

Breakthrough or Breakdown? U.S.-Pakistan Military Alliance of 1954

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ABSTRACT

Scholars often query why the United States and India, the world's greatest and largest democracies, are not more closely allied. Though news headlines recite continued attempts to improve ties, the Cold War-era record is telling.

As the last British ships left India, their stewards left behind a legacy in the Subcontinent. They had stirred religion as a divisive issue in South Asian politics in order to advance their own interests. By contrast, Mahatma Gandhi propounded secular, unifying ideals that gained widespread acceptance in India.

It is this dichotomy, based in South Asian history, that forced Pakistan's acceptance of a Realism worldview and India's policy of nonalignment. While Pakistan was founded on Islamic ideals, Nehru carved India's policy of dealing with its affairs independently, without Superpower domination (from which it had only recently freed itself). Militarily, he argued that a "no-war" zone should be extended from India's borders to include the entire Subcontinent.

Realism was the ideology that Pakistan found appealing. It favored the struggle for power internationally. This was the only policy that Pakistan *could* logically accept because it needed to deny India's secular ideology from dominating the Subcontinent. With America as its ally, Pakistan could justify its existence as an Islamic nation in South Asia, with its military to back up its words.

Meanwhile, the United States was in the midst of the Cold War and was disenchanted with India's unswerving determination to build a "third power"—non-aligned one—to shadow the power struggle of the superpowers. Moreover, Indian traditions espousing a class-free society too closely resembled socialism to American eyes, and fueled a belief that India favored Communism.

These are the conditions that made it ripe for a Pakistani request for military aid and an American approval. While Pakistan argued that it would not use its weapons shipment in its struggle against India in Kashmir, Nehru blasted this aid. He claimed that Pakistan's Prime Minister intended such aid for more than defensive purposes. The nature of this aid—reportedly a military alliance rather than an isolated weapons shipment—fueled this belief.

Although the United States and India both fought the same colonial power for justice and independence, this fact alone failed to bind them due to prevailing ideologies and the impressions they engendered. Politicians from India and the United States each indicated why the other could not be relied upon, as America was preoccupied with containing Communism and India was preoccupied with non-alignment. Pakistan's acceptance of Realism was inevitable due to the geographic and historical experience of the Subcontinent. Significantly, these stances played themselves out in the nature and fact of a US-Pakistan alliance.

I. IDEOLOGIES AT WORK

American military aid to Pakistan in 1954 appears to be the battleground of opposing ideologies. In understanding this battle, the dispute over Kashmir shortly following Independence in the Subcontinent is instrumental. Since the end of the Second World War, the Subcontinent's two major powers—India and Pakistan—have adopted differing ideologies in dealing with their external relations. India's involvement in regional power struggles indicates a Realist interpretation, which holds that individual states prioritize national interest and security over ideology and moral concerns.¹ However, such policies as non-alignment and secularism in its dealings with nations outside of South Asia and with its domestic policy indicate idealism. At the same time, Pakistani policy seems to approve the extension of a Realist explanation of power alignments to South Asia, while Pakistan has continued to emphasize Islamic ideals domestically. Meanwhile, United States foreign policy has been preoccupied with combating Communism in furtherance of its own brand of idealism—democracy—and it has attempted to extend this struggle to South Asia. The conflicting stances of these powers on the issue of American military aid reflect their differing ideologies.

A. Relevance of Ideology To American Military Aid To Pakistan

To begin, we must understand South Asia's position in the hierarchy of American priorities. According to Manoj Joshi, American strategic policy in South Asia has historically been limited because it is close to the bottom of such a list of priorities. Joshi places the defense of the American mainland at the top; the betterment of the American economic system, second; the containment through military alliances of America's main adversary, the Soviet Union, third; and finally the encouragement of underdeveloped countries to grow in the image of the United States by transplanting American values abroad.²

According to this model, American policy toward particular South Asian nations, would be determined by the extent to which these nations can appear attractive to America with

¹ Wikipedia.org, definition of "Realism (international relations)."

² Joshi, Manoj "South Asia and American Strategic Policy" in Crunden, Robert M, Joshi, Manoj, and Rao, R.V.R. Chandrasekhar, ed., 30-1, *New Perspectives on America and South Asia*, Chanakya Publications, Delhi 1984.

regards especially to the latter two categories. These are important given both Pakistan's appeal to the United States for military aid on the basis of similar domestic ideologies opposed to Communism, and also Nehru's blanket refusal of any foreign military alliances with South Asia to prevent an extension of the Cold War. American suspicions of the similarities between Communism and India's traditional acceptance of socialism are also telling of the relevance of American priorities to its policies in South Asia.

Recalling the above determination that one of America's priorities in South Asia was an attempt to further contain Communism, let us consider particularly the need and implications of American military aid to Pakistan in 1954. Charles Heimsath and Surjit Mansingh seem to believe that Pakistan chose to receive US military aid out of necessity: it "badly needed external support to balance the tangible power of India and if possible exert pressure on its larger neighbor (sic) to make concessions on Kashmir."³ Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, on the other hand, blasted this aid "because it would create a breach in the nonaligned area ... and would introduce into southern Asia the military presence of a great power."⁴

R.V.R. Chandrasekhar Rao appears to believe that America at some point wanted to befriend India on the basis of a shared commitment to democratic principles, perhaps in order to encourage India to grow in its own image (the fourth priority in the above list). However, the squeeze of the Cold War led America to redefine its national interest. With the compulsion of the containment doctrine, the United States would search for military allies in the region to check Communism's spread to China. As such, "[t]o India it appeared that the US in befriend[ing] Pakistan ha[d] projected the primacy of its strategic interests over those of promoting democratic values."⁵ By contrast, the United States believed that it was defending the world against Communism precisely *because* it was continuing to promote its own system of democratic values.

As leader of the "free world" and promulgator of a universalist ideological position the U.S. expected non-communist states to follow the lead offered, and if they did not there was a suspicion in Washington that those states overtly or covertly sought to reinforce the objectives of the communist bloc. The simplistic Marxist-Leninist notion that the governments could be classified as either one of two main types had gained acceptance in the U.S.⁶

³ Heimsath, Charles H. and Mansingh, Surjit *A Diplomatic History of Modern India*, 160.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Rao, R.V.R. Chandrasekhara "The US and the Indian Subcontinent: Can there be a Regional Detente?" in *New Perspectives on America and South Asia*, ed. by Crunden, Robert M., Joshi, Manoj, and Rao, R.V.R. Chandrasekhar, 112.

⁶ Ibid. #3, 351.

The disparity in views lies in the fact that America was promoting its own leadership of democratic principles in pursuing its policy of containing Communism, while India's non-alignment and co-existence policies were inconsistent with the expectation that America would ally militarily with India to check Communism's spread into China.⁷

B.M. Jain describes Pakistan as the only viable substitute for India as an American ally, once the latter had refused to be an anti-Communist satellite. Regarding Pakistan, he writes, "[s]he was the only soft country in South Asia which was prepared to be a substitute for the fulfillment of US designs in the Subcontinent."⁸ As Jain points out, though, India perceived that Pakistan was not genuinely "soft": "Pakistan never felt any danger from Communism and tricked a gullible America into giving her weapons which she wished to use against India only."⁹

For India, ideology was the pivotal means by which to argue its policy of non-alignment. "American military aid to Pakistan in the 1950's constituted the most serious US infringement of India's tangible, in this case security, interests. The New Delhi government, however, concentrated its protest against that move at the level of principle, rather than expediency—the 'no-war area' had been breached, rather than Indian security threatened."¹⁰

Indeed, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was ostensibly concerned with warning Pakistani Prime Minister Mohammad Ali of "the classical dangers of the loss of independence which followed any military alliance with a more powerful state."¹¹ This is clearly a Realist argument. As Stephen Walt argues in "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power," "[t]o ally *with* the dominant power means placing one's trust in its continued benevolence. The safer strategy is to join with those who cannot readily dominate their allies, in order to avoid being dominated by those who can."¹² While Nehru's view might appear to resemble that of a Realist, this does not mean that he was not committed to non-alignment. This is because Realism and non-alignment are not opposites; there are obviously overlaps between these two schools of thought as there are overlaps, similarities, and differences among nearly all ideologies.

Another reason that Nehru opposed American military aid is that he viewed it as another form of imperialism. This notion, too, finds support in Realist theory. As Hans Morgenthau writes, "[i]t follows from the nature of international politics that imperialistic policies resort practically always to ideological disguises, whereas status quo policies more frequently can be

⁷ Ibid. #5.

⁸ Jain, B.M. *South Asia, India, and the United States*, 22.

⁹ Jawaharlal Nehru, quoted by S.M. Burke, *Mainsprings of Indian and Pakistani Foreign Policies* (University of Minnesota Press, 1974), 143 in Jain, B.M. *South Asia, India, and US*, 23.

¹⁰ Ibid. #3, 344.

¹¹ Ibid. #3, 160.

¹² Walt, Stephen M. *Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power*, 5, in *International Security*, Spring 1983 (Vol. 9, No.4).

presented as what they actually are.”¹³ With the United States ending its support of India in favor of strategic considerations that facilitated a turn to Pakistan, based on the surface on ideological similarities, it appeared that America was looking for mere “puppets” that would allow it to further its own agenda in the region.

America *could* find such a “puppet” in Pakistan, or at least a power that was submissive enough to allow itself to be exposed to American values. Pakistani Realism, which approved of balance of power struggles rather than non-alignment, was able to accept American democratic principles on the surface. As pointed out above, America was looking to transplant democratic values abroad. India had already demonstrated that its own brand of secularism was a challenge to that of the United States; the logical alternative was Pakistan.

B. Relevance of Ideology to Kashmir

*“Kashmir crystallizes the fear, the mistrust and the bigotry that darken the subcontinent and provides a vehicle for enlarging them with modern political implications.” — Russell Brines, *The Indo-Pakistani Conflict**

As Sumit Ganguly argues in *The Origins of War in South Asia*, wars in this region occur when either nation feels its fundamental ideology threatened. As Pakistan was founded on the basis of its religious dissimilarity to India’s Hinduism, its religion is the fundamental ideology to which it can cling in standing up for its territorial integrity. India continued to emphasize the interpretation that South Asia has had a history of acceptance, while Pakistan continued to emphasize religious dichotomy. When one side threatens the fundamental ideologies of the other, problems ensue. Further, Pakistani policy since Independence was guided by the belief that India would forever try to realize the dream of a united Subcontinent, “as it had never accepted the ‘two nations’ concept.”¹⁴ Just as the United States and the USSR fought the Cold War internationally for survival, India and Pakistan both accepted a Realist struggle for power in the region.

In discussing the future of the Subcontinent in international affairs, Peter Lyon argues for the primacy of regional relations. With this in mind, he pinpoints the Kashmir issue as pivotal because it “continues to be regarded as unrequited irredenta by many Pakistanis”¹⁵ and because “past Indian governments dealing with Pakistan have been worried most of all when they see her made unnaturally strong by armaments supplied to her by other Powers.”¹⁶

¹³ Morgenthau, Hans J. *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 89, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, NY 1963.

¹⁴ Vertzberger, Yaacov Y. I. *China’s Southwestern Strategy*, 25. Praeger Publishers, New York, NY, 1985.

¹⁵ Lyon, Peter in *The Foreign Policies of the Powers*, 345; “Sources of Indian Foreign Policy.”

¹⁶ Ibid.

In explaining the struggle for Kashmir, while Pakistan emphasizes India's military and strategic advantage in justifying its dependence on the United States to "balance" powers in the Subcontinent, India claims that it is on the defensive. The reason for this is that India was ceded the Kashmir region by a ruler who was choosing between India and Pakistan.¹⁷ As such, Pakistani involvement in Kashmir would be understood in India as an invasion. The Indian argument, then, would oppose the involvement of outside powers that had nothing to do with Kashmiri sovereignty at the start, but which were now getting involved as they attempted to secure their own interests without care for the welfare of the Kashmiri people. Indeed, as India and Pakistan appeared close to war, Nehru believed that the US was siding with Pakistan and "blamed the war scare on American policies, claiming that US support for Pakistan encouraged its leaders' bellicosity."¹⁸

The end result was an introduction into South Asia of the Cold War, in direct violation of Nehru's exhortations against the military involvement of foreign forces in the Subcontinent. As India claimed non-alignment, Pakistan gradually allied itself militarily with the world's greatest superpower, the United States, in the hope that the world would support any power that is an obvious opponent to India's seemingly intransigent policy.

It appears that Kashmir is the present battleground for these ideologies. With the retention of this predominantly Muslim region, India can further prove to the democratic world that it is a truly secular state, protective and inclusive of its Muslim minorities. (In fact, Hyderabad is another majority-Muslim region in southern India and it co-exists relatively peacefully within the Indian republic.) With dominance in Kashmir, Pakistan can prove to the Islamic states of the Middle East and Bangladesh that religion has always been and always will be the foremost issue in determining alliances.

What are the stakes? It has been stipulated that Pakistan and Bangladesh had only Islam in common,¹⁹ but Bangladesh seceded from Pakistan. As this relationship with Bangladesh refutes Pakistan's own rationale for existence as a haven for all South Asian Muslims, Pakistan has little to lose ideologically. India, however, has everything to gain as it has an opportunity to replace its post-Independence image as a stubborn power²⁰—a necessity of her non-alignment and of the Cold War's extension to the Subcontinent—with one of a self-sufficient success story. By regaining control of Kashmir, India can prove that it has continued to shrug off foreign dependencies and has mastered a world of challenges alone. Moreover, India's weapons testing and its rejection of a nuclear test-ban treaty - under the

¹⁷ See pp, 43-44, below, "Instrument of Accession of Jammu and Kashmir," October 26, 1947 in *White Paper on Jammu and Kashmir*, 17-19, compiled in *Documents on the Foreign Relations of Pakistan: The Kashmir Question*, 58, edited by K. Sarwar Hasan.

¹⁸ McMahon, Robert J. *The Cold War on the Periphery*, 61, Columbia University Press, New York, NY, 1994.

¹⁹ Ganguly, Sumit *The Origin of Wars in South Asia*, 9-10.

²⁰ Heimsath, Charles. *A Diplomatic History of Modern India*, 59 Allied Publishers, New Delhi, India, 1971.

rationale that not only Western nations should be allowed to perform such tests – reinforce this revised image.

C. Ideologies in Theory

Traditional theories can be drawn upon to bring light to the conflict of ideologies involved in the decision to extend American military aid to Pakistan in 1954. As influential American statesmen were suspicious that India had the potential to officially accept Communism, theories that justify and refute this impression will be useful. Also, because India and Pakistan have each accepted or rejected Realism or Liberalism to some degree, the theoretical underpinnings of these decisions are telling.

Perhaps due to its experience with other Third World nations that struggled with Communism, America was wary of the extent to which India was influenced by Marxist ideology. In early 1951, governmental repression prevented Indian Communists from becoming powerful enough to be a serious threat to India's political stability.²¹ It was understood then, however, that if the Communists "concentrate on exploiting the unrest and discontent caused by India's unsettled economic and political conditions, they might rapidly acquire new support.... It seems possible that the militant phase could be revived and guerrilla activity be extended. Then, perhaps with external aid, Communism would offer a renewed threat to India."²²

In reviewing American containment of Communism, John Lewis Gaddis details the spread of the Cold War to "a competition for influence in the so-called Third, or Nonaligned, World."²³ This view is telling in that it illustrates a focused attempt to expand spheres of influence as part of the larger scheme of containing Communism, rather than an attempt to understand the particular brands of Communism in different countries and crafting individualized approaches.

Hans Morgenthau, on the other hand, argues that America should avoid viewing the Third World as nonaligned—synonymous with stubborn, difficult, and intransigent (as Communist governments have been labeled)—and instead calls for a "differentiated approach to communism" that considers individual Communist governments in light of their particular interests.²⁴ The advantage is that it prevents America from immediately allying itself with governments that are anti-Communist and also from needlessly alienating nations that are not readily hostile to its own interests. In furtherance of this approach, Morgenthau

²¹ *The Extent of Communist Penetration in India*, Department of State Office of Intelligence Research Report No. 5373, March 8, 1951.

²² *Ibid.*

²³ Gaddis, John Lewis in Kegley, Charles W., Jr. and Wittkopf, Eugene R. "Containment: Its Past and Future" in *Perspectives on American Foreign Policy*, 17.

²⁴ Morgenthau, Hans J. in Kegley, Charles W., Jr. and Wittkopf, Eugene R. "Defining the National Interest-Again: Old Superstitions, New Realities" in *Perspectives on American Foreign Policy*, 36.

identifies two flaws in American outright opposition to Third World Communism: first, it assumes a Communist monolith united in its opposition to American interests; and, second, it assumes a uniform reception in the Third World to “aggressive anti-American communism.”²⁵

Morgenthau also provides the Realist description of international politics in the Cold War that is often considered to be the most influential:²⁶ “All history shows that nations active in international politics are continuously preparing for, actively involved in, or recovering from organized violence in the form of war.”²⁷

In their model of complex interdependence, Keohane and Nye offer an explanation of international politics alternative to the Realist models commonly accepted by capitalist and Communist societies. They imply that a government that does not accept a Realist interpretation is not necessarily intransigent; it might simply recognize that factors other than an international struggle for a balance of power are most relevant in formulating policy. First, they set out to downplay the central role of the Realist explanation by describing their model of complex interdependence (which is often referred to as a Liberal model): there are multiple channels which connect societies, there is no hierarchy among issues because military security is not a dominant theme, and “military force is not used by governments toward other governments within the region, or on the issues.”²⁸

They also recognize that their model is an ideal one as is the Realist explanation. At times, the Realist model is useful in explaining international politics, but where it is limited this alternative explanation allows for a deeper understanding of international relations. The significance of Keohane’s and Nye’s model is that it opens our eyes to the ensuing possibilities of cooperation. We can deduce that if a government does not accept the capitalist and Communist struggle for a balance of power, it can nevertheless be a significant political body and should not simply be shrugged off as a nuisance.

But why should America allow India—a government that refuses to cooperate with it by remaining non-aligned—a voice in determining world affairs? According to Kenneth Waltz, it is natural for one state to arm itself against others. “Because some states may at any time use force, all states must be prepared to do so - or live at the mercy of their militarily more vigorous neighbor.”²⁹ Thus, alliance members naturally expect one another to provide access to their geographically-strategic positions; similarly, the United States would expect such

²⁵ Ibid., 38.

²⁶ Keohane, Robert O. and Nye, Joseph S. “Realism and Complex Interdependence” in Kegley, Charles W. Jr. and Wittkopf, Eugene R. *Perspectives on American Foreign Policy*, 119.

²⁷ Morgenthau, Hans J. *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* Alfred A. Knopf, New York, NY 1963.

²⁸ Ibid. #26, 121.

²⁹ Waltz, Kenneth N. “Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power” in *Neorealism and its Critics*, 98, Columbia University Press, 1986.

behavior if it were to ally with India. Luckily for India, there are other members of the non-aligned movement.

D. The Indian Ideological Twist

India has had a history of not associating with Western capitalist thinking. It has, nevertheless, also attempted to distance itself from the ideals of the Russian Revolution. It is the uniqueness of Indian ideology that has necessitated a policy of non-alignment.

Before Indian Independence, Western imperialism was viewed as irksome. The perceived opposite—socialism—was thus instinctively accepted. Over time, though, the ideals of the Indian national movement were understood as autonomous of the political thinking of both capitalism and Communism. As exploitation by the West was despised, so was Communism's use of violence. Especially opposed to this was Mahatma Gandhi, whose faith in non-violence made the Indian nationalist movement "confident of building a new set of political and economic institutions [that] would steer clear of the evils of both the systems and break new ideological ground for the future course of human progress."³⁰ Of course, these institutions would supposedly fare best in a society that is domestically secular (so that it fosters the interplay of ideas), while steering clear of external pressures to join the capitalist or Communist camp in tilting the scales of power struggles.

We see in Harbans Mukhia's *Marx on Pre-Colonial India* an assessment of India's preparedness for socialism. While accepting that Karl Marx prematurely accepted the idea of "the unchanging East,"³¹ Mukhia also notes Marx's determination that Indian land is used for a variety of reasons. At times, it is used for communal cultivation but usually each person owns and tills his own land.³² This would imply an agrarian India society ready for both some form of socialism as well as capitalism. Mukhia draws specific reference to Marx's take on Indian use of land:

Those small and extremely ancient Indian communities ... are based on possession in common of the land.... The constitution of these communities varies in different parts of India. In those of the simplest form, the land is tilled in common, and the produce divided among the members.³³

The Soviet revised understanding of the Indian position is instructive in that the Soviets realized their own faulty perception of India's ideological position. With the Soviets' worsening of ties with China and Pakistan, Moscow initially understood the Indian position

³⁰ Bandyopahyaya, J. *The Making of India's Foreign Policy*, 73, Allied Publishers, New Delhi, India, 1970.

³¹ Mukhia, Harbans "Marx on Pre-Colonial India: An Evaluation" in *Marxian Theory and the Third World*, 179, ed. by Diptendra Banerjee,

³² *Ibid.*, 182.

³³ Marx, Karl *Capital*, vol.1, 357 in "Marx on Pre-Colonial India: An Evaluation," *Marxian Theory and the Third World*, 183, ed. by Diptendra Banerjee and Harbans Mukhia.

as not unlike its own. Nevertheless, Soviet leaders were not blind to reality. After having intervened in the 1966 Tashkent Conference, their influence in South Asia had steadily grown, but “by the 1970s, no country in the region was any closer to making that transition to socialism.”³⁴ Perhaps part of the reason for this was India’s non-alignment policy and Pakistan’s increasing closeness to China, which opposed the Soviets.

Indeed, while India rejected Communism as a phenomenon of the Soviet and Chinese regimes, it did not reject socialism. Nehru admitted this acceptance in Indian society. In speaking against a rigid, constrained definition of socialism, he

look[ed] upon it as a growing, dynamic conception, as something which must fit in with the changing conditions of human life and activity in every country. I believe that socialism can be of many varieties.... What I want is that all individuals in India should have equal opportunities of growth, from birth upwards, and equal opportunities for work according to their capacity.³⁵

The important point is to distinguish between Communism and socialism, the former being a working-class revolt against capitalism but the latter representing a self-sufficient utopia. The United States Government also noted India’s distance from Soviet Communism: suggestions that the Indian Communists received guidance from Moscow Communists had been hinted, but “[t]here is ... little evidence that this is the case.”³⁶ Nevertheless, it often based its South Asian policy on the belief that India was ripe for Communism. (This will be more evident in the discussion on the influence of personalities, below.) While India rejected Communism, its own peculiar traditions fostered a unique combination of capitalism and socialism.

In order to preserve such a unique way of life, alliances with nations that valued different ideologies were frowned upon because they were not in the Indian interest. When the United States gave up its close relations with India on the basis of common democratic values alone, India had a further incentive to revert to its policy of nonalignment. Ideological differences with both capitalist and Communist nations necessitated a foreign policy objective of coexistence without alliances. Interestingly, this was the stance recommended by President George Washington as well in his Farewell Address:

[A] passionate attachment of one nation to another, produces a variety of evils. Sympathy for the favorite nation, facilitating the illusion of an

³⁴ Racioppi, Linda, 6, *Soviet Policy Towards South Asia Since 1970*, Cambridge University Press, New York, NY, 1994.

³⁵ Nehru, Jawaharlal *Away From Acquisitive Society: Speech to All-India Congress Committee, Indore, January 4, 1957* in *Jawaharlal Nehru’s Speeches, Vol. III, 1953-1957*, 52, Copyright by Publications Division, New Delhi, India, May 1983.

³⁶ *Evidences of External Direction of the Indian Communist Party*, Office of Intelligence and Research Report No. 5548, August 13, 1951.

imaginary common interest, in cases where no real common interest exists, and infusing into one the enmities of the other, betrays the former into a participation in the quarrels and wars of the latter, without adequate inducement or justification.... Such an attachment of a small or weak, towards a great and powerful nation, dooms the former to be the satellite of the latter.³⁷

E. Pakistani Realism

Pakistani ideology regarding regional and foreign policy stemmed from historic insecurity in a region used by invaders to enter the Subcontinent, from its suspicions of India's territorial intentions, from its founding ideology of Islam, and from India's claims to secularism and nonalignment.

Due to its strategic geographic location and continued reminders of this by India, Pakistan was suspicious of India's intentions. With the Middle East, the Soviet Union, India, and China on its borders, Pakistan stands at the mountain passes through which invaders have almost always entered the Subcontinent.³⁸ As Roderick Peattie illustrates, such a geographic position is inherently unsafe: "It is axiomatic that if several governments exist in one topographic basin or province, one government will absorb the other and the larger government will tend to grow until some barrier or definitive earth feature is reached."³⁹

Further, Pakistan has been reminded of the threat to its own territorial integrity by threatening words in India: "Geography and the mountain and the seas fashioned India as she is ... Economic circumstances and the insistent demands of international affairs make the unity of India still more necessary. The picture of India we have learnt to relish will remain in our minds and our hearts."⁴⁰

As Pakistani President Mohammad Ayub Khan pointed out, Pakistan's geographic position at that entrance to the Subcontinent which is usually opted for by invaders ought to make India favor a fortified Pakistan that checks invasions before they draw close to India. However, as Pakistan signed the Agreement of Cooperation with the United States in 1959 (guaranteeing US assistance in case of aggression to Pakistan), India demanded that such assistance "could not be used against India."⁴¹ As such, according to Khan, Pakistan would

³⁷ President George Washington in *Washington's Farewell Address to the People of the United States of America*, 9-10, Sept. 7, 1796, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, by A. Boyd Hamilton, State Printer, 1856.

³⁸ Khan, Mohammad Ayub "The Pakistan-American Alliance" in *Pakistan Perspective: A collection of Important Articles and Excerpts From Major Addresses by Mohammad Ayub Khan, President of Pakistan*.

³⁹ Peattie, Roderick, *Look to the Frontiers*, New York, Harper in Siddiqi, Aslam *Pakistan Seeks Security*, 16-17, Longmans, Green & Co. Ltd., 1960, Lahore, Pakistan.

⁴⁰ *The Statesman* (Delhi), June 14, 1947 All-India Congress Committee's June 3 Plan in Siddiqi, Aslam *Pakistan Seeks Security*, 17, Longmans, Green, & Co. Ltd. 1960 Lahore, Pakistan.

⁴¹ Nehru Speaking in the Indian Parliament, March 14, 1959 in Khan, Mohammad Ayub *Pakistan Perspective*, 18.

be deprived of help in case India attacks it. “There could not be a more illuminating commentary on India’s historic attitude toward Pakistan.”⁴²

Also, some Pakistani leaders paralleled Islamic ideals to American ideals of democracy.⁴³ President Mohammad Ayub Khan indicated his belief “that Allah, in His infinite mercy, created Pakistan to give the Muslims of these regions a homeland in which to mould (sic) their lives in accordance with the fundamental principles and the spirit of Islam.”⁴⁴ However, Safdar Mahmood wrote that it is generally accepted “that democracy has failed in Pakistan” allegedly because “Islam which is the sheet anchor of this country does not encourage democratic values.”⁴⁵ Further, he quotes Keith Callard writing in *Pakistan, A Political Study*: “Islam has not encouraged systematic opposition. The vision of good government possessed by many Muslims is that of a people united under a strong leader and confident in the possession of certain truth.”⁴⁶

In response to India’s claims to nonalignment, Pakistan needed to adopt an opposing ideology in order to continue the perception that Pakistan was different from India, and to therefore validate its original justification for existence. Particularly useful to this end was the emphasis on Islam whenever Pakistan needed to advance its security interest. As indicated above, for example, parallels were drawn between the ideology of Pakistani Islam and American democratic ideals when Pakistan sought American military aid. (By extension, religion is also the main proffered reason for which Pakistan has been fighting for control of Kashmir, which is also of strategic interest to it.)

Based on a history of foreign invasions into South Asia, suspicions of India’s intentions, claims to similarities between Islamic ideals and American ideals of democracy, and India’s claim to being a nonaligned, secular homeland for South Asians without regard to race, caste or creed, Pakistan adopted a Realist policy that would extend Cold War bipolarity to South Asia. As Kenneth Waltz argues in favor of a neo-Realist worldview, “[t]he threat of violence and the recurrent use of force are said to distinguish international from national affairs”⁴⁷ in that “[c]itizens need not prepare to defend themselves. Public agencies do that. A national system is not one of self-help. The international system is.”⁴⁸ Such a view would seem to favor international involvement in such a conflict as Kashmir in the form both of an

⁴² Khan, Mohammad Ayub “The Pakistan-American Alliance” in *Pakistan Perspective: A collection of Important Articles and Excerpts From Majors Addresses by Mohammad Ayub Khan, President of Pakistan*.

⁴³ Waltz, Kenneth N. “Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power” in *Neorealism and its Critics*, 100, Columbia University Press, 1986.

⁴⁴ Manifesto issued on the eve of the Presidential election in Pakistan, January 1965 in *Pakistan Perspective*, ix.

⁴⁵ Mahmood, Safdar, *A Political Study of Pakistan*, 150.

⁴⁶ Callard, Keith, *Pakistan, A Political Study*, London, 1968, G. Allen and Unwin, 125, in Mahmood, Safdar, *A Political Study of Pakistan*, 150.

⁴⁷ Waltz, Kenneth N. “Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power” in *Neorealism and its Critics*, 98, Columbia University Press, 1986.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 100.

extension of the Cold War to South Asia as well as the Pakistani acceptance of American military aid.

On the other hand, Siddiqi calls into question the actual need for Pakistani military assistance from the United States. After its independence, the first Pakistani security tie was the Agreement for Friendly Co-operation between Pakistan and Turkey,⁴⁹ which “allied Pakistan with the strongest country in the Middle East and one which could meet to a certain extent its requirements in arms and ammunition.”⁵⁰

Whether or not it was needed in Pakistan, American military aid illustrated Pakistan’s Realist acceptance of international power struggles.

II. AMERICAN MILITARY AID TO PAKISTAN IN 1954: THE HISTORICAL EVIDENCE

The Pakistani request for American military aid made history in 1954 when it was met with American acceptance. This specific extension of American military aid is best understood in the context of American military aid to India. Instrumental in determining Pakistan’s request and America’s acceptance were early impressions that American and Indian leaders developed of each other. Prior to, during, and after this request was made, the Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru spoke against such an involvement of foreign forces in the Indian Subcontinent. His vision of a future for the region was based on a combination of idealism and Realism, as well as on his own background as a native Kashmiri. And it is such a vision that influenced him in reacting to the invasion of Kashmir in 1947 and in deciding in favor of a *conditional* accession of Kashmir by India. With the seeming uncertainty in the latter decision, however, Pakistan could strengthen its argument in favor of acquiring this predominantly-Muslim province. Moreover, Pakistani policy regarding Kashmir and foreign military aid followed a decisively Realist approach, despite the Islamic ideals which it sought to exemplify domestically. Indian external policy, on the other hand, was based on a combination of both Realism (regionally) and idealism (globally) with a uniquely secular domestic counterpart, especially because Indian regional policy was largely determined by Nehru. It is the disparity between Indian and Pakistani bases of global policy that served to make Pakistan’s 1954 weapons procurement a bittersweet fact.

A. The Pakistani Request

First, we turn to Pakistan’s actual request to the United States for military aid. After looking at stated reasons for this aid, we will look at Pakistani interests that fostered a request for aid. We will note that such interests follow naturally from Pakistani ideology.

⁴⁹ Signed on April 2, 1954. Siddiqi, Aslam *Pakistan Seeks Security*, 103, Longmans, Green & Co. Ltd. 1960 Lahore, Pakistan.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

As early as 1951, Pakistani Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan requested assistance from former Foreign Secretary of Pakistan M. Ikramullah in obtaining American military aid to meet Pakistan's defense requirements.⁵¹ For his part, Ikramullah, in discussions with Assistant Secretary of State McGhee, made it clear that such military aid would not be used for internal security and also gave McGhee the impression that Pakistan did not need protection from outside aggression. He referred to a worsening of the situation in Kashmir, to "a hostile neighbor," and recalled Governor General Mohammad Ali Jinnah's prediction after the Subcontinent's 1947 Partition "that Pakistan would have to fight for Kashmir."⁵² Quite unmistakably, Ikramullah gave the impression that Pakistan would use American military aid to further its struggle, admittedly not internal, in Kashmir. Specifically, Ikramullah wanted a total of 320 tanks for Pakistan, of which 70 were already on order.⁵³

Pakistani Prime Minister Mohammad Ali in 1954 attempted to clarify the purpose of his nation's request for military aid: "Hitherto, Pakistan has striven to build up her defenses (sic) with her own unaided resources. But under rapidly changing requirements of modern warfare, the demands of adequate defense (sic) are . . . imposing an increasingly burdensome strain on the country's economy."⁵⁴ As such, Pakistan had to divert resources intended for economic development in favor of maintaining her political status — that is, regional security and the preservation of her Independence. Only after solving this defense dilemma, according to Mohammad Ali, would Pakistan "be able to devote its resources increasingly to the development of its human and material wealth"⁵⁵ because only then would it be "secure [in its] ideological and economic freedom."⁵⁶

Mohammad Ali also attempted to downplay any notion that Pakistani aggression might be furthered by American military aid: "It must be emphasized that the decision to obtain military aid from the United States is not aimed against any country whatsoever. Pakistan has never entertained, and does not entertain, any aggressive intentions."⁵⁷

By contrast, as Dan Haendel pointed out in observing Pakistan's raising of the Kashmir issue at a March 1956 SEATO meeting in Karachi, such behavior demonstrated that Pakistan had entered into an "alliance with the US primarily in order to arm itself against India and to

⁵¹ Footnote in "Memorandum of conversation between Assistant Secretary of State McGhee and M. Ikramullah, former Foreign Secretary of Pakistan, 18 October 1951 (Extract)" in Jain, B.M. *South Asia, India, and the United States*, v.2, 68.

⁵² Ibid. (of document), 69.

⁵³ "Memorandum of conversation between M. Ikramullah, and Donald M. Kennedy, Director, and T. Eliot Weil, Deputy Director of the Office of South Asian Affairs (SOA), 18 October 1951 (Extract)" in Jain, B.M. *South Asia, India, and the United States*, v.2, 69.

⁵⁴ Statement by Prime Minister Mohammad Ali, February 25, 1954 (Extract), in Jain, B.M. *South Asia, India, and the United States*, 91-2.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 92.

⁵⁶ Prime Minister Mohammad Ali in *Dawn*, March 27, 1954, 1, attached to *Foreign Service Despatch 617* from Karachi to US Department of State.

⁵⁷ Ibid. #3.

secure its support over Kashmir.”⁵⁸ Even Ali himself hinted at not simply defending Pakistan against Indian encroachments, but actually needing Kashmir to be a whole. “Pakistan came into being as a result of the struggle of the Muslims of this [Subcontinent] for the establishment of an independent homeland in which they may be able to lead their lives in accordance with the ideals of Islam. That struggle is not yet over. Kashmir was and continues to be an essential part of the concept of Pakistan.”⁵⁹

To understand why Pakistan was so determined to fortify its military defense with outside help at this time, we must look to the historic and ideological interest in safeguarding the territorial integrity of Pakistan. According to Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan in 1950, the last thing that the people of Pakistan will agree to would be that “the slightest dent should be made in the territorial integrity of their country.”⁶⁰ Since Independence, the perception has existed in Pakistan that India would not give up its attempts to reunite the Subcontinent. Further, with the grounds for Pakistan’s existence as a nation resting on the perceived threat to Muslims by a Hindu majority, any strategic maneuver by India would naturally be closely monitored by Pakistan.

Another Pakistani interest that is relevant in explaining the 1954 request for military aid is the preservation of Pakistani culture. In arguing for economic aid for Pakistan in 1950 (relevant here due to Mohammad Ali’s claim that economic advancement is the ultimate goal of receiving military aid from the United States), Liaquat Ali Khan clarified what he believed to be foreign misconceptions of Pakistani Islamic culture before describing what the United States had in common with his nation: “The phrase ‘Islamic way of life’ has on many occasions been ... misconstrued ... as religious intolerance, theocratic rule, return to mediaevalism (sic) and so on.”⁶¹ A theocracy, however, was not intended, as “we abhor the idea of applying any religious or cultural coercion to our non-Muslim nationals.”⁶² This made Pakistan appear to be an all-accepting society, an idea certain to appeal to a secular United States.

Further, Liaquat Ali Khan paralleled American ideals of democracy to Pakistan’s domestic ideals based on Islam. For example, he claimed that Pakistan fostered the Islamic belief of private ownership to promote economic equilibrium and advance human welfare generally. In referring to an American marble tablet in Pakistan which read, “Except the lord build the house, they labour in vain that build it”, he stated that Pakistani ideology similarly meant a belief in democracy: fundamental human rights, private ownership, the people’s right to be governed by representatives whom they vote into office themselves, equal citizenship for all,

⁵⁸ Haendel, Dan *The Process of Priority Formulations: US Foreign Policy in the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971* (Colorado, 1977), 29 in Jain, B.M. *South Asia, India and US*, 37.

⁵⁹ Mohammad Ali’s speech delivered in the Constituent Assembly on October 7, 1953, as it appeared in the Pakistani newspaper *Dawn*, “Full Text of PM’s Speech.”

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 11.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁶² *Ibid.*

equal opportunity, equality before the law.⁶³ These ideals, however, cannot be realized without economic aid—without “resources at the greatest possible speed. For this we need your goodwill and cooperation.”⁶⁴ Similarly, American *military* aid to Pakistan’s Army, Navy, and Air Force in 1954 might have improved Pakistan’s economic dilemma, as we imply from Mohammad Ali’s link between economic success and military aid.

B. The American Response

Certainly, as B.M. Jain points out, “President Eisenhower’s decision to furnish military aid to Pakistan in February 1954 created a ‘new situation’ in South Asia.”⁶⁵ Ideologically, though, it was quite consistent with the events surrounding it.

The American response to this request for military aid varied. For example, Chester Bowles, US Ambassador to India, discussed “creeping militarism” in the context of the debate over whether to send military aid to Pakistan. He defined the former as “the process by which our foreign policy is determined in bits and pieces by decisions which are largely based on military thinking which ignores the political, economic, and social forces which are shaping tomorrow’s world.”⁶⁶ Bowles traced patterns of military strength in the region, relying on an argument in Sir Olaf Caroe’s “Wells of Power.” During colonial times, as Caroe understood it, the stability of the area depended on British diplomacy, the British Navy, and the Indian Army. After the British left India, Nehru neutralized the Indian Army by declaring India’s non-involvement. “[H]ence . . . a substitute must be found, and Pakistan was the most likely possibility.”⁶⁷ Bowles warned, though, that “[t]he proposed arms agreement with Pakistan, far from furthering our national objectives in the Middle East and South Asia, will add dangerously to the grave instability that already exists there”⁶⁸ because India would react unfavorably to a military program to build up the Pakistani Army that might be used against it. After America agreed to extend military aid to Pakistan, Senator Fullbright made a similar observation, concluding in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that America “should have been extremely careful in our relations with” India and Pakistan.⁶⁹

Further, in National Security Council paper NSC 5409, we find the United States still thinking of South Asia in terms of the international struggle against Communism. This document lists American interests in the region: “Seek greater participation of Pakistan in a common front against communism . . . seek to insure that in the event of general war

⁶³ Ibid., 32-33. Mohammad Ali’s Town Hall speech of May 8, 1950.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 33.

⁶⁵ Jain, B.M. *South Asia, India, and US*, 22.

⁶⁶ Letter of Chester Bowles, US Ambassador to India, to Secretary of State Dulles and his comments on the origin of US military aid programme to Pakistan, December 23, 1953 (Extracts) in Jain, B.M. *South Asia, India, and the United States*, 84.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 85-6.

⁶⁹ *Congressional Record* (US), v. 100 (1954), 2481 in Sinha, Janki, *Pakistan and the Indo-US Relations (1947-1958)*, 122.

Pakistan will make available manpower, resources and strategic facilities for mutual defense effort with the West . . . give special consideration to Pakistan in providing military assistance.”⁷⁰ This theme of allying with powers that did not welcome Communism exists in many American foreign policy documents of the time. It is this preoccupation which led Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to say as a side note in his address on his visit to the Subcontinent that “[t]he strong spiritual faith and martial spirit of the people [Pakistanis] make them a dependable bulwark against communism.”⁷¹ Military assistance would ally America with Pakistan, ensuring that potential Communist activities that are “spearheading an agrarian revolt which could well be led into revolutionary channels and shake the stability”⁷² of the regime be thwarted.

Meanwhile, the United States officially made it clear that the use of military weapons for non-defensive—that is, aggressive—purposes would not be tolerated. It accepted “assurances on the part of the recipient country that it will not use such aid for aggressive purposes.”⁷³ Instead, Eisenhower indicated “an improvement in Pakistan’s defensive capabilities will serve the defensive interests of the Middle East. It is for this reason that our aid will be given.”⁷⁴ As Secretary of State John Foster Dulles points out, the President indicated that America ought to emphasize its willingness to extend similar military aid to India as well, in order to allay the latter’s fears that the US was uniting with Pakistan against it.⁷⁵

With America preoccupied with creating a united front against Communism and with assurances by Mohammad Ali, the United States was ready to respond to Pakistan’s request in the affirmative. This is codified in the “US-Pakistan Mutual Defense (sic) Agreement”: “The Government of the United States will make available to the Government of Pakistan such equipment, materials, services or other assistance ... as may be agreed.... The two Governments will, from time to time, negotiate detailed arrangements necessary to carry out the provisions”⁷⁶ of military aid.

Further, the “US-Pakistan joint communiqué on defense (sic) support aid to Pakistan” gives us a basis for understanding the American military aid to Pakistan. First, expecting an American preoccupation with Communism, we are surprised to find an official admission that the United States has indeed recognized that regional complexities should be and have

⁷⁰ NSC 5409: “United States Policy Toward South Asia,” February 19, 1954 (Extracts) in Jain, B.M. *South Asia, India, and the United States*, v.2, 89.

⁷¹ “Address by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles on his visit to India and Pakistan, 1 June 1953 (Extract),” in Jain, B.M. *South Asia, India, and the United States*, v.2, 77.

⁷² *Communist Activity of Pakistan*, Department of State Office of Intelligence Research Report No. 5356, National Security Archives R & A Report No. 5356.

⁷³ “Department of State Press Release on the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement with Pakistan,” 18 May 1954 in Jain, B.M. *South Asia, India, and the United States*, v.2, 95.

⁷⁴ “‘Ike’ Informs Mr. Nehru of Decision To Arm Pakistan,” *The Times of India*, February 26, 1954, 1.

⁷⁵ Dulles, John Foster *Memorandum of Conversation with the President*.

⁷⁶ “US-Pakistan Mutual Defence Agreement, 19 May 1954,” in Jain, v.2, 97.

been considered in America's military aid to Pakistan. Next, we see that American aid is being extended in response to a perceived economic need in Pakistan. For this, "the United States Government will make available to Pakistan in the current fiscal year [1954] about \$105 million in economic aid, part ... in the form of loans" for "technical assistance, flood relief ... and funds for developmental purposes."⁷⁷ The belief was that the main reason for Pakistan's request for military aid was to help its economy. This funding was intended to aid the economy directly, to get at the root of the problem.

Especially convincing is the fact that "[t]he poverty of the region and the developmental problems associated with the societies tend to make them dependent on American largesse. Nowhere in the region is there a sustained threat that may allow for an unacceptable gain for the adversary."⁷⁸ Not only was Pakistan free of Communism, it could also serve as a perfect puppet state advancing American democratic ideals through Pakistani Islam. In fact, according to Dulles, an injection of American culture would be appropriate: "The area is too vast to depend upon just a military line. You have to build on something which is far more important than that, which is along the tradition of religion and culture."⁷⁹

Further, regarding military aid itself, "the United States will endeavor to accelerate the substantial military aid programs for Pakistan, which are beginning this year.... [T]he United States cannot make commitments beyond the limits of existing and current appropriations."⁸⁰ Through the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, the United States had launched in 1954 its military assistance program to Pakistan.⁸¹ The specific amounts of military aid would be specified later, at times when Pakistan appeared to need specific military aid. This is seen, for example, in the January 11, 1955 "US-Pakistan agreement on US aid under Chapter 3—Defense Support—of Title I in the Mutual Security Act of 1951." In Article II, \$60 Million was made available for Pakistan in military aid until June 30, 1955, of which \$20 Million would be loans.⁸² In the period 1954-1965, arms to Pakistan totaled \$3 to \$4 billion.⁸³

C. 1954 Military Aid In Context

The nature of America's military aid to Pakistan at this time understandably caused panic on the Indian side, as it did even on the Pakistani side. America and India agreed in 1950 to

⁷⁷ "US-Pakistan joint communiqué on defence support aid to Pakistan," 21 October 1954 (Extracts), in Jain, B.M. *South Asia, India, and the United States*, v.2, 102-3.

⁷⁸ Joshi, Manoj in *New Perspectives on America and South Asia*, 32.

⁷⁹ *Mutual Security Act of 1953*, H.R. 5710, 83rd Congress, 1st Session, 96.

⁸⁰ "US-Pakistan joint communiqué on defence support aid to Pakistan," 21 October 1954 (Extracts), in Jain, v.2, "US-Pakistan joint communiqué on defence support aid to Pakistan," 21 October 1954 (Extracts), 103.

⁸¹ Jain, B.M. *South Asia, India and United States*, 114.

⁸² "US-Pakistan agreement on US aid under Chapter 3 - Defence Support - of Title I in the Mutual Security Act of 1951, 11 January 1955 (Extracts)," in Jain, B.M. *South Asia, India, and the United States*, 104-5.

⁸³ Jain, B.M., *South Asia, India and United States*, 38.

send India weapons “to foster international peace and security” and “maintain its internal security, its legitimate self-defense of the area of which it is a Part, [so long as it does] not undertake any act of aggression against any other state.”⁸⁴ In light of the fact that almost the exact same words were used for Pakistan in its agreement with America at the same time,⁸⁵ the proclaimed American support for India seems meaningless (especially in view of the scant military aid actually sent).

Several years later, as the United States considered sending Pakistan military aid, it took its time in specifying the details of the 1954 “US-Pakistan Mutual Defense Agreement.” Meanwhile, it came to be understood that America would gain “the right to establish military bases and station troops on [Pakistani] territory, and Eastern Pakistan and the North-Western province are to be special strategic areas.”⁸⁶ Further, Pakistan would receive from the United States 200 million dollars; it would ultimately buy 400 tanks and 700 planes from the United States, of which 150 would be jet-planes.⁸⁷ The program would be a grant-aid military program, to which the United States would contribute a “force basis.”⁸⁸ Meanwhile, in weighing the repercussions of military aid to Pakistan, the United States understood that such aid would further indicate to India a policy of “favoritism” to Pakistan on the issue of Kashmir, “(b) lead to a dangerous increase in Pakistan’s military strength; and (c) sooner or later involve establishment of US bases in Pakistan.”⁸⁹

It should be understood that India, too, was receiving American military aid at this time. Still, Pakistan was the primary recipient of American military aid through the 1950s and until around 1962.⁹⁰ The distinction of Indian military aid from military aid to Pakistan lay in the use of military bases in Pakistan. Aid to South Asia was not new, so long as South Asian nations controlled this aid. The American military aid to Pakistan was not simply aid; it was an alliance. This guaranteed the presence of America in South Asian affairs. Of course, wherever America went the containment of Communism was the primary objective, particularly in light of China’s renewed militarism in response to America’s “hostile bases.”⁹¹

As Nehru proclaimed and attempted to extend the “no-war” zone from India’s borders to include the entire Subcontinent, India would be wary of threats to its desire to keep the Cold

⁸⁴ “US-Pakistan Mutual Defence (sic) Assistance Agreement effected by exchange of notes on 29 November and 15 December 1950 (entered into force on 15 November 1950),” 177 in Jain, B.M. *South Asia, India, and the United States*, v.1.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, v.2, 43.

⁸⁶ O. Orestov, “Why Are Pakistan’s Neighbours Alarmed?” as understood from talks between Pakistan’s Governor-General Ghulam Mohammad and Eisenhower and Dulles in *The Hindustan Standard*, 4, Jan. 4, 1954.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸⁸ *The Mutual Security Act of 1954*, 455.

⁸⁹ *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954*, Volume XI, Africa and South Asia (in two parts), v.I, 1842.

⁹⁰ B.M. Jain *South Asia, India, and the United States*, 22-23, Jaipur, India, 1987.

⁹¹ Heimsath, Charles and Mansingh, Surjit, *A Diplomatic History of Modern India*, 354.

War out of South Asia.⁹² In this light, India's National Council of the Party's Joint Secretary believed that the 1954 US-Pakistan alliance was an American attempt to establish and fortify bases around the Soviet Union.⁹³ The Council believed that that this alliance would involve the region "in great power conflict and eventually in war."⁹⁴ Further, it would prevent the development of a "third force" that was neither capitalist nor Communist. With this in mind, Nehru did not want to involve India with American military aid at all. In response to Eisenhower's offer to India to request military aid from America, Nehru decided to forego the opportunity. This was probably because India's nonalignment clashed with "[a] program of United States military grants-in-aid . . . [which] would mean the return of colonialism to the Indian [S]ubcontinent in a new form, and would bring the hatreds of the '[C]old [W]ar.'"⁹⁵ Also, Nehru believed that India would buy arms when she needed them and from where she could find them, instead of relying on the supplies of one particular power.

In our struggle for independence, we never thought of foreign aid and we never asked for it. We carried on in our own peaceful way and ultimately made good. The only way we can preserve the freedom of India through crises or difficulties, in peace or war, is by holding on to the ideals and the methods which we learnt during our struggle for independence.⁹⁶

America's alliance was all the more threatening because it followed on the heels of the Turko-Pakistan pact, which called for defensive collaboration between the two nations.⁹⁷

The fact that India was receiving military aid from the United States at all, however, in Pakistan made Nehru's condemnation of American military aid to Pakistan seem hypocritical. "India, while campaigning bitterly against proposed American arms aid to neighboring (sic) Pakistan, has been quietly purchasing a substantial amount of modern military equipment in the U.S."⁹⁸ As McMahon points out, Brigadier General William T. Sexton disappointed Mohammad Ayub Khan by indicating that the U.S. intended to give Pakistan less than \$30 million in the first year of aid. Not only had he expected about \$200-\$300 million, but he was also hoping for funds that "could be spent as he declared appropriate rather than funds restricted exclusively to equipment and training support."⁹⁹ Instead, this aid was more of a military alliance in the interest of America's desire to surround the Soviet Union. The US could thereby check the spread of Communism into South Asia and balance Communist influence in the region. This is indicated by a vague

⁹² Limaye, Satu P. in *U.S.-Indian Relations*, 6, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1993.

⁹³ *Two Years of PSP*, 131, Bombay in Sinha, Janki, *Pakistan and the Indo-US Relations (1947-1958)*, 121.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

⁹⁵ "Eisenhower Offer of Military Help Spurned by Nehru," *New York Times*, 1, March 1, 1954.

⁹⁶ "Pak-U.S. Pact Will Bring War Right To India's Door: An Anti-Asian Step," *Hindusthan Standard*, pp.1,4, Jan. 4, 1954.

⁹⁷ "Turko-Pakistan pact signed," *The Civil & Military Gazette*, April 3, 1954,1.

⁹⁸ "India Bags War Weapons From U.S.: Supply Mission Busy Bolstering Military Power of Country," *The Civil & Military Gazette*, February 25, 1954, 1.

⁹⁹ McMahon, Robert J. *The Cold War on the Periphery*, 192.

American commitment (no dollar values attached) after the 1954 agreement to send military aid to Pakistan.¹⁰⁰ This vague commitment thereby left the door open for India to interpret American aid to Pakistan in whatever way it wished, though there were already indications that America would establish its own military bases in Pakistan.

This ideological mission on the part of America spread a Realist worldview to Pakistan. Whether or not Pakistan indeed planned to use such aid in Kashmir, a breach in ideologies was symbolic in this instance. As Ali believed, “[t]he matter which now holds up further progress with the settlement of the Kashmir dispute is the construction that the Bharati¹⁰¹ Prime Minister has put on Pakistan’s decision to receive military aid from [the] USA.”¹⁰² This indicates either his belief that Nehru was thinking only in terms of power struggles, but was not being conciliatory, or that Nehru was simply not accepting an international power struggle and was therefore not cooperating. Pakistan’s *The Civil-Military Gazette* indicates the belief that some diplomatic failures result from “Mr. Nehru’s refusal to take [a] ‘realistic’ attitude towards the problems facing the region.”¹⁰³

Nehru, however, completely rejected foreign involvement. For him, the only power struggles were those among the nations of South Asia. As such, this misunderstanding prevented progress, as is indicated in the letters between him and Ali:

Nehru: “It has always been . . . my fervent hope that India and Pakistan . . . would keep out of the war approach. . . . Pakistan, by rejecting this course, completely lines up with one of the great power blocs. The effect of this is that she becomes a pre-determined party as well as a theatre, base or arsenal . . . in the present conflicts or in a possible war.”¹⁰⁴ For this reason, he called for a “No-War Declaration.”

Ali: “I am puzzled by your statement that by seeking to strengthen its defenses (sic) by outside military aid Pakistan has decided on a war approach instead of a peaceful approach to the solution of Indo-Pak differences. It seems to me extraordinary that steps taken by a country to strengthen its defenses (sic) should be considered steps not in the direction of peace, since

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., 185.

¹⁰¹ Hindi term meaning Indian.

¹⁰² “No Pak-Bharati Friendship Unless Kashmir Dispute Settled,” *Morning News*, Karachi, Pakistan, April 20, 1954. Enclosure to Karachi’s *Despatch 69 of April 24, 1954*.

¹⁰³ “Nehru Isolated on Pakistan Resolution Condemning ‘Israel’: Columbo Conference Fails,” in *The Civil-Military Gazette*, May 1, 1954, 1.

¹⁰⁴ *Letter Dated the 13th April 1954 from Prime Minister, India to Prime Minister, Pakistan, in Kashmir: Meetings and Correspondences*, New Delhi, 86.

weakness inevitably invites aggression, but in the direction of war. . . . A mere 'No-War Declaration' . . . could serve no useful purpose.”¹⁰⁵

D. Early Encounters

*“Political Realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature.” — Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace**¹⁰⁶

American strategic policy in South Asia has been historically limited, in large part due to the Subcontinent's Dominion status until 1947. Thereafter, American perceptions of India and vice versa were shaped primarily by interactions among Indian and American leaders.¹⁰⁷ This was a product of a limited tradition of US-Indian relations, the framing of relations around ideology, and “free presses and public platforms” in both democracies.

Particularly, speakers from both nations at United Nations conferences appeared to be ideological contenders rather than collaborators working for a common purpose. As Charles Heimsath and Surjit Mansingh detail, “[t]he major Indo-US involvement in the 1950's resulted from the participation of both states in the global ideological disputations of the post-Second World War period, each as the leading spokesman for its respective ideological grouping.”¹⁰⁸

Such people as Indian Prime Minister Nehru and Indian representative Krishna Menon, as well as the impressions they made on people such as US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, Dean Acheson, Richard Nixon, and President Eisenhower and vice versa primarily determined each nation's perception of the intentions and ideological stances of the other. For example, Menon did not fit the hyped-up American expectation of an Indian as thoughtful, passive, and relaxed. He came across as “sardonic, vigorous, prone to outbursts of passion, and [someone who] never lost his fox-like alertness.”¹⁰⁹ Further, Dulles made a poor impression with Indians by stating that “[i]n India, Soviet Communism exercises a strong influence through the interim Hindu government.”¹¹⁰ Dulles dominated the new Republican Administration's foreign policy with an “overt hostility to uncommitted nations ... offer[ing] full military assistance to those who were prepared to acquiesce in US global

¹⁰⁵ Letter Dated the 14th July, 1953, from Prime Minister, Pakistan to Prime Minister, India in Kashmir: *Meetings and Correspondences*, Karachi, 91.

¹⁰⁶ Morgenthau, Hans J. *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 4

¹⁰⁷ Heimsath, Charles H. and Mansingh, Surjit. *A Diplomatic History of Modern India*, 344. Allied Publishers Private Limited, Bombay, India, 1971.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ Heimsath, Charles H. and Mansingh, Surjit. *A Diplomatic History of Modern India*, Footnote 1 to p.345 on 362. Allied Publishers Private Limited, Bombay, India, 1971.

¹¹⁰ *New York Herald Tribune*, Jan. 18, 1947 in Heimsath, Charles H. and Mansingh, Surjit. *A Diplomatic History of Modern India*, Footnote 1 to p.345 on 362. Allied Publishers Private Limited, Bombay, India, 1971.

strategy of building a ‘cordon sanitaire’ against communism in different regions of the world.”¹¹¹ Also, Acheson proved his limited understanding of the Subcontinent, when he reportedly told an author that America in the 1950s “was ‘blind’ to happenings in south Asia, being preoccupied with Europe and the [F]ar [E]ast.”¹¹² Acheson also found Nehru difficult to deal with and was offended by Nehru’s criticisms of the US.¹¹³ In addition, Vice President Nixon after a visit to South Asia recommended American military aid to Pakistan to counter India’s “confirmed neutralism.”¹¹⁴ Indeed, he was instrumental in convincing the Pentagon and the State Department to include Pakistan in military links through SEATO and CENTO.¹¹⁵ Just as some later administrations overtly called New Delhi “Leftist” and pro-Soviet, India too came to believe that American policies were anti-Indian and aggressive.¹¹⁶

Further, due to the limited sources on which to draw to make impressions of the other government, the informed populaces of both nations were each guided by their own government’s impression “that the other state represented an opposing ideological posture.”¹¹⁷ This facilitated a popular view that these two governments’ ideologies were dissimilar, despite the opinions of many who believed that Indian and American foreign policy objectives were alike and only the means of carrying them out differed.¹¹⁸ Of course, because of different means leaders from both nations would be reluctant in cooperating with corresponding leaders of the other nation of whose ideologies they did not approve. The result was an Indian impression of America as “the current embodiment of Western power, progress, and personal aggressiveness, while Americans transferred their images of non-Western economic backwardness, social inefficiency, and pathetic but dignified mass humanity from China to India.”¹¹⁹

E. Nehru’s View

The historical significance of Pakistan’s military aid procurement from the United States must be understood on a regional level. When the United States agreed to aid Pakistan militarily in 1954, this represented the first intrusion through military means into South Asian affairs since the 1947 Independence of India and Pakistan. And the issue of Kashmir has been considered to be directly affected by this military aid. Indeed, according to Jayantanuja Bandyopadhyaya, Kashmir “is the single most important factor which brought

¹¹¹ Jain, B.M. *South Asia, India and the United States*, 36.

¹¹² *Ibid.* #109.

¹¹³ *Ibid.* #109.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.* #111, 37.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.* #111, 39.

¹¹⁷ Heimsath, Charles H. and Mansingh, Surjit. *A Diplomatic History of Modern India*, 345. Allied Publishers Private Limited, Bombay, India, 1971.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.* #117, 343-4.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.* #117.

about the [C]old [W]ar to the Indian [S]ubcontinent.”¹²⁰ With the Pakistani request for weapons came an extension of the debate over whether foreign military powers should be allowed into the South Asian sphere.

In the Kashmir dispute, Nehru emphasized Indian secularism (as reflective of his domestic idealism), which followed from a policy of non-alignment (as reflective of his regional realism). First, the traditional Indian stance on non-alignment finds its voice in Nehru. Speaking before the Indian Congress’ upper-house, Nehru said of American aid: “We welcome it, although we have made it always clear that we cannot accept any help to which any string is tied or any conditions are attached.”¹²¹ Indian nonalignment was meant to be an indication that India did not want to be another pawn in the international chess game between American capitalism and Soviet Communism. Instead, India preferred to be a model for the Western world by relying on acceptance of differences in domestic relations, and by employing diplomacy, rather than military might exclusively, in foreign relations. (This is one reason that Pakistan could not accept nonalignment for too long.)

Further, India’s nonalignment in the foreign sphere related to her secularist stance in the domestic sphere. Nehru explained how India’s traditional secularism made her different:

[E]specially in Europe, you will find, in the past intolerance and persecution . . . But in India, in olden time there was almost full tolerance.... The slight conflict between Hinduism and Buddhism was nothing compared to the violent conflicts of religious sects in the West.... [W]e have had religious and communal troubles recently, and some people, ignorant of history, imagine that this has been India’s fate right through the ages. This is wholly wrong.¹²²

It is this belief that Indian secularism was unique in that it had historically been acceptance in practice, not just in name, that convinced Nehru that the Cold War should be kept out of South Asia. The Cold War did not originate in South Asia; so, why should South Asian nations want to allow it to spread within their own borders? With this logic, Nehru blasted Pakistan’s decision to ally with the United States, arguing that it would further make the Kashmir issue explosive, as it has since indeed become.

Nehru also specifically opposed the Pakistani request for military aid from the United States in 1954. “[I]f something affects Asia, India especially, and ... in our opinion, is a reversal of history after hundreds of years, are we to remain silent? We have thought in terms of freeing our countries, and one of the symbols of freedom has been the withdrawal of foreign armed

¹²⁰ Bandyopadhyaya, Jayantanuja, *The Making of India’s Foreign Policy: Determinants, Institutions, Processes and Personalities*. p.233, Allied Publishers Private Limited, 1970, Bombay, India.

¹²¹ *Nehru’s statement in Rajya Sabha, 24 December 1953* in Jain, v.1, 200.

¹²² Nehru, Jawaharlal’s *Glimpses of World History* in Khilnani, 112.

forces.”¹²³ Any return of foreign armed forces would therefore be a reversal of history. While the American acceptance of the Pakistani request might sound well-intentioned, the situation in South Asia at the time of the request would not, according to Nehru, require Pakistan to be on the defensive. The only “situation” in which Pakistan was involved was Kashmir, where it was on the offensive. Of course, Nehru saw this immediately because he understood the context in which the United States offered this aid. “Now it is in the context of this rejection of our proposal for a No-War declaration [by Pakistan] that we have to view this military aid from the United States to Pakistan.”¹²⁴

Also, the perceived threat to India seemed only worse with the fact that India and Pakistan had fought each other in the past. If there had been no armed conflicts in the past, the present military aid procurement might not be as relevant to Indian security. However, “if two countries have actually been conducting military operations against each other in the past and are in a state of truce, military aid to either of them is an act unfriendly to the other and not in keeping with neutrality.”¹²⁵ But as Pakistan claimed to *need* military aid, it could naturally not accept non-alignment. In this light, the aggravation of tensions in Kashmir was inevitable.

Nehru hinted that Pakistan’s Prime Minister Mohammad Ali would indeed use this aid to deal with the Kashmir problem.¹²⁶ According to Nehru, “[t]his is an indication of the way his mind works and how he thinks this military aid might be utilized (sic). Military aid is only utilized (sic) in war or in a threat of war.”¹²⁷ This statement is significant for several reasons. First, Mohammad Ali had already claimed that “the decision to obtain military aid from the United States is not aimed against any country whatsoever,”¹²⁸ although by using America’s military aid in Kashmir Pakistan would obviously be using it against India (even though some Pakistanis believed that Kashmir ought to have belonged to Pakistan to begin with). Second, with Nehru’s belief that Pakistan had no reason to be defensive, the United States’ military aid to Pakistan was ostensibly being used to prepare for a war with India over Kashmir. Third, it proved Nehru’s point (and the point of U.S. Ambassador to India, Chester Bowles) that foreign military involvement in South Asian affairs would aggravate regional tensions.

F. Nehru on Kashmir

¹²³ Nehru, Jawaharlal in “Military Aid to Pakistan,” *Jawaharlal Nehru’s Speeches 1953-1957*, v.3, 345. India’s No-War declaration requested that Pakistan not use US aid in its dealings with India; Pakistan rejected this request.

¹²⁴ Nehru’s statement in Lok Sabha, 1 March 1954 in Jain, B.M. *South Asia, India and the United States*, v.1, 203.

¹²⁵ “Letter of the Prime Minister of India addressed to the Prime Minister of Pakistan, 5 March 1954”, in *The Kashmir Question*, edited by K. Sarwar Hasan, 353.

¹²⁶ Ibid. #124.

¹²⁷ Ibid. #124, 203-4.

¹²⁸ Statement by Prime Minister Mohammad Ali Jinnah, February 25, 1954 (Extract), in Jain, B.M. *South Asia, India and the United States*, 92.

Let us take a look at Nehru's own interest in Kashmir. Without emphasizing this point, we should be aware that Nehru was a Kashmiri. He details his fascination with that which he believes to be traditionally Indian. In writing to Gandhi, he romanticizes India's majestic mountains:

The sight of this outline against the sky (the Himalayas), and now their summits and sides are covered with fresh snow, have meant a great deal to me. They seem to rouse in me ancient memories of the long age when perhaps my ancestors wandered about the mountains of Kashmir and played in their snow and glaciers.¹²⁹

In a broadcast from New Delhi on November 2, 1947, Nehru defended India's handling of the Kashmir dispute by first narrating the dispute itself. Once again romanticizing Kashmir, he stated that the Pakistani "raiders from outside, well-armed and well-equipped ... have sacked and looted the towns and villages and put many of the inhabitants to the sword. Frightfulness descended upon this lovely and peaceful country and the beautiful city of Srinagar was on the verge of destruction."¹³⁰

In this way, Nehru appeared to be the defender of Kashmir, at a time when Kashmir indeed needed articulate leaders. And Nehru's defense of all Kashmiris fit well with India's secularism. Upon realizing that communal violence in the form of raids across the Pakistan border in the province of Jammu resulted in the killing of Muslims, Nehru articulated that India has in the past "condemn[ed] evil whoever might have committed it,"¹³¹ thus condemning in this instance the Hindus and Sikhs that might have been responsible. This attitude is a testament to Gandhi's lasting legacy and of India's brand of secularism - the ability to take sides on the basis of nothing except Truth, even when condemning one's own actions.

G. The Accession of Kashmir

As raiders entered Kashmir on October 24, 1947, Kashmir State forces could not stop them and people of all religious backgrounds fled. In reaction, Kashmir requested both accession to and military help from India. According to Nehru, the request for accession came from both the Maharaja's Government as well as from Sheikh Abdullah,¹³² the popular leader of most Kashmiris. As Maharaja of Kashmir Hari Singh wrote in October 27, 1947, "[I]n the exercise of my sovereignty in and over [Jammu and Kashmir].... I hereby declare that I

¹²⁹ Chakraborty, Amulya Kumar, *Jawaharlal Nehru's Writings*. From Nehru's letter to Gandhi dated August 13, 1934, Anand Bhavan, Allahabad, India.

¹³⁰ *Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches, 1946-1949*, 156. Broadcast from New Delhi, November 2, 1947.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, 157.

¹³² *Ibid.*, 158.

accede to the Dominion of India.”¹³³ In requesting Lord Mountbatten’s approval of this, Hari Singh described the emergency state of affairs leading him “*no option* but to ask for help from the Indian Dominion” which “[n]aturally they cannot...[do] without my State acceding to the Dominion of India. I have accordingly decided to do so.”¹³⁴ Moreover, he would establish an interim government and “ask Sheikh Abdullah to carry the responsibilities in this emergency with [his] Prime Minister.” But why would Sheikh Abdullah collaborate with Hari Singh in the new government? Although Sheikh Abdullah had been sent to prison for his “Free Kashmir” activities against Hari Singh, perhaps the two were united in wanting to avoid the destruction of their shared homeland; in any case, as stated above, Hari Singh really felt he had no option.

Sheikh Abdullah, for his part, might have preferred the lesser of two evils – join India in the short-term to limit mayhem and carnage, and focus on Kashmiri independence in the long-term. He declared that he and the National Conference never believed in the two-nation theory based on religion, nor in communal hatred.¹³⁵ “We realized that Pakistan would not allow us any time, that we had either to suffer the fate of our kith and kin of Muzaffarabad, Baramula, Srinagar and other towns and villages, or to seek help from some outside authority....Under those circumstances, both the Maharaja and the people of Kashmir requested the Government of India to accept our accession.”¹³⁶ Moreover, Sheikh Abdullah did not feel that Pakistan’s subsequent insistence on a plebiscite was genuine, as it had shrugged off his Free Kashmir movement only years before. He pointed out that Pakistan had also rejected a conditional offer by the Kashmiri people to join Pakistan and then hold a plebiscite, on the basis that Pakistan felt that it could easily conquer the entire state of Jammu and Kashmir without the need to agree to this. On the contrary, Abdullah found Nehru’s conditional acceptance to be telling, as India did not need to offer Kashmir this concession in light of the latter’s exigent circumstances.¹³⁷

Nehru’s response was typical of his Realism and idealism (accept a struggle for power regionally, but revert to secularism domestically): “We decided to accept this accession ... but we made a condition that the accession would have to be considered by the people of Kashmir later when peace and order were established. We were anxious not to finalize (sic) anything in a moment of crisis and without the fullest opportunity being given to the people of Kashmir to have their say. It was for them ultimately to decide.”¹³⁸ In accepting Kashmir, he behaved in a Realist manner (allowing individual states to affect the balance of power),

¹³³ “Instrument of Accession of Jammu and Kashmir,” October 26, 1947 in *White Paper on Jammu and Kashmir*, 17-19, compiled in *Documents on the Foreign Relations of Pakistan: The Kashmir Question*, 58, edited by K. Sarwar Hasan.

¹³⁴ Emphasis added. Letter from Maharaja Hari Singh to Lord Mountbatten on the eve of Pak invasion on J&K in 1947.

¹³⁵ Excerpts of the speech by Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah in the UN Security Council Meeting No. 241 held on 5 February 1948. <http://www.jammu-kashmir.com/documents/abdulun48.html>.

¹³⁶ Ibid.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ Jawaharlal Nehru’s Speeches, 1946-1949, 158. Broadcast from New Delhi, November 2, 1947.

while in calling for a plebiscite he showed his idealist belief in the right of people to elect their own representatives. Ultimately, India never accepted a UN plebiscite because such “peace and order” was never established, i.e., the invaders never left. To wit, UN Resolution 47 recommended that in order to implement a plebiscite, Pakistan should withdraw all tribesmen and nationals and India should keep only minimal troops needed to maintain civil order.¹³⁹ However, Pakistan ignored this, continued fighting and retained control of the region it had gained. On this basis, India thereafter refused to allow the plebiscite.¹⁴⁰ This stance is consistent with the prevailing understanding: in accepting Hari Singh’s accession to India, Lord Mountbatten clarified that “it is my Government’s wish that, as soon as law and order have been restored in Kashmir *and its soil cleared of the invader*, the question of the State’s accession should be settled by a reference to the people (emphasis added).”¹⁴¹

This compromise between idealism and Realism of the Indian accession is also codified in the Indian Constitution:

Article 370(1)(b) the power of Parliament to make laws for the said State shall be limited to (i) those matters in the Union List and the Concurrent List which ... are declared by the President to correspond to matters specified in the Instrument of Accession governing the matters with respect to which the Dominion Legislature may make laws for that State; and (ii) such other matters in the said List as ... the President may by order specify.¹⁴²

These clauses are interesting in that they limit the domain of the Indian central government, while nonetheless legitimizing Indian control.

What exactly did Nehru mean by a call to self-determination? Apparently, he saw a decision by the Kashmiri people as providing the official recognition required by the international community. This is perhaps the main incentive for his insistence that a referendum be held under United Nations supervision. Under UN auspices, the entire world would see that India was the accepted leader in regional affairs and Indian secularism the accepted interpretation of South Asian history.

Nehru’s unique role is understood by looking at his view on Indian interests with regard to Kashmir in the region:

We were, of course, vitally interested in the decision that the State would take. Kashmir, because of her geographical position, with her frontiers with

¹³⁹ *UN Security Council Resolution 47*, April 21, 1948, adopted under Chapter 6 and thus non-binding.

¹⁴⁰ Wikipedia.org, *United Nations Security Council Resolution 47*.

¹⁴¹ Emphasis added. *Reply from Lord Mountbatten to Maharaja Hari Singh*, http://www.kashmir-information.com/LegalDocs/Maharaja_letter.html.

¹⁴² “Article 370 of the Constitution of India Defining the Status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir” in *Documents on the Foreign Relations of Pakistan: The Kashmir Question*, 408, edited by K. Sarwar Hasan.

three countries, namely, the Soviet Union, China and Afghanistan, is intimately connected with the security and international contacts of India. Economically also, Kashmir is intimately related with India. The caravan trade routes from Central Asia to India pass through Kashmir State.”¹⁴³

However, when the Maharaja of Kashmir Hari Singh, backed by Sheikh Abdullah, actually offered Kashmir to India unconditionally, Nehru showed his commitment to a combination of idealism and Realism. He was mainly responsible for insisting that the accession of Kashmir to India would be conditional in nature; i.e., he would accept Kashmir now but would require a vote by Kashmiris on the fate of their state once law and order was restored and the invader had left. Nehru argued that the people of Kashmir should decide their own future without duress. It is this conditional character of the accession that Pakistan has always emphasized at the U.N. and which has been India’s main weakness in its claim to Kashmir.¹⁴⁴ However, as Bandyopadhyaya writes, the Realism of Nehru’s approach is that the Kashmiris’ wishes had been already ascertained because Sheikh Abdullah, President of the Kashmir National Conference and the undisputed leader of the Kashmir Muslims, ultimately decided to accede it to India. The decision was hasty only because of the Pakistani aggression.¹⁴⁵ If we accept this argument, then no referendum is needed. The idealist side of Nehru’s approach can be seen in his words in the Constituent Assembly in March 1948: “Our making a reference on this issue to the Security Council of the United Nations was an act of faith, because we believe in the progressive realization of a world order and a world government.”¹⁴⁶ He was, however, confident that Sheikh Abdullah’s decision to accede to India indicated that the Kashmiri people had already decided in favor of a future in the Indian Union because he was the popular leader. It would seem that Nehru’s own unique role was involved in determining Kashmir’s status at the time of accession as well as since that time.

H. Further Strife in Kashmir

With no administration left in the Kashmir capital of Srinagar, Sheikh Abdullah symbolically combined ranks with Muslim, Hindu, and Sikh volunteers to maintain order against “the ruthless invader who was destroying their country and trying to compel them by terrorism to join Pakistan.”¹⁴⁷ Per Abdullah, “I had thought all along that the world had got rid of Hitlers and Goebbels, but, from what has happened and what is happening in my poor country, I

¹⁴³ Nehru’s speech in the Constituent Assembly on November 25, 1947 in *India’s Foreign Policy*, 443, in Jayantanuja Bandyopadhyaya, *The Making of India’s Foreign Policy: Determinants, Institutions, Processes and Personalities*, 234, Allied Publishes Private Limited, 1970, Bombay, India.

¹⁴⁴ Jayantanuja Bandyopadhyaya, *The Making of India’s Foreign Policy: Determinants, Institutions, Processes and Personalities*, 234, Allied Publishes Private Limited, 1970, Bombay, India, 235.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 235-6.

¹⁴⁶ *India’s Foreign Policy*, 451.

¹⁴⁷ Nehru’s speech in the Constituent Assembly on November 2, 1947 in *India’s Foreign Policy*, 159, in Jayantanuja Bandyopadhyaya, *The Making of India’s Foreign Policy: Determinants, Institutions, Processes and Personalities*, Allied Publishes Private Limited, 1970, Bombay, India..

am convinced that they have only transmigrated their souls into Pakistan...” With this background, the decision by the Maharaja of Kashmir to make Sheikh Abdullah the administration leader at this point symbolized “the struggle in Kashmir [as] a struggle of the people of Kashmir under popular leadership against the invader. Our troops are there to help in this struggle, and as soon as Kashmir is free from the invader, our troops will have no further necessity to remain there and the fate of Kashmir will be left in the hands of the people of Kashmir.”¹⁴⁸

In late October 1947, people from Pakistan invaded Kashmir. As Nehru points out, it was clear at that time that this invasion was “not only encouraged and patronized but actively supported by the Pakistan Government.”¹⁴⁹ It was later hinted that the Pakistani Army actively participated as well. However, the Pakistani Government at first gainsaid it “aggressively, loudly, and persistently”¹⁵⁰ for nearly ten months. On the basis of this, the Pakistani admission to this later on indicates a record of deception. According to Nehru, all proceedings addressed to the UN Security Council regarding Kashmiri sovereignty “should be viewed from that aspect.”¹⁵¹ Indeed, any discussion of a conflict in Kashmir should be based on “the fundamental factor ... [of] the aggression of Pakistan on Indian Union territory; secondly, the denial of the fact of that aggression; thirdly, the present admission of that fact.”¹⁵²

I. The Pakistani Reaction

On the other side of the ideological debate, America and Pakistan have used Realist approaches to explain shows of force through military action. As Paul Viotti summarizes in *International Relations Theory*, “[p]ower ... is a key concept. To the Realist, military security or strategic issues are sometimes referred to as **high politics**, whereas economic and social issues are viewed by many of them as the more mundane, less important **low politics**.”¹⁵³ These definitions are important in understanding how America and Pakistan viewed India’s emphasis on secularism, an “economic and social”, as opposed to “strategic,” issue.

Understandably, Pakistan could not accept Indian secularism because its chief proponent was Mahatma Gandhi, a Hindu. The new Islamic nation tried to polarize herself from a Hindu India in order to ensure that the world saw Pakistan as a haven for Muslims from repressive Hindus. In Liaquat Ali Khan’s speech to the U.S. Senate on May 4, 1950, he stated that “Pakistan was founded by the indomitable will of a hundred million Muslims who felt that they were a nation too numerous and too distinct to be relegated forever to the

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.,160.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.,191. A speech in the Constituent Assembly (Legislative), New Delhi, September 7, 1948.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁵¹ Ibid.,196.

¹⁵² Ibid.

¹⁵³ Viotti, Paul, *International Relations Theory*, 7.

unalterable position of a political minority.”¹⁵⁴ These Muslims were convinced that their already-poor economic position would likely worsen.¹⁵⁵ This is one reason that Pakistan sought alliances with the West, in defiance of Nehru’s urging of a nonaligned policy. With such backing, Pakistan could enforce its platform on the Kashmir issue, an issue that represented a boiling point for opposing beliefs.

In addition, Pakistan’s understanding of global policy was based on Realism. Nehru was a Realist regionally, but an idealist globally. Pakistan refused to accept his idealism globally, opting instead for a Realist approach. This is the source of one reason that Pakistani Prime Minister Mohammad Ali further attacked Nehru’s non-alignment model of global policy. Nehru recognized that the two superpowers’ blocs were balanced and that a weaker power that leads small nations could therefore be decisive in shifting the scales. “That is what Nehru wants. By holding the balance of power, he wants to dominate the two great power blocs.”¹⁵⁶ Therefore, another power that threatened India’s ability to lead smaller nations will weaken “Nehru’s bargaining position. . . . That is why he is against an agreement for military aid between America and Pakistan.”¹⁵⁷

Historically, the superpowers have disliked India’s policy of nonalignment because for them it represents a “policy of standing up for the weak and the oppressed in various continents, [which is not] to the liking of the great Powers who directly or indirectly share in their exploitation.”¹⁵⁸ And the superpowers’ dissatisfaction with India means a window of opportunity for Pakistan.

Simply put, Nehru attempted to reunite the Subcontinent at least ideologically. By claiming nonalignment and secular policies for all of South Asia, the hope was that India and Pakistan would resolve their problems without outside interference and through an application of Nehru’s own brand of realism and idealism (as is evidenced in his handling of problems in Kashmir and Kashmir’s accession to India). Pakistan could not accept this without being wary of Indian attempts to reunite the Subcontinent territorially as well as symbolically. The constant fear of Hindu reprisals and worldwide recognition of India as the major power in the Subcontinent prevented a Pakistan intent on having its own voice in South Asian affairs from joining India. Instead, Although it was founded as a haven for South Asian Muslims, Pakistan now claims to be a secular country because that is what its Cold War democratic allies, such as the United States, have wanted to believe. Meanwhile, Pakistan’s adoption of a Realist stance in external affairs resulted from a greater sensitivity than India to its own

¹⁵⁴ Khan, Liaquat Ali, *Pakistan: The Heart of Asia*, 4-5.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 10. May 4, 1950 address to the National Press Club in Washington, DC.

¹⁵⁶ “Interview of Prime Minister Mohammad Ali with Joseph Fromm, Middle East Regional Editor of *U.S. News & World Report*, 15 January 1954 (Extracts),” in Jain, B.M. *South Asia, India and the United States*, v.2, 87.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 213. Speech in the Constituent Assembly (Legislative), New Delhi, March 8, 1948, in reply to two ‘cut’ motions moved by Prof. Ranga and Seth Govinddas.

territorial integrity, and a concomitant need for Western military aid in Kashmir. This facilitated a Pakistani move closer to a military alliance with the United States in 1954 and set the stage for Pakistan's subsequent procurement of weapons.

III. CONCLUSIONS

We have sought in this paper to understand the American extension of military aid to Pakistan in 1954 in the context of that era. Fortunately, the ideological record at that time was well-preserved, thus affording us the opportunity to contextualize those conditions. The American preoccupation with containing Communism coupled with an understanding of world politics that was limited to Realist explanations and balance of power struggles. Indian nonalignment coupled with a tradition of socialistic and capitalistic ways of life in agricultural lifestyles. Meanwhile, Pakistani concern for territorial integrity allowed it to accept Realism in dealing with the world outside of South Asia, with the hope that it could introduce Realism into the Subcontinent in order to relax its regional concern for strategic appropriateness.

In the final analysis, Pakistan's success in importing Realism (and military weapons) into the Subcontinent was facilitated by the ideological debate that both made India's nonalignment appear to be an intransigent policy and cast doubt on India as an ally in the crusade against Communism. The struggle in Kashmir has been and remains a reminder of the interplay of the conflicting stances of parties to this debate. Moreover, given the historical conditions that continue to guide these stances, the fact of the present struggle over Kashmir is inevitable. Future attempts to craft a solution to this struggle should bear this in mind, especially as the world remains hopeful that elections will legitimately evince the Kashmiri people's own will. Rather than proposing solutions that are subtly inimical to one party or another's interests, feasible plans should require either negotiations among all relevant parties or a concerted tilting of the scales to end the current stalemate in one party's favor. Talks among leaders have produced no substantial agreeable answers, and elections within Kashmir are frequently criticized as corrupt and tainted. The Independence of Bangladesh appeared to affirm India's position in the stalemate, as it gained Bangladesh as a new ally. Yet, there is still no end to the problem. Why?

If a person is told something repeatedly, since childhood, he believes it. Despite the potential for dissent on a particular issue, a country's leaders too can be convinced to guide their nation's policies in a manner consistent with ideas which that nation and its people have grown to believe. Perhaps this is the reason that both India and Pakistan have been relentless with regard to Kashmir.

Yet hope should not be lost for enlightenment. Just as American leaders once realized that slavery was wrong *and* implemented these beliefs, so too incisive thinking can pierce through such temporal claims as that Pakistan is a haven for all Muslims of South Asia (including those of Kashmir) or that India is a nonaligned, secular nation that is truly open to all faiths. More important than these political stances is the havoc wreaked on the peaceful people of

Kashmir, havoc that has forced mass exodus of Hindus fearful of Pakistani occupation forces, havoc that has devastated the Kashmiri landscape and has debilitated the tourism industry that is a pillar of the Kashmiri economy.

As far as continued terrorism on the part of Pakistan in Kashmir is concerned, this in no way fuels the idea that Pakistan is the legitimate guardian of Kashmiri interests. Rather, it only helps India's case, which is further advanced by elections in Kashmir that brought the National Conference Party and Sheikh Abdullah's son, Dr. Farooq Abdullah, to power to lead Kashmir to peace and stability. On the other hand, elections might not do any good if all parties do not agree that they are untainted and legitimate.

It is only when both India and Pakistan *simultaneously* demonstrate that they care enough about Kashmir to respect the rights of its inhabitants that solutions to these problems will follow naturally. Until then, Kashmir will continue to be a product of Indo-Pakistani mistrust and rivalry. Because both India and Pakistan have been guilty of human rights violations, both have a long way to go before they can prove to the world that they truly deserve the respect of the Kashmiris. Perhaps the way forward is for both India and Pakistan to finally put to rest competing claims and allow a United Nations mission to monitor elections in Kashmir so that there is no question as to the people's will, even if this means that neither nation prevails. Indeed, the outcome could even determine that Kashmir is ready to become an independent nation. Of course, this would require each side to withdraw most of its troops, an unlikely scenario.

APPENDIX: Armies of India and Pakistan (as indicated in Mutual Security Program of 1954)

	<u>India</u>	<u>Pakistan</u>
Total strength:	425,000	185,000
Major units:	6 infantry	8 infantry
	1 armed division	2 armed brigades
	1 armed brigade	1 infantry brigade
	9 infantry brigades	6 artillery regiments
	1 infantry brigade group	
	1 parachute brigade group	
	1 armed cavalry regiment	
	3 artillery regiments	
	2 cavalry regiments	
	22 infantry battalions	