The armed conflict with Taliban insurgents and the Karzai government with its international backers for control of the Afghan state is a ‘hybrid[1] internationalized instrastate struggle’[2] playing out on various levels and with both sides receiving external support. It includes a social level with issues of ethnic and religious identity struggles as well as a search for various groups to reform their political and economic marginalization from predatory elites. The conflict is intensified on a global level by a global war on terrorism and by regional actors in a struggle for strategic influence. Regardless, it is critical to remember that these structural dynamics manifest themselves in a predominantly local context. A myriad of complex local interactions form in essence thousands of “micro-insurgencies” that coalesce to form the dyadic conflict.[3] This best explains the dynamic allegiances of Afghan groups shifting to and from those who best satisfy their communal, developmental, political and ideological needs.

The incidence of violent conflict has registered an alarming up-tick. As of mid September 2010, coalition KIA has exceeded 2009’s record high of 521, itself a 77% increase over 2008.[4] Civilian casualties registered a 31% increase as of mid-2010, although the Taliban accounted for the overwhelming majority as coalition forces tightened their rules of engagement.[5] Meanwhile various forms of structural violence persist with the HDI Index ranking Afghanistan 181st out of 182 countries, with abysmal rankings on virtually every metric of human wellbeing.[6]

The Taliban

Taliban (EPA)Today at least 25,000 insurgents are suspected to be active in Afghanistan, up from a few thousand in 2003.[7] They directly control 4% of Afghanistan with influence and presence in another 30%, a figure rivaling the Karzai government.[8] Officially, they are engaged in a revolutionary struggle for control of the state guided by “the most conservative village Islam, with Deobandi doctrines, with a stress on the importance of rituals and modes of behavior.”[9] This religious emphasis has multiple benefits. It is a source of identity-formation for their cadres, a projected incompatibility between puritanical values and the supposed moral corruption of international and government forces as a means of conflict mobilization.[10] It has also contributed to a zero-sum thinking that sees little utility in compromise or negotiation while they retain the upper hand on the battlefield.

The Taliban have evolved into a sophisticated insurgency by purposely decentralizing their organizational structure and forming “personal networks formed around charismatic leaders”[11] under the overall command of Mullah Omar and his Quetta Shura, the Taliban’s highest leadership council. Some have argued that Omar’s prolonged absence in the public sphere means only a superficial sense of fealty to his rule now exists. A poll of 42 Taliban militants in Kandahar found a “fascinating lack of loyalty” towards Omar, with over half of respondents believing he was neither required for their war, nor necessarily the best one to lead it either.[12] Others disagree, believing Omar to be the glue that holds the Taliban together, without whom they would “surely collapse into a welter of tribes and factions.”[13] More likely it seems that Omar today is an arbitrator between the disparate networks that subscribe to his authority. His diktats, while carrying immense weight, are not always fully adhered to by a new guard of hyper-radicalized militants.[14]

In a major structural change, a senior commander estimated today that 80% of Taliban fighters are in their late teens or early 20s and that their intensified ideological indoctrination and formative years spent at war have bred a recklessness and contempt for authority that is like “earth and sky” when compared to their anti-Soviet predecessors.[15] As captured journalist David Rohde found to his discomfit, his captors in the Haqqani syndicate, whom he had assumed to be “Al Qaeda Lite,” were actually young, fervent ideologues from radical madrassas professing global jihad.[16] This evolution has also contributed to the decline of command and control mechanisms with effects on conduct, control and discipline. For example, a young militant in Helmand casually dismisses former overall Taliban military commander, Mullah Baradar: “I’m here risking my neck fighting the Americans and he’s eating chicken and pilau in Pakistan… We are here on the ground with our Kalashnikovs and RPGs and we live and die by our own quick judgments. We don’t need to listen to anyone who is not out here putting their life on the line.” [17]

Despite these changes, the departure from a hierarchical mode of battlefield organization has not meant the destruction of a sophisticated centralized apparatus guiding overall strategy and policy. On the contrary, key elements such as impressive intelligence and propaganda networks, a defined code of conduct[18] and significant civil resources to facilitate ‘shadow administration’ are often deployed with great sophistication to precede and augment local autonomous military commands. Recruitment has tapped into various sectors of society to create a “complex adaptive system”[19] that amalgamates the efforts of insurgent groups, transnational terrorist outfits as well as criminal groups, co-opted tribes, local commanders and security elements complicit in the insurgency. This diversity allows for the inclusion of many ideological leanings and alliances, often competing with each other for dominance. The Haqqanis in Loya Paktiya, for example, cooperate with Taliban grand strategy while simultaneously competing for power and influence in certain provinces.[20] They also maintain a close relationship with Pakistani intelligence agencies (notably ISI) in contrast to other networks that resent Pakistani intrusions.[21]

Such a broad jihadi umbrella also allows for the incorporation of various differing motivations at the individual level. A “semi-retired Helmand Taliban commander” describes three echelons of Taliban rank and file; those “who just have problems with the government…. who joined just for power, and the real jihadis who just want to become martyrs.”[22] The poll of Kandahari Taliban found a similar array of professed motivations.  Some saw themselves in a religious revolutionary struggle to reshape Afghan political structure into one more Islamic: “Even if you give me so much money that I can’t spend it in my entire lifetime… [I] would continue my fight because I do not want non-Muslims and the people of other religions in my country.” Others spoke of relatives or acquaintances being killed by foreign forces, some of a perceived moral corrosion while most hinted at a strong, religious-nationalist zeal to expel the ‘infidels who enslaved the government.”[23] Also interesting is the 80% who admitted to personal involvement in the opium trade and bemoaned the Western assault on their livelihoods.[24]

Karzai/ISAF

NATO-ISAF forces, now numbering 119,819,[25] are the backbone of military capabilities to support the Karzai government in areas of security, development and reconstruction. The official coalition mandate, now diluted as a result of political pressures, is to create a strong central government with institutions at least capable of combating Taliban forces and denying transnational terrorists sanctuary. However a failure to create adequate governance through the Karzai government has been a key contributor to anarchic conditions prompting British Foreign Secretary David Miliband to remark that coalition and Afghan forces may end up being “outgoverned, rather than outgunned.”[26] Yet, despite staggering missteps towards an increasingly fragmented state, 62% of Afghans continue to support an international force presence and 70% identify the Taliban as the greatest danger to the country.[27]

On paper, the Karzai government and its international backers have created one of the world’s most centralized democracies[28] without adequate resources to extend Kabul’s writ towards the periphery. This radical attempt to transform socio-political structures is especially daunting given governance having historically revolved around a “segmentary kinship system,”[29] with a local sense of identification. To combat the shortfall in central authority, power is outsourced to a variety of regional, and autonomous powerbrokers, often powerful politicians, warlords and criminal warlords all at once. To sit atop this factional pyramid, President Karzai’s centralized model is useful. With the power to appoint every significant official in the executive branch from provincial governors down to the subprovincial level[30], Karzai controls the federal dispensation of patronage, the single most valuable piece of political real estate. Such official patronage at present allows for various profit-making opportunities including siphoning off tax revenues and provincial expenditures, criminal drug, extortion and smuggling rackets along with lucrative security contracts secured with state-subsidized personal militias.[31]

This parallel economy has incentivized the rise of a variety of ‘conflict entrepreneurs’[32] who use ethnic patronage and extensive independent militias to coercively entrench their power and relevance. The 2005 parliamentary elections saw 40 of those elected associated with armed groups, 24 affiliated with criminal gangs, 17 drug traffickers, and 19 facing serious human-rights charges.[33] The September 2010 parliamentary elections continues the trend with only one female (sister of the ANA Chief of Staff) feeling secure enough to run for office in Khost[34] and widespread vote-rigging in Loya Paktiya leading to a vote described as “doomed already and fixed before it starts.”[35] Even in provinces relatively removed from the insurgency such as Badakshan, “routes and border crossings… correspond to the map of political power groupings,”[36] bad news to any aspirant without his hand in the cross-border smuggling trade.

Such pervasive abuse of official authority has incentivized government stakeholders to fight for a continued status quo, although fighting the war for “greed rather than grievance.”[37] However their failure to meet basic communal needs has also been manna for Taliban recruiters and significantly narrowed the legitimacy of the Karzai government, ceding political space to insurgents. A survey by Integrity Watch Afghanistan revealed disturbing statistics: 67% of those polled admitted they had not sought a single government service in the past year while 50% admitted to seeking out non-state justice providers, essentially legitimizing insurgent structures.[38] The extent of corruption and misgovernance is best demonstrated in the capital flight out of Kabul Airport, estimated at $3.65bn annually, more than a quarter of Afghan GDP and potentially more than the government officially collects in tax and customs revenues.[39]

A doctrinal shift towards counterinsurgency has also failed to reap adequate dividends to date. Created with the understanding that “reconstruction and development in the absence of security for the population have little enduring value,” efforts have been made to unfold a ‘government in a box’ after coalition-led military offensives. The reality so far is grim, as voiced by Lt. Col. Peter Benchoff, a 101st Airborne battalion commander who notes that months after an offensive into Kandahar, “Security sucks. Development? Nothing substantial. Information campaign? Nobody believes us. Governance? We’ve had one hourlong visit by a government official in the last 2 ½ months”[40] Kinetic operations too have failed to degrade Taliban strength and support. Special Forces operations are at their highest tempo since the war began[41], as are drone strikes against high-value targets in Pakistan[42] but key metrics of improved Afghan collaboration such as IED turn-in ratios continue to decline from 4.5% in early 2009 to 2.2% today.[43]

The Conflict

At the local level, various sources of discontent persist, including victimization under predatory elites and an official failure to deliver on expected economic improvements or degrade illegal enterprises. Moving away from the conception of the insurgency drawing strength from a disenfranchised populace, another interpretation is that of an ethnic conflict pitting Northern Tajik/Uzbek powerbrokers against the Pashtun south. There is some merit to this interpretation given the existence of an acute and entrenched ethnic security dilemma. All parties are armed and many non-Pashtun communities who suffered under Taliban rule are allergic to the idea of Taliban resurrection. This is particularly true of the Hazaras, but also large segments of the Tajik and Uzbek populace. They are not so easily pigeonholed, however, as individual ethnic concerns have the potential to be overridden by other status concerns, among those marginalized by the current power structure. Such an example is Hazara commander Sedaqat in Daikundi, who briefly flirted with the government before rejoining the Taliban and kidnapping two French nationals,[44] or the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), which helps give the Taliban a local face in the North.[45]

Today ethnic cleavages have grown increasingly pronounced as a direct result of elite posturing and government decisions. The integration of former Northern Alliance commanders into the post-Taliban structure led to fears of Pashtun marginalization and the creeping de-legitimization of a Karzai government perceived as window-dressing for an Uzbek/Tajik coalition. An embattled Karzai further entrenched ethnic powers in the 2009 presidential elections, by allying with various ethno-warlords, including Uzbek Abdul Rashid Dostum, Tajik Ismail Khan and Mohammed Fahim and Hazara Mohammed Mohaqqeq.[46] Despite all the aforementioned having been implicated in various crimes, including wartime atrocities, involvement in criminal enterprises and provincial mismanagement and corruption, their command of ethnic bases made them crucial electoral allies. ISAF-NATO are also seen as complicit in these oppressive power-structures. Not all Afghans can be as understanding as a Pashtun leader in Balkh when he stated, “America does not support Dostum so that he can loot people’s homes. We understand that”[47]

The willingness to tolerate armed factional leaders in exchange for a basic modicum of security has greatly weakened the democratization process and ordaining the prevailing perception of state institutions as elements to be “captured and manipulated by … factions that can summon up the guns and money to do so.”[48] It does not help that many of these men have used their official posts to dispense patronage for ethnic compatriots and entrench their hegemony in institutional structures. Under now Vice President and former Defense Minister Fahim’s guidance, the Afghan National Army (ANA) counts 41% of enlisted personnel as Tajiks, vastly exceeding the Eikenberry guidelines of 25%.[49] Tajiks also command 70% of ANA battalions, and the recent Pashtun appointee to ANA Chief of Staff is believed to command the loyalty of only a single brigade commander, while Fahim through his networks is assured the support of an estimated six of eleven brigade commanders and twelve of forty six battalion commanders.[50]

Interestingly, perhaps the strongest opponents of an ethnic interpretation to the conflict are the Taliban themselves, who take great pains to portray themselves in religious-nationalist terms as a pan-Islamic party rejecting both tribe and ethnicity as the  “standard-bearers… of the Afghan-Pashtun vendetta against the Americans”[51] Yet in many provinces, they have benefited from leveraging existing ethnic grievances as in districts in Wardak and Logar provinces where they have supported the Pashtun Kuchi nomads against the Hazaras.[52] Directly the conflict has little bearing on the insurgency, being related to historical tensions over grazing rights, but the exploitation of ethnic cleavages allows the Taliban to make inroads into districts they would otherwise be a marginalized force.

Despite the Taliban being predominantly Pashtun (see map) and often the “authentic voice of rural Pashtun conservatism,”[53] it is not true that all Pashtuns are Taliban. Powerful Pashtun confederations such as the Durrani Zirak, composed of Karzai’s Popolzai tribe and the Barakzai and Alokzai tribes, all of whom have benefited in the post-2001 Afghan order, are vociferously anti-Taliban. Their rise has, however, marginalized other tribes, such as Helmand’s Ishaqzai, who have found themselves on the wrong side of an unequal competition for government resources and control of the drugs trade. Capitalizing on this marginalization, the Taliban’s Helmand shadow administration consciously elevates Ishaqzai and relies upon them as a key source of provincial recruitment. Similarly, in other provinces, the systematic undermining of tribal identity by various armed groups over the past few decades has meant that today tribes are no longer independent actors, but rather an “arena in which political competition takes place,”[54] including recruitment by ‘tribal entrepreneurs’ from the government and the Taliban.[55]

In many ways the conflict was developed and catalyzed on the global level. The bipolar struggle between the Soviet Union and the United States set the stage for a large-scale proxy-war that destroyed institutions and set the stage for the intra-factional anarchy that was to pave the path for the Taliban. The subsequent 9/11 attacks whose inspirational genesis emanated out of Afghanistan provided the overarching rationale for coalition involvement in Afghanistan centering around the denial of safe havens for Islamist militants with a penchant for global jihad. Today with domestic political pressure intensifying and wider global issues requiring attention, the Obama Administration appears to have diluted its goals from transformative nation-building to basic conflict limitation mechanisms centered around the building up of indigenous Afghan military capacity while broadening aerial strike campaigns against high-value insurgent targets.

The regional context, too, is a key accelerant, particularly today as the perception of ISAF-NATO as a transient regional actor pushes regional actors to establish positions on the post-American Afghan chessboard. On one side is a loose alliance between India and Iran, and on the other Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, which admittedly is a vast oversimplification ignoring diverging ambitions and tactics for each of these stakeholders. While the Saudis and Iranians are battling for regional leadership, the Indians and Pakistanis are battling largely to contain each other and to control access to Central Asian energy corridors. For the Saudi-Pakistani alliance, Sunni Taliban primacy offers the best means to achieve their interests, while the Indians and Iranians prefer an anti-Taliban bloc drawn from former Northern Alliance non-Pashtun groups. Peripheral actors such as China and Russia also share concerns on a spillover of radicalization, but neither are likely to directly participate.  Instead, China is likely to depend on Pakistani preeminence in mitigating its security worries and delivering access to economic resources.

Most worrying is the Pakistani strategic calculus that foresees a precipitous Western withdrawal and thus remains interested in Taliban primacy as the most potent means to ward off fears of Indian encirclement. Covert support continues to be extensive with a recent report suggesting that retired ISI ‘contractors’ are represented on the Quetta Shura, the Taliban’s highest leadership body. The ISI allegedly also remains actively involved at the operational level with extensive support in financing, munitions and training provision as well as assistance with cross-border movement and the provision of external sanctuary.[56] Fears of rising Indian influence as the largest regional donor to the Afghan nation-building project[57] have ignited proxy war with various attacks on Indian interests including dual attacks on its embassy in Kabul. Many observers, including the CIA, have alleged that these attacks are traceable back to the ISI and conducted on their behalf by local militant proxies, most often the Haqqanis and the Lashkar-e-Taiba.[58]

Meanwhile Iranian influence has largely centered on eastern provinces such as Herat where it shares ethnic kinship. It has committed development aid and collaborated with Indian development projects[59] and anti-drugs efforts.[60] Iran paradoxically may be facing difficulties in reconciling its dislike of the U.S. with that of the Sunni Taliban. It has established an anti-Taliban beachhead in eastern Afghanistan by arming and supporting local warlords, employing sizeable economic and cultural outreach programs[61] to advance its soft power influence and making cash payments to curry favor amongst the highest echelons of Afghan governance.[62] Iran has also been accused by coalition officials of indirectly supporting the Taliban, including allegedly training Taliban fighters in the use of anti-aircraft missiles[63] and offering Iraqi-style EFPs to insurgents.[64] Therefore, unlike India, Iranian ambitions might be best served by an American withdrawal, removing both a threat to itself and what it considers a key source of inspiration for Taliban militants. The Saudis are primarily interested in rolling back Iranian gains and ensuring Sunni primacy with themselves as facilitators and “unifiers.”[65] As one of only three governments that recognized the Taliban government, and sharing some element of religious solidarity with the Taliban, the Saudis are also sympathetic to reconciliation measures that include the Taliban, being they believe they can ‘peel off’ the hardcore global jihadists such as al-Qaeda from the broader Taliban movement.[66]


[1] Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse and Hugh Miall, “Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts,” (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009), pg. 25

[2] Andrew Mack, “Global Political Violence: Explaining the Post-Cold War Era,” International Peace Academy, March 14, 2007, pg. 2

[3] Russell Hampsey and Sean P. McKenna, “Afghanistan’s Unique Surge,” Armed Forces Journal, June 2010, Available at http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2010/06/4646076/

[4] “Operation Enduring Freedom,” iCasualties.org, August 1, 2010. Available at http://www.icasualties.org/oef/

[5] Jon Boone, “Afghanistan civilian deaths up 31% this year,” The Guardian, August 10, 2010. Available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/aug/10/afghanistan-civilian-deaths-up-un

[6] “Human Development Report 2009: Afghanistan,” United Nations Development Programme, Available at http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/country_fact_sheets/cty_fs_AFG.html

[7] “US: Taliban has grown fourfold,” Al Jazeera, October 9, 2009. Available at http://english.aljazeera.net/news/americas/2009/10/20091091814483962.html

[8] Kenneth Katzman, “Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security and U.S. Policy,” Congressional Research Service, June 7, 2010.

[9] Antonio Giustozzi, “Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop,” (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), pg. 12

[10] Isak Svensson, “Rebellion, Religion and Resolution: Exploring the Religious Dimensions of Peace Agreements,” Uppsala University, March 25, 2005. Available at http://www.religionandconflict.net/RebRelRes.pdf

[11] Antonio Giustozzi, “Negotiating with the Taliban: Issues and Prospects,” Century Foundation, June 21, 2010.

[12] Graeme Smith, “What Kandahar’s Taliban Say,” in Decoding the New Taliban: Insights from the Afghan Field, Antonio Giustozzi, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), pg. 204

[13] Sami Yousafzai and Ron Moreau. “The Mullah Omar Show,” Newsweek, August 16, 2010. Available at http://www.newsweek.com/2010/08/08/this-mullah-omar-show.html

[14] Varun Vira, “Taliban 2.0: Dissension and Regeneration,” Foreign Policy Journal, June 1, 2010. Available at http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2010/06/01/taliban-2-0-dissension-and-regeneration/all/1

[15] Sami Yousafzai and Ron Moreau, “Not Your Father’s Taliban” Newsweek, May 7, 2010. Available at http://www.newsweek.com/2010/05/07/not-your-father-s-taliban.html

[16] David Rohde, “Terrorists without borders” The New Republic, February 23, 2010. Available at http://tinyurl.com/2ccovg7

[17] Sami Yousafzai and Ron Moreau, “Not Your Father’s Taliban” Newsweek, May 7, 2010. Available at http://www.newsweek.com/2010/05/07/not-your-father-s-taliban.html

[18] “Key quotes from new Taliban book,” Al Jazeera, July 27, 2009. Available at http://english.aljazeera.net/news/asia/2009/07/200972775236982270.html

[19] Seth Jones, “In the Graveyard of Empires,” (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2010), pg. 224

[20] Anand Gopal, Mansur Khan Mahsud and Brian Fishman, “The Battle for Pakistan: Militancy and Conflict in North Waziristan,” New America Foundation, April 2010, pgs 7-8.

[21] Antonio Giustozzi, “Negotiating with the Taliban: Issues and Prospects,” Century Foundation, June 21, 2010.

[22] Tom Coughland, “The Taliban in Helmand: An Oral History,” in Antonio Giustozzi, “Decoding the New Taliban: Insights from the Afghan Field,” (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), pg. 127

[23] Graeme Smith, “What Kandahar’s Taliban Say,” in Decoding the New Taliban: Insights from the Afghan Field, Antonio Giustozzi, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), pg. 205

[24] Ibid, pg. 201

[25] “International Security Assistance Force (Key Facts and Figures),” International Security Assistance Force Afghanistan, Available at http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/Placemats/100804%20Placemat.pdf

[26] David Miliband, “The danger is being outgoverned, rather than outgunned,” The New Statesman, Vol. 139, Issue 4985, January 25, 2010, p25-34

[27] Peter Bergen, “Keeping Promises,” The New Republic, July 28, 2010. Available at  http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/magazine/76422/afghanistan-war-peter-bergen

[28] Stephen Biddle, “Defining Success in Afghanistan,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 89, Issue 4, July/August 2010, pg. 48-60.

[29] David Kilcullen, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Roundtable on Afghanistan, February 5, 2009. Available at http://www.cnas.org/node/693

[30] Stephen Biddle, “Defining Success in Afghanistan,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 89, Issue 4, July/August 2010, pg. 48-60.

[31] Carl Fosberg, “Politics and Power in Kandahar,” Institute for the Study of War, April 2010.

[32] Marina Ottaway, “Combating Conflict Enterpreneurs,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, February 7, 2002. Available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/events/index.cfm?fa=eventDetail&id=453&

[33] Jonathan S Landay, “Warlords and killers seek re-election to Afghan parliament,” McClatchy, September 14, 2010. Available at http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/09/14/100574/warlords-alleged-killers-seek.html

[34] Fabrizio Foschini, “(Campaign Trail 6/1) Loya Paktia, elections without campaign and (many) voters,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, August 28, 2010. Available at http://aan-afghanistan.com/index.asp?id=998

[35] Fabrizio Foschini, “(Campaign Trail 6/2) Loya Paktia, elections without campaign and (many) voters,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, August 28, 2010. Available at http://aan-afghanistan.com/index.asp?id=1001

[36] Fabrizio Foschini, “Campaign Trail 2010 (1) Badakhshan – drugs, border crossing and parliamentary seats,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, June 19, 2010. Available at http://aan-afghanistan.com/index.asp?id=833

[37] Katrina Rohl, “Greed or Grievance: Why does the FARC keep fighting?” Peace and Conflict Monitor, Available at http://www.monitor.upeace.org/Colombia.pdf

[38] “Afghan perceptions and experiences of corruption: A National Survey 2010,” Integrity Watch Afghanistan, July 2010.

[39] Matthew Rosenberg, “Corruption suspected in airlift of billions in cash from Kabul,” Wall Street Journal, June 25, 2010. Available at http://tiny.cc/5dupn

[40] David S. Cloud, “US, Afghan forces launch assault in southern Afghanistan,” Los Angeles Times, September 15, 2010. Available at http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-afghanistan-20100915,0,3382816,print.story

[41] Kimberly Dozier, “Analysis: Special Ops on show to woo war skeptics,” Associated Press, September 3, 2010. Available at http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5ghAznHVc0Af8OIJ_PJe97T57SOVAD9I0JEB80

[42] Rachel Martin, “Northwest Pakistan sees surge of drone strikes,” Center for a New American Security, September 20, 2010. Available at http://www.cnas.org/node/5001

[43] Gareth Porter, “Doubling of SOF Night Raids backfired in Kandahar,” Inter Press Service, September 15, 2010. Available at http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=52842

[44] “Afghan commander says kidnapped two French nationals,” Reuters, July 22, 2008. Available at http://www.e-ariana.com/ariana/eariana.nsf/allDocs/AFDC4EE5B79AF7AD8725748E003820BC?OpenDocument

[45] Antonio Giustozzi, “The Taliban Beyond the Pashtuns,” Afghanistan Papers, Vol. 5, No. 1, July 2010.

[46] “Afghanistan: Elections and the Crisis of Governance,” International Crisis Group, Asia Briefing No. 96, November 25, 2009.

[47] http://articles.sfgate.com/2002-02-15/news/17529736_1_raped-soldiers-tajik

[48] Carl Fosberg, “Politics and Power in Kandahar,” Institute for the Study of War, April 2010.

[49] Gareth Porter, “Tajik grip on Afghan Army signals strife,” Asia Times, December 1, 2009. Available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/KL01Df02.html

[50] Antonio Giustozzi, “The Afghan National Army: Unwarranted Hope,” RUSI Journal, Vol. 154, No. 6, (December 2009), pp. 36-42.

[51] Thomas Ruttig, “How Tribal are the Taliban? Afghanistan’s largest insurgent movement between its tribal roots and Islamist ideology” Afghan Analysts Network, June 29, 2010.

[52] Fabrizio Foschini, “The Kuchi-Hazara Conflict, Again,” Afghan Analysts Network, May 27, 2005. Available at http://aan-afghanistan.com/index.asp?id=5

[53] William Dalrymple, “There is no NATO game but Pakistan’s proxy war with its brother in the South,” The Guardian, July 1, 2010. Available at http://tiny.cc/zcph1

[54] Thomas Ruttig, “How Tribal are the Taliban? Afghanistan’s largest insurgent movement between its tribal roots and Islamist ideology” Afghan Analysts Network, June 29, 2010, pg. 24

[55] Gilles Dorronsoro, “Afghanistan: Searching for Political Agreement,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 14, 2010, pg. 7

[56] Matt Waldman, “The Sun in the Sky: The Relationship between Pakistan’s ISI and Afghan Insurgents,” LSE Crisis States Research Center, Discussion Paper No. 18, Series 2, June 2010.

[57] http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125061548456340511.html

[58] Mark Mazzetti and Eric Schmitt, “CIA outlines Pakistan link with militants,” New York Times, July 30, 2008. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/30/world/asia/30pstan.html

[59] Karim Sajadpour, “Iran,” in Ashley Tellis and Aroop Mukherjee, “Is a Regional Strategy Viable in Afghanistan,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 2010.

[60] Christopher M. Blanchard, “Afghanistan: Narcotics and US Policy,” Congressional Research Service, December 7, 2004.

[61] Maseh Zarif and Ahmad Majidyar, “Iranian influence in Afghanistan: Recent Developments,” American Enterprise Institute Iran Tracker, August 21, 2009. Available at http://www.irantracker.org/analysis/iranian-influence-afghanistan-recent-developments

[62] Robert Tait, “Afghan money bags point to wider Iranian outreach strategy towards neighbors,” Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, October 26, 2010. Available at http://www.rferl.org/content/Afghan_Money_Bags_Point_To_Wider_Iranian_Out_Reach_Strategy_Toward_Neighbors/2201978.html?page=1&x=1#relatedInfoContainer

[63] Sara Carter, “Iran training Taliban fighters to use surface-to-air missiles,” San Francisco Examiner, October 25, 2010. Available at http://www.sfexaminer.com/world/Iran-training-Taliban-fighters-how-to-use-surface-to-air-missiles-1328182-105728878.html

[64] Mark Townsend, “Special Forces find proof of Iran supplying Taliban with equipment to fight British,” The Guardian, June 22, 2008. Available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2008/jun/22/military.afghanistan

[65] Steven Biddle and Daniel Markey, “Afghanistan: The View from the Battleground,” Council on Foreign Relations, November 24, 2008. Available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/17850/afghanistana_view_from_the_battleground.html

[66] Christopher Boucek, “Saudi Arabia,” in Ashley Tellis and Aroop Mukherjee, “Is a Regional Strategy Viable in Afghanistan,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 2010.