In mid-July 2011, Russia, in a diplomatic initiative, laid out a “step-by-step” approach toward the Iranian nuclear dilemma. According to it, if Iran clarifies questions about its nuclear program, it would be rewarded with a gradual easing of sanctions. It is described as “phased process” in which Iran would take steps to address the concerns of the International Atomic Energy Agency; and in response, the international community would react positively.
This initiative was proposed by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov after talks with President Barack Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton two weeks ago. The US Secretary of State did not directly address a question on her views about Russian approach, but commented: “We are committed to our dual track of pressure and engagement and we want to explore with the Russians ways that we can perhaps pursue more effective engagement strategies”.
But on the Iranian side, there has been a kind of duality and hesitation in the officials’ responses towards the Russian initiative. Speaking at a ceremony in Kerman (southern city of Iran), President Ahmadinejad said that Iran has already taken measures to cooperate with the IAEA, “Now, you [the West] should take your step”. He underscored that “you will take one step and we will take one.” He reiterated Iran’s stance about the peacefulness of its nuclear activities, saying: “We have said we do not want bombs, we have also said that if we wanted to develop a bomb, we would not fear announcing it to the world.”
On the other hand, the Iranian Foreign minister voiced Tehran’s readiness to study positively the Russian proposal for the settlement of the Iran-West nuclear standoff, but pointed out that Tehran has not yet received the plan. When Russia was assured that Iran is welcoming the Russian initiative, its deputy Foreign Ministry arrived in Tehran on July 25 and submitted the Russian initiative officially to Iranian officials.
Nuclear talks between Iran and the G5+1 have reached an impasse since they met last January (2011) in Istanbul. While Iran insists that it has answered all IAEA questions, the West, led by the US, maintains that Iran has not been fully transparent about its program. Meantime, all Iranian high-ranking officials stressed Iran’s inalienable right to access and use the peaceful nuclear technology, and called on the other sides to recognize and respect Tehran’s rights in their proposals.
It seems that Russia believes that the “nodes” of the Iranian nuclear case can be untangled just by the US, and it was the US that has caused the prolongation of the case. It looks that Russia with this mentality proposed its initiative first to the US authorities because, if Washington agrees with it, other members of G5+1 surely will accept it.
From the Iranian side, if the Russian scheme is going to give result, the following four basic notes should be considered:
1. The main aspects of Russian Initiative address the technicality of IAEA’s questions and Iranian answering. Iranians also believe that they have a lot of questions which have not been answered; hence it is not fair that just the Western side (G5+1) poses questions. It should be clear that the Russian proposal contains that Iran has the right to pose questions too. In other words, the process of questions and answers should be mutual.
2. If a set of questions should be answered by Iran, is there any guarantee that Iran’s nuclear case will return back to the IAEA from the Security Council and undergo a normal process? Or will the past vicious circle still just continue? For example, in the previous IAEA modality, six questions were put forth and Iran replied to them, but the IAEA and G5+1 asserted that these questions had not been answered clearly and new questions were put forward again. It should be clear and guaranteed that if Iran is going to answer to questions, then no newer questions should be posed. From the Iranian viewpoint, all who’ve followed the trend of Iran’s nuclear case since 2002 can verify that Iran’s nuclear case is a pretext for exerting pressure against Iran. If Iranian foreign policy does not change fundamentally along the US policy, these kinds of pressures will continue through IAEA and Security Council mechanisms. So, in the Russian initiative, it has to be clarified what are the scope and time-limits of questions; if this important issue is not clarified, the vicious circle will continue.
3. In the case of dispute over whether the answers are convincing or not, what final reference or authority can be the criterion? If, for any reason, the concerned parties would not agree on the answers, what final reference should judge who is right?
Documents should also be cross-examined mutually. For example, the IAEA’s questions are usually similar to allegations which are not legally substantiated. While the rule is that claimants should prove their claims by providing the detailed and concrete documents for receiving transparent answers. The mere speculation and suspicion should not be the basis of any legal claim.
4. It seems that the positive aspects of the Russian initiative are that Moscow put away its double standards role and has entered into an innovative brokering in the nuclear case. Since they do not follow just the US policy, this track would be attractive for Iran. Russians should also take note that Iran does not cease its right to uranium enrichment. It seems that the Russian initiative implicitly accepted that Iran continues to its uranium enrichment in the framework of International Law, but at the same time insists that it should answer some questions. Therefore, the initiative should be considered positively and it is believed that Moscow really is seeking to open “nodes” that have been tangled hardly.
A concluding remark is that until now, both concerned parties have followed a zero-sum game on the Iranian nuclear issue. It is believed that the West, by accepting low-level and highly supervised uranium enrichment by Iranians and Iran through full cooperation with IAEA, can change this game to non-zero sum nature; if there would be any good intention!
As an Iranian professor he, above all, should know better, than to describe Hezbollahi nuclear policies with the word “Iran”.
It was the best article, I have ever read about this issue.
… and of course you think you know better than him. Under what title, exactly?
This is a translation of much Persian cultural poetry
One who is aware of self knowledge?
Fame of one’s honor reaches the universe
One unaware of self knowledge
Should be awakened from one’s deep sleep
One who is aware of self lack of knowledge?
Eventually reaches one’s honorable goal
One unaware of self lack of knowledge
Remains with dense ignorance for ever
هر آنکس که بداند و بداند که بداند
اسب شرف خویش ز گردون جهاند
آنکس که بداند و نداند که بداند
بیدارش نمائید که بس خفته نماند
آنکس که نداند و بداند که نداند
لنگان خرک خویش به مقصد برساند
آنکس که نداند و نداند که نداند
در جهل مرکب ابد الدهر بماند
The author is another sycophant and an apologist for the brutal theocrats in Iran. He subtly attempts to defend his turbaned head pay masters and at the same time criticizes the international community of double standard. There is no denial that there is a double standard when it comes to applying nuclear standard on the Islamic Republic of Iran. That is a fact and it will remain that way until the mullahs change their world view and harsh rhetoric.
Scientific achievements of a nation has nothing to do with the rulers who could be changed when the rule of law brings democracy to the nation
The rule of law
That individuals, persons and government shall submit to, obey and be regulated by law, and not arbitrary action by an individual or a group of individuals.
In the most basic sense, the rule of law is a system that attempts to protect the rights of citizens from arbitrary and abusive use of government power
The rule of law is a legal maxim that states no person is immune to law, and no one can be punished by the government except for a breach of the law
Iranians are intelligent nations they know one or two warhead is no competition for… and waste of time, funds, and effort especially when it could never be used! There for they have no such plan
Having the peaceful nuclear energy hence having the knowledge of building the bomb takes away the importance of possession and helps the destruction of such weapons
The reason Iran’s nuclear program has become so controversial, therefore, has nothing to do with nuclear nonproliferation, any more than the war on Iraq had anything to do with weapons of mass destruction or terrorism. The problem with Iran is the same as that posed by Iraq, which is that it is too independent, too willing to defy orders from Washington, D. C. The U.S. used to support Iran’s nuclear program, when the country was under the Shah’s regime. The U.S. installed the Shah in 1953 after the CIA coup that overthrew the democratically elected Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadeq for nationalizing Iran’s oil industry, for standing up to the West and saying that Iran’s oil belonged to the Iranian people.
after that rather confused first few sentences, . your conclusion
“The reason Iran’s nuclear program has become so controversial, therefore, has nothing to do with nuclear nonproliferation”
has not been demonstrated.
“one or two (or even three or four) bombs will serve quite nicely to dominate the lightly populated Gulf states and to serve as cover for the continuation of Iran’s expansionist policies and militant proxy groups.
Interestingly, the commenter is quoting me. That the reason Iran’s nuclear program has nothing to do with nuclear nonproliferation is illustrated here: http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2011/07/06/iran-is-singled-out-because-it-defies-washington/
{The author is another sycophant and an apologist for the brutal theocrats in Iran.}
Another Zionist liar who pose as “Iranian” using the name of overthrown ‘Qajar’ dynasty to hide his ZIONIST credentials.
Clearly the question and answer process between Iran and the IAEA and the US is inadequate to resolve all the issues with defense industry and nuclear technology. Whilst Russian involvement in the uranium enrichment process may well be a step forward, it could also complicate the already inefficient global regulation of nuclear defense. How for instance would Russian involvement streamline the SCO collective security arrangements shaping up in the Far East? Would China take similar steps between North and South Korea in respect of the ASEAN geopolitical body and nuclear defense?
State nuclear energy and defense converge at the point of relative security which requires coordinated geopolitical regulation of resource management and defense industry per se.