In June 2008 the Atlantic Council of the United States published a paper entitled Restoring Georgia’s Sovereignty in Abkhazia. The author proposed several solutions to the on-going conflict, specifically calling on Russia to become a force for peace rather than an obstructionist great power. Unfortunately the timing of the publication invalidated many of its suggestions as Russia and Georgia went to war two months later.
The author bears no criticism for making bold predictions since these are often necessary to focus international attention on forgotten problems. However, the Summer War showed something more disturbing than a forgetful diplomatic community. It showed how little Georgia matters in the Great Game of world politics. As a result, Abkhazia will likely never return to Georgian control. Russian troops garrison the region, oligarchs own increasing amounts of beachfront property in the Black Sea capital of Sokhumi, and an overwhelming majority of Abkhaz can claim citizenship in another country by virtue of their Russian passports. How then can Georgian sovereignty be restored?
Determining the future of Georgian territorial integrity first requires an explanation of the Summer War. It also demands radical changes in Georgian nationalism and international aid policies. In contrast, Russia need only accept responsibility for those under its control. None of the following suggestions will be easy or well-liked, but they are the only way for Georgia to solve the enduring problems of its territorial losses.
Georgia is a patchwork of ethnic groups that share a few commonalities: Orthodox Christianity, cuisine, and the Georgian language. The Abkhaz are one of several ethnicities with ties to groups in Southern Russia and Georgia; they are most closely related to Georgian-Mengrelians living near the border with Abkhazia. However, centuries of shifting imperial lines of control, punctuated by periods of independence, created competing claims of political legitimacy.
Nationalism in both countries increased in the early Soviet period, but political machinations over the next seventy years worsened rather than calmed relations. Fighting eventually broke out in the early 1990s leading to the expulsion of over 200,000 Georgians (mostly Mengrelians) from Abkhazia. Nearly 50,000 returned to the Gali border region after the ceasefire, but few ever returned to their homes in Abkhazia.
The Abkhaz never pursued offensive military strategies during the sixteen years of conflict resolution efforts with Georgia. Instead, they maintained defensive positions under the 1992 Sochi Agreement monitored by Russian peacekeepers. There had been small skirmishes around the border, but rarely more than the occasional flare-up. The Georgian capture of the Kodori Valley in northern Abkhazia in 2006 did not upset the status quo, nor did bombastic rhetoric from Tbilisi and the disruption of diplomatic and trade relations compel Russia to set aside its claimed neutrality.
However, once Georgian forces began killing Russian peacekeepers in South Ossetia, Moscow seized the opportunity to punish the Georgian government and restore Russian dominance in the Caucasus.
The Summer War developed out of a series of skirmishes common to the region. South Ossetian paramilitary groups destroyed a Georgian police vehicle on August 1st, and Georgian snipers retaliated by killing several off-duty Ossetian police officers. Localized fighting continued until August 6th, when both sides significantly increased their military forces engaged in the battle. Despite the antagonists’ assertions that their enemies had aggressive intentions, it seems more likely that dramatically heightened threat perceptions caused the escalation: the separatists had grown increasingly worried by the Georgian President’s assertive nationalist rhetoric, while increased Russian security assurances to the Abkhaz and Ossetians compressed Georgian time frames for reclaiming the separatist regions.
Sometime between the late evening of August 7th and the early hours of the 8th Georgian troops entered the South Ossetian capital and the Russian army entered South Ossetia.[1] Both sides claim they acted in response to the other’s aggression, but President Saakashvilli called for a ceasefire once it became clear that the Russians had fully committed to the battle. His actions could have halted the disastrous spiral towards full-scale war if Russia had maintained purely defensive intentions, but Moscow’s actions in the following months clearly showed this was not the case.
The Georgians argue that Russian aggression in 2007, specifically the downing of Georgian unmanned aerial vehicles and a helicopter attack on Georgian positions in the Kodori Valley, had taken relations in a decidedly negative direction. The tipping point came when Russia opened official relations with the separatists in April 2008, signaling a major shift from tacit approval to overt recognition. This may have been the logical response to the Georgian government changing the title of the Ministry of Conflict Resolution to the more aggressive sounding Ministry of Territorial Integration. However, the Georgian action can be explained as either playing to nationalist sentiment in the face of growing domestic opposition, or as fulfillment of a campaign promise to restore Georgia’s long-lost territory; neither reason contradicted the international agreements governing relations between the parties.
The Russian offensive into Georgia proper also calls into question Moscow’s claims that its actions were 1) peacekeeping, 2) UN-sanction Right to Protect against aggression, or 3) outside intervention in support of oppressed peoples, especially since they and the Abkhaz drove out the remaining Georgian civilians rather than protect them during the fighting.
In addition, the Georgians argue that Russian troop deployments were not defensive but rather a premeditated plan to alter the configuration of power in the region prior to fully recognizing Abkhaz and South Ossetian independence. Moscow simply waited for an opportune time to release the full force of its military on the weaker Georgian army. The loss of several Russian peacekeepers did not warrant such a massive military response, but it served as a catalyst to change the larger strategic situation in the Caucasus.
The Russian version of events states that Abkhazia was fortified by sea and land forces through newly repaired roads and railways connecting it to Southern Russia because Russian military commanders believed that an attack into Abkhazia was imminent.[2] Whether they received covert intelligence or had monitored the Georgian military buildup with growing concern, the signs showed a major change was about to take place.
Then, during late July Russian troops participated in a counter-terrorism exercise near the border and were ideally poised to defend their peacekeepers in South Ossetia and Abkhazia if Georgian soldiers entered in force. Once that happened, Russia pursued a strategy of “peace coercion” to ensure the Georgian government would never again try to alter the strategic situation through military means.
This led to a full-scale invasion of northern Georgia, driving the Georgians out of their American-financed bases near Zugdidi (the closest town to the Abkhaz border), and maintaining security zones for several weeks to eliminate guerilla activity in the area.
Several months earlier I had spoken to members of the US intelligence community about the growing likelihood of war in the region, providing pictures taken behind the Abkhaz border. Their importance was not to show behind-the-scenes photos of Russian troop emplacements, rather to give examples of intelligence provided to the Georgian security service by my translator while I was there. The pictures showed run down facilities concentrated around the Gali border region, but no Russian troops afterward on the primary highway to the Abkhaz capital of Sokhumi. The occasional Abkhaz army minivan accounted for most of the military traffic.
Yeah, they got the pre-war history quite accurately, but….the SOLUTIONS they
purpose….are…….well….NUTS .. Good Luck getting Russia to pay for all the
damage….. And watz up with… “Forcing the Abkhaz and Ossetians to face the consequences of siding with Russia against the international community”
Was the ” international community” on GEORGIA’S ‘side’ when they
“Sometime between the late evening of August 7th and the early hours of the 8th Georgian troops entered the South Ossetian capital…?? Or was it the “EMPIRE” Didn’t Georgia use “battlefield Weapons ” on APARTMENT BLOCKS in South Ossetia..???and THEN the Russian army entered South Ossetia.[1] Both sides claim they acted in response to the other’s aggression, but President called for a ceasefire once it became clear that the Russians had fully committed to the battle.” UUUghghgh Well if your gonna FIGHT BACK, we change OUR mind!!
Oh Yeah..?? Maybe “Georgian President’s assertive nationalist rhetoric,” and There is the NEOCON [Israeli’s at STATE AND DEFENSE] angle……. and the
CONNECTION to IRAN/ISRAEL tension……and a MORON as U.S. president..
Why DID Georgia send TROOPS to Iraq…?? So U.S. Back down Russia??
Don’t KICK a SAD BEAR………O.K….and……less..chance you get MAULED!!!!!
An article full of inaccuracies and arrogant lecturing, so typical for a usual Neocon style.
“The second condition is … important for the resumption of Georgian sovereignty: the complete cessation of all international aid to Abkhazia and South Ossetia”.
Bravo, Herr Professor!! Organize for them the bloody separatists a concentration camp. Make them die of hunger, so that Georgians could again control them and exploit their rich country’s recourses, as they did during the Soviet times.
However, unlike Georgia, which will not survive even a month without the western tax-payers’ aid money (a typical parasite state!), Abkhazia for 16 years lives mainly on its own – on tourism and subtropical agriculture – getting only a TOKEN assistance from “international community” and pensions from Russia. Stop the Western “help” to Abkhazia – and nobody will even notice it, accept for a couple of NGOs.
Georgian independence is good. Abkhazian independence is bad. Tell me why?? The Abkhazian people whom you despisedly call “separatists” have the same rights to independent and free development as the Georgian people are. They were put into Georgia in 1931 by the Communist Georgian shah Stalin, who settled in Abkhazia tens of thousands of Georgians from Georgia proper and killed 90 per cent of Abkhaz intellectuals and politicians, forbidding the Abkhazians even to use their native tongue, replacing it with Georgian. And now the Abkhazians have freed themselves from from Georgian ultra-nationalist yoke. Forever.
“to choose Russia OR international community”… Russia IS a part of international community. Or is it not?? Or is it only we, the WEST, who are THE international community??
As to Abkhazia being a “historical province of Georgia”, read history textbooks and you will learn that some time in the past it was Georgia that was a historical Abkhazian province.
Disgusted!!
Jane.
My own view is that there is a wrong assumption here that self-determination for Abkhazia and South Ossetia should be rejected.
/quote/
Sometime between the late evening of August 7th and the early hours of the 8th Georgian troops entered the South Ossetian capital and the Russian army entered South Ossetia.[1]
/endquote/
This is a simple assertion that is not backed by any source but Saakashvili’s words..
There is NO indication at all that Russian troops entered the Roki tunnel before midday of August 8 some 12-16 hours after the massive artillery attack on Russian peacekeepers in South Ossetia.
The rest is a bunch of inaccurate onesided tale and wishful thinking.
/reply for Jane/
you are very critical and that’s ok. but…
FIRST —–
“Georgian ultra-nationalist yoke” ?! where have you seen it? you’ve no idea what you are talking about!
“Georgia, which will not survive even a month without the western tax-payers’ aid money (a typical parasite state!)” is a marasmus!
Thanks to The Almighty God this “parasite state” exists for more than 21 century and will go on.
on the other hand the issue about: where does the western taxpayers money go to? — is very delicate!
OF COURSE!…
they should know and i’ll say must control that money to be spent on purpose!
on purpose to build free, liberal and transparent democratic institutions for all citizens of Georgia despite their ethnicity (Abkhazians, Georgians, Osetians, Armenians, Azerbaijanis, Jews, Greeks or even Russians)!!!
they should prevent that money from flowing to the pockets of corrupted authorities as well as for militarization and such nonsence. ——- and that is the inherent term of real help and support!
———— “……teach a man to catch the fish and you feed him for the lifetime!”
SECOND —– speaking of Stalin you should remember that he wasn’t pro Georgian leader but pro soviet and totalitarian. otherwise he wouldn’t give up quite big parts of Georgian lands to the Armenia Azerbaijan and Russia.
Determination “They were put into Georgia in 1931” is totally wrong! where did Stalin took them out before putting it into Georgia — excuse me?! Abkhazian state never ever existed before separately. not to speak about south osetia.
AND THE THIRD at the end: —– “As to Abkhazia being a “historical province of Georgia”, read history textbooks and you will learn that some time in the past it was Georgia that was a historical Abkhazian province” it is simply not true but I DONT CARE who whose province was. even your words prove that Abkhazians and Georgians left in ONE united kingdom!!! they fought together side by side under ONE flag and for ONE sovereign.
and may god wish it to be so in the future!!!
P.S. once visitors from the western countries asked:
– why it is such a bad situation in Georgia? west spends so much money on your development… i cant even imagine how bad situation would be if we didn’t support you.
– that’s the deal! just giving the money doesn’t mean solve the problem…
First – Yes, it’s right to call ”Georgian ULTRA Nationalists.” The 1990s was the time when Georgian nationalism was at its peak. “Georgia for Georgians” was a popular slogan. All non-Georgians were announced to be “hosts on Georgian land.” Not many people even in the USSR knew that Abkhazians protested against being within Georgia even in the Soviet times, every decade. But in the ’90s these protests became known to the world.
Second – In 1921, Abkhazia and Georgia became Sovietized. On 31 March 1921, an independent Soviet Republic of Abkhazia was proclaimed. On 21 May 1921, the Georgian Bolshevik government officially recognized the independence of Abkhazia. But the same year, under pressure from Stalin (Iosif Vissarionovich Dzhugashvili) and other influential Georgian Bolsheviks, Abkhazia was forced to conclude a union (i.e., confederative) treaty with Georgia. Abkhazia still remained a full union republic until 1931, when its status was downgraded, under Stalin’s orders, from that of Union Republic to that of an Autonomous Republic within Georgia.
Vladislav Ardzinba, first president of Abkhazia, stated: “In 1931 Abkhazia was transformed into an autonomous republic within the Georgian SSR. Seemingly it was the only republic whose political status changed under pressure from Stalin not upwards but downwards”.
Google: Declaration of the Revolutionary Committee of the SSR of Georgia on Independence of the SSR of Abkhazia – 21 May 1921
Third: Abkhazia is NOT historical part of Georgia. 780 – 978: The Kingdom of Abkhazia flourished and the Abkhazia Dynasty extended its sway over much of what is now Western Georgia. 1300-1500: A portion of Abkhazia was under Mingrelian Rule. Abkhazia was part of a united Georgia only in the Middle Ages, when it united with Georgian speaking lands by right of dynastic inheritance.
Google: Map of Europe, Southeast 800 Euratlas (Kingdom of Abkhazia)
And last one. It was Georgia STARTED the war in 1992. On 14 August 1992 when the Abkhazian Parliament was discussing a draft proposal for a Federation with Georgia, the Georgian bombs started. Georgia invaded Abkhazia.
It seems the US and EU supporting Stalin’s ILLEGAL borders.
Of course only for their self interest. No more…
First of all the author should know that Abkhazia is not historical part of Georgia. I think Dr. Spencer did not read any book or article about history of Abkhazia.
The point is: which side bears responsibility for starting the war, and that is NOT in doubt – it was Georgia, just as it was Georgian NATIONALISM that created the tensions from 1989 onwards.
Well, in an ideal world the international community would not have recognised Georgia in the spring of 1992. It would have encouraged the (then still illegitimate) regime in Tbilisi under Shevardnadze to engage seriously in a negotiation-process, as suggested by the Abkhazians, on restructuring relations between Tbilisi and Sukhum along (con)federal lines. But, no, the opportunity to exercise an influence for the good of ALL the various ethnic groups living within Georgia’s Soviet frontiers (including the Georgians themselves) was squandered, and war in Abkhazia was the result. The Abkhazians did NOT seek this war; it was imposed on them by Shevardnadze. And then, having had the audacity to defeat the rabble that called itself the Georgian National Guard, the Abkhazian victors were punished by seeing their broken land subjected to years of isolation and blockade — they were not even given any credit for responding to Yeltsin’s request to let Shevardnadze escape from his Sukhum bunker with his life.
The international community (including Russia, be it noted), thus, again chose the wrong course of action by backing all of Georgia’s demands for support; a short-term boat-link between Trabzon (Turkey) and Sukhum in 1996, allowing passage in and out of Abkhazia without the need to enter Russia, was cancelled under Georgian pressure, and for years the border with Russia over the R. Psou was closed to all male Abkhazians between the ages of 15 and 55. Only under the presidency of Vladimir Putin did the situation begin to ameliorate. Since 2006 the Psou-border has been open; there is investment, and building-work has been noticeable all over the capital (especially along the Riviera-type sea-front). Given the madness of Saakashvili’s actions in S. Ossetia at the start of August 2008, the Abkhazians naturally took advantage of the situation and finally liberated the one portion of their land that remained under Georgian control since the end of the war in 1993, namely the Upper Kodor Valley, into which Saakashvili had quite illegally introduced military troops (along with an alarming stockpile of offensive weaponry) in the early summer of 2006. What were the Abkhazians supposed to do? Spit in the face of the only state which has manifested a willingness to help over at least part of the 20 years of Georgian belligerence and outright aggression to which the Abkhazians have been subjected?
The UN Security Council on the night of 7th-8th August 2008 refused (thanks to the blocking tactics of the USA and the UK) to issue even a call for a ceasefire in S. Ossetia (no doubt in the hope that Georgia would quickly achieve Saakashvili’s goal of taking S. Ossetia back under Georgian control, which would have left the way open for a later assault on Abkhazia). (See: Saakashvili “planned S. Ossetia invasion”: ex-minister – http://www.reuters.com/article/newsOne/idUSLD12378020080914?sp=true)
In the light of this, is anyone seriously suggesting that the pro-Georgian international community would have lifted the smallest of fingers to prevent a further Georgian demarche into Abkhazian territory? I think not. Twenty years ago the distinguished Abkhazian historian Stanislav Lakoba wrote an article on Abkhazia’s geo-political position; he entitled it ‘Between the Hammer and the Anvil’. The West has had ample opportunity to insert a softening cushion. There is still time for it to do so, because the only obstacle standing in the way is its own series of ignorance-based short-sighted miscalculations.
I also would like to share maps.
Historical Maps: Abkhazia at various times in history
http://gallery.abkhazworld.com/#4.41
The maps included here give an idea of the frontiers of Abkhazia at various times in history. The Abkhazians call their capital /Aqw’a/, but it is more usually known in other languages as Sukhum (Sukhum-Kalé or Sukhum-Kaleh in the period of Turkish influence along the Black Sea’s eastern coast; /soxumi/ in Georgian). The ending -i in the form /Sukhumi/ represents the Georgian Nominative case-suffix, and it became attached to /Sukhum/ from the late 1930s when (Georgian) Stalin (Ioseb Besarionis dze Jughashvili) and his Mingrelian lieutenant in Transcaucasia, Lavrent’i Beria, began to implement a series of anti-Abkhazian policies. Abkhazians today, for obvious reasons, resent the attachment of this element from the language of a people they see as oppressors.
See also: ”The International Legal Status of the Republic of Abkhazia In the Light of International Law. ” by Viacheslav Chirikba
http://www.abkhazworld.com/articles/analysis/285-int-legal-status-abkhazia-vchirikba.html
Dear Sanne, well said. Only for their self interest…
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