia at will, and the Chinese will not hesitate to do so when they face water resource crises of their own. The plan is for a Great South-North Water Project which will be able to divert river waters from the Tibetan highlands, including the waters of the Brahmaputra which feed India, into the parched Yellow River. With such crises against the background of historic tensions that have still not been resolved between China and India, Japan, and Vietnam, and Russia’s historically sound relations that endure with Vietnam and India, and the Chinese aim of hegemony over Central Asia, the much touted Shanghai Cooperation Organization established in 1996 as the “Shanghai Five,” will be no more enduring than the Hitler-Stalin Pact. Ironically, it was during the “Communist” era that China and the USSR came close to full-scale war, when China caused provocations along the border with Russia. During 1960-1963 there were over nine thousand disputes. The biggest clash in 1969 came when the Chinese killed 32 Russians in an ambush, with Russia responding by bombing China, causing about 800 Chinese deaths.
Such was the adversity between Russia and China during the 1960s that veteran journalist Harrison E Salisbury wrote a book entitled The Coming War Between Russia and China, in which he referred to the historic enmity starting during the 13th Century. It would be naïve to think that a “Shanghai Cooperation Organization” has fundamentally altered the broad outlines of Salisbury’s thesis.
USA & China
US opposition to Red China is one of the great myths of popular history. Nor was Mao particular antagonistic towards the USA other than when he wanted to posture as the rival leader of World Communism and the Third World against the “running dogs of US imperialism.” His opposition was very much that of a “paper tiger.”
Stalin was never well disposed towards Mao, whereas the USA was. The USA was insistent that Chiang deal with the Communists, while Stalin insisted that the Communists deal with Chiang. It was Chiang whom Stalin recognized as the leader of China, and regarded Mao as a “Trotskyite.” When the Russians prepared to evacuate Manchuria in 1945 they stayed until 1946 to allow Chiang in ahead of Mao. The Soviet Ambassador was only withdrawn from Chiang’s entourage the day before Mao’s announcement of his government in Peking in October 1949. Mao never forgave this. Mao’s attempts to ingratiate himself with the USSR were never successful, and he endured humiliation.
Conversely to the anti-Communist policy pursued by Stalin, the USA did whatever it could to back Mao. Gen. George C Marshall warned that US support for Chiang would end if he did not stop pursuing the Red Army into northern Manchuria at a time when Mao could have been defeated. As Chang and Halliday point out in their definitive biography on Mao, in a chapter aptly entitled “Saved by Washington,” this US betrayal of Chiang was decisive. However, Mao, as the budding co-equal to Stalin as leader of World Communism, was obliged to direct his alliance towards the USSR rather than the USA, a decision that cost China dearly under the terms of the colonialistic “Sino-Soviet Treaty.” Moreover, Mao was never accepted as the leader of World Communism other than by the Communist Party of New Zealand and by Albania. His only option for recognition as a world statesman was to return to the USA, resulting in the Nixon visit of 1972.
However, despite the self-imposed isolation of Mao in his ill-considered attempt to align with the USSR rather than the USA, the US foreign policy establishment and plutocratic interests had never disowned their pro-Mao attitude. These centred on the Rockefeller cabal and more latterly that of George Soros. Despite US recognition for China not being achieved until 1975, the policy that was pursued by the Nixon Administration towards China since 1970 had been formulated a decade previously by the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Peter Grose explained this in the official history of the CFR, which he calls America’s “foreign policy establishment”:
The Council turned in earnest to the problem of communist China early in the 1960s. Various Council publications had started developing the idea of a ‘two-China’ policy—recognition of both the Nationalist government of Taiwan and the communist government on the mainland. This, Council authors suggested, might be the least bad policy direction. Professor A. Doak Barnett published a trail-blazing book for the Council in 1960, Communist China and Asia. A major Council study of relations between the United States and China commenced in 1964, the year China exploded its first nuclear bomb; the group met systematically for the next four years. ‘Contentment with the present stalemate in relations with the Chinese is not statesmanship,’ declared Robert Blum of the Asia Society, the first director of the project. ‘American impatience and the strong currents of political emotion often make it impossible to plan ahead to manage our policy in a persevering but flexible way.’”
Like the recognition of Bolshevik Russian desired by the international bankers at the earliest stages of the regime, recognition of Red China presented a problem, especially since the USA had given guarantees to Taiwan. A typically duplicitous strategy was therefore required. The USA used the “two-China policy” to secure Red China’s entry into the United Nations, and to sideline Taiwan. The CFR approach was one of gradual promotion of the Mao regime, decrying the so-called “strong currents of emotion” that were holding back the globalist relationship with Red China. Grose explains:
This seemed just the sort of political stalemate that the Council on Foreign Relations, free of electoral and partisan constraints, was endowed to repair. Midway through the project, the Council published an analysis of public opinion called The American People and China by A. T. Steele, who reached the unexpected conclusion that Americans were more willing than many of their elected officeholders to forge new relations with China. This study argued that it was only a steady diet of hostile public statements that had made Americans “disposed to believe the worst of communist China and they [the Chinese] the worst of us.”
It is from this milieu that Rockefeller protégé Henry Kissinger emerged as the public architect of the US policy towards China. Grose states of Kissinger and Cyrus Vance:
Kissinger, acting as Nixon’s national security adviser, embarked on a secret mission to Beijing in 1971, to make official, exploratory contact with the communist regime. Nixon himself followed in 1972. The delicate process of normalizing diplomatic relations between the United States and China was completed in 1978 by Kissinger’s successor as secretary of state, Cyrus R. Vance, a leading Council officer before and after his government service.
US Trade with Russia & China: The Imbalance
In 1973 David Rockefeller went to China and came back writing of what he saw of China’s “social experiment” being one of the “most important and successful in human history.” His Standard Oil soon obtained exclusive rights to oil exploration, and his Chase Manhattan Bank quickly followed. When in 1978 Taiwan was formally dumped, America’s first Ambassador to Red China was Leonard Woodstock, an early member of David Rockefeller’s Trilateral Commission. On the heels of Rockefeller went Coca Cola, Boeing, and Mitsui-Petro Chemical, all affiliated with the Trilateral Commission; starting a momentum that has made China the universally recognized juggernaut of world capitalism.
What has developed between the USA and China is a symbiotic economic relationship that exists neither between the USA and Russia nor Russia and China. Niall Ferguson describes what he calls the “growing interdependence” between the USA and China:
Far from being strategic rivals, these two empires have the air of economic partners. The only question is which of the two is more dependent, which, to be precise, stands to lose more in the event of a crisis in their amicable relationship, now over thirty years old.
While China has been heralded as the power that will be co-equal if not surpassing the USA, leaving Russia in a subordinate position, Russia has the upper hand in economic relations with China, and “will continue to sell oil and weapons on Russian terms.” Trade relations, while heralded by both states, are inconsistent. Of particular significance, Stratfor has forecast that, “competition and mutual suspicion would prevent the rejuvenation of a strategic partnership between the two Eurasian powers. Moscow’s determination to economically integrate with Western Europe also is driving a wedge between the two.” The European Union, not China, is Russia’s main trading partner, and the EU is the most important investor in Russia, based on the 1994 “Partnership & Co-Operation Agreement,” with the aim of an integrated market. In terms of US goods trade, Russia stands at 24th; US foreign direct investment (FDI) in Russia (stock) was $21.3 billion in 2009 (latest figures). However, China is the USA’s second largest goods trading partner, and US foreign direct investment (FDI) in China (stock) was $49.4 billion in 2009 (latest data available).
To what extent, then, is there a geopolitical alliance between Russia and China that is genuinely rooted in a common outlook? Who or what are their common “outer enemies”? The fact seems that, despite the occasional verbiage on the world stage about “tensions” between the USA and China, or future possibilities of geopolitical rivalry over oil supply routes, the power distrusted by both is Russia, and Russia in turn deeply distrusts both.
Russia & USA
The rapport between the USA and Russia was very brief: the interregnum of Gorbachev and Yeltsin, followed by a renewed “Cold War” with the rise of Putin. Gorbachev is today feted as a celebrity by the globalist elite for his having dismantled the Soviet bloc, with the prospect of re-colonizing Russia; a project that had been abruptly halted by Stalin. Gorbachev’s 80th birthday celebration at the Royal Albert Hall, March 2011, was billed for “The Man who Changed the World.”
Ynet News, one of the large Israeli media outlets, stated of the Gorbachev festivities that among the attendees were Israeli President Shimon Peres, and unnamed “oligarchs.” Israel’s Shimon Peres was a featured guest of the event, Ynet News reporting: “In his speech, the Israeli president said Gorbachev fought to regain what his country had lost to communism, adding that the former Soviet leader changed history.”
However, despite the flurry of jubilation up until the drunken clown Yeltsin, Russia never could be relied upon to stick to the script, and the Council on Foreign Relations laments that “Russia is heading in the wrong direction.” One of the CFR recommendations is to directly interfere with the Russian political process, urging US Congress to fund opposition movements by increased funding for the Freedom Support Act, in this instance referring specifically to the 2007-2008 presidential elections. Authors of the CFR report include Mark F Brzezinski, who served on the National Security Council as an adviser on Russian and Eurasian affairs under President Clinton; Antonia W Bouis, founding executive director of the Soros Foundations; and James A Harmon, senior advisor to the Rothschild Group, et al.
The high level policy makers of the globalist establishment, far from seeing China and the USA as rivals, see them as the linchpins of the “new world order.” A report carried by Forbes states:
The US and China are not in a competition to dominate the world, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger said during a meeting in Beijing on Tuesday.
“Such competition is meaningless,” Kissinger was quoted saying in Tuesday’s China Daily. Regarding the South China Sea issue, Kissinger said that freedom of navigation in the area, in which the US has claimed national interests, is a separate issue apart from the territorial disputes between countries in the region.
“The US’ primary interest is a good relationship with China, not provoking difficulties with it, and the US is not stirring up the Philippines and Vietnam,” he said.
…The controversial Kissinger was in China for a series of public and private meetings, and also took time-out to promote his book, On China.
“What I tried to do with my new book is to explain…what the Chinese think about the world,” he told China Daily. “That’s the best I could do in the spirit of building confidence between the two countries,” he said.
The joint Sino-American project is noticed within Russia. Alexander Lukin, Director of the Center for East Asian and SCO Studies at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, stated in a scholarly paper:
Two U.S. foreign-policy pundits, Zbigniew Brzezinski and Henry Kissinger, have recently come out with programs for solving global problems in the new situation. In fact, they have proposed to the newly elected U.S. president, Barack Obama, changing the U.S. foreign policy. The positions of the two policymakers do not fully coincide; yet they agree on one thing: a stable future of the world depends on whether or not the United States and China are able to put aside their differences and launch constructive cooperation between themselves.
Lukin also cites an article by Kissinger where he proposes a Sino-US alliance to shape the global system, stating that the USA must be wiling to compromise in order to display its goodwill to China, going so far as to shape China and the USA “into a design for a common destiny, much as was done with trans-Atlantic relations in the postwar period.”
Lukin refers to the anti-Russian motivation that continues to be a primary factor in the thinking of Zbigneiw Brzezinski, as one of the major theorists for US hegemony, Lukin writing:
The two veteran policymakers build their reasoning on different logic. Kissinger follows up on his own geopolitical concepts, while Brzezinski apparently remains committed to the dominating dream of his life – creating a widest possible anti-Russian coalition. Yet, for various reasons, there is much in common in their recommendations.
Lukin believes that there are various scenarios such as protests from human rights activist in regard to China, that make a Sino-US alliance of the type proposed to Brzezkinski unlikely. His reasons for objections seem naïve. However, Lukin does make an interesting comment about the implications of such a shift in alignments, one being a realignment between Russia and Europe, which he states is a desirable project for Russian policy-makers:
Finally, geopolitically, a U.S. shift towards China would create favorable conditions for the fulfillment of a daydream of many politicians in Moscow: the separation of Europe from the U.S., its rapprochement with Russia, and the creation of a Europe from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean. Realistically minded policymakers in Washington are unlikely to be delighted by the prospect.
Despite his belief in the “unfeasibity” of a Sino-US pact, Lukin states of high-level relationships that will at least likely bring the two closer:
Nevertheless, a certain shift in Washington from the ideologization of its foreign policy to pragmatism would inevitably lead to closer cooperation with China. Circles close to the administration are actively discussing the idea of establishing a U.S.-Chinese cooperation commission, to be led by Vice President Joseph Biden and Premier Wen Jiabao (similar to the former U.S.-Russian Albert Gore-Victor Chernomyrdin commission). The two countries have agreed to broaden their bilateral strategic dialogue on economic issues and include security issues in it. They have also announced plans to start discussions on global warming. In addition, shortly before Clinton’s visit, they declared the resumption of consultations between their defense ministries, which had been suspended by China last year after the George W. Bush administration announced plans to sell large quantities of armaments to Taiwan.
Both Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski continue to serve US Administrations, and Brzezinski has served as President Obama’s foreign policy adviser. Brzezinski stated when Russia invaded Georgia:
Fundamentally at stake is what kind of role Russia will play in the new international system. Unfortunately, Putin is putting Russia on a course that is ominously similar to Stalin’s and Hitler’s in the late 1930s… Not only the West, but the rest of the international community, must make it clear that this kind of behavior will result in ostracism and economic and financial penalties. Ultimately, if Russia continues on this course, it must face isolation in the international community – a longer range risk to its own well-being… The question is not what obligation the West may have at the moment. The question is about our longer term interest. If a Russia, which misjudges its power and its capacities embarks now on a blatantly nationalistic and imperialistic course, we will all suffer.
It is notable that Brzezinski advocates a new Cold War containment of Russia in its own spheres of interest by the “international community,” and that there is concern about Russia as a nationalistic and imperialistic state that does not fit into the globalist schemes for a “new international system.” Brzezinski rightly sees Eurasia as pivotal in world power politics. Russia’s influence over Eurasia is therefore of primary concern to Brzezinski, and to contain that influence he advocates a Sino-American alliance. He writes of the volatile situation in Eurasia:
In the western periphery of Eurasia, the key players will continue to be France and Germany, and America’s central goal should be to continue to expand the democratic European bridgehead. In the Far East, China is likely to be increasingly pivotal, and the United States will not have a Eurasian strategy unless a Sino-American political consensus is nurtured. In Eurasia’s center, the area between an enlarging Europe and a regionally rising China will remain a political black hole until Russia firmly redefines itself as a post-imperial state. Meanwhile, to the south of Russia, Central Asia threatens to become a cauldron of ethnic conflicts and great-power rivalries.
It can be seen from the above passage that Brzezinski is recommending:
• The further ongoing subversion of the former Soviet bloc states that has been taking place via the so-called “velvet” and “color revolutions” orchestrated by the Soros Open Society networks, Freedom House, National Endowment for Democracy, etc.
• Ensuring that Russia is limited in its relationship with Europe.
• Aligning with China in containing Russia.
While Brzezinski focuses on what he regards as the nationalistic and imperialistic revivals of Russia, he refers to the USA as “the world’s premier power.” Hence, US global hegemony is to be regarded as beneficent, while any challenge is regarded as an “imperialistic” danger to the “new international system.”
No state is likely to match the United States in the four key dimensions of power – military, economic, technological, and cultural – that confer global political clout.… America’s global stewardship will be tested by tension, turbulence, and periodic conflict.… In a volatile Eurasia, the immediate task is to ensure that no state or combination of states gains the ability to expel the United States or even diminish its decisive role.… A benign American hegemony must still discourage others from posing a challenge.…
The “medium-term goal” is to forge a Europe that is subservience to US interests, and to support “a regionally pre-eminent China.” Brzezinski states of these goals that “it will be success or failure in forging broader strategic relationships with Europe and China that shapes Russia’s future role and determines Eurasia’s central power equation.” Hence, US global hegemony can be seen to rest on the containment of Russia through the subordination of Europe and a partnership with China.
Japan is required to place trust in China as the dominant power. “There will be no stable equilibrium of power in Eurasia without a deepening strategic understanding between America and China and a clearer definition of Japan’s emerging role.” China’s rise, which he calls “Greater China,” does not pose a challenge to US hegemony, as Brzezinski regards Chinese regional hegemony as different to that of the Russian.
A de facto sphere of Chinese regional influence is likely to be part of Eurasia’s future. Such a sphere of influence should not be confused with a zone of exclusive political domination, like the Soviet Union had in Eastern Europe. It is more likely to be an area in which weaker states pay special deference to the interests, views, and anticipated reactions of the regionally dominant power. In brief, a Chinese sphere of influence can be defined as one in which the first question in the various capitals is, “What is Beijing’s view on this?”
“Greater China” does not pose a threat to US strategic interests. So far from there being a potential for geopolitical rivalry between China and the USA, there is a commonality of interests:
Greater China’s geopolitical influence is not necessarily incompatible with America’s strategic interest in a stable, pluralistic Eurasia. For example, China’s growing interest in Central Asia constrains Russia’s ability to achieve a political reintegration of the region under Moscow’s control. In this connection and in regard to the Persian Gulf, China’s growing energy needs means it has a common interest with America in maintaining free access to, and political stability in, the oil-producing regions. Similarly, China’s support for Pakistan restrains India’s ambitions to subordinate that country, while offsetting India’s inclination to cooperate with Russia in regard to Afghanistan and Central Asia. Chinese and Japanese involvement in the development of eastern Siberia can also enhance regional stability.
The bottom line is that America and China need each other in Eurasia. Greater China should consider America a natural ally for historical as well as political reasons. Unlike Japan or Russia, the United States has never had any territorial designs on China; compared to Great Britain, it has never humiliated China. Moreover, without a viable strategic relationship with America, China is not likely to continue to attract the enormous foreign investment necessary for regional preeminence.… For America, China’s regional power, co-opted into a wider framework of international cooperation, can become an important strategic asset – equal to Europe, more weighty than Japan – in assuring Eurasia’s stability.
It will be noted that Brzezinski seems to base his perception of states on their relationship to Russia, and in this India, rather than Pakistan, is the problem state that needs containing. Brzezinski therefore sees India as the aggressor vis-à-vis Pakistan, to say nothing of China’s aggressive designs on Indian territory. The various states on whom “Greater China” has territorial ambitions are apparently supposed to ignore those designs, including ongoing provocations. There have been many skirmishes against Vietnam over the Bay of Tonkin, during which fishermen seem to bear the brunt of Chinese aggression. India has faced confrontation with China over Arunachi Pradesh. Late in 2010 there were diplomatic tensions between China and Japan over disputed islands in the East China Sea. Brzezinski’s answer to territorial disputes between Japan and China seems to be that of their jointly “developing” eastern Siberia.
Soros’ attitude towards China parallels Brzezinski’s. Soros bases his perceptions of China as a super-power that has matured and has to accept global responsibilities as being co-leader of the “new world order” along with the USA. Accepting his award as “Globalist of the Year” from the Canadian International Council, the currency speculator who admits to having a messiah complex, stated of China that: “They have now got to accept responsibility for world order and the interests of other people as well.” When Soros was asked about an impending visit to China in 2009 he stated to the London Financial Times:
This would be the time because I think you really need to bring China into the creation of a new world order, financial world order. I think you need a new world order, that China has to be part of the process of creating it and they have to buy in, they have to own it in the same way as the United States owns … the current order.
China & Israel
Since the establishment of Israel and Red China at around the same time there has been an ongoing, although usually covert, relationship, despite the posturing of China as the friend of the Palestinians and the Arab cause. From 1949 Israel was the only independent state in the Middle East to recognize Red China and support its admittance to the United Nations. During the 1960s and 1970s China adopted a pro-Arab posture in attempting to counter Soviet influence. However, despite an attempt at alignment with the Arab states, in 1971 Zhou told Senator Henry Jackson, who was as opposed to the USSR as he was supportive of Israel, that China supported Israel in its opposition to Soviet expansion in the Middle East.
However, the real significance of Sino-Israeli relations was through the covert arms deals largely arranged by Shaul Eisenberg, “Mossad’s tie-in with China.” In 1979, when China was posing as the friend of the Arab people, Prime Minister Menachem Begin obtained US approval for Eisenberg to undertake a $US10 billion 10 year deal to modernize the Chinese armed forces, the Chinese insisting on “absolute secrecy.” In 1999 The New York Times reported, “Israel has long had a close, secretive military relationship, with China.” The Clinton Administration made some protestations to Israel about the dealings in advanced weapons technologies to placate concerns in the State and Commerce Departments, but allowed US corporations to advance classified technologies for satellite and missile launching, despite the objections of the Pentagon and others, and even while the corporations were being investigated for prior export violations.
Sino-US-Israeli Alignment in Middle East
As the foregoing shows, the relations between the USA, China, and Israel have been duplicitous, and have often been far different in reality, behind-the-scenes, than the posturing on the world stage. All three have had a common anti-Russian motivation. Now, with the so-called “Arab Spring,” contrived by the same interests that brought “velvet revolutions” to the former Soviet bloc states and with the worrying prospect that these new regimes in the Middle East might have unleashed forces that cannot be controlled by their money-masters and advisers in New York and Washington, Israeli sources are urging a joint Sino-American-Israeli intervention.
A Jerusalem Post op-ed by Dr Shalom Wald and Dr Gedaliah Afterman comments on the visit by Chinese Chief of Staff, General Chen Bingde, to Israel in August 2011, that this is an opportunity for China to have a “stabilizing” impact on the region:
Indeed, improved Israel-China ties could have a positive impact not only on Israel but on the whole region. It could signal the Iranians and their Arab followers, Hamas and Hezbollah, that notwithstanding the help that some of them may have received from China in the past, China has no time and no sympathy for wild, genocidal ranting. China’s rapid ascendance and its interest in maintaining regional stability in the Middle East means China may be more ready to play a role in regional affairs and in the Middle East peace process.
The United States’ reaction to growing Israel-China ties will be crucial. All efforts should be made to convince Israel’s closest ally that it is in its own interest to let China lend a helping hand in stabilizing the Middle East.
The Arabs and Iranians listen to China because they have to. China was their great neighbor for thousands of years before the United States was even formed, and before Europe become a power in the Middle East. Today China is their most important Asian energy market, and provides political cover because it does not ask them for political or human-rights concessions.
In his recently published book On China, Henry Kissinger continues his most important struggle – to help avoid the clash between a traditional and a rising great power which has occurred so often in history. He suggests that America can and must cope with China’s peaceful rise, but also asks the Chinese to become more involved in maintaining peace and stability on a global level. Have the Chinese already listened to him on the Middle East? Has the United States?
As has been shown by the “Brzezinski Doctrine,” globalist interests in the USA have already been urging a joint Sino-US role, in the Middle East. An Israeli overture in that direction will give impetus for the Obama Administration to adopt the globalist agenda, especially given the current tumult that globalist interference has unleashed over the Middle East.
Globalist interests, headed up by David Rockefeller and Soros, and articulated by Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski, see Russia as the major obstacle to a “new world order,” as they have since the time of Stalin. China long has been seen as the means of containing Russia. Now China is a super-power in her own right, and one that – despite occasional rhetoric from public rostrums about “democracy” and “human rights” – globalist business interests welcome as being privotal to the “new world order.”
While internationalist and Israeli aims have occasionally been divergent, both are in confluence in considering China as a means of “stabilizing” Eurasia and the Middle East respectively. The US internationalists have been pursuing a pro-China agenda since before Mao assumed power, and the Israelis have always maintained a (usually covert) relationship with China. The present is the overt culmination of the largely unseen agendas of decades past.
These globalist interests do not need persuading to advocate for a Chinese role in “stabilizing” the Middle East. This role would also be useful in containing Russia in that region, just as China is also seen as the major factor in blocking Russia’s influence over Eurasia. The USA, Israel and China have all seen Russia, both in her Soviet and post-Soviet modes, as the primary adversary. A US-China-Israel alliance is more in accord with historical facts than the current Sino-Russian rapport, which could face crises scenarios over water resources, and the ancient Chinese desire for lebensraum in Russia, which is seen by the “Brzezinski Doctrine” as acceptable for the “development” (sic) of Siberia.
The option for Middle Eastern states that reject a joint Sino-US hegemony could be alignment with Russia. In Europe, the American-appeasing Sarkozy is an aberration of French politics. While Britain is likely to remain the USA’s primary ally in Europe, already there is disquiet from Germany about Europe being dragged into US military adventures that do not serve Europe’s interests. Building upon the relationship Europe is developing with Russia would be desirable, along the lines envisioned by de Gaulle.
The “Brzezinski Doctrine,” if we may call it that, could be the catalyst not for a Sino-US “new world order” but for the emergence of great geopolitical power blocs, and “vectors” of the type foreseen in particular by Russian geopolitical theoreticians who already have significance in Russian political and scholarly circles.
 K R Bolton, “Origins of the Cold War and how Stalin Foiled a New World Order,” Foreign Policy Journal, 31 May 2010, https://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2010/05/31/origins-of-the-cold-war-how-stalin-foild-a-new-world-order
 K R Bolton, “Mikhail Gorbachev: Globalist Super-Star,” Foreign Policy Journal, April 3, 2011, https://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2011/04/03/mikhail-gorbachev-globalist-super-star/
 K R Bolton, “Russia and China: An Approaching Conflict?,” Journal of Social, Political & Economic Studies, Washington DC, Vol. 34, No. 2, Summer 2009.
 K R Bolton, “Rivalry Over Water Resources as a Potential Cause of Conflict in Asia,” Journal of Social, Political & Economic Studies, Vol. 35, No. 1, Spring 2010.
 J Chang and J Halliday, Mao: The Unknown Story (London: Jonathan Cape, 2005), pp. 570-571.
 H J Salisbury, The Coming War Between Russia & China (London: Pan Books, 1969).
 H J Salisbury, ibid. See: K R Bolton, “Russia and China: An Approaching Conflict?,” op. cit., p. 156.
 K R Bolton ibid., 156.
 J Chang and J Halliday, op. cit., pp. 304-311. They confirm a basic contention by Senator Joseph McCarthy et al that the USA was pursuing a pro-Maoist course. See: Joseph R McCarthy (1951), America’s Retreat from Victory: The Story of George Catlett Marshall (Boston: Western Islands, 1965); and John T Flynn (1961), While You Slept: Our Tragedy in Asia & Who Made It (Boston: Western Islands, 1965).
 See the chapter “Maoism Falls Flat on the World Stage,” in Chang and Halliday, ibid., pp. 587-600.
 It is interesting to note that Robert Blum, head of the CFR China team, was also with the Asia Society, another Rockefeller think tank that had been founded in 1956 by John D Rockefeller III. The by-line of the Society is: “Preparing Asians and Americans for a shared future.” http://www.asiasociety.org/about/mission.html (Accessed 2 March 2010).
Asia Society Trustees currently include: Charles P. Rockefeller, and John D. Rockefeller IV, a member of David Rockefeller’s Trilateral Commission and of the CFR. The chairman of the Asia Society’s Executive Committee is Richard C Holbrooke, former US Ambassador to the UN, a Trilateralist and CFR member.
 P Grose, Continuing The Inquiry: The Council on Foreign Relations from 1921 to 1996, “X Leads the Way.” (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2006). The entire book can be read online at: Council on Foreign Relations: http://www.cfr.org/about/history/cfr/index.html
 Kissinger started his public policy career as director of the Special Studies Project of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund in 1956-57; had served as chief foreign policy adviser to Governor Nelson Rockefeller, and had been Rockefeller aide at the 1964 and 1968 Republican conventions.
 Grose mentions in a Note that: “Accompanying Kissinger on this momentous flight was his personal aide, Winston Lord, a former Foreign Service officer [who] became president of the Council on Foreign Relations in 1977.”
 D Rockefeller, “From a China Traveller,” New York Times, August 10, 1973.
 For the involvement of Trilateralist Commissioners in formulating policy on China, see: Dr Antony C Sutton and Patrick M Wood, Trilateralists Over Washington Vol. 2 (Arizona: The August Corporation, 1981), pp. 63-72.
 N Ferguson, Colossus: The Rise & Fall of the American Empire (London: Allen Lane, 2004), p. 261.
 “Moscow Takes Charge of Chinese-Russian Trade Relations,” Stratfor Intelligence Brief, April 29, 2004.
 “Moscow Takes Charge,” ibid.
 European Commission, “Trade: Russia,” http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/countries/russia/
 Office of the US Trade Representative, “US-Russia Trade Facts,” http://www.ustr.gov/countries-regions/europe-middle-east/russia-and-eurasia/russia
 Office of the US Trade Representative, “US-China Trade Facts,” http://www.ustr.gov/countries-regions/china
 K R Bolton, “Mikhail Gorbachev: Globalist Super-Star,” Foreign Policy Journal, April 3, 2011 https://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2011/04/03/mikhail-gorbachev-globalist-super-star
 K R Bolton, ibid.
 Jack Kemp, et al, Russia’s Wrong Direction: What the United States Can and Should Do, Independent Task Force Report no. 57 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2006) xi. The entire publication can be downloaded at: http://www.cfr.org/publication/9997/
 Jack Kemp, et al, ibid., p. 7.
 Son of Zbigniew, President Carter’s National Security adviser and founding director of the Trilateral Commission.
 K Rapoza, June 28, 2011, “Kissinger: US-China Not Competing for World Domination,” Forbes, http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2011/06/28/kissinger-us-china-not-competing-for-world-domination/
 A Lukin, “Rusia to Reinforce the Asian Vector: Some Priorities of Russian Foreign Policy After the Crisis,” Russia in Global Affairs, Vol. 7, No. 2, April June 2009, p. 86; referring to Z Brzezinski, “The Group of Two that could change the world,” in The Financial Times, January 13, 2009.
 H Kissinger, “The World Must Forge a New Order or Retreat to Chaos,” The Independent, January 20, 2009; cited by A Lukin, ibid.
 A Lukin, ibid., p. 87.
 A Lukin, ibid., p. 92.
 A Lukin, ibid., p. 93.
 N Gartdel’s interview with Z Brzezinski, August 10, 2008, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/nathan-gardels/brzezinski-russias-invasi_b_118029.html
 Z Brzezinski, “A Geostrategy for Eurasia,’ Foreign Affairs, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, Vol. 76, No. 5, September/October 1997 http://www.comw.org/pda/fulltext/9709brzezinski.html
 K R Bolton, “Russian and China: an Approaching Conflict?,” op. cit. pp. 164-165.
 Ibid., pp. 165-166.
 W Pesek, “Pop Group and Pandas – Asian Power Games Descends into Farce,” The Dominion Post, Wellington, New Zealand, B9, October 1, 2010.
 R Clabough, “George Soros Touts China as Leader of New World Order,” New American, November 17, 2010, http://thenewamerican.com/world-mainmenu-26/north-america-mainmenu-36/5226-george-soros-touts-china-as-leader-of-new-world-order
 Guang Pan, “China’s Success in the Middle East,” Middle East Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 4, December 1997.
 V Ostrovsky, By Way of Deception: The Making & Unmaking of a Mossad Officer (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1990), p. 26.
 Uri Dan, New York Post, March 30, 1997.
 New York Times, November 11, 1999, p. 1.
 M Levin, Washington Times, May 27, 1999, A1.
 K R Bolton, “Tunisian Revolt: another Soros/NED Jack-Up?,” Foreign Policy Journal, January 18, 2011, https://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2011/01/18/Tunisian-revolt-another-sorosned-jack-up
“What’s Behind the Tumult in Egypt?,” Foreign Policy Journal, February 1, 2011, https://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2011/02/01/whats-behind-the-tumult-in-egypt
“Post-Qaddafi Libya’: on the Globalist Road,” Foreign Policy Journal, February 26, 2011, https://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2011/02/26/post-qaddafi-libya-on-the-globalist-road/
“Egypt and Tunisia: Plutocracy Won,” Foreign Policy Journal, June 28, 2011, https://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2011/06/28/egypt-and-tunisia-plutocracy-won
 Senior fellow of the Jewish People Policy Institute and author of China and the Jewish People: old civilizations in a new era (JPPI, 2004).
 Fellow of the Jewish People Policy Institute.
 S Wald and G Afterman, “China Enters the Middle East,” Jerusalem Post, August 23, 2011, http://new.jpost.com/Opinion/Op-EdContributors/Article.aspx?id=235150
Thanks to Maidhc Ó Cathail, editor of The Passionate Attachment, for bringing this to my attention. http://thepassionateattachment.com/2011/09/15/israel-to-convince-us-to-let-china-play-role-in-stabilizing-middle-east/
 K R Bolton, “An ANZAC-Indo-Russian Alliance? Geopolitical Alternatives for New Zealand and Australia,” India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs, (New Delhi: Indian Council of World affairs), Vol. 66, No. 2 June 2010, pp. 183-201.